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PART ONE 
THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER 
HFIVE": AN ANALYTIC COMPARISON 
by 
L. Hart Wright 
CHAPTER I 
AN OVERVIEW: REQUISITE ADMINISTRATIVE 
FRAMEWORKS 
1.1 Introduction: Why the volume was written 
Tax administrators in well developed countries rarely have 
either occasion or opportunity to compare experiences or ex­
change opinions regarding procedures and practices utilized in 
administering complicated tax laws. Moreover, there is little 
comparative literature on the subject. Even the tax institutes 
which are internationally oriented usually focus on substantive 
tax principles, not procedures and practices. Hopefully, there­
fore, administrators in highly developed countries will find 
useful this analytic comparison of practices and procedures 
through which six of their number resolve disputable income 
tax questions -administratively and judicially. 
Concern for tax administrators in well developed countries, 
however, was not the prime motivation for this study. The 
initial conception grew out of the belief that administrators in 
countries just now developing would find especially useful an 
analytic comparison of diverse functioning models which had 
evolved out of long experience. Since these now developing 
countries differ from one another on many counts, it was im­
perative that there be equally wide dissimilarity among the 
several experienced countries selected as models. Thus, the 
choice of Belgium, France, West Germany, Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, and the United States. These countries differ in 
their size and population, the complexity and precision of their 
tax statutes, the degree their legislative bodies provide addi­
tional guidance through pre-enactment materials, the assess­
ment system used (self- versus non-self-assessment systems), 
the standards of construction to which their courts traditionally 
conform, the theoretical status assigned by each to the doctrine 
of precedent, and the types of persons available to handle tax 
disputes-both within and without the government. Consequently, 
it was possible to determine whether such basic differences 
were relevant or irrelevant when choosing, from among the 
alternative functioning models, the structural arrangement and 
practices most appropriate for each level involved in the con­
flict resolution process. Also, the analytic comparison contained 
3 
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in the first four chapters should enable any given country to 
determine the extent to which diverse parts of different wholes 
are adaptable to its situation. 
The third purpose of this study is a byproduct of the first 
two. Practitioners engaged in international tax practice may 
gain a useful insight into the conflict resolution process fol­
lowed in each of the six countries covered. 
1.2 RelationshiP of procedural goals to organization 
Enactment even of a semi-complex income tax statute is 
bound to generate substantial uncertainty and a host of disputes. 
Uncertainty and disputes alike need to be dealt with in a timely 
fashion, uniformly but efficiently and conveniently to taxpayers, 
through impartial determinations of high quality. 
These objectives cannot be achieved through spontaneous 
self-generation. Nor can they be achieved in a vacuum. 
Achievement-if it does take place-must come through the acts 
or non-acts of people, operating in the first instance within 
some administrative framework. Since the aims themselves 
ultimately conflict with each other, the likelihood they can be 
achieved in proper balance is affected inevitably by the manner 
in which the relevant parts of the administration are organized. 
In other words, once an administrative organization comes into 
being, the die tends to be cast regarding the relative degree 
of emphasis each such goal actually will enjoy. Consequently, 
the administrator should consider first those diverse goals, not 
organizational structures. Only after balancing the goals so 
they fit together properly-due account being taken of the per­
sonnel available to implement them-is he in a position to con­
sider the implementing structure. In short, the "mix" of 
balanced goals should fix the shape of the administrative struc­
ture, not vice versa. 
1.3 Sequence of this volume 
The wide range of considerations relevant to the accom­
plishment of that first step (reconciling the goals) and the 
impact the resulting mix should have on the details of ad minis­
trative organization, procedures, and practices, are examined 
by Chapters II and III in the course of analytically comparing 
the experience of the six countries. A comparable but self­
contained analytical comparison of the judicial machinery these 
countries use in resolving income tax disputes then follows in 
the concluding Chapter IV of this PART. Succeeding PARTS 
TWO through SIX then describe, on a country-by-country basis, 
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the five European models (Belgium, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, and the Netherlands). These PARTS provide the basis 
for the analytical comparison to u.s. experience contained in 
this PART. Because PART ONE weaves a description of U.S. 
practices and procedures into its comparative study of all six 
countries, only its general sequence, not its topic headings, 
conform to the common outline to which the five European 
authors were requested to adhere in the subsequent PARTS. 
The ultimate choices which a country must make in estab­
lishing administrative machinery to deal with disputable tax 
questions are no more difficult than those involved in setting 
up judicial machinery. As between the two, however, there is 
far greater variation at the administrative level in the relevant 
functions to be performed. Thus this level, viewed en toto, 
tends to become substantially more complex than the other. 
Because of this peculiar complexity at the administrative level, 
this introductory chapter is designed (i) to put briefly in over­
all perspective the main outlines of the administrative struc­
ture, described in Chapters IT and ITI, which were evolved from 
the previously mentioned goals, and {ii) to identify at least the 
primary problems of practice and procedure with which each 
of the major components of that structure, and those two 
chapters, must grapple.! This overview is accomplished by 
focusing separately on the three central themes upon which 
the relevant parts of the administrative structure should be 
organized. 
1.4 First central theme: A centralized interpretative program 
Whatever the inherent conflict otherwise existing between 
the previously described goals, not one can be effectively im­
plemented in the absence of the first organizational require­
ment: specifically, a tax administration's National Office should 
establish at that same top level an active interpretative pro­
gram for the benefit of lower echelons. A few specialists 
concentrated there can produce interpretations of a high quality 
which otherwise thousands of less qualified field officials would 
need individually to work out for themselves with consequent 
prejudice both to uniformity and overall efficiency. 
1 Readers interested in detailed treatment of any of the matters 
specifically referred to in this Chapter should consult the table of 
contents. 
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The first problem is whether these interpretative direc­
tives should be made accessible to taxpayers through publica­
tion. True, such a policy would create many administrative 
problems. Illustrative-but only illustrative-are questions per­
taining to reliability, the right to make retroactive changes 
or indeed prospective changes, to say nothing of inherent dif­
ficulties associated with the requisite painstaking draftsman­
ship. But on the affirmative side, publication will contribute 
to uniformity even in so-called non-self-assessment countries. 
Further, it will help assure proper application of these direc­
tives by the field forces. Only through publication can this 
process receive assistance from an adversary-a taxpayer. For 
only then will he have a firm basis on which to question the 
way in which a given local official applies a directive to his 
own situation. Finally, publication will minimize uncertainty. 
Because these interpretations are centrally evolved, at the least 
they should have the stature of reliable advance warnings re­
garding the contours of an administration's litigation policy. 
Of course, all interpretative difficulties can never be an­
ticipated as of that point in time immediately following enact­
ment of a new statute. Consequently, for the National Office 
to sustain its control over interpretative policy to the previ­
ously cited ends, it must promulgate, in addition to an initial 
set of interpretative instructions or regulations, ad hoc rulings 
as new questions arise. Many of the difficulties this policy 
-.vould create are similar to those associated with publication 
of any initial set of directives. Distinctive here, however, is 
the problem of providing the "ivory tower" at the National 
Office with an effective early warning system, capable of alert­
ing it in a timely fashion to the really significant newly emerg­
ing practical issues. The most effective device of this type 
actually depends on catering directly to taxpayer self-interest. 
The National Office can guarantee receipt of such warning if 
it establishes the practice of ruling in advance on the proposed 
transactions of individual taxpayers. While this practice also 
produces many administrative headaches to which detailed 
procedures must be responsive, it simultaneously satisfies a 
further significant and worthwhile aim: dispelling uncertain­
ties for which the tax system itself is otherwise responsible. 
Not one of the European countries covered here fosters 
major programs involving every one of these different types of 
interpretative efforts. Britain does the least,2 though actually 
2 See Chap. XVII infra . 
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it has the most complex statute of the Five. Normally, on 
enactment of a new statute, it does not publish an initial set 
of interpretative regulations, thereafter does not rule on pro­
posed transactions, and as new issues emerge typically does 
not publish rulings thereon. However, by foresaking goals 
which, when viewed in long-run perspective, seem basic to 
wise tax administration, Britain has avoided the raft of diffi­
culties experienced by the United States, the country which 
does the most in this area, and which maintains every one of 
the foregoing types of interpretative programs. For purposes 
of this overall view, only the two prime difficulties the United 
States has encountered need be mentioned. 
The first involves certain inherent conflicts. Previously 
it was said that, given the doubts and volume of disputes 
stemming from a complex tax statute, the consequent goals (to 
deal with these doubts in a uniform, timely, efficient, impar­
tial, and sophisticated manner) actually united to support es­
tablishment of a centrally administered interpretative program. 
Within such a program, however, are certain inherent and 
difficult-to-resolve conflicts. For example, in trying to pro­
mulgate an initial set of interpretative instructions, it is not 
easy to strike the right balance between timeliness, complete­
ness, technical accuracy, understandability, and efficiency (in 
the sense of avoiding undue expenditure of talented manpower). 
As is indicated in Chapter II infra, however, adoption of cer­
tain procedures and practices will tend at least to provide a 
reasonable degree of assurance that each competing aim will 
enjoy the stress appropriate to it. 
Another inherent conflict exists between that part of a 
program designed to neutralize uncertainty in individual cases­
through a private ruling on a taxpayer's proposed transaction­
and that part designed to achieve uniformity through publication 
of rulings. As to the former, speed is essential, for con­
summation of any given taxpayer's proposed transaction cannot 
be long postponed. Equally indispensable in the case of pub­
lished rulings, however, is the exact opposite -painstaking care 
or absolute technical accuracy-for published rulings fix the 
nationwide stance of the government, not just the tax conse­
quences of an isolated taxpayer's proposed transaction. Here 
again the difficulty lies in devising procedures and practices 
which at least tend to assure that each goal (speed v. quality) 
will receive that degree of stress appropriate to the purpose 
to be served. 
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The second major problem is to sustain on a continuing 
basis the requisite emphasis on each aspect of such a multi­
sided interpretative program. Interpretative directives long 
delayed guarantee an interim marked by uncertainty, lack of 
uniformity, inefficient use of field forces, or all three. Main­
taining an interpretative program at an adequate level, how­
ever, can be prejudiced all too easily by a competing pressure 
on administrators. For example, a national office official, re­
sponsible for manning the typically under-staffed assessment 
function's "firing line," is concerned with putting out today's 
brush fires. Moreover, he knows that this kind of productivity 
is measurable day by day and man by man. That official 
would be under tremendous pressure not to allocate on an ade­
quate sustaining basis the talented manpower-i.e., the "think 
time"-required to develop interpretations which will be wholly 
useless until completed. Also prejudicial is the fact that even 
then their exact net utility, however large, can not be recorded 
in terms of a precise monetarily expressed plus on his pro­
ductivity charts. One possible remedial step-which simul­
taneously will further the goal of impartiality-is to assign 
responsibility for the interpretative function to senior officials 
who work outside the enforcement function-as in France3 and 
the United States. Chapter TI indicates other arrangements 
and procedures which likewise can contribute to the first of 
these two ends. 
1.5 Second central theme: Decentralization of the enforcement 
function 
A second structural requirement involves a high decen­
tralization of the enforcement function itself, with local ad­
ministrative offices resolving the bulk of all actual disputes. 
These two activities-enforcement and dispute-resolution-are 
certain to engage a large number of personnel, which decen­
tralization will spread widely across the nation. In conse­
quence, this arrangement would make unachievable the goal of 
uniformity if not complemented by the previously described 
centrally administered interpretative program. 
Even then, the first and most serious problem is to main­
tain-among such a large and decentralized staff-a sufficiently 
high level of competence to do the work properly.4 However, 
3 See Chap. IX infra. 
4 The character, and its relevance, of non-governmental tax prac­
titioners is considered in Chap. IV, §4.9 infra. 
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the overriding imperatives of efficiency and taxpayer conven­
ience lead to an inescapable conclusion. Decentralization is 
so essential that the administration itself simply must assume 
the added burden of providing, through in-service training, the 
requisite professional understanding to otherwise educated per­
sons. Even among the six highly developed countries covered 
here, the educational systems do not produce the particular 
type of specialists needed. Moreover, persons most suited to 
the task all too often-though with variations from country to 
country-are not available for government employment at this 
level in anything like a sufficient number. In consequence, 
each of the Six, having decentralized its enforcement function 
among offices numbering from 100 in the Netherlands to 1700 
in France,5 has instituted some type of in-service training 
program. 
Of the Six, Belgium does the least. 6 Most inspectors in 
its local offices came into the system at a lower level, on the 
basis of an examination taken after completing secondary edu­
cation. Their subsequent professional development, insofar as 
government bears the cost, involves little more than a planned 
program of on-the-job training. They must carry out on their 
own time the contemplated study of tax law, regulations, etc. 
The most extensive government sponsored training pro­
grams among the European countries are carried on by France 7 
and the Netherlands.S After passing a general qualifying ex­
amination, applicants for the job of inspector or assessor are 
subsidized during the period required to complete work on a 
law degree. In France, the applicant previously must have 
started work on this degree. His two-year training program 
at the National School for Taxes is arranged so that he can 
complete the degree requirements. The Netherlands' subsidy 
covers all university work leading to a Master's Degree in 
tax law and theory. Both countries require that the subsidy 
be returned should the applicant fail to stay with the govern­
ment for a certain number of years. Both also provide sub­
stantial in-service classroom courses for the employee-rank 
5 see § 1. 4 in Chaps. V , IX, Xill , XVII, and XXI infra. The u.s., 
while maintaining only 58 district offices, subdivides them into ap­
proximately 800 posts of duty. 
6 See Chap. V, § 1.5 infra. But cf. Great Britain, Chap. XVII, 
§ 1 .5 infra. 
7 See Chap. IX, § 1 . 5 infra. 
8 see Chap. XXI, § 1. 5  infra. 
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immediately below inspector or assessor. As to these, Germany 
does likewise, with the classroom course there extending over 
nine months. 9 Its assessors, however, typically are employed 
only after they have graduated from a university, usually with 
a law degree. These men then have three months of special­
ized training at the Federal Finance College, interspersed with 
on-the-job training. 
The United States differs from the three European coun­
tries just mentioned. Its chief reservoir for the revenue agent 
class is made up of college graduates who majored in account­
ing.10 However, during their first two years of employment, 
in addition to carefully supervised on-the-job training, these 
recruits attend in-service regional schools for almost five 
months,11 and there the emphasis is on tax law. 
The second major problem at the local office level involves 
the inherent conflict between its dispute-resolution function­
requiring as it does an image of impartiality-and the local 
office's competing revenue-producing responsibility. Once again 
adoption of compensating procedures peculiar to that level be­
comes essential, but from the foregoing conflict and other con­
siderations emerges a third organizational theme. 
1.6 Third central theme: Centralization of final administrative 
hearings at an intermediate level 
To reduce the magnitude of the last mentioned conflict, it 
is important to isolate from the local office the highest ad­
ministrative official with whom a taxpayer may discuss a dis­
puted proposed assessment. Taxpayer convenience, however, 
bars assignment of this function to the National Office. Thus, 
the need for an intermediate layer, which incidentally will per­
mit the concentration of particularly able men to fulfill a most 
demanding task. Of the countries covered here, three {Belgium, 
France, and the United States) do put the apex of the adminis­
trative conflict resolution process in just such an office. 
A yet further hard choice emerges in trying to assure ad­
ministrative impartiality. The aim is avoidance of unnecessary 
9 See Chap. XIII, §1.5 infra. 
10 Estate and gift tax examiners, on the other hand, are law school 
graduates. 
11 Additional classroom courses are provided those who spend a 
substantial part of their time examining special types of returns-such 
as those filed by insurance companies or exempt organizations. 
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litigation, with simultaneous protection of the government's 
interest. But this leaves unresolved two perplexing questions : 
What litigation is unnecessary and, prior to litigation, what 
interest does the government have in a disputed question ? 
As to the first question, the tax system gains nothing, 
apart from protecting the government's interest in an individual 
dispute, from litigating cases which neither are essential to 
the central office's litigation policy nor are capable of clari­
fying the law to any really significant degree.  The answer to 
the second question, however, ultimately means that, to obtain 
a bilateral agreement in many controversies, the intermediate 
office must be empowered to exercise true "settlement" or 
compromise authority, geared to a realistic appraisal of the 
litigation hazards each side faces. Not to be empowered to 
make mutual concessions in response to the litigation hazards 
deprives the intermediate office of the chance to be truly im ­
partial and to obtain a bilateral agreement in disputes where 
the taxpayer has some reasonable chance to prevail in litiga­
tion. In short, the government's interest in a controversy not 
otherwise worth litigating is worth nothing more than the value 
of its relative chance to prevail should that dispute actually 
be litigated. Comparably, the taxpayer's competing chance 
represents his interest in that same controversy. And at the 
administrative level, i.e.,  absent actual litigation, justice can­
not be impartial unless .the total amount in issue is divided 
on the basis of those chances or interests . To permit such 
settlements, as is done in France,12 the Netherlands,13 and 
the United States, 14 will generate certain major problems con­
s idered fully in Chapter III infra. Some are peculiar to this 
level; yet others pertain to the local office level. Both can 
be dealt with, however, by appropriate instructions and pro­
cedures . Conversely, not to empower an intermediate office 
to reach such settlements is bound to result in an excessive 
amount of time-consuming expensive litigation. 15 
12 See Chap. XI, §§ 3. 2a and 3.4b infra. 
13see Chap. XXID, §§ 3. 2a and 3 . 4a infra. 
14 u.s. Treas. Reg. § 601. 1 06(£), Rule II. 
15 See Chap. IV infra. 
CHAPTER ll 
CENTRALLY ADMINISTERE D RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS 
Section A. Evolution of U. S. Programs 
2.1 Introduction 
Among the six countries treated here, the U. S. tax ad ­
ministration maintains the most comprehensive set of centrally 
administered rule - making programs. A preliminary de scrip ­
tion of the evolution, magnitude, and effect of its programs will 
serve two purposes : first, to identify the consequent problems, 
answers to which will fix the major contours of such programs, 
and second, to facilitate a subsequent analytic comparison of 
the "Six's " diverse reactions to the vital purposes these pro­
grams serve . 
Obviously, the appropriate legislative body, not the execu­
tive, ultimately is respons ible for a nation's tax policy. Further, 
substantive policy considerations, responsive to the nation's 
socio-economic status and goals, alone should determine the 
general thrust of its income tax statute . But this is not so 
as to all details. Decisions regarding the latter, such as the 
number and types of substantive deviations to be incorporated 
and the manner in which the statute is to be drafted, should 
depend also upon the variable extent the alternatives would 
generate uncertainty and controversies between taxpayers and 
the tax administration. The significance the legislature actually 
attaches to any differences anticipated on this count should be 
affected, in turn, by the degree it is empowered and willing to 
share a clarifying rule -making function with administrators, 
independent tribunals, or both. Necessarily, its attitude toward 
this must be influenced by the anticipated relative capabilities 
of the other two. Also relevant, however, are its expectations 
regarding two other matters : first, the standards of construc ­
tion to which administrators and/ or independent tribunals would 
conform and second, its own willingness and power to employ 
pre -enactment materials (legislative committee reports, etc.) 
to reduce the unce rtainties reflected in the statute itself and 
through this means control the range of rule making by the 
other two. Finally, in considering at the pre -enactment stage 
the extent to which the tax administration itself should be 
12 
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counted on to satisfy a clarifying function, the legislative body 
should take account of the degree it is willing to permit the 
administration to identify its interpretative position before 
transactions are consummated (through regulations and rulings), 
i.e.,  before controversies emerge rather than just after they 
arise in the setting of the administration's conflict resolution 
procedures .  
Though the U.s. Congress should have examined the above 
questions before it chose from among competing statutory ap ­
proaches, in fact the answers to many evolved after it already 
had gone beyond the point of no return in shaping a most com ­
plex substantive statutory pattern. 
For example, as to the anticipated role of courts, the 
rule -making consequence of the fairly strong American doc ­
trine of precedent undoubtedly was generally understood by 
those who enacted the first modern income tax statute in 1913. 
But neither the congressional debates nor the committee re ­
ports bearing on that act reflect any concern or expectations 
regarding either (i) the judiciary 's standard of statutory con­
struction (i.e.,  the degree courts should or would exercise an 
active or passive role in the interpretative process) or (ii) its 
capac ity to share the rule -making function in a manner both 
timely and convenient to taxpayers. As events turned out, 
however, the congressional sponsors of that act would have 
been misled for the future by any findings as of that moment 
with respect to the first of these . Before, and just immedi­
ately after that act was passed, the Supreme Court insisted 
that the judiciary would follow a passive role in construing 
tax statutes :  
In the interpretation of statutes levying taxes it is the es­
tablished rule not to extend their provisions, by implication, 
beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge 
their operations so as to embrace matters not specifically 
pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly 
against the Government, and in favor of the citizen.l 
Within two decades, however, it was to abandon this standard 
of strict construction except perhaps -now to the taxpayer's 
1 Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S .  151, 153 (1917).  Accord, Benzinger v. 
U.S ., 1 92 U.S . 38 (1904) ; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 
141 U.S . 468 (1891) ;  U.S . v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story 369 (Cir. Ct. D. 
Mass. 1 842). 
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disadvantage -in the case of deductions .2 And even as to these 
the Court subsequently observed: 
We are not impressed by the argument that, as the ques­
tion here decided is doubtful, all doubts should be resolved in 
favor of the taxpayer. It is the function and duty of courts 
to resolve doubts. We know of no reason why that function 
should be abdicated in a tax case more than in any other 
where the rights of suitors turn on the construction of a 
statute and it is our duty to decide what that construction 
fairly should be. . . . 3 
Shortly thereafter, the High Court took the final major step, 
by making abundantly clear that it expected the j udiciary to 
play a more active role in combating avoidance, 4 though within 
the framework of a notion that courts should "seek the pur ­
poses of the applicable sections of the Code and adopt that 
construction which best gives effect to those purposes . " 5  The 
judic iary, by this belated step, began to assist the legislative 
body in achieving one salutary effect, namely, greater "equality 
among taxpayers, 1 1 6 i .e . ,  "uniform application"7 of the law by 
reference to the "substance " 8 of transactions rather than their 
mere "for m. 1 19 But these shifts also were responsible for 
generating additional uncertainty throughout the code and in 
consequence new controver sies.  In many affected areas, Con­
gress then felt called upon to supply legislative refinements 
which made the basic law more complex 10 and, because also 
new deviations were added, yet new uncertainties and contro­
versies emerged. 
While those who sponsored the first modern act could not 
have been expected to anticipate the above shifts in standards 
of judicial construction, they could have predicted that the then 
constituted federal judiciary provided a forum neither adequate 
; New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934). 
White v. u.s., 305 u.s. 281, 292 (1938). 
4 E.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 u.s. 112 (1940); Higgins v. Smith, 
308 U.S. 473 (1940). But cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 u.s. 687 
(1966). 
5 U.S. v. Benedict, 338 u.s. 692, 696 (1950) . 6 Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. U.S., 320 U.S. 422, 425 (1943), 
reh. den . 320 U.S. 816 (1944). 
7 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 u.s. 103, 110 (1932). � Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 u.s. 331, 334 (1945). 
10 
Higgins v. Smith, 308 u.s. 473, 477 (1940). 
E.g., I.R.C., §§ 671-678. 
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nor convenient in which to resolve all the uncertainties and 
controversies which that and succeeding acts were certain to 
generate . Within a decade the Congress was forced to create 
a specialized independent tribunal (Board of T ax Appeals, now 
called the Tax Court), both to provide a means of resolving a 
tremendous back-log of unresolved controversies and to permit 
this to be accomplished with more convenience to taxpayers, 
i .e., before they had to pay the contested portion of the tax. ll 
But even with the addition of that tribunal, the conflict resolu­
tion burden was more than the judicial system could be ex­
pected to accommodate. Three years after that tribunal was 
created, top policy-making officials concluded it was necessary 
to adopt a compensating administrative procedure which, with 
certain limitations, prevails to this day. 12 Administrative of­
ficials were directed to seek administrative "settlements " 
geared, if need be, to partial concessions by both sides, on 
the basis of their competing strengths and weaknesses, with 
nuisance values ignored by both. As the Under-Secretary of 
the Treasury described it: 
• • •  There are any number of legal questions for which 
there are no precedents, that are relatively unimportant, and 
where it pays the Government to make concessions to the tax­
payer if, in return, the taxpayer will make concessions to the 
Government. In other words, we are applying, in the field of 
tax administration, the ordinary business methods of adjusting 
disputes, because we found that, both for the taxpayer and for 
the Government, litigation is unsatisfactory and expensive. 
Settlement methods tend to keep tax questions where they 
belong : in the administration field, and tend to promote prompt­
ness and finality . . .  , 13 
2.2 Evolution of U. S. regulations program 
Though the Congress which passed the first modern act 
should have foreseen the ensuing substantial degree of uncer ­
tainty and controversy such statutes generate, there is little 
11 Prior thereto, to litigate an issue, the taxpayer had to pay the 
entire contested amount and then sue for refund in either a federal 
district court or the United States Court of Claims . Flora v. u.s., 357 
U.S. 63 (1958), reh . 362 U.S. 145 (1960). Refund suits in these two 
forums still survive as alternative remedies to the litigate-first-pay­
later remedy before the Tax Court. See Chap. IV infra . Indeed, out­
side the income, estate, and gift tax areas, they are the sole remedies. 
12 See Chap. m, § 3.4 infra . 
13 Mills, " Federal Administration of Tax Law," 5 2 N.Y. State Bar 
Assoc . Proc. 495, 503 (1929). 
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to suggest it had any real intention of sharing in any significant 
degree its rule-making function with administrators.  It proba­
bly believed that it was accommodating only otherwise unpro­
vided for procedural requirements when, in three different in­
stances, 14 it required certain things to be accomplished under 
rules and regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the 
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. Three years later, 
however, on the substantive side, it did authorize the fir st of 
what might be described as narrowly focused legislative -type 
regulations . When establishing a "reasonable allowance for 
depletion" in 1916, it provided that "such reasonable allow ­
ance " would be determined "under rules and regulations to be 
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury . "  15 That this 
delegation of legislative authority was upheld came as no sur ­
prise;16 the Supreme Court previously, in non-tax areas, had 
said it was appropr iate for Congress, after indicating its "will, " 
to "give to those who were to act under such general provi­
sions 1p0Wer tO fill Up the detailS I, , , , r r 17 
In the next year, 1917, similar legislative -type delegations 
were added to a few other isolated substantive provisions . 18 
And these were supplemented by the following catch- all provi­
sion which seemed broad enough to accommodate, as to the 
whole code, both interpretative -type regulations and procedural 
problems: 
That the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the ap­
proval of the Secretary of the Treasury, is hereby authorized 
to make all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement 
of the provisions of this Act.19 
In the years immediately following, only sporadic and 
limited concern was expressed in Congress regarding its in­
creasing though still modest tendency to authorize issuance of 
legislative -type regulations covering specific isolated areas. 20 
14 Rev. Act of 1913, §§ IIA, Subdiv. 2, liD, and liE. But cf, an older 
provision in the general law. Rev. Stat. § 3447 (1 875).  
15 Rev. Act of 1916, §§ 5 (a) Eighth, 6(a) Seventh, and 12 (a) Second. 
Cf. § 8(g). 
16 Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co. 283 u.s. 301 (1931). 
17 u.s. v. Grimaud, 220 u.s. 506, 517 (1911). 
18E. g., Rev. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, §§ 205 (a) and 210. 
19 Id. § 1005. Cj. Rev. Act of Mar. 3, 1917, § 207 .  
2 0  For a fairly current compilation of specific delegations, see 
Balter, "Relief from Abuse of Administrative Discretion," 46 Marq. L .  
Rev. 176, 182 n .  27 (1962). 
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Even a leader of the minority side of the sponsoring congres­
sional committee defended the practice, arguing that the language 
of the bill in these instances was "so obscure and almost non­
understandable that somebody ought to have discretion in ad ­
ministering its provisions . " 21 
Far greater concern was expressed repeatedly, however, 
and on several counts, regarding administrative practices in 
implementing the catch-all provision dealing with interpretative ­
type regulations and rulings. From the responses to these 
concerns, emerged the main outlines of the present regulations 
program, the end product of which, as to the income tax, now 
could fill a volume of 3,000 pages at 400 words per page . 
The first such concern, exposed to light in 1921, grew out 
of the administration's own belief that its interpretations did 
not attain automatically the force of law merely through the 
process of be ing incorporated in regulations issued under this 
general provision. It felt it was legally obligated not only to 
correct by amendment any previously issued regulation deemed 
by it to contain an erroneous interpretation, but in consequence 
to reopen all cases previously closed on the basis of the earlier 
"errone ous" interpretation. Frequently, from the vantage point 
of taxpayers, the earlier ver sion, characterized belatedly by 
the administration as erroneous, proved to be the more favor ­
able of the two. But the practice of reopening these cases on 
the bas is of the later interpretation was defended by the ad ­
ministr ation before a congressional committee on the grounds 
that a mere administrative officer not only legally could not, 
but ordinarily as a matter of policy should not, be permitted 
"to waive a tax legally imposed" (i. e . ,  imposed by the statute 
itself when properly interpreted) . It added, however, that Con­
gress itself might want to make room for a limited exception, 
by adopting a procedure enabling the administration to avoid 
any "great hardship " resulting from belated administrative re­
vision of interpretative regulations or rulings. 22 Congress 
proceeded to adopt such an arrangement, 23 the modern statutory 
counterpart of which24 per mits the administration- within its 
discretion-to fix the extent to which any regulation is to be 
applied without retroactive effect. In currently implementing 
21 Statement of Senator Walsh, 61 Cong. Rec. 6576 (1921). 22 Notes on the Revenue Act of 1918, submitted by the Secretary of 
the Treasury to the Committee on Ways and Means, 48-49 (1919). 23 Rev. Act of 1921, § 1314. 
24 I.R .C., § 7805 (b). 
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this discretion, the administration according to a top official ­
has tried to conform to three sometimes -difficult-to- apply 
principles . Amendments which actually change the thrust of 
the regulations to the detriment of taxpayers are made pro ­
spective only. 25 Where such a change is of benefit to tax­
payers, it is applied retroactively to all open years . This is 
the practice also where the amendment deals with a matter 
not previously covered or clarifies an ambiguity in the previ­
ously issued regulation. 26 
In 1924, just three years after the above statutory change 
was made, certain congressional quarters complained that the 
administration's interpretative regulations actually tended, on 
the whole, to stretch the statutory law to the disadvantage of 
taxpayers.27 The House proposed to attack this problem by 
adding to the general author ization a limitation which provided 
that "such regulations shall not enlarge or modify any provi­
sions of this act . "  28 The Senate, however, rejected the pro­
posed amendment 29 after being assured by the Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee that no administrative official could 
ever "make any rule or any regulation in violation of the law 
itself with any binding force . " 30 Of course, literally neither 
this comment nor the proposed amendment were responsive to 
the only real and infinitely more subtle question: To what ex­
tent should the administration's own interpretative view re ­
garding a statutory ambiguity gain additional weight because 
incorporated in its own regulations ? In the end, while this 
question-the subject matter of 2.4 infra-was left to the courts, 
the Congress itself almost immediately began to step up its 
own effort to contain, by a flanking manuever, what otherwise 
would have been a larger potential range for administrative 
rule making. It began to supplement newly proposed statutory 
25 Rogovin, "The Four R' s :  Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and 
Retroactivity," 43 Taxes 756, 762 (1965) .  This was not always ad­
hered to at an earlier time. E.g., see Manhattan General Equipment 
Co. v. Commissioner, 297 u.s. 129 (1936). Further, if the earlier 
regulation itself was a reasonable interpretation, retroactive change 
may be beyond the Commissioner' s power. Helvering v. R .  J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. , 306 U.S. 110 (1939), 
26 E.g., see Helvering v. Reynolds, 31 3 u.s. 428 (1941). 
27 See Statements of Representative Deal and Senator McKellar, 65 
Cong. Rec. 3333 and 7140 (1924). 
28 65 Cong. Rec. 3334 (1924). 
29 Id. at 7140. 
30 Id. at 7141. Statement of Senator Smoot. 
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prov1s10ns with more fully developed congressional committee 
reports which clar ified and reflected more precisely the inten­
tion to be attributed to otherwise ambigious statutory terms . 
Both then31 and now, 32 courts deemed state ments in such re­
ports, explicitly revealing the congressional intention, to be of 
controlling importance in interpreting the statute . 
2.3 E volution of U. S. private and published rulings programs 
Almost coincident with the foregoing 1924 debate pertaining 
to administrative tendencies in drafting regulations appeared 
the first public expression of a frequently recurr ing congres­
sional concern regarding private rulings which, at that time, 
could be obtained by individual taxpayers only from the National 
Office and then only as to completed transactions . 33 At an 
earlier point, in 1919, the administration had begun to publish 
some of these, 34 though with names and other identifying char ­
acteristics omitted .  However, in 1924 a congressional sub­
committee then investigating tax administration35 observed that 
most private rulings remained secret. It contended that uni­
form treatment of all taxpayers could be assured only if all 
these rulings were published. 36 Apparently, it was in response 
to this charge and contention that the tax administration pub ­
licly committed itself to publish, after necessary revision, all 
rulings of general interest having precedent value .37 Two 
years later, however, the Senate indicated it was not content 
with this commitment. This was not just because the adminis ­
tration had failed to fulfill its own pledge . Interested Senators 
recognized that the nature of that commitment actually left the 
31 McLean v. u.s., 226 u.s. 374 (1942). 
32 Commissioner v. Bilder, 369 U.s. 499 (1962). The report issued 
by the Senate Finance Committee in connection with the major statutory 
revision in 1954 contained 614 pages. s. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. , 
2d Sess. (1954). 
33 Mim. 2880, Cumulative Bulletin [hereinafter cited as C .B.] 1-1, 
400 (1921). 
34 C .B. 1-1 (1919). 
35 Pursuant to S. Res. 168, 68th Cong., 1st Sess . ,  Mar. 12, 1924. See 
65 Cong. Rec. 4014-4023 (1924). 
36 Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Investigation of 
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 68th Cong., 30-31, 56-57 (1924) and 
more generally discussed in 3630-3661 (1925). For a more complete 
statement justifying publication, see s. Rep. No. 27, 69th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 229-234 (1926). 
37 See fly-leaf, C .B. III-1 (1924). 
20 RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS COMPARED 
administration free, in any given case, to turn the question of 
publication on the often all too subtle difference between what 
is a new precedent and what is merely a new application of a 
previously published precedent. 38 In an attempt to force pub ­
lication of both new precedents and new applications of earlier 
published precedents, the Senate passed an amendment to the 
general provision, requiring the Commissioner to "publish all 
rules, practices, principles, and formulas applied or followed 
in the interpretation and application of any revenue act . • . .  u 39 
A conference committee, composed of representatives of both 
chambers, dr ained this of much of its vitality by reducing it 
to two words40 which, upon subsequent enactment, required the 
Commissioner "to prescribe and publish all needful rules and 
regulations for the enforcement of this act. " 41 Nevertheless, 
the administration itself also continued, in the fly-leaf of each 
Cumulative Bulletin thereafter published, to repeat its own 
earlier self-assumed commitment. 42 Years later, however, in 
1953, the administration openly acknowledged to a second in­
vestigating subcommittee that it had not lived up to this com ­
mitment; proportionately, of the precedent-type rulings issued, 
"very few" had been published .43 Senior administrative offi­
cials agreed, however, that this failure was not in the interest 
of wise tax administration, and promised immediate correc­
tion. 44 The number published annually then jumped from 115 
in the preceding year, 1952, to a peak of 801 in 1955. Begin­
ning in 1960, however, a sharp decline set in; only 388-well 
under 5 percent of the pr ivate substantive rulings issued-were 
published in 1 964. 45 By then, because many outs ide the gov­
ernment felt that federal agencies in general held back from 
38 Hearings, Rev. Act of 1926, Senate Finance Committee, 69th Cong., 
1st Sess. 93-96 and 1 36-145 (1926). !� 67 Cong. Rec. 3879 (1925). 
H. Rep. No. 356, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1926). 
41 Rev. Act of 1926, § 11 01 . Italics added. 
42 E.g., see fly-leaf, C.B. 1951-2 (1952). 
43 Hearings on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws Before 
a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 82d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1340 (195 3). 
44Jd. at 1564. Also, Hearings on Administration of the Internal 
Revenue Laws Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, 83d Cong. , 2d Sess. 51 (1954) .  
45 Of course, many of the private rulings had no precedent value. 
See note 50 infra . Nevertheless, to assure accuracy and integrity of 
the private rulings program, and to acquaint Congress with the manner 
in which the Commissioner exercised his interpretative function, a bill 
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the public far more information than could be justified, a statu­
tory remedy was being sought46 -a so-called "Freedom of In­
formation Act . "  For a variety of reasons, including the argu ­
ment that the proposals would require publication of all private 
rulings, and thus cripple the latter program, 47 the tax admin­
istration opposed these efforts .  48 In 1966, however, one such 
proposal was enacted by Congress. 49 While the intent of the 
act was clear, to increase public knowledge and access to ma­
terial not theretofore available, the language of the act was 
not. 50 In consequence, the tax administration now argues that, 
to determine congressional intention, recourse must be made 
to the relevant congressional committee reports. And to sup­
port the proposition that it need not publish all private letter 
rulings, 51 it relies on the following statement in the sponsor ­
ing committe e 's report: 
• • •  under § 1160, an agency may not be required to make 
available for public inspection and copying any advisory in­
terpretation on a specific set of facts which is requested by 
and addressed to a particular person, provided that such in­
terpretation is not cited or relied upon by any officer or 
employee of the agency as a precedent in the disposition of 
other cases • . •  ,52  
(footnote continued) 
introduced but not enacted in 1965 would have required the administra­
tion to publish within ten days all rulings involving potential tax lia­
bilities exceeding $100,000, S. 2 047, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See 
Statement of Senator Gore, 111 Cong. Rec. 11810, 11 814 (1965). 
46 See S. 1 666, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), 
47 See Statement of G. d'Andelot Belin, Hearings before the Sub­
committee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. , 1st Sess. 176 and 268 (1963) 
and id. 88th Cong. , 2d Sess. 168, 177E (1964). 
48 Ibid. Also see Statement of E dwin Rains in hearings before the 
same subcommittee, op. cit. supra note 47, 89th Cong. , 1st Sess. 30 
(1965) and Treasury Department exhibit, id. at 441 . 
49 Pub. Law 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966). 
50 See Panel Discussion on Freedom of Information Act, XX Bulle­
tin, Taxation Section, A.B.A., No. 3, 43 (April 1967) ; Bennett, "The 
Freedom of Information Act, Is It a Clear Public Records Law ? "  34 
Brooklyn L .  Rev. 72 (1967) ; Sexton, "New Law Changes Rules on What 
Information IRS Must Disclose ; Confusion Likely," 26 J. Taxation 120 
(1967). 
51 See Panel Discussion, op . cit. supra note 50, Statements of 
Messrs. Rogovin and Uretz. Also, Uretz, "Freedom of Information 
and the IRS," 20 Ark . L .  Rev. 2 83 (1967). 
52 H. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966). 
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A second major problem in the rulings area concerned 
prospective transactions . In 1921, a Commissioner had ex­
plained that the administration was not equipped to do more 
than "advise taxpayers promptly of their present liabilities 
aris ing out of past transactions . "5 3  In 1938, however, to avoid 
delay or abandonment of legitimate transactions because of tax 
uncertainties, both the Treasury54 and a congressional sub­
committee 55 proposed to empower the Commissioner to issue 
binding advance rulings on prospective transactions where this 
appeared to be in the interest of wise tax administration. The 
Congress, however, substituted the more cumbersome bilateral 
closing agreement arrangement, with the signature of at least 
an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury being required in each 
case.56 Sharp rate increases and the explosion of the economy 
accompanying the outbreak of World War II resulted in an 
enormous increase in requests for these closing agreements . 
To meet the demand, the administration-acting on its own 
initiative -substituted the less cumbersome unilateral advance ­
ruling arrangement. By the 1 9609s, the number annually 
processed always exceeded 30,000, of which about 10,000 in­
volved substantive income tax questions .57 Generally speaking, 
none of these involved either factual questions or tr ansactions 
53 Mim. 2880, C .B. I-1 400 (1921). Italics added. 
54 Statement of Under-Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings Before 
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 75th Cong. , 3d Sess. 109 
(1938). 
55 Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means, 
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 55 and 79 (1938). 
56 Rev. Act of 1938, § 802. The statute itself no longer requires 
the signature of such a high official. I.R.C., § 7121. 
57 E.g., see Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Annual Report 1966, 
6. A large proportion of the balance are requests for permission to 
change accounting methods or years for federal tax purposes. Further, 
of the 10,000 requests for substantive income tax rulings, not all spring 
from known doubts or real interpretative issues ; in effect, some simply 
request what is tantamount to an "insurance policy" to protect the 
taxpayer-because of the large sums involved-from unanticipated or 
unrecognized doubts or uncertainties. For conflicting views regarding 
the propriety of this practice, see Rogovin, op. cit. supra note 25, 
at 765 n. 48. Finally, a majority of the 10,000 actually concerned 
exempt organizations. Quite apart from this, however, district offices 
issued 14,330 determination letters to organizations seeking exemp­
tions, 15,515 determination letters affirming qualification of pension 
and profit sharing plans covering employees, and 7, 231 determination 
letters covering pension plans for self-employed persons. 
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lacking in business purpose; well publicized administrative 
practice renders both ineligible . 58 
Finally, there is a difference between private and published 
rulings regarding the extent to which taxpayers may rely 
thereon. Implicit in the first public announcement that the 
National Office would issue pr ivate rulings on prospective 
transactions, 59 was a limitation-later expressly stated 60 _to 
the effect that a private ruling issued to a taxpayer on a par­
ticular transaction applied, generally speaking, only to that 
transaction and to that particular taxpayer . In other words, 
the government expressly sought to exclude the poss ibility that 
such a ruling could be relied upon either by the same taxpayer 
as to other similar transactions or by other taxpayers in­
volved, say, in the same industry.61 It acknowledged, how­
ever, that the limitation would be appropriately adjusted where 
the ruling itself expressly either covered a series of identical 
transactions, as in the case of a taxpayer 's excise tax, or 
covered all parties to a given transaction, such as a merger 
of two or more corporations . It is only because this limita­
tion ordinarily has been respected by the courts 62 that the 
National Office has been willing to permit the great majority 
of these rulings to be issued by its own junior staff officials 63 
- an absolute essential if it is to accommodate in an even 
reasonably timely manner the tremendous number of such 
requests . 64 In contrast to the limited range attributed to a 
58 See §§ 2.13 and 2.15 infra . 
59 Rev. Rul. 54-172, C.B.  1954-1, 394. 
60 Rev. Proc. 62-28, C.B. 1962-2, 496, superseded by Rev. Proc. 
67-1.1 Internal Revenue Bulletin [ hereinafter cited as I.R.B.] 1967-1, 5 .  
6 .1  France, on the other hand, tends to issue rulings on prospective 
transactions only to industrial, trade, professional, or labor groups. 
See Chapter XIV, § 2.7 infra . 
62 E. g., Goodstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959). 
But cf. International Business Machines Corp. v. u.s., 343 F.2d 914 
(Ct. Cl. 1965). 
63 See Rogovin, op. cit. supra note 25. Within the National Office, 
more than 75% are issued at the Branch level; proportionately few go 
above the higher Division level, and not over 2% are reviewed by the 
legal staff in the Chief Counsel's Office. For a more detailed break­
down, see Caplin, "Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue 
Service," N.Y.U. 20th Inst.  on Fed. Tax. 1, 28 (1962). 
64 Even so, of those issued in fiscal 1965, 58% took from two to six 
months, and of these almost one-third took more than six months. 
Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 25, at 767 n. 59, Not all of this delay 
is due, however, to excess inventory coupled with the actual time taken 
to resolve a given question; initial submissions by taxpayers often are 
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private ruling, the above mentioned public announcement made 
it equally clear that the more carefully processed published 
rulings were addressed to all taxpayers . It added, in conse ­
quence, that a given taxpayer "need not reque st a specific 
ruling applying the principles of the published ruling to the 
facts of the taxpayer's particular case where otherwise appli­
cable . r r 65 
However, such a taxpayer does assume some risk, apart 
from that necessarily involved in determining whether the prin­
ciple of a given published ruling applies to his own facts . Not 
all of the 14, 776 substantive rulings published since 191 9  con­
tinue to have vitality . Some expressly modified or reversed 
earlier ones. Others, however, have been affected by subse­
quent legislation, 66 regulations, or court decisions without any 
attempt by the Service to alert taxpayers to this fact. And, 
thus, the taxpayer assumes the risk. In other words, the prac ­
tice governing the published rulings program 67 imposes on 
each taxpayer the burden of determining whether any such 
subsequent events affected an earlier published ruling on which 
he proposes to rely in consummating a transaction. 68 In 
theory, to overcome the particular hazard implicit in this prac ­
tice, he need only research and carefully analyze relevant de ­
cisions, etc., post-dating that published ruling. 
But no matter how carefully a taxpayer researched a ques ­
tion, he still could not protect himself if, having consummated 
a transaction in reliance on that ruling, the administration 
thereafter changed its interpretative position and applied the 
change retroactively to his case. In consequence, given the 
statutory limitations on its authority, the administration itself 
has stretched a long way in trying to minimize this risk. The 
type of protection it accords differs slightly, however, as be ­
tween the two different types of rulings. 
(footnote continued) 
inadequate, and thus delay the ruling until adequately supplemented. 
See Rose, "The Rulings Program of the Internal Revenue Service," 35 
Taxes 907 (1957), 
65 Rev. Rul. 54-172, C .B. 1954-1, 394, 401. 
66 E.g., of the 14,776 rulings issued between 1919 and 1965, 9,234 
were issued before the revision of the code in 1954. 
67 See Rev. Rul. 54-172, C.B. 1954-2, 394, 401 ; Rev. Proc. 62-28, 
C .B. 1962-2, 496, 506, 
. 68 In 1967, the administration announced that it planned to re-examine 
all pre-1954 rulings, to the end of identifying publicly those it deems 
to be obsolete. 
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Relevant to the sweep of the protection accorded in the 
case of private rulings is the fact that the tax administration, 
without congressional bless ing, itself extended this program to 
prospective transactions at the beginning of World War II. This 
action was taken in spite of the fact that the statute itself, en­
acted immediately prior thereto, literally author ized the ad­
ministration to bind itself only by bilateral clos ing agree ­
ments. 69 However, at an earlier time when the National Office 
confined rulings to completed transactions, a previously men­
tioned statute, giving the Commissioner discretion to prescribe 
the extent a regulation would be applied without retroactive 
effect, 70 was amended so as literally to include also "any 
ruling. " 71 In the first public announcement e xtending the pri­
vate rulings program to prospective transactions, the adminis­
tration sought in two ways to reconcile the two foregoing statu ­
tory provisions : first, by asserting its right to revoke any 
ruling retroactively, and second, by declaring its "general 
policy" was not to do so (absent a retroactive change in the 
law itself) if the taxpayer had consummated a prospective trans ­
action in good faith reliance on the ruling and retroactive revo­
cation would be to his detriment. 72 As applied to a s ituation 
of this type, the administration later sought to strengthen the 
image of its so-called "general policy, " by noting that devia­
tions would be limited to "rare and unusual circumstances. "73 
As to modifications of earlier published rulings, the first 
public announce ment mentioned above laid down what appeared 
to be an even more sweeping immunity, for no conditions were 
attached expressly to the asserted "general practice of the 
69 That the administration has the power to revoke both published 
and private rulings retroactively is not open to serious question. 
Dixon v.  U.S., 381 U.S. 68 (1965) ; Automobile Club of Michigan v. 
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957) ; Helvering v. Reynolds, 31 3 U.S. 
428 (1941). For one exception regarding excise taxes, see Rev. Act 
of 1926, § 1108(b) and Treas. Reg. § 601 . 201 (1) (8). Also cj. Interna­
tional Business Machines v. u.s. , 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965). 
70 Rev. Act of 1 921, § 1314, now I.R.C.,  § 7805 (b). 
71 Rev. Act of 1934, § 506, amending Rev. Act of 1926, § 1108(a). 
Italics added. 
72 Rev. Rul. 54-172, C.B. 1954-1, 394, 401. The limitation would 
not apply, of course, if the taxpayer had misrepresented the trans­
action. 
73 Rev. Rul. 62-28, C.B. 1962-2, 496, 5 05.  An administration hardly 
could go beyond this, given the fact that Congress expected each Com­
missioner to exercise discretion in each case. See Caplin, op. cit. 
supra note 63, at 21. 
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Service to make such revocation or modification prospective 
only. ,74 Presumably, a taxpayer favored by an earlier pub­
lished ruling would be protected whether or not he actually 
had relied on that ruling to his detriment, such as by reliance 
thereon before entering into a prospective transaction. There 
is nothing to suggest that the administration meant to change 
this policy when, in a later substitute announcement, it put the 
matter differently, saying that such rulings "ordinarily are not 
revoked or modified retroactively. " 75 
That taxpayers place considerable reliance on the policy 
not to revoke retroactively either type of ruling is evident from 
the fact that, in fiscal 1964, only four asked for closing agree ­
ments,76 in contrast to the thousands who secured private rul­
ings or relied on published rulings . 
2.4 Weight normally accorded U. S. interpretative regulations 
and published rulings 
Related to the matter just considered is a broader ques ­
tion: just how much stature does an administrative interpreta­
tion gain from the mere fact, in a given case, it is housed in 
an interpretative regulation or ruling previously published by 
the National Office ? Field personnel who examine returns 
would be bound, of course, by both-as a matter of hierar chi­
cal control.77 Taxpayers, however, on challenging either of 
these before the independent judiciary, find that it subscribes 
to a different view. To regulations, it attaches substantial but 
not binding s ignificance,7 8 and ordinarily even this is not ex­
tended to rulings as such. 
74 Rev. Rul. 54-172, C .B. 1954-l, 394, 401. 
75 Rev. Rul. 62-28, C.B. 1962-2, 496, 506 (1962). That a top offi­
cial thought no such change was contemplated, see Rogovin, op. cit. 
supra note 25, at 769. 
76 Rogovin, op. cit. supra note 25, at 77 0. 
77 As to the limited power of certain regional officials, on exercis­
ing their "settlement" function, to compromise private rulings, see 
Chap, Ill, § 3.4 infra . 
78 For comprehensive early discussions regarding the effect of 
regulations, see Eisenstein, "The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly 
City of Legislative Intention," 2 Tax L .  Rev . 327 (1947) ;  Griswold, "A 
Summary of the Regulations Problem, 11 54 Harv , L .  Rev. 398 (1941) ; 
Surrey, "The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the In­
come, E state, and Gift Taxes," 88 U. Pa . L .  Rev. 556 (1940). For a 
less comprehensive but more recent analysis, see Rogovin, op . cit. 
supra note 25, at 759 .  
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The Supreme Court's view is that an interpretative regu­
lation, construing an otherwise ambiguous statute, ordinarily 
is entitled to "respectful consideration, ,79 indeed, to "great 
we ight, r r80 and that an "assertion of its invalidity must be pre ­
dicated either upon its being incons istent with the statutes or 
its being in itself unreasonable or inappropriate . "  81 Depend­
ing on the circumstances, the Court has relied upon one or 
more of three different rationales to justify this special sig­
nificance. 
The first involves the circumstances which surround the 
original pr omulgation of most but not all regulations. Cur ­
rently, they are drafted shortly after a statute is enacted, by 
in-service personnel who also worked closely with the con­
gressional committees through which the bill was processed 
(furnishing drafting assistance both as to it and the committees' 
explanatory reports).82 Given their intimate acquaintance with 
the specific congress ional purposes, their "wide experience in 
tax matters, " 83 and the administration's own general " 'respon­
s ibility of setting • . • [ the ] machinery in motion, of making 
the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet un­
tried and new, ' "  84 their "contemporaneous construction" 85 of 
the statute undoubtedly warrants the respectful consideration it 
enjoys. Of course, a regulation though contemporaneous will 
not survive if deemed inconsistent with a statute not thought 
79 Fawcus Machine Co. v. u.s., 282 u.s. 375, 378 (1931 ) .  
80 See Koshland v. Helvering, 298 u.s. 441, 445 (1936). 
81 U.S. v. Morehead, 243 u.s. 607, 614 (1917). The Court has not 
always been careful to note a distinction between legislative and inter­
pretative regulations; it even suggested in Koshland v. Helvering, 298 
u.s. 441, 446 (1936) that they were governed by the "same principle." 
Elsewhere, however, it has indicated that the special delegation of 
power associated with legislative-type regulations provides "added 
reasons why . • • regulations under it should not be overruled by Courts 
unless clearly contrary to the will of Congress." Commissioner v. 
South Texas Lumber Co., 333 u.s. 496, 5 03 (1948). 
82 Indeed the division of the Service's legal staff housing draftsmen 
of income tax regulations is called the "Legislation and Regulations 
Division." Further, policy reviews are performed by lawyers in the 
Office of the Tax Legislative Counsel-a constituent of the Treasury 
Department. 
83 Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. U.S., 320 U.S. 422, 426 (1943). 
84 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. u.s., 2 88 u.s. 294, 315 (1933) 
quoted with approval in U.S, v. Leslie Salt Co.,  350 U.S. 383, 396 
(1956). 
85 Fawcus Machine Co. v. U.S., 282 U.S, 375, 37 8 (1931). Italics 
added. 
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to be ambiguous . 86 Conversely, the fact a given regulatory 
interpretation was not promulgated contemporaneously with en­
actment of the statute is not in itself necessarily fatal to its 
claim for respectful consideration; 87 a second or third rationale 
may be invoked to justify attributing substantial weight to it. 
The second possible justification is bottomed on the Supreme 
Court's long-standing conviction that uniform application of tax 
laws is one of the positive goals warranting encouragement. 
The implementation by the Court of this conviction began when­
long before the first modern income tax act was passed-it 
stated with respect to a tax regulation, in force for many 
years:  
• • •  But when there has been a long acquiescence in a 
regulation, and by it rights of parties for many years have 
been determined and adjusted, it is not to be disregarded 
without the most cogent and persuasive reasons. 88 
According to this theory, in any given case, the extent to which 
the previous uninterrupted life span of a regulation will tip the 
judicial scales in favor of the regulatory interpretation neces ­
sarily is affected by the relative length of that life span. That 
the regulation will benefit substantially from this argument 
where the period is forty years 89 hardly means that it will 
benefit in like degree if only a relatively few years are in­
volved.90 But again, that a given regulation has been out­
standing only a relatively short time when first challenged, 
does not mean it will have no special significance . Though 
challenged promptly, it may be entitled to special weight by 
reference to the first-mentioned rationale, i.e . ,  because the 
regulation reflected the construction of experts contemporaneous 
with the enactment of the statutory provision. 91 Or it may 
derive special weight from a third rationale92 which is of such 
a nature, however, that-as a practical matter-it is more likely 
to serve only as a complementary factor adding yet further 
86 U.S. v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957) ; Koshland v. Helvering, 
298 u.s. 441 (1935) .  
87 Lykes v. U.S., 343 U.S,  118 (1952) .  
88 Robertson v. Downing, 127 U.S. 607, 613 (1888) ,  
89 Cammarano v. U.S . ,  358 U.S.  498 (1959), 
90 U.S, v. Calamaro, 354 U ,S, 351 (1957). 91 Colgate-Palmolive-Feet Co. v. U.S. ,  320 U.S,  422 (1943). Cf. the 
fate of a belated amendment in u.s. v. Leslie ·salt Co. ,  350 U.S. 383 
(1956). 
92 Lykes v. u.s., 343 U.S. 118 (1952). 
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weight to regulations otherwise entitled to respectful consid­
eration because of their fairly long life . 
This third rationale emerged out of the High Court's con­
viction that taxation is essentially statutory in character; there ­
fore it is not too much to expect Congress, having itself ex­
pressly authorized regulations, to exercise -perhaps "through 
its committees"93 -some measure of legislative oversight, to 
which the judiciary could then attach significance.  Even at a 
point before the first modern income tax statute was adopted, 
the foregoing premise had led the Supreme Court to the follow­
ing conclusion: 
. . .  And we have decided that the re-enactment by Con­
gress ,  without change, of a statute, which had p reviously re­
ceived long continued executive construction, is an adoption by 
Congress of such construction. 94 
This rationale proved to be of particular significance to the 
host of regulatory interpretations promulgated during the first 
twenty-five -year period (191 3 - 1 93 8) immediately following adop­
tion of the first modern income tax act. In that period, each 
Congress-usually on a biennial basis-re-enacted the whole of 
the income tax law, making only such changes as it deemed 
appropriate . Thus, by reference to the above -quoted theory, 
any regulation promulgated during the early part of that period 
was certain to derive great vitality from the consequent re­
peated re-enactments of the underlying statutory provision. 95 
The added possibility that, in the interval between re-enact­
ments, a regulation actually was challenged by taxpayers but 
sustained by the lower courts, served only to reinforce the 
Supreme Court's conviction that Congress, upon re-enactment, 
should be deemed to have acquiesced in the earlier regulatory 
interpretation. 96 
In 1939 the environmental setting changed drastically . 
Congress adopted a permanent tax code, the intention being 
that this law would survive ad infinitum . Each subsequent 
Congress, instead of making isolated revisions in the course 
of an otherwise wholesale re -enactment, was expected to do 
93 See Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S, 389, 399 (1940) . 
94 U.S. v. Cerecedo Hermanos y Compania, 209 U.S, 337, 339 (1908). 
Italics added. 
95 U.S. v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S, 383 (1956) ;  Commissioner v. 
Flowers, 326 U.S, 465 (1946). 
96 Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U,S. 498 (1959). 
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nothing more than amend the particular statutory prov1S1ons 
warranting change . Not until 1954 did Congress again re-enact 
the whole code in the course of a maj or revision. 
The vitality which pre -1939 regulatory interpretations de ­
rived from the biennial re-enactments of the pre -1939 period 
survived, of course, the codifications in 1939 and 1 954, pro­
vided the underlying statutory provision itself remained un.., 
changed. However, the 1939 change in congressional procedure 
regarding tax legislation did pose the threat that newly pro­
mulgated post-1939 interpretations would have no chance to 
benefit from this third alternative rationale, and would have to 
justify their claim to substantial weight solely by reference to 
one or both of the two rationales first discussed. This threat 
did not materialize at once, however . For a time, a divided 
Supreme Court appeared willing to go a long way in reshaping 
its "re -enactment" theory to accommodate this environmental 
change. In one case, the Court attributed "substantial weight" 
to a post-1939  regulation though the underlying statutory pro­
vision had not been re -enacted even once . It observed that, 
after the regulation had been issued, Congress had amended 
many provisions of the code without amending the particular 
statutory provision interpreted by this regulation. 97 From this 
congressional inaction, a majority of the Court apparently was 
prepared to presume congressional acquiescence to the regu­
latory interpretation. More recently, however, it appears that 
the Court has become more sensitive to reality and intends at 
least to back away from so sweeping a view regarding con­
gressional acquiescence. Indeed, as to a post- 1954 taxable 
year of one taxpayer, the Court refused to apply the re-enact­
ment theory even to a regulation which had been promulgated 
three years before the 1 954 code was substituted for the 1939 
code . It reasoned as follows : 
• . • The regulation had been in effect for only three years, 
and there is nothing to indicate that it was ever called to the 
attention of Congress.  The re-enactment of § 3290 in the 1954 
Code was not accompanied by any congressional discussion 
which throws light on its intended scope. In such circum­
stances, we consider the 1 954 re-enactment to be without 
significance. 98 
97 Lykes v. U.S., 343 u.s.  118, 127 (1952). Also see Costanzo v. 
Tillinghast, 2 87 U.S. 341 (1932) ; McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co. ,  
2 8 3  u.s. 4 8 8  (1931) .  
98 u.s. v. Calamaro, 354 U.s. 351, 359 (1957).  Cf. Commissioner 
v. Acker, 361 u.s. 87 (1959). 
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This, of course, represented just a retrenchment, not an aban­
donment of the re -enactment theory. 99 And it left completely 
unaffected the vitality of either of the first two previously dis ­
cussed reasons which courts have invoked to justify special 
consideration for an interpretative regulation. Observe further 
that in fact both these reasons would support most currently 
existing interpretative regulations, and that the first of them 
alone would warrant respectful consideration of future regula­
tions if promulgated more or less contemporaneously with new 
statutory amendments . 
However, this latter justification (that the interpretation is 
contemporaneous, and is made by expert officials whose agency 
is responsible for enforcement and who worked closely with 
the legislative processing of the underlying provision) would 
seldom if ever warrant special consideration for the usual 
published ruling, as distinguished from the typical regulation. 
Most published rulings, as well as the private rulings from 
which they e merge, are issued long after, not more or less 
coincident with, adoption of the relevant statutory provision, 
and are drafted by personnel who did not work with the con­
gressional committees at the earlier point when the statutory 
provision was being processed.100 Moreover, Treasury offi­
cials (as distinguished from those of the Internal Revenue 
Service), to whom Congress assigned final administrative au­
thority in the case of interpretative regulations,1 01 ordinarily 
make no review of a private ruling and at best assume only a 
modest role regarding published versions .1 02 These differ ­
ences undoubtedly contributed to the Service 's initial position, 
expressed in its first volume of published rulings, that the 
latter were intended to reflect only "the trend and tendency of 
official opinion in the administration of the income and profits 
tax provisions of the Revenue Acts. The rulings have none of 
the force or effect of Treasury Decisions [ i.e., regulations ] 
99 Fribourg Navigation Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 383 u.s. 272 
(1966). 
100 While the published version ordinarily is reviewed by the Chief 
Counsel's Office, the review is carried out by the Interpretative Divi­
sion, not by the Legislation and Regulations Division which drafted the 
ref8:lations. 
01 I.R .C.,  § 7805. 
102 The Treasury receives a syllabus of proposed published rulings, 
and even this just immediately prior to publication. Its attention is 
called specifically only to published rulings involving policy issues of 
a high order. See Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 25, at 766 n. 50. 
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and do not commit the Department [ i.e ., the Treasury ] to any 
interpretation of law which has not been formally approved and 
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury. n 103 Implicit in 
this was the suggestion that the government itself ordinarily 
did not expect courts--by reference at least to the circum ­
stances existing at the point a ruling was published-to give 
any greater weight to a published ruling than that accorded a 
brief submitted by the government at the point of litigation. 
Later, however, the Commissioner did seek to induce the 
Supreme Court to extend the re -enactment theory to published 
rulings . The facts involved a ruling published between adop­
tion of the 1921 and 1 924 acts and applied by him in interpret­
ing a provision in the latter which was common to both. The 
court refused, however, to apply the re -enactment theory to 
this situation, partly because of the government's own previ­
ously published disclaimer limiting the intended significance of 
published rulings . It stated: 
The Commissioner' s suggestion that, by retaining the same 
definition in the 1924 Act, Congress approved the construction 
for which he contends is without merit. The definition had not 
been construed in any Treasury Decision [ i . e . ,  in a regula­
tion] , by the Board of Tax Appeals or by any court prior to 
that enactment . . . .  The rulings, I. T .  137 9, 1660 and 1 889, 
cited by the Commissioner were made before the passage of 
the 1924 Act but they "have none of the force or effect of 
Treasury Decisions and do not commit the Department to any 
interpretation of the law." See cautionary notice published in 
the bulletins containing these rulings. It does not appear that 
the attention of Congress had been called to any such con­
struction. There is no ground on which to infer that by the 
1924 Act Congress intended to approve it.1 04 
Later efforts to induce the High Court to reconsider the 
applicability of the re-enactment theory to published rulings 
always originated with taxpayers, not with the Commissioner . 
In each such instance,  a taxpayer challenged an assessment 
which conflicted with a previously published ruling, claimed by 
him to have achieved irrevocable vitality through congressional 
acquiescence . With the parties thus reversed, twice the High 
Court seemed to find some attraction in the taxpayer 's posi­
tion, as distinguished from its own earlier view as quoted 
above . In both cases however, it first expressed its own 
103 Fly-leaf, C ,B. 1-1 (1919). 
104 Helvering v. New York Trust Co. , 292 U.S. 455, 468 (1934). 
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conviction that the initial published rulings properly interpreted 
the act; then, by way of dictum, it merely added that Congress ' 
repeated re-enactment of the underlying provision indicated its 
acquiescence also to that administrative interpretation.105 
This dictum has not yet "blossomed into full fruition. "  
However, a favorable environment for this was not provided 
by the cases subsequently arising before the High Court. In 
each such case except the most recent, the Court's own con­
viction, regarding the correctness of the ruling itself, was op ­
posite to that reached in the two cases just described. In other 
words, in the subsequent situations, the initial published ruling 
each taxpayer sought to sustain was believed by the Court to 
reflect a clearly erroneous interpretation of the act. After 
expressing this conviction, the Court was to add that only in 
extreme circumstances could such rulings, of "less dignity " 
than regulations, be saved by the re-enactment theory. In one 
case, it put the matter as follows : 
. . .  Unless the administrative practice is long continued 
and substantially uniform in the Bureau and without challenge 
by the Government in the Board and courts, it should not be 
assumed, from rulings of this class, that Congressional re­
enactment of the language which they construed was an adop­
tion of their interpretation. 106 
Any practical assessment of this judicial position would require 
the addition of one further fact: once the more or less perma­
nent codes replaced the earlier biennally adopted revenue acts, 
there was much less chance that Congress would ever re-enact 
any given statutory provision. Equally important because of 
this changed circumstance is the Court's recent refusal, in the 
case of published rulings deemed clearly erroneous, to equate 
congressional inaction with congressional acquiescence. In one 
such case, the Court again pointed to the "ample notice" con­
tained in the rulings volume, that published rulings lack the 
105 Helvering v. Bliss,  293 U.S. 144 (1934) ; McFeely v. Commissioner, 
296 u.s. 102 (1935) .  
106 Higgins v.  Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 216 (1941). Italics added. 
The Court also noted that the quoted comment in the two previously 
discussed cases was only dictum. Id. In circumstances similar to 
the Higgins case (earlier published ruling deemed clearly erroneous), 
the Supreme Court refused even to apply the re-enactment theory to 
11 [ t] wo rulings [published] • . •  twenty-five years ago, [ though] not re­
peated in the intervening quarter-century . . . .  " Manning v. Seeley 
Tube & Box Co. ,  338 U.S. 561, 571 (1950) . 
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"force or effect of Treasury Decisions, "  and do not commit 
the Treasury. Its holding, that a revised or corrected inter ­
pretation could be applied retroactively even though a taxpayer 
may have relied to his detriment on the Commissioner 's earlier 
mistake, then was explained as follows : 
• • .  This principle is no more than a reflection of the 
fact that Congress, not the Commissioner, prescribes the tax 
laws. The Commissioner' s  rulings have only such force as 
Congress chooses to give them, and Congress has not given 
them the force of law. Consequently it would appear that the 
Commissioner' s acquiescence in an erroneous decision pub­
lished as a ruling, cannot in and of itself bar the United States 
from collecting a tax otherwise lawfully due. 107 
In conclusion, of the three different rationales used to 
justify the special weight accorded by the Supreme Court to 
most regulations, two (so-called "contemporaneous-construction" 
and "re -enactment" theories) currently fail to generate any 
special standing for rulings as such. However, as to the third, 
because of the High Court's interest in maintaining uniformity, 
there is reason to believe that a previously untested, long con­
tinued and consistent, administrative interpretation, of which 
published rulings may be evidence, will enjoy the judiciary 's 
respectful consideration when interpreting an otherwise am ­
biguous statutory provision.108 
Section B. Analytic Comparison: The "Six 's "  
Reactions to Vital Purposes Served 
by Centrally Administered 
Interpretative Programs 
2 . 5  Introduction: Programs of the Six compared 
There is no uniformity in the extent to which the central 
administrative offices of the six countries covered by this study 
engage in substantive rule -making activity. 
107 Dixon v. u.s., 381 U.S. 68, 73 (1965). However, where published 
rulings merely support the Court' s  own view regarding the clear im­
port of an interpretative regulation, this reinforces the applicability 
of the re-enactment theory as applied to regulations. Fribourg Navi­
gation Co. ,  Inc. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966). 
108 See E state of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 u.s. 39 (1939). Cf. 
Fribourg Navigation Co.,  Inc. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 2 7 2  (1966); 
Higgins v. Commis sioner, 312 u.s. 212 (1941). 
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Under some limited circumstances, authority to engage in 
such activity has been extended specifically to all six offices .  
Each national legislature has encountered at least a few income 
tax problems which it believed could be resolved effectively 
only by a type of detailed rule making for which the otherwise 
burdened legislative process was deemed ill adapted. And in 
that situation, all six legislative bodies have chosen to com­
plement statutory expression of a general objective with a spe ­
cific delegation of legislative authority enabling the executive 
arm to fix the technical standards governing that isolated 
area.1°9 Since these gap-filling administrative promulgations 
do much more than merely interpret statutory language and, if 
not ultra vires, generally have the force of law, no they pre ­
viously have been characterized as legislative -type regulations . 
The frequency with which the six administrations exercise 
this particular type of rule making varies, of course . But 
there is a far more substantial range of variation in the mag­
nitude and types of interpretative programs they centrally ad­
minister for the benefit of taxpayers as well as field person­
nel. No doubt national tradition and basic philosophical dif­
ferences regarding the role appropriate to administrators are 
partially responsible for this. That this diversity in attitude 
(whether legislative, administrative, or both), regarding the 
need for full blown centralized interpretative programs, has 
survived in an area as complex as taxation may also be due to 
yet other differences peculiar to these individual tax systems . 
Most relevant to this are their differences in (i) assessment 
techniques, (ii) the types of income tax statutes being adminis ­
tered, and (iii) the standards of statutory construction to which 
their respective judiciaries adhere. 
As to the relevance of the first of these, observe that the 
most comprehensive interpretative program is carried on by 
the one country (United States) which relies on the so-called 
self-assessment system. 
In effect, in the first instance, each of its sixty-seven 
million taxpayers must assess himself, for returns prepared 
and filed personally constitute the sole basis for initial lia­
bility-fixing assessments . The other five countries employ the 
109 See § 2.4 in Chaps. VI, X ,  XIV, XVIII, and XXII infra . In France 
power to issue regulatory texts is also derived by the Prime Minister 
directly from the Constitution itself. See Chap. X, § 2.4 infra . 
llO see § 2.4 as in note 1 09 supra . 
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so-called non-self-assessment system, 111 In theory, the tax­
payer himself is relieved of question-resolution burdens . The 
government assessor determines each assessment, theoretically 
on the basis of his examination. 
As to the relevance of the second (type of statute), if every 
one of the sixty- seven million U.S. taxpayers was required to 
fix his individual liability unassisted by administratively fostered 
interpretations, in theory each would have to rely primarily on 
his own interpretation 112 of what clearly is the longest, most 
complex statute of the six. The U.S. code 's substantive income 
tax provisions, if spread at the rate of 400 words per page, 
would cover an awesome 7 54 pages. l13 Uncertainty persists, 
however, despite the meticulous care and supposedly finespun 
precision with which the provisions are drafted. Transactions 
in the United States vary from one another in every possible 
degree. To this, add the fact that most of the words used in 
that longest of all statutes are more likely than not to have 
multiple shades of meaning. These factors react cumulatively 
upon each other to produce countless interpretative difficulties, 
which are complicated further by a related factor, which in 
itself contributes further to the statute 's length and complexity. 
The basic principles of this statute have been subjected to a 
multitude of deviations which have spawned their own sub­
deviations, and even deviations from sub -deviations, thereby 
creating additional interpretative difficulties with stress and 
pressure at many joints . Not just a few taxpayers are poten­
tially affected by many of these. Indeed, of the total 7 54 pages, 
only 138 deal with tax patterns confined to peculiar types of 
enterprises such as cooperatives, insurance companies, exempt 
organizations, estates and trusts . 
In contrast to the situation in the United States, the Parlia­
ments of the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, and France not 
only assign full responsibility for determining initial assess­
ments to the government's own trained personnel, but also 
confine statutory provisions of a substantive character to 
abstract principles, which, if spread on the same basis as 
that indicated above, would cover, respectively, only 40, 114 
111 see § 3.2 ,  Chaps . VII, XI, XV, XIX, and XXIII, infra . 
112 No doubt, they or their representatives actually would rely on 
interpretations appearing in texts written by experts but devoid of the 
harmonizing effect of interpretative regulations . 
113 As of 1964. · 
114 Section 2.1 Chap.  XXII infra, refers to 57 pages, but of these 30% 
are devoted to administrative or procedural provisions . 
VITAL PURPOSES SERVED 37 
50,115 100,116 and 120117 pages.  While the variation between 
the types of statutory techniques employed by these four coun­
tries, and those employed by the United States, may be one 
reason why the four have not embarked on a centralized in­
terpretative program even approaching the magnitude of that 
in the United States, this underlying difference does not ac ­
count at all for Britain. Its statute actually resembles that of 
the United States more than those of the other four European 
countries, being both complex and long-exceeding 3 50 pages .118 
Yet its administration does not publish interpretative regula­
tions at the point a statutory provision is enacted;119 does not 
thereafter ordinarily issue advance private rulings on prospec­
tive transactions 120 nor publish rulings which explain to one 
and all the reasoning behind specific interpretative positions 
in-service field personnel will be expected to take in examin­
ing returns, l21 Nor does its Parliament attempt to clarify 
the statute by publishing carefully designed interpretative re­
ports. 122 In final analysis, of the five European countries 
covered here, it appears, surprisingly, that administrations in 
the four having the shortest and most abstract tax statutes 
(Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) actually carry 
on more comprehensive interpretative programs than does the 
fifth (Britain), which has a long and complex statute somewhat 
like that of the United States .  The four, with Belgium tradi­
tionally at the head,123 publish for one and all to see more of 
115 Section 2.1 Chap. XIV infra, indicates that the corporate and in­
dividual taxes combined require 95 pages when spread at the different 
rate of 300 words per page, but of these about one-third are devoted 
to administrative or procedural provisions. 
116 See § 2 .1 ,  Chap. VI infra . 
117 Section 2.1 Chap. X infra, refers to 80 pages , calculated, how­
ever, at the different rate of 600 words per page. 
118 Section 2.1 Chap. XVIII infra, indicates that of the 511 pages, 
approximately 30 percent are devoted to administrative and procedural 
matters. 
119 See Chap. XVIII, § 2.4 infra . Interpretative instructions are dis­
tributed internally, however. 
120Jd . § 2.7 . 
121 Jd. § 2. 10. While a series of pamphlets covering many different 
areas is published, these usually are devoid of the legal reasoning on 
which the indicated results were reached. 
122 Id. § 2. 2 .  The Belgian Parliament stands alone among the five 
European countries in making even modest use of this device. See 
VI, § 2 .2 infra . Cf. the use of Parliamentary debates in France, 
Chap, X, § 2.2 infra . 
123 However, official commentaries on the recent tax reform law of 
1962 are much less complete than those on the earlier law. See Chap. 
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their administratively engineered interpretative instructions, 
with at least the expectation that field personnel will be bound 
as a matter of hierarchical control. Further, Germany and 
the Netherlands also sporadically publish some rulings and-as 
to prospective transactions-give much advance advice, though 
usually through local offices, which, in practice, do respect the 
advice thus given. 124 
There is a third difference among the six countries, how­
ever, which may partially account for the fact that Britain ap­
pears to feel the least pressure to develop a substantial pub­
lished interpretative program. At least it is not surprising 
that the least comprehensive administrative program is carried 
on in the one country (Britain) whose judiciary apparently tends 
to interpret the tax statute most strictly. 125 Given this cir ­
cumstance, it could be argued that Britain has less room for, 
and thus less need for, a large scale, published, administra­
tive interpretative program. 
But this conclusion is relative in character .  The fact is 
that differences in methods of assessment, in statutory ap­
proaches, and in the judiciary's standards of statutory con­
struction, taken together, actually do not provide sufficient 
reason for the substantial differences existing in the Six's ad­
ministrative interpretative programs. Other relevant charac­
teristics, common to the Six, suggest that properly adminis ­
tered programs of this type would achieve purposes vital, 
whether or not equally so, to each country's tax system. 
Each of the Six has millions of taxpayers, a highly de ­
centralized administration bottomed on thousands of geographi­
cally dispersed field officials, a statute relatively inprecise 
and mysterious to everyone but the specialist and, finally, very 
high rates . These characteristics, taken together, should have 
led each of the six systems to include among its administrative 
goals three which are almost impossible to accomplish-given 
(footnote continued) 
VI, § 2.5 infra . Further, even the voluminous regulations interpreting 
the earlier law were, in substantial part, a compilation of results 
previously reached by courts. Finally, Belgian administers neither a 
formal private nor a published rulings program. Advance rulings ordi­
narily take the form only of informal advice or-as in France-of P'lb­
lished answers to oral questions put to the Ministry on the floor of 
Parliament for the benefit of a taxpayer-constituent. See Chap. VI, 
§ 2.7 et seq ., infra . , 
124 See Chaps .  XIV and XXII, § 2. 7 et seq ., infra . 
125 Cf. Chap. XVIII, § 2.3 infra, with § 2.3 in Chaps. VI, X, XIV, and 
XXII infra, and-as to the United States-with § 2.1 supra . 
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those same characteristics--without substantial centralized 
published interpretative programs, namely : 
39 
(i) Achieving timely nationwide uniformity in application 
of the law, efficiently and fairly; 
(ii) Choosing the wisest possible interpretative positions ; 
(iii) Preventing uncertain tax effects from impeding, un­
necessarily, consummation of legitimate prospective 
transactions. 
Each of these three goals, and the general relationship of 
centralized rule making to each, is considered separately in the 
immediately succeeding sub-topics .  Thereafter attention shifts 
to precise methods of implementation and difficulties to be 
circumvented. 
2 . 6  Achieving timely uniformity, efficiently and fairly 
Because all six of the statutes under consideration here 
involve national taxes and high rates, country-wide uniformity 
in applying the law is an absolute essential. This is difficult 
to achieve when income tax statutes are superimposed on, and 
hence must take account of the nice distinctions inherent in, 
sophisticated systems of private law and complex economies .  
In the application of each such tax statute a host-albeit a 
varying number -of interpretative difficulties will be generated 
whether that statute expresses abstract pr inciples, as in Ger ­
many, or employs great detail, as in the United States .  Nation­
wide uniformity in resolving these doubts can be achieved in 
adequate degree, efficiently, fairly, and in a timely manner, 
only if the central office administers an adequate interpreta­
tive program. 
In both self- and non-self-assessment systems, many an 
interpretative difficulty, whether or not foreseen by the central 
office, actually becomes a "live " issue only at the point an 
examining official in the field faces the question of whether 
there is sufficient merit on the government 's side to warrant 
pressing the matter as to a given taxpayer . Since that ques ­
tion necessarily includes the other side of the coin, i .e . ,  whether 
to abandon the issue, nationwide uniformity will be achieved 
among similarly situated taxpayers only if all these lower eche ­
lon officials conform to a uniform interpretation. Left to their 
own devices, however, this goal will not be attained. These 
officials are seldom legally trained, 126 their number is large, 
126 see § 1,5 in Chaps. V, IX, XID, XVII, and XXI infra . 
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and they are scattered through many widely dispersed local of­
fices -ranging from 1 00 in the Netherlands to 1700 in France . 127 
Their individual analysis and research, however painstaking, 
in attempting to resolve interpretative problems of common 
concern to many, guarantees only duplication of effort, not uni­
formity in results reached. However, a centralized interpre ­
tative program, administered by officials more expert in analy ­
sis and research, not only efficiently avoids the duplication 
otherwise generated by this necessary decentralization, but 
also in itself assures a far greater degree of uniformity. 
To attain the maximum possible degree of uniformity, and 
to accomplish this with efficiency and fairness, it is not enough 
to disseminate centrally-arrived-at interpretations only among 
the government's  own field personnel.12"8 Public access to 
these interpretations, even in countries employing the non-self ­
assessment system, contributes efficiently to  greater uniformity 
because knowledgeable voluntary compliance with the law is 
thereby encouraged. Even now, to assist assessors in those 
countries, taxpayers are required to file information returns .129 
However, neither in those countries nor in a self-assessment 
country such as the United States, is it wise or even possible 
to design a form which requires taxpayers to reflect their af­
fairs on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Details ordinarily 
are reflected only by subtotals, each covering transactions 
alleged to be of the same class .  Obviously even under the 
non-self-assessment systems, assessors cannot possibly as ­
certain, with respect to each return, the true nature of each 
transaction affecting each subtotal.130 Thus, by trying to make 
the taxpaying public as knowledgeable as possible, albeit in­
directly through published interpretations, the tax system effi­
ciently furthers uniformity at least among the honest segment. 
The aim is to increase the likelihood that subtotals initially 
submitted by that segment will conform to what the tax ad­
ministration believes to be the proper treatment of the under ­
lying transactions, with exceptions anticipated where honest tax­
payers believe the administration to be in error. Further, it 
is only fair to taxpayers, and responsive to the administration's 
127 Id . § 1.4. While the U.S. is divided into 58 districts, these spread 
audit personnel across approximately 800 posts of duty. 
128 All five of the European countries maintain at least this restricted 
type of program. See §§ 2.4 and 2.9, Chaps. VI, X ,  XIV, XVIII, and 
xxn infra . . 
129 See § 3. 2, Chaps. VII, XI, XV, XIX, and XXITI infra . 
130 Id. 
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own interest in having its interpretations applied correctly, 
that these centrally-arrived-at interpretations be exposed to 
the public 's  view. This exposure enables a taxpayer to deter­
mine whether the examiner has correctly interpreted the cen­
tral office 's  regulation or ruling when applying it to that tax­
payer's situation. 
The foregoing analysis cannot be shunted aside by the argu­
ment that statutory interpretative difficulties should be resolved, 
not by tax administrations, but by tribunals independent of 
them. Such argument itself necessarily assumes that, on proper 
occasions, someone somewhere in the tax administration must 
adopt interpretative positions antagonistic to given taxpayers;  
otherwise such matters would never reach the independent tri­
bunal . Thus, mere adoption of a centralized interpretative 
program, without more, need neither subtract from, nor add 
to, the ultimate role of independent tribunals. Further, even 
where the independent tribunals are not expected to attach any 
special weight to administratively adopted published positions, 
a centrally administered program of that type is still vital to 
the maintenance of uniformity. Without such a program, in­
terpretative anarchy will prevail until long after the interpre­
tative difficulties are exposed to  light, i.e ., until that typically 
much later point in time when an independent appellate tribunal 
has had an opportunity to respond to the issue in an adversary 
proceeding initiated by some taxpayer .  Of course, in theory, 
uniformity in an equally timely manner also could be secured 
by requiring the central administrative office, immediately upon 
discovering a significant interpretative difficulty, to seek bind­
ing advice from a so-called independent tribunal.131 But, dis ­
regarding other shortcomings of this arrangement, if the sole 
aim is to avoid the administrative character of the interpreta­
tion's sponsorship, the arrangement would be self-defeating. 
The so-called independent tribunal no longer would be independ­
ent of administration, for the tribunal itself would have be ­
come the administrator in fact, if not in name . 
131 Cj. the French practice wherein the government can seek advisory 
opinions from the separate Council of State. Chap. X, § 2.4 infra . In 
the United states ,  a declaratory judgment regarding the tax effect of 
a prospective transaction cannot be obtained in the regular federal 
courts. See Goodman, "The Availability and Reviewability of Rulings 
of the Internal Revenue Service," 113 U. Pa . L .  Rev . 81, 97 (1964). It 
appears, however, that the Tax Court has the discretion to enter a 
declaratory order in such a situation. Id . at 109. 
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2 .  7 Choosing the wisest possible interpretative positions 
Centralized interpretative programs are essential, not just 
to achieve uniformity in a timely and efficient manner, but 
also to facilitate wise selection of those interpretative posi­
tions as to which uniformity is to be sought. And this is true 
whether the controlling statutory datum is cast in quite broad 
terms or, as such things go, is fairly precise . 
In the case of broad statutory language, frequently it would 
be equally reasonable, solely by reference to technical con­
siderations, to draw the interpretative line at any one of two, 
three, or more competing places . In net effect, the ultimate 
choice must be based on non-technical or policy considera­
tions . Ordinarily, however, the scattered local offices are 
staffed only with technicians. In addition to their difficulty in 
achieving uniformity if left without guidance, they obviously 
are ill-prepared to make the type of policy choice required 
here . Wiser selections can be expected from policy-oriented 
officials in the central office, using a centralized interpretative 
program as their medium. 
Even in the setting also, relatively speaking, of fairly pre ­
cise statutory language, diverse factual patterns can generate 
doubt-in every conceivable degree -regarding the correct tech­
nical answer . This is because, prior to litigation, the truly 
correct technical answer can be nothing more than a predic­
tion. While the very nature of a prediction precludes cer ­
tainty, often it is clear that technical arguments favoring the 
government's side are sufficiently persuasive to require a mere 
administrative official to adopt that position solely on the basis 
of technical considerations. On other occasions, however, the 
converse is true ; it simply is not clear whether the technical 
arguments favoring that side are sufficiently persuasive to 
warrant forcing the matter to litigation if the taxpayer will not 
yield. In striking the balance here, account should be taken 
administratively of other variables, such as the degree to which 
a given answer could be effectively administered or the im­
portance of the question to the tax system. Again, because of 
their broader administrative perspective, central office offi­
cials are better suited to this task, and uniform compliance 
with their decision can be achieved best through a compre ­
hensive centralized interpretative program. 
2 . 8  Neutralizing risks re prospective transactions 
Tax systems have the capacity, though hot always adequate 
authority, to neutralize legal uncertainties regarding the tax 
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effects of prospective transactions. Such a program (i) satis ­
fies a real need and (ii) enables the tax system to realize on 
a unique opportunity of benefit to itself. These two considera­
tions provide distinct additional reasons for maintaining cen­
tralized interpretative programs. 
As to the first, substantive tax uncertainties adversely 
affect the country as a whole, as well as individual taxpayers .  
Both suffer if, because of tax uncertainty, legitimate prospec ­
tive business transactions are delayed or abandoned. More­
over, a tax system's own image also suffers.  It will be held 
responsible not only for the consequent delay or abandonment 
of transactions but for complaints generated later if a tax­
payer -having consummated the transaction-finds he must liti­
gate the tax question to defend the personal interpretation on 
which he proceeded but which the tax system belatedly claims 
to have been erroneous . That it is the tax system, and not the 
individual taxpayer, which produces the tax uncertainty seems 
clear in the case of prospective transactions supported by le­
gitimate business purposes . In consequence, where feasible, 
the system should bear the cost of neutralizing that uncertainty 
through some sort of advance ruling. And if the need really 
springs from uncertainty or doubt, this in itself is a reason 
for resolving it through a centrally administered interpretative 
program, rather than at the local office level. As previously 
explained, this centralization will provide greater uniformity­
more efficiently and fairly-and simultaneously yield a wiser 
selection of those interpretative positions as to which uni­
formity is sought. 
Second, requests from taxpayers regarding rulings on 
prospective transactions serve better than any other device to 
alert the central office immediately as new interpretative prob ­
lems arise . They give that office the opportunity to develop 
and publish its position in a timely manner, for the benefit of 
field personnel as well as other taxpayers. In the United States, 
despite efforts to encourage field personnel to seek the central 
office 's advice on difficult matters, the fact is that requests 
which originate with taxpayers are ten times as great. l32 
1 32 E.g., Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. cit. supra note 57, 
at 6. 
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Section c. Implementing an Interpre tative 
Regulations Program 
2 . 9  Introduction: Inherent conflict among the goals 
A program, responsible for promulgating interpretative 
regulations of Proper quality, in a timely manner, without un ­
due expenditure of talented manpower, cannot hope to succeed 
unless these goals are considered in proper perspective . To  
this end, the first need is  to  analyze the specifics which make 
for proper quality, to maximize the likelihood that, in practice, 
the right balance will be reached between inherently conflicting 
constituents of that one goal. The essential second step is to 
take suitable account of yet another inherent conflict: the one 
between that goal-viewed as a whole-and the other two goals 
of timeliness and efficiency. The solution here is to so design 
the procedures (through which drafts will be processed) that 
they will avoid undue compromise of any one of the three goals. 
2 . 10 The goal of proper quality 
To say that interpretative regulations will be of proper 
quality if they are complete, technically correct, and under­
standable133 is to say much but not enough. So simplistic a 
standard tends to obscure the complexity of each constituent 
and the inherent conflict among them. 
If regulations alone discharged the entire interpretative 
function, then to be complete they would have to deal Precisely 
with every significant ambiguity in the statute . Yet to seek 
absolute precision in an initial regulation issued more or less 
simultaneously with the enactment of the underlying statute 
involves great risk. With every precise line drawn at this 
embryo stage come increased risks of reaching unintended re ­
sults in unanticipated situations and of committing technical 
error in the eyes of the judiciary . There is, of course, a 
competing risk. Overzealousness in trying to achieve absolute 
accuracy can produce regulations which are nothing more than 
purposeless sterile echoes of the statute itself and, thus, well 
below any meaningful level of completeness and understand­
ability . 
Technical accuracy, nevertheless, not perfect precision, 
does stand foremost among the constituents insuring proper 
133 See Williams, " Preparation and Promulgation of Treasury De­
partment Regulations Under Internal Revenue Code of 1954," So . Calif. 
8th Tax Inst .  733 (1956). 
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quality. If inaccurate, a regulation achieves the opposite of 
its sole purpose . Typically, after promulgation, several years 
will pass before the judiciary can make a final determination 
regarding a regulation. And if the courts belatedly disapprove 
the regulation, it alone bears responsibility for the injustice 
suffered by those who voluntarily complied and for the result­
ing nonuniformity between this group and those who success­
fully resisted. Further, recurring invalidation of regulatory 
interpretations, if by a judiciary which-in principle -custom­
arily gives respectful consideration to regulatory interpreta­
tions, can tend only to shorten the life span of that customary 
practice . And too frequent invalidation even by a judiciary not 
so committed tends to lead taxpayers also to lose respect for 
the whole regulations program, and this will tend to produce 
wholesale nonconformity . 
In attempting to achieve the right balance between two 
competing standards, technical accuracy and completeness in 
the sense of precise interpretations, three considerations should 
lead to a rather obvious conclusion. First, at the point when 
a statutory provision is enacted, those who must draft the in­
terpretative regulation cannot possibly envisage the actual 
shape of every potentially affected transaction. In effect, from 
the vantage point of transactions not foreseen, any perfectly 
precise regulatory line would have been drawn by draftsmen 
who were ' 'blindfolded. "  Second, to help alert the draftsman 
to factual situations not imagined, and also to test the logic 
behind his proposed interpretation and his choice of language 
in trying to reflect his intention, some type of public hearings, 
formal or informal, should be held after publication of a tenta­
tive draft134 and before its formal adoption. 135 Third, while 
this practice will help educate the draftsman, 136 neither public 
hearings at this early stage in the life of the statute nor the 
134 Fairness to taxpayers also requires the government to take this 
type of meticulous care, given the fact that regulations, once formally 
adopted, bind employees at least as a matter of hierarchical control 
and can be tested, where adverse to a taxpayer, only by litigation. 
135 Of the countries covered by this study, only the United States 
holds formal hearings where any taxpayer may appear in person or 
submit statements in writing. However, most of the others do receive 
pre- adoption comments from interested professional, industrial, and 
labor groups. See § 2.6 ,  Chaps. VI, X, and XIV infra . While the U.S. 
practice, as it relates to interpretative as distinguished from legisla­
tive regulations, may not be required by statute, it is consistently 
followed. See Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 25, at 759 n. 6. 
136 See Williams, op . cit. supra note 133, at 753. 
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draftsman's own study, can be expected to alert him to more 
than a fraction of all the diverse factual situations his attempt 
at a precise line would affect. 137 In consequence, the drafts­
man should be made to understand that a new regulation is not 
expected to discharge the whole interpretative function. A 
rulings program should assume part of the burden. After the 
regulation is issued, sporadic requests from taxpayers for 
rulings will further educate the central office regarding the 
factual patterns of the really marginal cases, thus removing 
additional bits of its blindfold and enabling it intelligently, 
through individual rulings, to "pinprick" its way toward a more 
precise line . 138 
These considerations suggest that an interpretative regu­
lation which clarifies a statutory ambiguity by the use of a 
general definition or principle -supplemented by illustrative 
concrete applications to the most frequently recurring but 
seemingly not marginal situations-is the only method which 
can balance properly completeness (in the sense of precision) 
and the paramount aim of technical accuracy. By hypothesis, 
such a regulation is more likely to survive judicial scrutiny 
than one which establishes a perfectly precise line . For ab­
sent a precise line, the courts remain free, when testing sub ­
sequent rulings in seemingly more marginal cases, t o  edge 
toward the exact location of the dividing line without prejudice 
to the regulation's general definition or to the large measure 
of uniformity achieved by its illustrative concrete responses 
to the more frequently recurring but seemingly less marginal 
cases.  
Finally, to be of proper quality, a regulation must be 
understandable. Hence, draftsmen have the further burden of 
determining the intellectual level of the expected audience .  
137 This i s  amply demonstrated by U.S. experience, where, though 
such hearings always are held, post-promulgation requests for rulings 
continue to expose problems in previously unanticipated situations. 
138 This opportunity to pinprick toward a line is also the reason 
why, generally speaking, it is wise to use a series of narrowly tailored 
published rulings, rather than a general amendment to the regulations, 
to deal with situations not anticipated when the original regulations 
were drafted. 
There is a yet further reason for conforming to this practice in 
countries such as the United States, where regulations , but not rulings, 
are given great weight by the judiciary. In good conscience, the 
government ought not try, through the amending process, to "boot­
strap" what essentially are just belatedly arrived at litigation positions . 
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This will differ, not just from country to country, but also 
from regulation to regulation. To illustrate, the U.S. program 
assumes that the regulations will not be used by the typical 
individual taxpayer who usually is completely unaware of their 
existence. The administration attempts to resolve the ques­
tions of such a taxpayer in 18  pages of instructions which ac ­
company his return. As to other relatively small U.S. tax­
payers for whom those instructions are inadequate (farmers, 
small business men, and employees with some outside inter­
ests), over two and a half million pay a few cents for a much 
detailed booklet distributed by the government_l39 Millions 
more purchase an inexpensive commercial counterpart of those 
booklets .  Yet other millions of taxpayers in the same bracket 
employ one of the many thousands of persons who, usually on 
a part-time basis and for only a few dollars, prepare these 
relatively simple returns . Further, these groups can consult 
field personnel associated with the taxpayers-assistance pro­
gram which each local office maintains throughout the year 
(though the great bulk of its activity is concentrated in the 
filing season) . During fiscal 1966, for example, this program­
manned by the lowest grade technicians in the local office-re­
sponded to 16.6 million inquiries made by telephone and to 
questions raised by 9.1 million taxpayers who visited the local 
offices .140 Thus, those persons who use portions of the regu­
lations affecting relatively simple returns include widely di­
verse groups . They range from tax professionals, who draft 
the instructions attached to returns and write the government's 
booklets or their commercial counterparts, to the far less well 
trained individuals who e ither man the local offices '  taxpayers­
assistance program or, as  part-time practitioners, prepare un­
complicated returns for small fees. And it is to these less 
less capable individuals that draftsmen of such regulations 
address their efforts. 
At the other extreme, regulations affecting, say, depletion 
or consolidated returns, have an audience as sophisticated as 
139 See C ommissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note 57,  at 
90. Of the large ones, the three most widely used are Your Federal 
Income Tax, Tax Guide for Small Business (the 1965 editions of which, 
in both cases, ran to 160 pages) , and the Farmer's  Tax Guide (164 
pages). Approximately 60 other more narrowly focused pamphlets are 
distributed. Altogether, the total taxpayers' assistance program in 
fiscal 1965 required an expenditure of 1,298 man-years. See Com­
missioner of Internal Revenue, Annual Report 1965, 4. 
140 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note 57,  
at 4. 
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the business enterprises affected. Thus these regulations, in 
the interest both of technical accuracy and brevity, can use 
terms of art incomprehensible to those not intimately familiar 
with the affairs of such enterprises, and still conform to an 
acceptable level of understandability . 
The understandability of a regulation is affected also by 
whether it is expected to respond to anything more than the 
anticipated ambiguities in a given statutory provision. Un­
questionably, the interpretation accorded these, and its signifi­
cance, will be both more readily understood and easier to 
draft if put in the context of a comprehensive regulation suffi­
ciently self-contained to serve for most purposes as a substi­
tute for the statutory provision itse1f. 141 This approach, to 
which the United States conforms, also enables the draftsman 
to rephrase otherwise unambiguous parts of the statute to com­
pensate, where necessary, for the formal legalistic mode of 
expression.142 But this is not without risk; to change language 
not otherwise ambiguous may change the meaning, however 
slightly. 
2 . 1 1  Processing regulations : Reconciling the goal of proper 
quality with competing goals of timeliness and efficiency 
To design a regulation of proper quality (striking the right 
balance as to technical accuracy, completeness, and under ­
standability) takes both time and talented manpower . In con­
sequence, stress inevitably emerges between that goal and the 
competing need for regulations to be issued in a timely man­
ner, without undue expenditure of precious talented manpower .  
A draftsman may invest substantial time just to identify 
the significant ambiguities in a new statutory provision and to 
learn something about the diverse types of transactions each 
such ambiguity affects . Then comes the painstaking effort to 
find language that is technically accurate, that is responsive 
both to the views of policy makers and to the administrative 
need of easy application, that is sufficiently precise to resolve 
141 Persons who have some doubt about either the meaning of the 
regulation or its validity necessarily must have recourse to the statute 
itself, pre-enactment materials, and court decisions. 
142 Of the four European countries which issue interpretative regula­
tions, apparently Germany is the only one which makes no attempt to 
rephrase the statute into the language of laymen, its premise appar­
ently being that the regulations are intended to guide only in-service 
professionals . Cf. Chap. XIV, § 2.5 with § 2.5 in Chaps. VI and XXII 
infra, and with § 2.4, Chap. X infra , 
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most recurring situations but not so precise as to create great 
risk of producing unintended results in unanticipated situations, 
and that clar ifies the "legalese " in the unambiguous part of 
the statute without changing the meaning. Any public hear ing, 
if scheduled to insure the public adequate time to react thought­
fully to a published tentative draft, will contribute to yet 
further delay, but also to an improved draft, as will any re­
sulting revisions and necessary reviews by higher officials.  
Nevertheless, if a regulation is to begin to fulfill its pur ­
poses in a timely manner, it should be promulgated, as in 
Belgium, 143 not later than the effective date of the new statu­
tory provision. Delay beyond this, as is the case so frequently 
in the United States, is unfair to the type of frequently re­
curring prospective transactions to which the regulation itself 
should have been a dependable guide . In the event of such 
delay, on any comparative basis, it is grossly inefficient to try 
to accommodate these cases through individual private rulings.  
Prospective transactions more marginal or doubtful in charac­
ter would be even more certain to suffer, for it would be both 
inefficient and often unwise to try to rule on these before 
finalizing the general principles of the regulation. Finally, if 
a regulation is not promulgated at least by the filing date of 
the first returns affected by the new statutory provision, then 
in both self- and non-self-assessment countries it will default 
pro tanto on all its remaining purposes. 
While all tax administrations tend to suffer, whether more 
or less, from a perpetual shortage of talented drafting per ­
sonnel, the magnitude of any given statutory revision itself 
will determine the actual difficulty generated by the inherent 
conflict between the goals of proper quality and timeliness.  In 
any circumstance, however, measures which properly reconcile 
these competing goals will tend also to secure the right balance 
in the efficient use of talented manpower . 
Countries covered by this study which do issue interpre ­
tative regulations lodge the drafting responsibility in offices 
which maintain close contact with the legislative processing of 
the new statutory provision.144 Given this essential contact, 
if historically diverse U.S. practices furnish a trustworthy 
guide, promulgation of a regulation will be expedited if three 
additional arrangements are built into the process.  
143 See Chap. VI, § 2.6 infra . 
144 See § 2.6 in Chaps. VI, X, XIV, XVIII, and XXII infra . Also, 
note 82 supra . 
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First, responsibility for the proposed draft should be 
lodged at the outset in the type of tax professional whose 
prior training is most likely to produce skilled, imaginative 
draftsmen. Second, they should be accorded timely access to 
policy-level personnel, as well as to technicians familiar with 
both administrative necessities and taxpayer concerns in the 
specific substantive area. Third, in proper circumstances, a 
regulation should be published piecemeal. 
Unfortunately, at one time or another, practice in the United 
States has failed to employ one or more of these techniques .  
During the 1950's, most initial drafts were prepared and ini­
tially reviewed by technicians academically trained primarily 
as accountants. These drafts then were re-reviewed by both 
spadework and senior personnel academically trained as law­
yers . Finally, the cumulative product was given a super­
review by both spadework and senior personnel in the policy­
making echelons . All too frequently, this arrangement resulted 
in superfluous duplication of effort on two counts, both of which 
contributed to substantial and unnecessary delay. 
First, the reviewing lawyers tended to treat initial drafts 
prepared by those academically trained primarily as account­
ants much as they would have treated the proposed draft of a 
will submitted by a lay client. The lawyers tended to believe 
their technical review would be more effective if they started 
by preparing what was tantamount to an entirely new draft. 
In consequence, much of the original draftsman's efforts, and 
thus considerable time, was wasted. It took a change in pro­
cedure to remedy this . Initial drafting responsibility for in­
come tax regulations was shifted to the lawyers who, with 
timely access to administrative technicians, could be alerted 
to administrative and taxpayer concerns as work on a regula­
tion progressed. 
Second, also in the 1950's, because the policy-making 
echelon ordinarily was not involved until after a completed 
draft had been refined and polished, any redirection on policy 
grounds, coming belatedly and sometimes requiring a more or 
less complete overhaul, wasted the time spent previously but 
futilely on refinements and polishing. 145 This too can be pre­
vented by affording more timely access to the policy-making 
145 The comparatively small policy-making group contributed to yet 
additional delay because of its tendency to fly-speck each regulation, 
in terms of its completeness, technical accuracy, and understandability. 
See Williams, op . cit. supra note 133, at 751 .  
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echelon. Initial contact with this level should occur not later 
than the point when the drafting office has isolated the major 
ambiguities in the statute, is alert to the more frequently re­
curring situations potentially affected by each, and has thought 
out the competing principles, if any, which would be techni­
cally defensible and administratively feasible to implement. 
The purposes of the two foregoing arrangements also can 
be satisfied, and not infrequently are in the United States, by 
assigning a regulations project at the outset to a three-man 
team composed of a lawyer, a technician, and a policy-making 
representative. This completely avoids the time-consuming 
seriatum nature of their respective involvements as it existed 
during the fifties .  
The third desired arrangement affects those instances 
where all of a regulation interpreting a given statutory provi­
sion is complete except for one isolatable and particularly 
difficult matter . If completion of that one aspect would unduly 
postpone the timeliness of the completed portion, the latter 
should be promulgated without further delay. The omitted 
paragraphs need only carry a notice that they will be published 
upon completion. 
Section D. Implementing Private and Published 
Rulings Programs 
2 . 12 Introduction: Resolving inherent conflict between respec­
tive goals of private and published rulings programs 
The first imperative in implementing separate programs 
covering private and published rulings is to insure that each 
takes proper account of the inherent conflict which exists be ­
tween their respective goals. Otherwise neither goal can be 
adequately achieved. 
As previously indicated, the principal goal of the private 
rulings program is to provide advance guidance to legitimate 
prospective transactions. To accomplish this objective, a pri­
vate ruling must be timely, i .e . ,  available before the deadline 
for consummation of the prospective transaction. Because in 
a fast moving economy, consummation of many prospective 
transactions cannot be long delayed, speed is an essential in­
gredient of the program. Published rulings, on the other hand, 
are intended as a supplement to the regulations program; their 
principal goal is nationwide uniformity, among both taxpayers 
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and field personnel. And precisely because these rulings do 
fix the nationwide position of the government, rather than just 
the tax effect of a single transaction, absolute correctness is 
their most important characteristic . In consequence, the in­
herent conflict between the respective essential attributes of 
the two different programs can be summarized in terms of 
speed v. quality -i.e. ,  absolute correctness. The potential con­
sequences of this conflict can be awesomely serious . 
On the one hand, in some instances, failure to publish 
immediately the result of the first pr ivate ruling in a given 
area, thus permitting time for further study prior to publica­
tion, may lead only to a loss of efficiency. Each local audit 
or assessing official will have to take the time, in the case 
of other taxpayers similarly situated, at least to think through 
a problem with which National Office rulings personnel already 
have dealt. But much more serious is the prospect that the 
widely scattered officials may reach nonuniform results, there­
by depriving other similarly situated taxpayers of equal treat­
ment under the law. On the other hand, immediate publication 
of the result speedily reached in a private ruling covering only 
a single case can extend across the entire nation a conclu­
sion, possibly incorrect. The private ruling may have been 
incorrectly decided, not just because it had to be issued in a 
timely fashion, but because, rulings personnel in the National 
Office were not then aware of all the potential applications and 
implications of that ruling, i.e., of the diverse factual situa­
tions the ruling inevitably would affect. When subsequent 
analysis of later requests for private rulings on somewhat 
similar situations discloses error in the previously published 
ruling, the administration-to be logical-must e ither enlarge 
that error or reverse it. In the United States, there is a 
tendency to try to avoid this dilemma by postponing issuance 
of a private ruling until rulings personnel, working at the level 
at which the given type of ruling normally would be issued, 
conclude the result reached is one which safely could be pub ­
lished,146 But because of this caution, too frequently the 
146 Even so, private rulings sometimes are issued before the total 
implications are recognized. E. g., see Knetsch v. u.s. ,  348 F.2d 932 
(Ct. Cl. 1965 ) ;  "Warwick Fund Ruling Withdrawn; I.R.S. Policy Ques­
tioned," 19 J. Taxation 197 (1963). Prior to issuance of a published 
version, the error is likely to be recognized, however. In substantial 
part, this is because published versions, as distinct from private rul­
ings, always are reviewed at a high level, involving usually the Assist­
ant C ommissioner {Technical) , the Director of the appropriate Division, 
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private ruling covering a prospective transaction is not timely 
and consequently this program defaults pro tanto on its sepa­
rate purpose .147 
Obviously the inherent conflict between the goals of the 
two programs needs resolution-and in a manner which ordi­
narily permits each effectively to accomplish its own separate 
mission. Personnel working on private rulings should under ­
stand (i) that the tax system itself-not the taxpayer- is re­
sponsible for any tax uncertainty suffered by a legitimate pro­
spective transaction and (ii) that in consequence of the fore­
going they are expected to reach the wisest decision possible, 
subject ordinarily, however, to an overriding responsibility : 
to respond within a fairly timely manner . Conversely, per ­
sonnel working on the published version of a ruling should 
understand that absolute correctness is their most essential 
goal. 148 Publication, if need be, is to be postponed until there 
is sufficient acquaintance with the total factual terrain to in­
sure correctness. With this overriding limitation, at least the 
subject matter (as distinguished from the exact result) of all 
precedent-type private rulings should become, in due course, 
the subject of a published ruling. 
(footnote continued) 
and a senior official in the Chief Counsel' s office. On major policy 
issues, the Commissioner himself and policy officials at Treasury' s 
headquarters also become involved. See Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 
25, at 766 n. 49, and Caplin, op. cit. supra note 63, at 27. Further, 
because often there is a substantial time lag between issuance of the 
first private ruling in an area and publication itself, several requests 
for rulings in that area will have been received and perhaps answered. 
In consequence, the senior officials who review proposed published 
rulings have the chance at least to become more fully acquainted with 
the total factual terrain than did the lower ranking official who issued 
the first private ruling. In further consequence, the actual result 
reached in the first published ruling may not coincide with the result 
actually reached in the first private ruling, in contrast to the supposed 
theory governing the relationship between the two programs as outlined 
in § 2.3 supra . 
147 In fiscal 1965,  37% of the rulings required more than 60 days but 
less than 6 months, and another 21% required more than 6 months. 
See Rogovin, op. cit . supra note 25, at 767 n. 59. An earlier Chief 
Counsel put blame for much of this delay on taxpayers themselves, 
citing their failure to present the facts fully, to pinpoint the issue, and 
to submit an adequate analysis of the authorities. Rose, "The Rulings 
Program of the Internal Revenue Service," 35 Taxes 907 (1957) .  
148 This i s  not intended to imply that different personnel should be 
used in carrying out the two different functions . As to the short­
comings of that arrangement, see § 2.17 supra . 
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There is one exceptional type of case, however, where a 
private ruling should be withheld until personnel are certain 
they have reached that result they would be willing, by publi­
cation, to apply on a nationwide basis . This withholding should 
occur in any case where it is recognized that a subsequent 
change in position, if applied to that taxpayer 's competitors, 
would substantially affect the business struggle between them. 
This limitation, however, probably applies more broadly to 
excise taxes with their direct effect on prices149 than to in­
come taxes .  
Observe, finally, that if each program otherwise is  to 
focus on its own separate function as suggested here, publica­
tion will not serve to police the integrity of the private rulings 
program. 150 But that need can be satisfied by appropriate 
internal reviews . 
2 . 13 Confining private rulings to legal questions : Requiring 
statements of fact and a brief 
The central office would assume a burden for which it is 
ill-suited as well as make wasteful use of local office talents, 
should it ordinarily attempt to rule on prospective transactions 
149 For a dramatic illustration, see International Business Machines 
Corp. v. u.s., 343 F .2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965). The abuse in that case 
was deemed to be so great that the court, in effect, extended an earlier 
favorable private ruling received by one taxpayer to a competing tax­
payer who later had received an adverse ruling. For an argument 
that this should be the universal practice, even as to income tax ques­
tions, see Kragon, "The Private Ruling, "  45 Taxes 331 (1967). For 
a contrary view, see Rogovin, op. cit. supra note 25, at 767.  That the 
general practice actually is to the contrary, see § 2.3, supra notes 53-
55, and Kragen, id., at 3 34 n. 13. If the earlier erroneous ruling had 
continuing effect because concerned with an excise tax matter, it could 
be revoked prospectively, of course. This was done, though belatedly, 
in the above cited case. 
150 In the United States ,  preservation of such clearly was one of the 
intended purposes of the publication program. See Hearings on Ad­
ministration of the Internal Revenue Laws, Before a Subcommittee of 
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 83d Cong. , 1st Sess. 1564 
and 1570 (1953). In furtherance of that purpose, if S. 2 047,  89th Cong., 
1st Sess.  (1965) had been enacted, the administration would have been 
required to publish within ten days any ruling involving a potential tax 
liability exceeding $100,000. For reasons previously related, however, 
both the private and published rulings programs, and thus the tax sys­
tem itself, would suffer from enactment of any proposal locking pub­
lication to the actual results reached in private rulings. See Rogovin, 
op . cit. supra note 25, at 7 67 n. 60. 
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involving mere questions of fact.151 Such questions frequently 
require on-site inspections and the weight accorded much of 
the evidence often turns on the credibility of witnesses. More ­
over, as a practical matter, the central office, precisely be­
cause it is central, would have to make its determination on 
the basis of a cold record. Thus, a local office would have 
to conduct an examination and certify that the record contained 
all the evidence and its own finding regarding credibility. 
Further, whether the central or local office actually issued 
the ruling, after the taxpayer had filed the return covering 
the affected transaction, the local office would have to conduct 
another examination to insure that neither the evidence nor 
facts had changed prior to the consummation itself. 
This wasteful duplication of effort will be avoided, how­
ever, and the central office will be peculiarly well suited to 
the task if, as is generally true in the United States, it con­
fines rulings to questions of law152 and holds the taxpayer 
responsible for submission of a written statement reflecting 
all relevant facts-including a copy of all documents to be exe ­
cuted when the transaction is consummated. 153 Then, later ­
after the ruling has been issued, the transaction consummated, 
and the return filed-the local office, in its first and sole ex­
amination, need only ascertain whether the actual facts cor­
responded to those previously submitted by the taxpayer _154 If 
they do correspond, the local office need not even make a 
legal analysis of the problem; that was done by the central 
office before issuing the ruling. In effect, labor has been 
divided between the two echelons, and all duplication avoided. 
On occasion, of course-particularly where unrepresented tax­
payers submit self-prepared requests-rulings personnel may 
find an essential fact has been omitted and thus be unable to 
rule . Where feasible, the taxpayer should be alerted to the 
151 C/. Goodman, op . cit . supra note 131. 
152 see Rev. Proc. 64-31, C .B. 1964-2, 947, amplified in Rev. Proc. 
66-34, I.R.B. 1966-34, 22, which lists the no-rulings areas. C ertain 
mixed questions are accommodated. Also, in a very few instances 
where the statute itself literally turns the tax on the presence of a 
tax avoidance purpose (e.g., I.R.C.,  §§ 367 and 1492), the administration 
will give advance rulings on this essentially factual question. E.g., 
see Treas. Reg. § 367-1. In a somewhat similar statutory setting, 
England follows a similar practice. See Chapter XVill, § 2. 7 infra . 
153 Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 6.02, I.R.B. 1967-1, 9. 
154 In the United States, the letter ruling itself will include a state­
ment of all facts to which the result is addressed. 
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difficulty, 155 but without prejudice to the overriding rule that, 
ultimately, he alone is responsible for exposing to light all 
relevant facts . If, upon later examination of his return, it 
appears that his request for the earlier ruling did omit a 
material fact or included material assertions at variance with 
the ultimate facts, the ruling will lack any force or effect. 
In the interest of efficiency, taxpayers also should be re­
quired as in the United States, 156 or in  fairness at least be  
encouraged, to  accompany their request with a second state ­
ment which both identifies the precise statutory issue in doubt157 
and analyzes the legal data (authorities, etc. )  supporting the 
taxpayer 's particular contention. Exception should be made, 
of course, where the question in issue involves an amount so 
small that it would be against the taxpayer 's economic self­
interest to e mploy a private practitioner .  These cases aside, 
however, requirement of such a statement would contr ibute to 
efficiency by relieving the rulings specialist from one of the 
three demanding roles he otherwise must fulfill (advocate for 
the taxpayer, advocate for the government, and judge ) .  More­
over, since the taxpayer 's own representative typically is best 
suited to develop the arguments which support his side, this 
requirement would insure that the taxpayer's position would be 
presented fully. Thus, while contributing to efficiency, the 
greater interest of equity also would be fostered: the tax­
payer 's statement serving not only himself but also the gov­
ernment, which should have the single aim of reaching the 
truly correct result. 
2.14 Organization, conferences, review, and appeals re private 
rulings 
Comparably for the reason just indicated, it serves the 
interest of administration and taxpayer alike to grant an oral 
155 This accords with u.s. practice. Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 6, 07 ,  
I.R.B. 1967-1, 11 .  On occasion, where this i s  not feasible, a n  informa­
tion letter, describing but not applying the law, will be issued. Rev. 
Proc. 67-1, Sec. 5,01, op . cit . ,  at 9. 
156 Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 6,03, I.R.B. 1967-1, 10. 
157 The United States permits local District Directors to issue so­
called determination letters as to non-doubtful situations clearly covered 
by statute, regulation, or previously published rulings. But because 
this practice generally is limited to completed transactions (Rev. Proc. 
67-1, Sec. 4. 01, I.R.B, 1967-1, 7), the national office itself receives 
many requests for rulings on prospective transactions which, while 
complex or involving large sums, are not believed by the taxpayer to 
involve any tax uncertainty. He simply wants an " insurance policy." 
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conference upon request. But this is so only if the specialist 
responsible for the problem tentatively decides to rule ad­
versely to the taxpayer's contention. A practitioner, preparing 
the earlier submitted written brief, hardly can be expected to 
anticipate every nuance of every court decision, etc., about 
which rulings specialists may develop some concern. Because 
both sides will benefit most if the conference focuses on the 
specific concerns which have emerged from the specialist's 
own considered study of the matter, taxpayers should be at 
least discouraged from seeking a conference at an earlier 
point, before the specialist has had a chance to study the 
matter and to determine the particular points he believes 
troublesome . 158 
Relevant to the choice of the government's representative 
at such conferences is the fact that, as requests for rulings 
increase, so too must rulings personnel. illustratively, the 
U.S. program now absorbs the time of several hundred techni­
cians . Moreover, if reasonable standards of efficiency are to 
be maintained, sizeable programs require a given division of 
labor . Most rulings personnel should specialize in a subject­
matter area with spadework on most rulings undertaken by the 
least experienced personnel, whose tentative conclusions will 
be reviewed by those more able and experienced to whom au­
thority has been delegated to sign the ruling, yea or nay. 
When this division of labor has evolved, a reviewer in the 
latter actual decision-making category-if at all feasible-should 
attend any conference accorded a taxpayer, to explore at first 
hand, rather than hear second hand through an underling, the 
taxpayer 's rebuttal to the actual decision-maker 's concerns . 
In responding to the need for efficient, fair, and informed 
discharge of the rulings function, rulings personnel in the 
United States have been spread among eight different special­
ized branches 159 and the branch chief himself, or a reviewer 
empowered to sign his name, ordinarily is required to attend 
any conference. 160 Such personnel at the branch level actually 
158 This is the import of the U.S. procedure. Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sees. 
6 . 08 and 7 . 02 ,  I.R.B. 1967-1, 11 and 1 2 .  
1 5 9  Six of these involve income taxation (corporation, corporate re­
organizations, individual, depreciation, exempt organizations, and pen­
sion trusts).  The other two deal, respectively, with excise and with 
estate and gift taxation. Yet other branches deal with actuarial and 
administrative matters . A given branch also may further subdivide 
its personnel into more narrow specialities. 
160 Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 7 . 02, I.R.B. 1 967 -1 , 12.  
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issue more than 7 5  percent of the rulings. 161 Situations occur, 
however, where a broader -based expertise is needed. Illus­
tratively, a particular factual situation falling within the com­
petence of one specialized branch actually may raise an inter­
pretative issue of common concern to two or more branches .  
And even where this is not so, the importance of some ques­
tions merits the attention, not just of specialists, but also of 
the most talented generalists . To accommodate these prob­
lems, the eight branches have been divided among three divi­
sions, dealing respectively with income taxes, exempt organi­
zations and pension trusts, and miscellaneous taxes .  Each 
Division Director has a very small staff of reviewers (most 
of whom are generalists) and is responsible to the Assistant 
Commissioner (Technical) . 
This three-layer organizational arrangement (branch, di­
vision, Assistant Commissioner) causes some taxpayers, on 
receiving an adverse ruling at the branch level, to wish a fur­
ther appeal were available -i.e ., an appeal to the appropriate 
Division Director and, if need be, to the Assistant Commis­
sioner .  While no doubt such appeals would produce different 
results in at least a few cases, attempts at perfection must be 
tempered by recognition of the possible. The hard fact is that 
the Division Director and his staff could not possibly review 
in detail all adverse decisions issued by his branches .  In 
consequence, instead of giving taxpayers a "right" to appeal to 
his office, the branches have been instructed to forward to it 
for further review, prior to issuance, any ruling the branch 
itself deems to be sufficiently doubtful or important to warrant 
such attention. Actually, well over three-fourths of all rulings 
are issued without such a review. And as to the remainder, 
it is physically possible to give affected taxpayers a "right" 
to a further oral conference in the Division Director 's office 
only if that office tentatively decides either to reverse a ruling 
which the branch would have decided favorably to the tax­
payer's contention, or to sustain an adverse ruling but on a 
new or different ground than that on which the branch re­
lied. 162 
161 See Rogovin, op. cit. supra note 25,  at 766 n. 49. 
162 Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 7. 02, I.R.B. 1967-1, 12.  Only a small per­
cent of those reaching the division level are referred also to the In­
terpretative Division in the Chief Counsel' s  Office. 
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2 . 1 5  Priorities re advance rulings; and grounds for refusal to 
rule 
Any private rulings program, if responsive to prospective 
transactions, will encounter two different types of priority 
problems. One involves the order in which requests should be 
handled; the other, the areas which should be excluded from 
the scope of the program. 
The first will become a problem even if, in the face of 
typically tight budgetary limitations, an adequate number of 
talented personnel can be assigned to the program. Requests 
for rulings do not come in throughout the year at a regular 
rate . Instead they tend in the opposite, with the United States, 
for example, showing a fairly consistent seasonal variation. 
Because this variation is an expected phenomenon, personnel 
working exclusively on rulings can use their time efficiently 
throughout the entire year only if there is at least a modest 
inventory or backlog to carry them through the slack periods . 
Inadequate staffing not infrequently causes that essential back­
log to increase beyond the essential level. Taken in conjunc­
tion with the work backlog, the varying amount of effort in­
dividual cases require typically will prevent taxpayers from 
receiving a ruling by return mail. Indeed, in the United States, 
not more than half the rulings usually can be issued within the 
first two months after the requests are received.163 In fair­
ness, since most requests will involve prospective transactions, 
they normally should be disposed of, as they are in the United 
States, according to the order of their receipt. But situations 
will arise where a given taxpayer, without fault, clearly shows 
great need for extraordinary speed in resolving his problem. 
However, only if these requests for special priority are a very 
small fraction of the total should procedures be left sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate them. 164 Otherwise, disposition of 
cases received earlier will be unduly postponed. 
A second and more broadly ranging priority principle, of 
concern to management at the highest level, should contribute 
to a delimitation on the scope of the program. In deciding the 
extent to which talented personnel can be made available to 
this particular program, the administration must take proper 
account of other important but inevitably unmet needs typically 
spanning the entire spectrum of its responsibilities .  Given 
163 See note 147 supra for other reasons contributing to this delay. 
164 This is the import of U.S. practice. Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 6,09 ,  
I.R.B. 1967-1, 11 .  
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these competing needs, any administration would be hard put 
to justify staifing this one program so adequately that its man­
power will be available to extend the advance ruling program 
to cover types of transactions which at best can be covered 
only with gross inefficiency . The argument in 2 . 13,  supra, for 
denying advance rulings to mere factual questions, was bottomed 
solely on this priority principle. 165 The existence within the 
Service of various unmet needs also should be one reason for 
precluding this program, as is the case in the United States, 
from being so well staifed that it can take time to respond to 
prospective transactions deemed lacking in business purpose .166 
Indeed, in further support of this position, the only argument 
for launching an advance rulings program was that tax uncer­
tainties should not be allowed to force delay or abandonment 
of transactions which would have been purposeful had no tax 
law existed. 167 The proscription regarding transactions lack­
ing in business purpose will not be easy to administer, how­
ever . Only at the extremes is it easy to distinguish between 
proposed transactions which are motivated solely by tax con­
siderations-and hence should fall in the no-rulings area-and 
others which would have a legitimate purpose in the absence 
of the tax law but are shaped to take advantage of the less 
costly of two or more different tax routes .  Though the line 
between these two categories becomes less discernible as 
transactions move toward the center,  an attempt to distinguish 
between them must be made, for ordinarily those falling in the 
second category should be granted advance rulings. Not to 
rule on transactions falling within the latter category would 
leave those responsible only for administration of a tax law 
open to a proper charge that, having established a rulings pro­
gram, they now have transcended their administrative function. 
That is, by discriminating through refusal to rule, they pres­
ently hope, in  terms of practical effect, either to  regulate the 
165 The prospect that effort might be wasted no doubt is also one 
reason why estate tax questions posed by living persons are beyond 
the ambit of the U.S. rulings program. See Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec, 3,02, 
I.R.B. 1967-1, 7. The prospect of waste here relates to the substan­
tial chance that the recipient' s circumstances or the law may change 
during the possibly long period between the date of the ruling and the 
recipient' s death. 
166 Rev. Rul. 64-31, C .B. 1964-2, 947 , amplified in Rev. Proc. 66-
34, I.R.B. 1966-34, 22, puts these in the no-rulings category. Germany 
does likewise. See Chapter XIV, § 2 .  7 infra . 
167 Cf. C aplin, op . cit . supra note 63. 
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shape of, or to deny a benefit accorded by the tax law to, 
transactions which would have been purposeful had the tax law 
not existed. Of course, the responsibility of a mere adminis­
trator to rule in this circumstance can be modified with per­
fect propriety expressly or implicitly by the legislature itself. 
For example, it may be implicit in a given statutory provision 
that the legislature specifically intended to use a loosely woven 
statutory standard (oftentimes subjective in character) as an 
en terrorem weapon to police the integrity, and hopefully in 
practice to fence in the range, of a given tax idea. An ad­
vance ruling in this circumstance obviously would frustrate the 
legislative intention. 168 
2 . 1 6  Completed transactions : Private rulings and in-service 
technical advice 
Again, employing a standard of priority, the absence of 
reliable tax guidance usually is less serious to a taxpayer 
whose transaction has been completed than to one facing a 
prospective transaction. Nevertheless, before filing a return 
covering a completed transaction, at least those taxpayers who 
live in self-assessment countries should be able-in a rela­
tively routine manner-to obtain national office rulings on legal 
issues, to the end of enabling them to file proper returns and 
thereby self-assess the proper liability. And, generally speak­
ing, this is U.S. practice .  Indeed, if the question is not open 
to doubt and does not involve an industry-wide problem, even 
a local District Director can make the necessary binding com­
mitment. 169 
Once the return is filed, however, in both self- and non­
self-assessment countries, the cumulative effect of three con­
siderations furnishes a substantial reason why, from that point 
on, the taxpayer himself should be denied free access to the 
central rulings office . First, because both types of countries 
168 On the other hand, in a yet different proviSion, the legislature 
may imply that the administration is expected to rule in advance re­
garding the motivation behind a given transaction, motivation being the 
crucial issue. E. g., see I.R.C., § 367 and Treas. Reg. § 1 .367-1. A 
similar example can be found in England. See Chapter XVIII, § 2. 7 
infra . 
169 His commitment is called a " determination letter" rather than a 
ruling. See Rev. Proc. 67-1, Sec. 4, I.R.B. 1967-1, 7, and supra notes 
57 and 157 . His authority ordinarily does not extend to prospective 
transactions, however. 
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must undertake an enormous number of examinations, 170  effec­
tive administration is possible only if initial authority over 
filed returns is decentralized and lodged in local offices. 171 
Second, because many, many issues will emerge from these 
examinations, a decentralized system of administrative appeal, 
geographically convenient to taxpayers-large and small-must 
be established. Third and finally, to preserve this indispensa­
ble decentralization and to prevent the system from being in­
verted and thus becoming top-heavy, every effort must be made 
to resolve at the lowest possible level as many issues as 
properly can be resolved there . To give taxpayers who had 
filed their returns complete freedom to deflect self-selected 
questions to the central rulings office, thereby enabling them 
to bypass the decentralized field procedures, would be totally 
inconsistent with this fundamental objective. 
On the other hand, uniformity would be served and served 
efficiently if, at the earliest possible moment, legal issues of 
wide import and open to serious doubt (not having been re­
solved previously by court decisions or published rulings) could 
be identified, removed from the total mass of issues,  and re ­
ferred immediately to the central rulings office . Assuming 
that only the central rulings office can assure nationwide uni­
formity as to such properly selected issues, the greatest effi­
ciency can be achieved if local offices can be trusted to exer ­
cise the screening function effectively; for then they also can 
be e mpowered to seek the requisite technical advice directly 
from the central rulings office, without involving intermediate 
or regional offices.l72 Nevertheless, of the countries covered 
by this study which have placed intermediate regional offices 
170 In theory, non-self-assessment countries examine each taxpayer. 
But even the United States, in policing the integrity of its self-assess­
ment system, annually examines about three and a half million returns. 
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit . supra note 57, at 23. 
171 These range from 103 in the Netherlands to 17 00 in France. 
While the u.s. is divided into only 5 8  districts, audit personnel are 
scattered among 800 posts of duty. 
172 Under this arrangement, the latter offices need never be involved 
with any issue the central rulings office decides in favor of an affected 
taxpayer. Except in one instance, those offices also could be freed 
from the need to hear administrative appeals regarding items in a re­
turn controlled by an adverse private ruling previously issued to that 
taxpayer by the central office. The exception would apply in any 
country which, as an administrative settlement practice, wants to em­
power the intermediate office to split or trade the less significant of 
these debatable legal issues in order to avoid litigation. 
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between the local and national echelons (England being the sole 
exception), 173  only in the United States does a local (district) 
office normally bypass the intermediate office in seeking tech­
nical advice from the national office.l74 This country thereby 
a voids the inevitable and substantial duplication of effort which 
otherwise could follow if its intermediate regional offices 
sought to rescreen the 2, 500 to 3, 000 difficult questions local 
offices refer annually to the central rulings office. 
In some of the other countries, the taxpayer himself may 
not even know that, in effect, the local office has yielded juris­
diction over an issue to a higher office . 175 In contrast, through 
published formal procedures, the United States not only re­
quires the local office to  inform the taxpayer of the referr..-.1 
but also gives the taxpayer the "right" at that point to file 
with the central office a memorandum analyzing the law, and 
later to be orally heard 176 by the latter office before it can 
decide adversely to him. 177 On these counts, the procedure 
is the same as that previously described in connection with 
rulings on prospective transactions, 178 Further, before a local 
office can refer a question, the taxpayer is entitled to see the 
document in which that office presents its view of the facts, 
to the end that he can submit his own version if the two dis ­
agree . 179 Of course, no taxpayer can prevent a local office 
from referring a question to the central rulings office; nor in 
an earlier day could a taxpayer who requested such a referral 
appeal that mere procedural question if the local office chose 
not to refer the matter , 1 80 In short, at that time it had ex­
clusive jurisdiction over the screening function, presumably in 
the interest both of efficiency and of preserving the integrity 
of the decentralized field procedures. The taxpayer then had 
only one method of recourse :  to appeal the substantive issue 
173 See Chap. XVIT, § 1 .3  infra . 
174 Cf. § 2.9 in Chaps. VI, X, XIV , and XXIT infra . In England, of 
course, direct recourse is essential. See Chap. XVIII, § 2,9 infra . 
175 See § 2,9 in Chaps. VI and X infra . 
176 While typically such a conference is also available in Belgium, 
Chap. VI, § 2 .9  infra, it is otherwise in Germany and Great Britain. 
See § 2. 9  in Chaps. XIV and XVIIT infra . 
177 Rev. Proc. 67-2, Sees. 4,08 and 4,09, I.R.B. 1967-1, 19, 
178 See § 2.14 supra . 
179 Rev. Proc. 67-2, Sec. 4.06, I.R.B. 1967-1, 19. 
1 80 Rev. Proc. 58-14, C .B. 1958-2, 1125. However, within the local 
office, he could appeal an adverse determination by lesser officials to 
the Chief of the local office ' s  (district) Audit Division. 
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to the intermediate regional settlement office and, if not satis ­
fied with the result reached there, to litigate that substantive 
issue . Now, however, if the Chief of the local district's Audit 
Division rejects a taxpayer is request to refer an issue to the 
central rulings office, a written explanation of the reason must 
be given the taxpayer . If he disagrees and submits his rea­
sons therefor in writing, these documents, together with all 
data bearing on the issue automatically are referred, not to 
the rulings office, but to the Director of the national office 's 
Audit Division. In effect, the latter performs a rescreening 
function. He decides, not the substantive issue, but rather the 
procedural question of whether the issue is sufficiently impor ­
tant and doubtful to warrant referral to the rulings office . 181 
As is more fully explained in Chapter III, infra, even if 
the rulings office ultimately directs a local office to decide a 
substantive issue against the taxpayer, that taxpayer still is 
free to try to "settle" the dispute by entering an administra­
tive appeal to the regional settlement office and then, if need 
be, to litigate . 
2 . 17 Publication of rulings and in-service technical advice 
If u. s. experience proves anything,182 it is that the pre ­
viously described prime purposes of a published rulings pro­
gram183 will be achieved year after year only if the program 
contains certain built-in arrangements which at least tend to 
assure its sustained compliance with two standards. 
The first major need is to insure that the quality of each 
published ruling is responsive to the peculiar purposes of the 
program; While each, of course, must reach a technically 
proper result, this alone will not achieve uniform treatment 
for other similar transactions or provide reliable guidance 
for prospective transactions. To provide such uniformity and 
guidance, each ruling must be so structured that its scope will 
be understood readily both by taxpayers and field officials. A 
bare statement of the material facts and the result reached 
is not enough. If other interested individuals are to deter mine 
what actually was decided, the ruling itself must orient the 
legal issue. Further, since no two cases are exactly alike, if 
the ruling is to be applied properly to other cases-which is 
the sole reason for its publication-the legal reasoning on which 
181 Rev. Proc. 67-2, Sec. 4. 03, I.R.B. 1967-1, 1 8. 
182 See § 2. 3 supra . 
183 See §§ 2.6 through 2. 8 supra . 
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the result is based must be set forth. In short, a published 
ruling should take the form of an abbreviated judicial decision. 
The statement of the pivotal facts, legal orientation of the 
problem, the stated result and the legal reasons therefor all 
are essential if taxpayers and field officials are to determine 
with precision what was and what was not decided and be in a 
position, by analogy, to apply that ruling properly to other 
cases . 1 84 
To insure also that each ruling reaches a technically 
proper result, and that the language chosen goes far enough 
but not too far in fixing that ruling's affirmative thrust, it is 
indispensable that the draftsman exchange ideas with others . 
The requisite exchange is accomplished best by having his 
draft reviewed from four distinctly different vantage points.  
The first review would come from an exceptionally able tech­
nical reviewer specializing in that particular area of income 
tax law. The second, from an exceptionally able technical 
generalist who understands thoroughly the whole body of in­
come tax law and thus the way the pieces technically fit to­
gether. The third, from a policy-oriented generalist, for often­
times -since the courts have not yet spoken-actually there is 
no one technically correct result but rather, at this stage of 
prediction, competing technically proper results, with the ulti­
mate choice of position properly dependent upon administrative 
and policy considerations. And fourth, from outside the tax 
administration, from the market place, i.e., the taxpayers 
themselves. 1 85 The latter will serve two purposes . The 
publicis very diversity equips it uniquely to focus the adminis ­
tration's attention on unanticipated situations affected, though 
unintentionally so, by the particular choice of words used in 
the ruling. Further, since the published ruling at the least 
will bind administrative echelons, it is only fair, before its 
formal and final adoption, that the public have a chance to be 
1 84 This is essential, not just because of their need to determine the 
direct scope of the ruling but also because they will tend to use the 
ruling at the least as a clue pointing in one direction or the other in 
more remote situations, on the assumption that the rulings office itself 
will proceed thereafter in a logical legal manner. By way of contrast, 
a private ruling, if favorable to the taxpayer, need only state the facts 
and the result, for that will satisfy his concern and it is not intended 
that this private ruling be applied to any other case. See § 2.3, supra 
notes 60-62. 
1 85 Only the first three types of review are utilized in the United 
States. See supra note 146. 
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heard, if only in writing. otherwise, affected taxpayers across 
the nation are deprived of a procedural safeguard which even 
a private rulings program (through a conference arrangement) 
should accord an individual taxpayer who has requested a 
ruling, and which administrative appeal systems in all coun­
tries  covered by this study do accord an individual taxpayer 
who, at the point of examination, protests an asserted liability. 
The fact that a given taxpayer will have the belated right to 
be heard in this latter circumstance is not an adequate sub ­
stitute for the proposal made here.  The chance t o  b e  heard 
at the point of examination comes too late and will be mean­
ingless if a previously published ruling-regarding which the 
taxpayer had no chance to be heard-covers the issue.  That 
ruling binds the action of examining officials with whom he 
must confer. 
From the foregoing, it should be obvious that time is a 
further factor in attaining a proper standard of quality for any 
given published ruling. And this is precisely the reason, as 
explained earlier, 1 8 6  why an essential attribute of this pro­
gram conflicts directly with one equally essential to the pri­
vate rulings program (quality v. speed). As explained there, 
to assure each program a proper chance to fulfill its own 
separate purpose, rulings personnel themselves must under ­
stand that the result ultimately e mbodied in a published ruling 
need not follow blindly a result previously and more hurriedly 
reached in a private ruling. 
The second major need, once a publication program is 
adopted, is to build in arrangements which at the least tend to 
prevent the central rulings office from defaulting pro tanto on 
the program's purpose by foregoing publication on some im­
portant precedent-type situations to which it has been alerted 
through requests received either for private rulings or in­
service technical advice. Matters of integrity aside, U.S. ex­
perience of an earlier day serves to indicate that there are 
three circumstances most likely to contribute to such non­
publication. 
One such circumstance will arise inadvertently; the failure 
of rulings personnel to appreciate the range of situations which, 
if covered by published rulings, would contribute significantly 
to the purposes of this program. While sophisticated lawyers 
might question the distinction which follows, not all rulings 
personnel are likely to be sophisticated lawyers.  They must 
186 See § 2.12 supra . 
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be made to understand that the purposes of this program are 
significantly served not only by publication of positions for all 
important precedent-type situations but also important new 
applications of earlier precedent-type rulings . 187 
A second adverse circumstance will exist so long as the 
national office is permitted to send confidential communica­
tions to all field offices stating its views on substantive issues .  
Typically in a tax administration, only the head, and perhaps 
his deputy, bears an ultimate responsibility which extends both 
to the decentralized enforcement function carried out by field 
offices and to the centralized rulings function. l88 If his staff 
can use confidential communications to guide the field forces, 
he will have less interest in having his rulings office maintain 
a proper publication standard. 189 To generate greater inter ­
est in him regarding the latter,  a subcommittee of the u.s. 
Congress extracted from the U.S. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue a promise that no confidential communications cover ­
ing substantive issues would be circularized by the national 
office to field offices . 190 Thus the publication program be ­
came the exclusive vehicle through which the Commissioner 
could insure that field officials received their guidance. 191 
The non-use of confidential communications had another salu­
tory effect: no longer could a field official merely cite the 
reference number of a secret national office instruction in re ­
jecting a taxpayer 's contention. The self-interest which trig­
gers a taxpayer into reading the relevant published commu­
nication enables him to discuss intelligently with the field 
187 A U.S. congressional committee felt the second of these cate­
gories was ignored too often. See § 2. 3 supra . 
188 In the United States, the Assistant Commissioner (Compliance) is 
responsible for the first of these, the second being under the jurisdic­
tion of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) . The Commissioner 
and Deputy Commissioner oversee both. 
189 This no doubt is one reason why England' s Board of Inland Reve­
nue feels no great pressure to develop a full-scale rulings program. 
See Chap. XVIII, §§ 2. 7 and 2.9 infra . 
190 Statement of Commissioner Andrews, Hearings on Administration 
of the Internal Revenue Laws, before a subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1954) . 
191 In keeping with his promise to the congressional subcommittee, 
the semiannual volume containing all published rulings specifically pro­
vides that no unpublished ruling or technical advice may be relied 
upon by field officials in resolving other cases. E.g., see the fly-leaf 
in C .B.  1966-1 .  
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official the question of whether the latter was applying properly 
the national office 's substantive instruction. 
A third likely circumstance, adversely affecting adminis­
trative adherence to a proper publication standard, will be the 
failure of that lesser but senior official, alone responsible for 
the private and the published rulings programs, to attach a 
sufficiently high relative priority to the publication function. 
Typically, he lives with two facts : adequate staffing lags be­
hind the workload of the two programs and outside pressure 
on him for work completion relates almost exclusively to pri­
vate rulings which interested individual taxpayers want ex­
pedited because they involve prospective transactions . Left to 
his own devices, the official's understandable inclination will 
be to respond to this constant pressure, rather than to the 
abstract requirements of wise administration. He will spread 
disproportionately between the two programs the inadequate 
absolute amount of man-hours available to him, to the relative 
prejudice of the publication function. Without disparaging the 
vital function of private rulings, including the fact that the 
national office learns of new problems primarily from these 
requests, wise administration requires a fair balance of atten­
tion between the two programs. A private ruling, after all, 
solves but one case; a published ruling covering an important 
precedent-type situation not only resolves that problem uni­
formly and efficiently on a nationwide basis but simultaneously 
provides guidance regarding future transactions .  The U.S. tax 
administration, at an earlier point in its history, divided its 
rulings personnel between the two functions, assigning them 
to separate subunits 192-each being assigned its own review 
staff and subordinate director . It was hoped that this division 
would assure permanently both a more balanced application of 
manpower and proper application of the standard used in de ­
termining whether publication of a position was warranted. 
This device, however, proved to be both ineffective and in­
efficient in solving the first of these problems. At best, it 
assured only that some man-hours-not a fair proportion-would 
be devoted to development of published positions . The constant 
outside pressure to expedite private rulings tended to keep 
disproportionately large the inventory backlog of the subunit 
charged with the publication function when compared with that 
of the office handling private rulings. In other words, division 
192 Then characterized respectively as the Tax Rulings Division and 
the Bulletin Branch. 
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of the functions between two subunits did not guarantee that 
the official overseeing both would respond to their relative 
needs when allocating manpower between them. Further, the 
division was inefficient. Automatically it doubled the people 
who had to deal with any problem warranting a published posi­
tion. Spadework personnel in the publication unit, and later 
its review staff, had to acquaint themselves with the total 
ramifications of a problem to which both spadework and re ­
view personnel in the private rulings office previously had 
directed considerable attention. Ultimately it was recognized 
that fewer total manhours would be needed if the latter, after 
issuing a private ruling, were given the time to develop prop­
erly a published version. 
There is only one effective and effecient way to achieve a 
fair balance in the attention given to the two intimately re ­
lated efforts. The head of the tax administration himself must 
provide inside pressure favoring a proper distribution of at­
tention, to counteract outside pressure focusing exclusively on 
private rulings . As in other situations, he can use a survey 
team composed of personnel outside the rulings function periodi­
cally to determine, on a sample basis, whether attention is 
divided properly between these two efforts and whether rulings 
personnel are making a genuine effort to comply with the 
proper publication standard. 
CHAPTER III 
ASSESSMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL PROCEDURES ! 
Section A. Analytic Comparison of the "Six ": 
R equirements of a Tax Administration 's 
Own Conflict Resolution Procedures, 
Viewed in Aggregate 
3 . 1  Introduction: Comparative profiles of the entire conflict 
resolution process 
Because the character of the tax administration's own con­
flict resolution process should depend upon the relative role it 
is expected to play in a country 's entire tax dispute resolving 
process, certain of the latter 's essential attributes and the 
relative roles each of the "Six" assigns to independent tribunals 
must first be mentioned. 2 
Viewed as a whole, the dispute resolving process of a 
country should be designed to insure it has a reasonable chance 
to be both fair and efficient. For that process to be fair, at 
some point taxpayers must have a readily realizable right, as 
they do have in the six countries covered by this study,3 to 
lay their sides of disputes before a tribunal wholly independent 
of the tax administration. However, it is relatively inefficient 
to rely on such tribunals to resolve large numbers of tax con­
troversies . Further, their use for such purpose either results 
in an expensive drain on talented and rare manpower or in­
vites reliance on inexpert personnel.  This is because in­
creased reliance on this method of disposition brings an in­
evitable increase in the required degree of decentralization; 
1 For a thoughtful comparative analysis of this subject in the setting 
of developing countries,  see Liker, "The Legal and Institutional Frame­
work of Tax Administration in Developing Countires," 14 U. C.L.A.L . 
Rev,. 240 , 262-324 (1966). For an earlier study, see Surrey, "Tax Ad­
ministration in Underdeveloped Countries,  11 12 U. Miami L .  Rev. 158 
(1958). 
2 See Chap. IV infra regarding details of the conflict resolution 
process at the judicial level. 
3 See Chaps. IV, VIII, XII, XVI, XX, and XXIV infra . 
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otherwise, the inconvenience of the forum to taxpayers creates 
an unfair arrangement. 
It is this requisite multiplication of such tribunals, if they 
are expertly staffed, that eats into a country's most talented 
and expensive manpower . When this consumption is balanced 
against a country 's other needs, the probably resulting in­
sufficient, albeit expert, staffing will create crowded dockets 
and delay as disputes await their turn. And those who repre­
sent the parties, though once intimately acquainted with all the 
niceties pertaining to a given dispute, must later-after the 
period of delay and just before the case comes to trial-take 
additional time to become reacquainted with those niceties and 
then devote yet further time, plus the time of the qualified 
judge, to educate that judge in all the ramifications. 
At least less costly to such a country is the alternative 
device of staffing its host of decentralized, outside, independent 
tribunals-operating at the lowest level-with unremunerated 
and inexpert citizens . Great Britain has long followed the 
practice of deflecting directly to just such tribunals income 
tax disputes which a local assessment office is unable to re­
solve .4 Now 700  such tribunals (General Commissioners), with 
two part-time lay citizens constituting a quorum for each case, 
are spread geographically throughout that island. Only the 
clerk is paid and has legal training.5 This arrangement, how­
ever convenient, invites three obvious risks if transplanted 
elsewhere . Except where appointment is deemed a distinct 
honor, unpaid lay members may not give adequate time and 
thought to their demanding function. Second, even if they do, 
problems of any complexity may still baffle them. Finally, 
given the large number of such tribunals, their lack of ex­
pertise, and the fact their decisions are not published, a high 
level of uniformity cannot be anticipated. 6 Apparently these 
were the risks the British Parliament sought to avoid 7 when, 
as distinct from income tax questions, jurisdiction over sur­
tax matters was lodged in a separate body of Special 
4 see Chap. XIX, § 3.3 and Chap. XX, § 4. 1 infra . 
5 See Chap. XX, § 4. 1 infra . 
6 According to a new but yet unpublished study of Michigan tax 
procedures ,  all three consequences resulted from that state 's use of 
approximately 1800 such tribunals to hear appeals of property tax 
assessments. Also see the earlier legislatively sponsored Michigan 
Tax Study Staff Papers 214 et seq. (1958) .  
7 See Chap. XX, § 4.1 infra . 
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Commissioners composed of eight full-time, paid professionals 
who ride circuit to the major metropolitan centers .  8 Further, 
by giving these two distinct types of tribunals concurrent 
jurisdiction over many but not all income tax questions, 9 some 
taxpayers were granted what is tantamount to an election be ­
tween them. Nevertheless, the widely scattered, uncoordinated 
General Commissioners decide from 7, 000 to 8, 000 cases 
annually, compared with approximately 1 , 000 decided by the 
Special Commissioners.lO In either case, further appeal to 
the regular courts is available only with respect to questions 
of law. ll 
In contrast, because relatively few German taxpayers in­
voked a previously existing option to lay their cases before 
local lay committees, Germany recently abandoned that ar­
rangement. 12 Now a taxpayer who is unable to resolve a 
dispute with local examining officials carries the case directly 
to one of the specialized fiscal courts staffed predominantly 
with professionals.l3 These necessarily are decentralized to 
accommodate the yearly volume of 20, 000 tax disputes, of which 
from 6, 000 to 8, 000 involve individual and corporate income 
tax matters.l4 The Netherlands follows a similar practice, 
utilizing specialized chambers within their regularly decentral­
ized court system 15 to accommodate an annually recurring 
2, 000 tax disputes which their local assessment offices are 
unable to  resolve. Approximately seventy percent of these in­
volve individual and corporate income tax matters. 16 
Belgium and France, however, like Britain, make some 
use of decentralized independent tribunals staffed, predominantly 
but not exclusively, with outside laymen, to hear disputes be­
tween taxpayers and local assessment officials, though in these 
two countries these particular tribunals function solely in an 
8 Id. at § 4.2b infra . 
9 Id. at § 4.1 infra . 
10 Apart from so-called "delay" cases. Id. at §§ 4.3a and 4,3b 
infra . 
llid . at § 4. 1 infra . 
12 See Chap. XV, § 3.4a infra . 
13 See Chap. XVI, § 4. 1 infra . However, before such action is taken , 
on filing a protest (in the case of substantive issues) with the local 
office , the individual taxpayer does obtain a hearing with the assess­
ment official. See Chap. XV, § 3.4a infra . 
14see Chap. XVI, § 4.3 infra . 
15 See Chap. XXIV, § 4. 1  infra . 
16 Id. at § 4.3 infra . 
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advisory capacity . 17 The lack of expertise on the part of the 
lay members presumably is responsible for denying to these 
advisory tribunals, in contrast to the British arrangement, any 
jurisdiction over questions of law. 18 And to assure some ex­
pertise regarding factual matters pertaining to a particular 
taxpayer 's profession or business, each tribunal consists of a 
large panel, and the lay members for any given case are 
drawn from those having familiarity with the petitioning tax­
payer 's vocation.19 A final contrast to British practice is 
most important. Taxpayers in Belgium and France may by­
pass these lay tribunals, 20 carrying their disputes with local 
assessment offices directly to a higher in-service administra­
tive appeal office (regional level), the jurisdiction of which 
must be exhausted in any event 21 before the taxpayer can lay 
his case before an outside professionally staffed independent 
tribunal. In one recent year, compared with the 135 ,312  Bel -
gians who carried their disputes with a local assessment office 
to one of the higher but decentralized offices handling admin­
istrative appeals, only 1 107 required a final decision from a 
professionally staffed independent tribunal. 22 Corresponding 
numbers in France were, respectively, 365, 000 and less than 
5, 000. 23 
The in-service appeal arrangement in the United States is 
similar to that of Belgium and France in that the apex is also 
at a higher regional level, rather than at the local district 
level. However, to handle its administrative appeals, the 
United States actually maintains formally constituted appeal 
offices at both levels, each of which has decentralized sub­
offices .24 When a dispute cannot be resolved by a local 
17 See Chap. VII, § 3.2a infra and Chap. XI, §§ 3.3 and 3.4a infra . 
18Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid . In Belgium, the assessor also can refuse to refer the case 
to the lay group if he believes the referral will not contribute to a 
proper determination of income. See Chap. VII, § 3.2a infra . 
21 see Chap. VII, § 3.4,  Chap. VIII, § 4.1 ,  and Chap. XI, § 3.4b infra . 
22 See Chap. VII, § 3.4 and Chap. VIII, § 4.3 infra . 
23 See Chap. XI, § 3.4b and Chap. XII, § 4. 3 infra . 
24Each of the 58 districts has a District Conference Office. Sub­
offices actually are maintained only in the larger districts. Each of 
the seven regions ,  among which the 58 districts are divided, main­
tains an office known as the Appellate Division and, together, the seven 
of these have about 40 geographically spread suboffices. 
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examining official,25 the taxpayer is encouraged by letter from 
the internal review staff to take the dispute to one or the 
other of the administrative appeal offices, the review staff's 
choice in a given case being determined by the character of 
the underlying issue and by the amount involved. 2 6  
Typically, small cases and cases which can be resolved 
without special compromise authority (e.g. , valuation questions) 
are encouraged to move to the lower of the two offices, i .e. ,  
to the appeal office operating at the district level . However, 
any taxpayer may avail himself of both offices on a seriatum 
basis before entering the litigation stage, or if encouraged to 
go to the district level appeal office, he may bypass it, going 
straightaway to the higher office, 27 or -contrary to the Belgian 
and French practices-he may, bypassing both, carry his case 
directly into the litigation stage . 28 At this latter point, 
whether reached either after going through one or both of the 
25Basically , these fall into two categories. Revenue agents are 
the more highly trained of the two (see § 3.6 infra ) and in each district 
are assigned to the Field Audit Branch of the local Audit Division. In 
fiscal 1966,  these branches examined 767 ,000 returns of which 590 ,000 
were income tax returns and of these 166 ,000 were filed by corpora­
tions, 411 ,000 by individuals and fiduciaries, and 13 ,000 by exempt 
organizations. Including supervisory personnel , this field force ex­
pended 12 ,473 man-years in fulfilling this mission. The second category, 
composed of tax technicians or office auditors , is situated in the Office 
Audit Branch of each local Audit Division. Together these consumed 
3 ,093 man-years in examining 2 ,681 ,000 of the less complicated in­
dividual returns. Much of this work was accomplished by correspond­
ence. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Annual Report 1966, 
23 and 68. 
The 58 district Audit Divisions spread personnel among 800 
different posts of duty. 
2 6 Rev. Proc. 67-27 , I.R.B. 1967-20,  45. See § 3.7 infra . The tax­
payer simultaneously receives a written report, prepared by the 
examining officer but internally reviewed by a separate review staff, 
explaining the adjustments which the examining official proposed. In 
cases handled by examiners in the Field Audit Branch, these adjust­
ments will have been orally discussed with the taxpayer at an earlier 
point when the examiner sought to get the taxpayer to accept the ad­
justments by executing Form 870.  See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601.105 (c) (2) .  
In the smaller cases handled by the Office Audit Branch, at least half 
the cases are dealt with by correspondence, and the taxpayer's first 
chance to indicate his acceptance of an adjustment may be at that point 
when, by letter,  he is invited to appeal to a given office and he does 
not accept the adjustment. See U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601.105(c) (1). 
27 U.S. Treas. Reg. §§ 601 .105 and 601.106. 
28 See Chap. IV infra . 
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administrative appeal levels or after bypassing both, U.S. 
practice differs on two principal counts from that of the other 
countries described above . 
First, at the moment a case is docketed initially with an 
outside independent tribunal, the United States is the only coun­
try to shift substantial administrative control and the litigation­
representation function to yet different government offices, 
composed entirely of lawyers . 29 Since these separate offices 
(legal staffs) settle, 30 before trial, over eighty percent of all 
tax cases docketed with the independent tribunals, 31 they prop­
erly should be considered as a third level of administrative 
appeal .  Second, the taxpayer at the litigation stage has three 
choices, two of which are substantially different. By paying 
the contested amount and suing for refund, the taxpayer may 
take his case into a nonspecialist federal district court of 
general jurisdiction. Only here-that is, subsequent to admin­
istrative appeals and in the course of trial before this one 
tribunal-are outside laymen used: in U.S. district court tax 
cases, either party may ask that a jury find the facts, though 
the judge will resolve all questions of law. As an alternative 
to the district court route, the taxpayer, before paying the 
contested amount, may docket his case with a specialized court 
(Tax Court of the United States) which rides circuit, with the 
judges finding the facts and deciding all questions of law. 32 
29 In cases docketed with the Tax Court, the Chief Counsel of the 
Internal Revenue Service performs the litigation-representation func­
tion through his several Regional Counsels who maintain approximately 
40 suboffices. Should the taxpayer, instead of taking the case to the 
Tax Court, pay the contested amount and sue for refund before either 
a federal district court or the Court of Claims ,  the litigation­
representation function will be performed by the legal staff of the 
centralized Tax Division of the Justice Department. 
30 In cases docketed with the Tax Court, settlement authority actually 
is shared jointly by the Regional Counsels ' and Regional Appellate 
Division' s suboffices. Exclusive settlement jurisdiction passes to 
the Regional Counsels' offices only when the court calls the calendar. 
Rev. Proc. 60-18, C.B. 1960-2 , 988. In cases filed either with a 
federal district court or the Court of Claims ,  the centralized Tax 
Division of the Justice Department has settlement authority but it 
consults with the centralized Refund Litigation Division of the Service's 
Chief Counsel's  Office before settling important cases. See Chap. IV 
infra . 
31 commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. cit. supra note 25 , Tables 
17 and 20 at 134 and 135. 
32 The third alternative is to pay the contested amount and sue for 
refund in the Court of Claims. This court uses legally trained Com­
missioners to find the facts. 
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In one recent year, approximately 60, 000 cases were ap­
pealed to at least one of the three administrative appeal levels 
described above . Of this number, approximately 42, 000 were 
routed by the district review staffs to the District Conference 
Offices . 33 Cases not agreed to there (13, 792) 34 represented 
about half the 27, 994 disputes which were appealed to the higher 
regional conference offices (Appellate Divisions) . 35 The other 
half of that 27, 994 went to those regional offices in the first 
instance, either on recommendation of the district review staffs 
or at the election of the taxpayer .  Cases in which agreement 
was not reached at the regional level, together with the some ­
what fewer than 5, 000 which bypassed that same level, 36 made 
up the approximately 8,400 cases which were docketed with 
independent tribunals (courts). 37 These outside tribunals, how­
ever, actually decided fewer than 1, 300 cases; 38 practically 
all the others 39 were settled, before trial, by the government's 
legal staffs, 40 which for that reason were characterized here ­
tofore as the third administrative appeal level. 
In summary, it is at least clear from the foregoing that 
income tax laws of small countries as well as large can gen­
erate a large number of disputes between taxpayers and local 
examining officials . Further, should a now developing country 
decide, for the first time, to resolve this entire mass of ex­
pected conflicts by forcing taxpayer reliance on a host of new 
outside or independent decentralized tribunals, that type of 
country in particular invites serious risks and problems whether 
it tries to staff those tribunals with professionals or inexpert 
laymen. Thus, there would be a distinct advantage in relying 
instead on properly designed internal administrative appeal 
procedures and, only where need be, on outside professionally 
staffed tribunals. However, even this arrangement will not be 
efficient unless the administrative machinery itself actually 
33 commissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit . supra note 25 , at 25. 
34[bid. 
35 Id., Tables 15 and 16 at 133. 
36 Id ., Table 17 at 134. These were based on final statutory notices 
of deficiency issued at the district level. 
370f these 6 ,874 were docketed with the Tax Court, 1 ,383 with 
federal district courts , and 125 with the Court of Claims. Id., Tables 17 
and 20 , at 134 and 135. 
380f these, the Tax Court decided 726 , district courts 488 , and the 
Court of Claims 58. Ibid . 
39[bid. 
40see note 30 supra . 
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has a reasonable chance to  dispose, by bilateral agreement, 
of the great preponderance of these disputes.  And it will have 
that reasonable chance only if it simultaneously possesses a 
reasonable chance both to be and appear to be fair. In those 
circumstances alone will taxpayers in sufficient numbers be 
willing, on a bilateral basis, to accept results achieved at that 
level. The administrative machinery itself also should have a 
reasonable chance to accomplish these dispositions efficiently ; 
this, after all, is the primary aim in trying to reach agree­
ment in as many disputes as possible without resort to an 
outside tribunal. 
The administrative process, viewed in aggregate, will have 
a more reasonable chance both to be and appear to be fair, 
and also to be efficient in disposing of these disputes, if all 
parties know that at some point a specific office (i) is required 
to look at each dispute with a proper degree of impartiality, 
(ii) has a reasonable chance to become fully acquainted with 
the taxpayer 's side of the story, and (iii) can assure "justice, " 
which prior to litigation means that some such office is en­
dowed with "complete settlement" authority. Each of these 
matters is separately discussed below. 
3 . 2  Assuring impartiality of administrative conflict resolution 
machinery 
If the administration's own conflict resolution machinery 
is to have a reasonable chance both to be and appear to be 
fair, it should be freed from the conflict of interest which al­
most inherently exists where the same person bears the two­
fold responsibility : to resolve tax disputes impartially and to 
produce revenue . One device alone will tend to eliminate, at 
least from the vantage point of ordinary taxpayers, both the 
appearance and actual existence of this conflict. However, 
sophisticated practitioners should acknowledge that a second 
device at the least will minimize the adverse effect of that 
conflict. 
The first and preferred device is to separate, organiza­
tionally, personnel who hear at least the final administrative 
appeal from personnel immediately responsible for the original 
examination and assessment function. 41 Obviously also, the 
4ln would logically follow from this that appeal personnel-while 
trying to resolve an existing dispute-would not then be expected to 
look for new affirmative issues. To do so invites both the fact and 
appearance of the previously mentioned conflict, for raising issues is 
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former should be free of the latter's control. 42 Belgium, 
France, and the United States do divorce these two groups of 
personnel. While local district offices carry on the basic ex­
amination function, 43 the apex of the administrative-appeal 
function is at a higher regional office .  44 As previously noted, 
however, the United States, by a published procedure, also 
makes possible an administrative appeal within the local district 
(footnote continued) 
an examination or revenue producing function. So complete a bill of 
divorcement within the administration itself becomes less logical , 
however, if the administration otherwise extends the examination func­
tion right up to the courthouse steps,  by raising new issues at that yet 
later point when a controversy regarding old issues is laid before a 
completely independent quasi-judicial or judicial body. In other words, 
if at the litigation stage the administration both can and does follow 
the practice of raising new issues, the argument for foregoing that 
practice at the earlier point when the case reached the apex of the 
administrative conflict resolution procedure is drained of much of 
its vitality. 
In the United states ,  a deficiency asserted by the government is 
presumptively correct at that point when a taxpayer takes that issue to 
the Tax Court of the United States. While the government' s answer 
to a petition filed by a taxpayer with that court can raise a new issue, 
the burden of proof regarding that new issue is borne by the govern­
ment, not by the taxpayer. Rule 32 , Tax Court of the United States.  It 
is widely believed in the United States that this shift tends to dampen 
the likelihood that the legal staff (Regional Counsel) will raise new 
affirmative issues after the case has been docketed. This belief, coupled 
with the fact that the case still can be administratively 1 1settled" 
before trial leads many taxpayers to bypass yet another regional settle­
ment office (Appellate Division) until after the case is docketed. Relevant 
is the fact that if the taxpayer had gone to the Appellate Division first, 
but been unable to reach agreement there, the doctrine of presumptive 
correctness would have attached to any new issues that division raised 
and included in its statutory notice of deficiency. 
42 Also at least the appearance of impartiality on the part of the 
administrative appeal official will be prejudiced if the original examin­
ing official attends the hearing and, indeed, sits at the same conference 
table. To avoid this prejudice as well as to save the time of the original 
examining official and to put pressure on him in the first instance to 
prepare an adequate written explanation of his adjustments (see note 26  
supra) ,  U.S. procedures properly provide that ordinarily the examiner 
himself will not attend the hearing. Rev. Proc. 67-2 7 ,  I.R.B. 1967-20, 45. 
43 See §§ 3.2  in Chaps. VII and XI infra, and U.S. Treas. Reg. 
§ 601. 105. 
44 See §§ 3.4 in Chaps. VII and XI infra, and U.S. Treas. Reg. 
§ 601. 106. 
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itself (District Conference Office). 45 In the early 1950's, these 
appeals were heard by the immediate supervisor of the par ­
ticular examining officer who had proposed the contested de ­
ficiency adjustment to the taxpayer 's return. Most practi­
tioners, however, pointedly objected to this arrangement. They 
believed the relationship and resulting daily contact between 
the supervisor and the examining officer prejudiced the likeli­
hood the former would be impartial. For this reason, many 
practitioners elected to bypass this particular appeal, taking 
their disputes with examining officers directly to the higher 
regional level. 46 The administration responded to this bypass 
pattern by a series of steps taken in the late 1 950's and early 
1 960's. 47 Among other things, it divorced the district appeal 
function from the district examination function by shifting 
jurisdiction over appeals at the district level from the imme ­
diate supervisors of examining officers to a separate intra­
district office48 created and staffed solely to carry on this 
function. 49 
In contrast to the foregoing, the one administrative appeal 
allowed in Germany and the Netherlands is heard by the same 
office which originally proposed the assessment from which 
the dispute emerged. 50 In most cases, a similar but not 
45 See U.S.  Treas. Reg. § 601. 105(c) and Rev. Proc. 67-2 7 ,  I.R.B. 
1967-20 , 45.  
46 For another reason why so many practitioners bypassed the 
district office, see § 3. 7 infra .. 
47 See Rev. Proc. 56-34, C.B. 1956-2 , 1396; Rev. Proc. 60-16, C.B. 
1960-2 , 940 ; Rev. Proc. 60-24,  C.B. 1960-2 , 998 ; Rev. Proc. 62-8, 
C.B. 1962-1,  431;  and Rev. Proc. 64-38 , 1964-2 , 965 ,  superseded by 
Rev. Proc. 67-27 , I.R.B. 1967-2 0 , 45. 
48 The head of this office (Chief, Conference Staff) is not under the 
control or supervision of the chiefs of the two separate branches which 
conduct field and office audits. While all three do report to the Chief 
of the district' s Audit Division, in theory the latter does not become 
involved in the appeal process. In other words, the Chief of the Con­
ference Staff reports to the Chief of the Audit Division only for ad­
ministrative purposes. Appeal from a district Conference Staffs 
determination goes to the higher regional Appellate Division. 
49 The United States also finally reversed its attitude toward the 
bypass problem. In 1964, it actively began to encourage taxpayers 
to bypass the District Conference Office in certain types of cases and 
to take them directly to the higher regional office. Rev. Proc. 64-38,  
C .B.  1964-2 , 965,  superseded by, but to the same effect, Rev. Pro c. 
67-2 7 ,  I.R.B. , 1967-2 0 ,  45. See § 3 . 7 infra for the reasons which 
led to this change and for a description of the types of cases to which 
the changed attitude was applied. 
50 See §§ 3 .3  and 3.4  in Chaps. XV and XXIII infra. 
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formally constituted practice prevails in Britain. 51 In these 
countries a taxpayer, who understandably might prefer not to 
discuss the issue again with the same person who actually 
proposed the original assessment, at best ordinarily can ex­
pect to discuss the issue only with an official in that same 
office who is senior to the examiner . 52 
However, each of these three European countries, in further 
contrast to U.S. practice, does employ a second but less effec­
tive device which tends at least to reduce the adverse effect 
of the underlying conflict between the hearing-officer's appeal 
and revenue-producing responsibilities .  The likelihood that the 
office will view appeals with a proper degree of impartiality 
is enhanced by the fact that it-that is, one of its inspectors ­
also actually must fulfill the trial litigation-representation 
function for the government if agreement is not reached and 
if the taxpayer dockets the dispute with an outside independent 
trial tribunal. 53 Human nature being what it is, no local in­
spector wants to build up a record of losses in fulfilling his 
litigation function. This inevitable concern at the minimum 
puts some pressure on the local office, during the earlier ad­
ministrative appeal, to conform to a proper degree of impar ­
tiality. Indeed, many practitioners in the United States believe 
that the absence of just this type of pressure on the two U.S. 
offices constituted solely to hear administrative appeals (Dis­
trict Conference Office and Regional Appellate Division) de ­
tracts from the prospect they will exercise an adequate degree 
of impartiality. 54 As previously noted, once a tax case in the 
51 Because not formally provided for and because the reconsideration 
is by the examiner 's own senior, the arrangement actually is deemed 
to be a mere extension of the examination , rather than an appeal. See 
Chap. XIX, §§ 3.3 and 3.4 infra . Also because the procedure is not 
formally provided for, some dissatisfied taxpayers write directly to 
the national office and it intervenes. 
52 In support of an argument that this p rocedure does provide a fair 
re-examination in Germany , see Chap. XV, § 3.4 infra . Also, as to an 
alternative possibility in Britain, see note 51. 
53 See § 4.3 in Chaps. XVI and XXIV infra . In Britain, however ,  
this is consistently s o  only a s  to income o r  profits taxes appealed to 
the independent General Commissioners. In the case of appeals to the 
Special Commissioners ,  a local inspector may and often does represent 
the government if the question involves income or profits taxe s ,  but 
never if it involves the surtax. A separate Solicitors ' Office represents 
the government in all surtax cases. See Chap. XX, §§ 4.3a and b infra . 
54 E .. g., see Hobbet and Donaldson , "A Practitioner ' s  Guide to 
Making a Good Settlement Within the IRS, 11 15 J. Taxation 230,  233 
(1961). 
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United States is docketed, say, with the Tax Court, the litiga­
tion-representation function is handled by a third office (Re ­
gional Counsel) . Because this third office also shares the 
power to settle cases administratively once they are docketed 
with the Tax Court, 55 many practitioners believe it desirable 
to bypass the first two offices and seek an administrative 
settlement only after their cases have been docketed.56 One 
reason is that these particular practitioners believe the third 
office's litigation-representation responsibility leads it to be 
more "realistic " than the first two in considering possible 
administrative settlements. 57 
Implicit in this is the suggestion that a tax administration, 
to enhance both the fact and appearance of impartiality on the 
part of its administrative appeal process, should implement 
both of the arrangements considered here . 58  In short, person­
nel who hear the final administrative appeal should be sepa­
rated, organizationally, from those immediately responsible 
for the initial examination and assessment function, and should 
fulfill the litigation-representation function at the trial level if 
agreement is not reached. Certainly the second of these, 
standing alone, would contribute little to impartiality in any 
case where the relatively small amount in dispute leads the 
official to conclude that it would be against the given taxpayer 's 
economic self-interest to assume the direct and indirect costs 
associated with litigation.59 Not one of the countries covered 
55 See note 30 supra . 
56 See Hobbet and Donaldson, op. cit. supra note 54. Also see U.S. 
Treasury Department, " Tax Practitioner Attitude Survey ," 17 Bull . 
Tax.  Section, A . B . A .  29 at 52 , questions 17 and 18 (Oct. 1964). For 
another factor contributing to the bypass problem , see note 41 supra . 
In fiscal 1966 , 4 ,489 cases were docketed by taxpayers before any 
effort was made to settle with the higher regional offices. However , 
in some of these cases , the taxpayer had no choice. For the district 
director himself, because the statute of limitations was about to run 
on the case , may have issued a final statutory notice of deficiency , 
thus forcing the taxpayer to docket his case with the Tax Court before 
trying to arrange an administrative settlement at the regional level. 
57 Id . Where the first two offices had the opportunity but were unable 
to achieve agreement with the taxpayer and the case then is tried and 
lost, they at least unconsciously can take refuge in the possibility that 
the loss resulted , not from overreaching on their part, but rather from 
the failure of the third office to perform its representation function 
skillfully. 
58 See § 3.4 infra for discussion of a third arrangement which will 
contribute substantially to this same end. 
59 See note 74 infra for an arrangement designed at least to cushion 
this prospect. 
82 ASSESSMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS COMPARED 
by this study employs both of the previously described devices .  
France, however, comes close.  It maintains a regional office 
to which a taxpayer can appeal a local office 's determination, 
and that higher office is responsible at least for final prepa­
ration of the government's memorandum of law if litigation 
ensues.  However, in such event, it appoints an inspector from 
the particular local office where the outside tribunal sits, to 
appear for the government at the hearing. 6 0  
3 .3  Assuring administrative machinery a reasonable chance to 
become fully acquainted with the taxpayer's side 
An inherent conflict exists also between the need to give 
the administrative appeal procedure a reasonable chance to 
dispose of most disputes by bilateral agreement and the com ­
peting need to avoid laying undue formal burdens o n  taxpayers. 
On the one hand, a typical taxpayer understandably wants 
to spend only the minimum time, effort, and money he con­
siders necessary to convince the administration his position 
is correct. On the other hand, in theory, the chance of an 
administrative appeal office to be fair will be as good as that 
of an outside tribunal only if, before the former office hears 
an appeal, the taxpayer devotes as much time, effort, and 
money in developing his case (marshaling evidence regarding 
facts and arguments regarding legal issues) as he would if the 
matter were to be heard instead by the outside tribunal. At 
the administrative level, however, many taxpayers will not 
devote that amount of energy to developing their cases.  There 
is an obvious reason: at this level, a taxpayer is not yet "up 
against the gun" ; recourse to an outside tribunal remains 
available if need be, and only then will he suffer the felt pres­
sure to "button up " his side of the case from top to  bottom. 
In consequence, an administrative office just does not have as 
good a chance to reach the truly correct result as does an 
outside tribunal, and this reduces the former's ability to obtain 
taxpayer acceptance of its determinations . 
Merely to require the taxpayer, as do certain European 
countries, 61 but not the United States, 62 to exhaust the 
60 See Chap. XII, § 4. 3 infra . 
61 For example , Belgium (see Chap. VII, § 4. 1  infra) and France 
(see Chap. XI, § 3 .4b infra). 
62 A U.s. taxpayer who disagrees with the adjustments an examiner 
proposes to make in the taxpayer's return can bypass the administrative 
appeal offices en route to litigation in either of two ways. 
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administrative remedy before invoking the jurisdiction of an 
outside tribunal, will not assure the administrative office's ex­
posure to a fully developed case on the taxpayer 's side . "Hit­
and-run" tactics could satisfy this formal requirement. 63 
Comprehensive development and indoctrination at the adminis­
trative level can be  assured absolutely only by  a requirement 
that puts each taxpayer "up against the gun" prior at least to 
completing his administrative hearing before the highest in­
service office to which he can appeal. In effect, it would be 
necessary to provide that a taxpayer could introduce later as 
evidence -in litigation before an outside independent tribunal­
only that evidence which he had submitted to the highest 
(footnote continued) 
First, the initial letter he receives explaining the adjustment (or , 
in small cases , a second letter, if the initial letter invited him to a 
district conference) will invite him, should he reject the adjustments , 
to enter an administrative appeal to the regional Appellate Division 
by filing a written protest. His default on this invitation will lead the 
district director to issue a statutorily required "notice of deficiency" 
(so-called 90 -day letter). This informs the taxpayer that the deficiency 
will be assessed in 90 days should the taxpayer fail to file a petition 
during that period with the Tax Court of the United States. By filing 
such a petition within that time, the taxpayer postpones the assessment 
and the need to pay the asserted deficiency, though interest will run if 
the government ultimately prevails. 
Second, taxpayers who plan to bypass the administrative appeal 
offices but p refer to litigate before a federal district court or the 
Court of Claims , may accomplish this by agreeing with the examiner' s 
proposed adjustment (executing Form 870) and by paying the entire 
asserted deficiency. Flora v. u.s., 362 U.S. 145 (1960).  The tax­
payer then files a claim for refund. In theory , the administrative appeal 
procedures applicable to refund claims disallowed by an examiner 
ordinarily conform to those applied to disputed deficiencies ,  the prime 
exception being that an administrative refund exceeding $100 ,000 must 
be reviewed by the congressional Joint Committee on Internal Revenue 
Taxation. See I.R.C. § 6405 (a) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. §§ 601. 105(e) (2 )  and 
601. 108;  Woodworth, " The New Joint Committee Refund Procedure," 
19 Bull . Tax.  Section, A .B .A .  9 (Oct. 1965). However ,  the hypothetical 
taxpayer in this case does not intend to take advantage of the available 
administrative appeals and, upon final rejection of his claim, may sue 
for refund before either of the two previously mentioned courts. 
63 To illustrate , before 1964 , when all U.S. taxpayers were encouraged 
to take their disputes first to the lower of the two administrative appeal 
offices (District Conference Office) , officials working at that level 
indicated they often encountered this " hit-and-run" tactic from tax­
payers who invoked their jurisdiction but intended from the outset to 
take their cases to the higher regional appeal office the moment they 
determined that, to obtain a satisfactory disposition, they would have 
to develop their cases fully. Also see note 64 infra . 
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in-service echelon.64 Logically, he further would be required 
to submit the same brief on the law. 65 
Unquestionably, these formal requirements could be im­
posed in a manner that would achieve their aim without de ­
priving taxpayers of a preliminary chance to reach agreement 
at a more informal hearing before that same high level in­
service office .  Proceedings there could be divided into two 
successive stages. The formal requirements would apply solely 
to the second stage . This itself would encourage taxpayers to 
develop their cases at least to a reasonable point prior to the 
first and more informal stage, for those who reached agree ­
ment there would be completely freed from the burdens and 
risks associated with the formal requirements. Only those un­
able to achieve agreement in that first stage would have to 
assume these burdens in preparation for the second stage. 66 
64 The United States does not impose any such requirement. See 
note 62 supra . In consequence, some administrative officials working 
in the regional Appellate Divisions have indicated that some taxpayers 
who did appeal to that office and , on failing to achieve agreement there, 
then did docket their cases with the Tax Court, fully developed their 
cases only at the latter point. In effect, it was said that the complexion 
of the taxpayer's case actually changed between the two different stages. 
This was said to be at least one reason why many disputes,  though not 
resolved by bilateral agreement during the first administrative appeal 
to the Appellate Division, were administratively settled to the satis­
faction of both sides after the case had been docketed with the court 
but before it was tried. Indeed, for this and other reasons , well over 
a maj ority of the docketed cases are administratively settled before 
trial. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit. supra note 25 , 
Table 17 B at 134. 
For a detailed explanation regarding the proposal, see Traynor ,  
"Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income , Estate , 
and Gift Tax Cases,"  38 Colum . L .  Rev . 1393 (1938 ) ;  Surrey, " The 
Traynor Plan- What It Is ," 17 Taxes 393 (1939). Mr. Traynor properly 
suggests that the independent tribunal itself would need some latitude 
in providing for exceptions to accommodate situations where the tax­
payer actually was not at fault in failing, at the earlier administrative 
hearing, to submit certain evidence. 
65 With provision for the same type of exception as that suggested 
in note 64 supra regarding evidence. 
66 See Traynor ,  op . cit. supra note 64. Absent the two-stage divi­
sion , the formal requirements would rob the entire procedure before 
that office of its informality. If there is but a single stage , with these 
formal requirements applying to it, many taxpayers would believe at 
the outset that they could afford to do no less than the perfect j ob and 
actually would expend more time , effort, and money than was necessary 
in arriving at a satisfactory disposition. 
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Just as unquestionably, even with this division, many tax­
payers -required to go through the second stage -would deem 
these formal requirements to be in their cases  both onerous 
and superfluous. From the beginning, they had expected the 
administrative appeal office (local or regional) to react ad­
versely in resolving the debatable questions in their cases if 
only because the national office itself had previously published 
its own adverse position. Thus, these taxpayers, if given a 
free choice and if guided by self-interest, might prefer to by­
pass completely the administrative appeal machinery, and place 
their cases before an outside tribunal as quickly as possible . 
Their situation also illustrates the principal yet distinctly dif­
ferent reason why these formal requirements, without more, 
would not achieve their ultimate purpose in the case of many 
other taxpayers whose need to resort to an outside tribunal 
would remain. An adverse administrative determination in any 
case really open to serious doubt will not convince any given 
taxpayer that an outside tribunal necessarily would reach the 
same adverse result even though exposed to the same evidence 
and the same brief. In all such truly debatable cases, a tax­
payer 's incentive to duplicate his effort by resorting to an out­
side tribunal would remain high. 
But this incentive could be dramatically reduced in the 
type of truly debatable cases which a court necessarily would 
decide entirely for one side or the other if a country adopts 
the policy of having the administrative office in question com­
promise such cases by reference to the litigation hazards, test 
cases aside. This practice alone, without the above formal 
requirements, would tend to induce these taxpayers, Prior to 
such administrative hearings, to expend the time and effort 
essential to proper development of their cases if only because, 
at that point, they would be "up against the gun" with respect 
to this type of justice (compromise). Because-absent this 
practice-the previously discussed formal requirements would 
be onerous to so many, because the compromise practice alone 
will go a long way in achieving the aims of those formal re ­
quirements, and because this compromise practice is otherwise 
intrinsically justified for the reasons explained in the next 
subtopic, the formal requirements themselves should not be 
imposed by any country until it has determined from its own 
experience that they are indispensable in maintaining an orderly 
administrative process and in keeping outside tribunals from 
being inundated with tax disputes .  
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3.4 Assuring justice : Need for complete "settlement" authority 
The nature of the question appealed to an administrative 
office can affect adversely its ability to be fair and, thus, its 
opportunity to dispose of the issues by bilateral agreement. 
This is not a problem if the controversy involves, say, the 
valuation of property. In such a case, the office, in fairness, 
may find that the original examiner's proposed valuation actu­
ally was too high though the taxpayer 's was too low. Officials 
hearing this type of appeal in any one of the six countries 
covered by this study possess adequate authority to reach an 
agreement with the taxpayer on the basis of what the officials 
believe to be an appropriate intermediate figure .  This, after 
all, is the result a court might reach if the matter were liti­
gated. 
But these administrative officials also often encounter the 
type of issue which, if litigated, a court-to conform to the 
statute -necessarily must decide entirely for one side or the 
other. 67 At the prelitigation point of an administrative appeal, 
however, the right answer, albeit yes or no, actually may be 
open to serious doubt. This is because, at that point, the truly 
"correct" answer can be nothing more than a prediction of the 
likely decision by an outside independent tribunal if litigation 
actually ensued. If the official at the administrative hearing 
believes that, if litigation ensues, the odds regarding the 
67 In determining the frequency with which these arise ,  vis-a-vis 
disputes regarding a mere amount, it must be remembered that a given 
subtotal on a return actually may cover many of the former. The fact 
that a court would find the taxpayer right as to some, but wrong as to 
others, and thus in effect require a change in the subtotal , does not 
mean that the dispute concerned a mere amount. To illustrate , con­
sider a country which allows a current deduction for true 1 1repair11 
expenses,  but requires capitalization of expenditures for "improve­
ments" in the nature of capital expenditures. The subtotal on a return 
reflecting so-called "repair expenses" actually may include a number 
of separate projects and, as to each of these, a court-viewing the 
projects separately-necessarily may have to decide the issue of de­
ductibility entirely for one side or the other. The fact that the tax­
payer might win as to three projects , with the government winning 
on five, hardly means that there was but one issue involving merely 
an amount. There were eight issues. One or more of many separate 
items hidden in a subtotal may raise both types of questions. For 
example, there may be an issue as to whether a given trip was pri­
marily a deductible business trip or primarily a nondeductible personal 
trip , and even if it is the former, there may be an additional issue 
regarding the amount actually expended for business purposes. 
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government's chance of success are roughly fifty -fifty, pre ­
sumably the real worth or value of the government's equity in 
the case is, as of that moment, only fifty percent of the pre­
viously proposed adjustment. However,  in only three of the 
six countries (France, the Netherlands, and the United States) 
is it ever possible at the administrative level to compromise, 
by reference to these litigation hazards, this type of issue . 68 
In the United States, appeal offices now situated at the 
regional level received initial authority to exercise this com­
plete type of settlement authority69 four decades ago, in the 
1920's.  By then, policy-making officials had learned, the "hard 
way, " the first of five reasons which cumulatively justify this 
practice. They had found it was fruitless to expect a well­
represented taxpayer to make an outright concession if he be ­
lieved he had, say, anything approaching a fifty percent chance 
to succeed in litigation. Indeed, by the time the administra­
tion decided to permit appeal offices  now situated at the re­
gional level to exercise complete settlement authority, the 
then fairly new Tax Court 7 0  already had become inundated 
with petitions from unsatisfied taxpayers and, in consequence, 
struggled with a tremendous backlog of unresolved tax dis ­
putes .71 
Second, U.S. policy-making officials believed it actually 
was unfair for an administrative office to expect the particu­
lar taxpayer described above voluntarily to pay one hundred 
percent and thereby forfeit his valuable possibility (say, fifty 
percent) to prevail in litigation. A compromise, based on 
68 See Chap. XI, §§ 3 .2a and 3 .4b, and Chap. XXIII, §§ 3 .2a and 3 .4a 
infra. Also U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601.106 (f) , Rule II. That such is not 
permitted in Belgium , see Chap. VII, § 3.4 infra; in Germany, see 
Chap. XV, § 3.4a infra; or in Great Britain, see Chap. XIX, §§ 3.2 and 
3.4 infra . It is widely recognized among U .S. practitioners that these 
compromises may be effected by splitting a single issue, by trading 
issues-sometimes subtly , sometimes otherwise , or by a package settle­
ment. In the United States ,  the basic delegation is from the Commis­
sioner directly to certain officials in the regional Appellate Division, 
not to the Regional Commissioner who otherwise exercises adminis­
trative jurisdiction over the latter officials. U.S. Treas. Reg. 
§ 601.10 6 (a) . 
69 For limitations on this authority, see U .S. Treas. Reg. § 60 1 . 106 (a) 
(2) (iii) , (iv) , and (v) ; and notes 73 and 74 infra . Regarding the extent 
this authority is shared with the legal staff once a case is docketed in 
court, see note 30 supra . 
70 But at that time called the Board of Tax Appeals. . 71 Its docket included 22 ,000 cases. See Mills,  "Federal Adminis­
tration of Tax Law," 52 N.Y. State Bar Assoc . Proc . 495 at 500 (1929) .  
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bilateral concessions suitably responsive to the competing 
weaknesses and strengths of the two opposing sides, was thought 
to achieve the most appropriate measure of "justice" if the 
parties agreed to forego litigation. 
Third, it was recognized that, in many such disputes, 
actual litigation would not really help the tax system, i.e . ,  
would not contribute to needed clarification of the law.72 For 
example, some purely legal issues are unlikely to recur with 
any frequency, if at all. Again, other more frequently re ­
curring issues, though of a type which a court necessarily 
would decide entirely for one side or the other,  actually may 
involve mixed questions of law and fact and too many decisions 
by diverse decentralized trial tr ibunals may serve to confuse ,  
not to  clarify, the area. Finally, litigation of  purely factual 
questions of this type would have little, if any, precedent value . 
On the other hand, the u.s. tax administration recently has 
made it exceedingly clear that a legal issue expected to recur 
frequently should not be compromised, for in this circumstance 
early litigation of a test case would.contribute to needed clari­
fication of the law. 73  otherwise, however, a U.S.  taxpayer 
enjoys what is tantamount to an election. On appealing to the 
regional level, he can seek to compromise a debatable issue 
by reference to the litigation hazards. If he does not agree 
with the official's supposedly impartial appraisal of those 
hazards, he can force the matter to litigation, in which event­
in the type of case under discussion here -a court will decide 
entirely for one side or the other .  
Fourth, to authorize an administrative appeal office to 
exercise complete settlement authority over issues a court 
72 See Mills ,  op . cit. supra note 71 ,  at 497 and 501. 
7 3 see Cohen, " Current Developments in the Chief Counsel ' s  Office ," 
42 Taxes 663 (1964). These test cases will be chosen by the National 
Office through a more-or-less computerized information retrieval 
system which ultimately will cover all cases reaching the regional 
level. Also, implicit in the fact that the National Office previously 
has published a revenue ruling on a given issue is the supposition that 
this issue is sufficiently important to warrant being tested in court, 
though this hardly could mean that every case touching that issue would 
be a good test case. By way of contrast, not every private ruling in­
volves a matter sufficiently important to the tax system to warrant 
litigation. Thus , some adverse private rulings , issued at a point when 
a transaction was prospective , should be subject to compromise by 
reference to the litigation hazards if the taxpayer actually consumates 
the transaction. 
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would decide entirely for one side or the other tends also� as 
to those issues, to satisfy an important need of that office .  
The delegation increases that office 's opportunity to become 
fully acquainted with the taxpayer 's side . In many such cases, 
of course, the official still may conclude that the issue is not 
open to any real doubt and will refuse to compromise in the 
belief that the government almost certainly would win if litiga­
tion ensues. 74 But taxpayers will not necessarily know this 
in advance.  Thus, at least those who initially believe they 
have a significant argument but prefer, if possible, to avoid 
expensive, time-consuming litigation which also exposes their 
financial affairs to public view, will be induced by the possible 
chance to compromise -available if at all only at the adminis­
trative level-to develop their cases fully before the hearing 
at that level. And this increases the likelihood administrative 
officials will be able to appraise all cases fairly and, con­
sequently, to secure more bilateral agreements. 
Fifth and finally, the compromises so achieved no doubt will 
produce more genuine uniformity among taxpayers concerned 
74 In the United States ,  the authority of the regional Appellate Divi­
sions to compromise by reference to the litigation hazards is subject 
to the limitation that "no settlement will be countenanced based upon 
nuisance value of the case to either party. " U.S. Treas. Reg. 
§ 601.10 6 (f) , Rule II. Italics added. A former senior official of the 
Appellate Division in New York has suggested that offers of 20 percent 
of the asserted deficiency , if truly responsive to the litigation hazards ,  
should not be deemed a mere nuisance value , but that offers below that 
figure should be so treated. Rosenweig, ' ' Pre- Trial Strategy in a 
Tax Case: Techniques and Limitations in Dealing with the Appellate 
Division," N.Y. U, 22d Inst .  on Fed. Tax 109 , 123 (1964). In other 
words,  as to a doubtful issue which a court necessarily would decide 
entirely for one side or the other, if the taxpayer holds what the gov­
ernment' s settlement official believes to be les s  than a one out of five 
chance to prevail if the matter were litigated but refuses to concede, 
the government should force the matter to litigation rather than accept 
less than the full amount. And if the government is the party holding 
such a small chance, the general instructions to its settlement official 
should contemplate that he would concede the issue. 
However ,  as to small doubtful cases of the type under considera­
tion here, it is believed that the government' s instruction s to its settle­
ment officials regarding its own concession policy should take into 
account the cost of litigation to the taxpayer. In short, it ought not 
expect any payment unles s  the settlement official believes it has a 
better than even chance to prevail should litigation ensue. To expect 
a 20 percent payment, for a one out of five chance , in a case where, 
solely because of the cost of litigation, it is against the taxpayer' s 
economic self-interest to litigate , is tantamount to extortion. 
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with the type of debatable issues under discussion here than 
would an attempt, by the substantial number of widely scattered 
administrative officials necessarily involved, to decide each 
such case entirely for one side or the other . Some would 
abandon an issue which others would force to litigation. 
Section B .  Analytic Comparison of Additional 
Requirements : Echelon by Echelon View 
of Assessment and Administrative 
Conflict Resolution Procedures 
3. 5 Examining officer level 
In both self- and non-self-assessment systems, practically 
all tax disputes are triggered at the examining officer level.  
It is imperative, therefore, that each administration identify 
the precise role of examining officials in the conflict resolu­
tion process.  
This presents no problem at all for certain types of po­
tential disputes, such as those involving a valuation question. 
Each country obviously should instruct its examiners to ap­
proach this type of inherently disputable question with the im­
partiality of a judge. Nor should there be any doubt about an 
examiner's function where he is at least fairly clear that the 
government is in the right regarding the distinctly different 
type of queE>tion which, if litigated, a court necessarily would 
decide entirely for one side or the other .  But if, after objec­
tive and careful analysis, he concludes the correct answer to 
this type of question is open to serious doubt, delimitation of 
his function becomes somewhat more complex. His function 
should vary, depending on whether his country, as to these de ­
batable cases, has adopted compromise as its ultimate standard 
of administrative justice, test cases aside . 
While a country's adoption of this practice should affect 
the function of these lower level examiners, this is not to say 
that they themselves should be empowered to exercise com­
promise authority. Typically, they are far too numerous, too 
lacking in sophistication, too far removed from the litigation 
process itself and thus know too little about it, to be able to 
compromise wisely by reference to the litigation hazards.  But 
where more experienced or higher officials have been so em­
powered, an examiner at the lowest level should be instructed, 
if in substantial doubt regarding the correct answer to this 
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type of substantive question, to do simultaneously two things : 
to set up an assessment and to acknowledge his doubt to the 
taxpayer . 75 This acknowledgment will make it clear that he 
actually is not trying to resolve definitively the difficult ques ­
tion in the impartial manner of a judge . Judge -like resolution 
of these apparently marginal questions would cause, all too 
often, one examiner to set up an assessment which, as to a 
similar dispute with a different taxpayer, another examiner 
would abandon. To avoid this, and further to facilitate a chance 
for both cases to be uniformly treated by reference to this 
country 's hypothetical ultimate standard of administrative 
justice (compromise), assessments should be set up for the 
entire amount in both cases, 7 6 but only to set the stage for 
an administrative appeal by the taxpayer, eventually to an offi­
cial possessing complete settlement authority. The latter ,  if 
convinced also that the correct answer is open to serious 
doubt, then either should compromise the issue by reference 
to his appraisal of litigation hazards or ask the national office 
for technical advice .77 Should he think it likely that the cen­
tral office will wish to litigate a test case on this substantive 
issue, his choice should be for the technical advice route. 
Where a country empowers no official to exercise com­
promise authority over the particular types of truly debatable 
issue under discussion here, a different procedural pattern 
should be employed. To be fair, each such official of such 
country, including those who examine returns, should be in­
structed to resolve all such debatable questions in the impar ­
tial manner of a judge . Since each of these questions, by 
75 Unless specifically instructed to acknowledge openly his doubts , 
if any , the felt pressure to obtain a bilateral agreement is likely to 
lead many examiners to propose adjustments without indicating their 
own doubts, if any. 
76Presumably this is the intention of U.S.  procedures. On the nega­
tive side, examining officers themselves are denied the right, in doubt­
ful situations , to attempt to resolve cases by reference to the litigation 
hazards , this being reserved exclusively to the administrative appeal 
offices. See § 3.7 infra: U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601.10 6 (f) , Rule II; and 
Rev. Proc. 67-27 , I.R.B. 1967 -20 ,  45. On the affirmative side , ex­
aminers are instructed as follows: "Issues should only be raised by 
examining officers when they have merit, never arbitrarily or for 
trading purposes. At the same time, the examining officer should 
never hesitate to raise a meritorious issue." Rev. Proc. 64 -22 , C . B. 
1964-1,  689. 
77 For details regarding a centrally administered technical advice 
program , see Chap. II, § 2 . 16 supra . As to cases covered by previous 
central office rulings, see note 73 supra . 
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definition, will have to be decided entirely for one side or the 
other, the administration hardly can anticipate uniform deci­
sions by the large host of examiners who work at the lowest 
level. But that is a price the country must pay for choosing 
to rely exclusively on a type of administrative justice com­
parable to the approach of the judiciary itself. Having exer ­
cised this preference, apart from administrative appeals initi­
ated by dissatisfied taxpayers, there are only two further 
procedures whereby such countries can increase the prospect 
of uniformity at the examination level. A coroparison of these 
follows . 
3.6 Mandatory internal review v. self-initiated requests for 
technical advice 
Whether, in theory, a given country ought to provide for 
internal review of all determinations made by its large ex­
amining force should turn on the cumulative effect of several 
considerations. However, whether it realistically can afford 
to meet that talent-absorbing need, assuming that need exists, 
turns on a yet different factor . 
Maintenance of integrity is a relevant but not the most 
important consideration in appraising the need for an all­
embracing review program. If this were the prime aim, a 
sampling procedure would suffice. Further,  an internal re ­
view-relying as it does on the administrative file -will not 
necessarily indicate that the original examiner was or was not 
honest. Particularly in the case of business returns, such a 
review necessarily focuses primarily on the examiner 's own 
written report. While this report should disclose all matters 
he thought at all questionable -whether ultimately resolved by 
him in favor of the taxpayer or the government-the file itself 
may leave no "tell-tale" tracks should he, in a given case, 
omit reference to those decided favorably to the taxpayer . 
This is why, in addition to its regular internal review pro­
gram, the United States maintains a completely separate In­
spection Service which typically probes behind and beyond the 
administrative file in attempting to expose in-service dis ­
honesty. 78 The very existence of internal reviews does tend, 
however, to put some pressure on examiners to be honest. 
And if this were the sole consideration, countries such as 
England and the Netherlands, given their civil services '  long 
78 See Trainor, " Functioning of the Inspection Service ," N.Y. U. 
17th Inst.  on Fed. Tax 495 (1959). 
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and widely recognized tradition of integrity, could justify easily 
their practice of not automatically reviewing internally the 
determinations made by their examining forces .  79 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that, in measuring the need 
for internal review, the most important consideration involves 
the frequency with which the examining force is likely-in utter 
innocence -to commit technical errors .  This likelihood in­
evitably is affected by the quality of personnel recruited for 
this force and of the in-service technical training program 
conducted for its benefit. On these counts, the United States 
compares favorably with both England and the Netherlands, as 
well as with the other European countries, 80 though it alone 
maintains a fairly broad-ranging, automatic, internal review 
program. Recruits to its revenue -agent classification (and 
they constitute approximately eighty percent of the entire ex­
amining force 81) must be college graduates with a substantial 
major in accounting. Further, practically all will have had at 
least one college-level course in federal tax law. Finally, at 
the point of recruitment, each also must attend on a full-time 
basis comprehensive in-service classroom courses covering 
not only federal tax law but other subjects as well. Given 
these standards, however, any comparison of error-incidence 
by this force with that of its European counterparts, must take 
account of the relative complexity of the different tax laws 
these various groups apply. Looking at this factor alone, the 
relative chance for error would be greatest in the United States .  
Its law, as noted earlier, is by  all odds the most complex. 82 
Moreover, the thousands of built-in deviations obviously are 
capable of spawning a multitude of interpretative difficulties .  
But a further factor tends at least to mitigate the apparent 
relative difficulty of the U.S. examiner 's task. 
The United States, in implementing the notion of justice it 
deems most appropriate at the administrative level, has dele ­
gated to high level regional officials complete "settlement" (or 
compromise) authority over all truly debatable issues, test 
cases aside . In consequence, whatever the difficulties of an 
79 However, in both countries,  inspectors who visit local offices 
may sample previously examined returns ;  but as in many other coun­
tries ,  this is to enable the higher official to appraise the overall quality 
of the work done , rather than to detect errors as such. See § 3.2 , 
Chaps. XIX and XXIII infra . 
80 See § 1.5,  Chaps. V, IX, XIII, XVII, and XXI infra . 
81 See note 25 supra . 
82 See the comparison in Chap. II, § 2.5 supra. 
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examiner at the lowest level, an escape-hatch exists . The 
examiner is not expected to make a refined judgment in the 
impartial manner of a judge if he concludes there is substan­
tial doubt regarding the correct answer to an issue of the type 
which, if litigated, a court necessarily would decide entirely 
for one side or the other. In effect, it is enough for the ex­
aminer to recognize that the answer is open to serious doubt. 
That doubt in itself, at his level, is enough to trigger a tenta­
tive decision against the taxpayer 83 who, by an administrative 
appeal, can lay the case before a higher official possessing 
complete settlement authority. In contrast, performance of a 
more demanding task should be expected of examiners in a 
country such as Britain, which denies this type of compromise 
authority to all officials. The consequence of this denial should 
be the expectation that its examiners will make impartial de ­
cisions, i.e ., refined predictions regarding the "correct" answer, 
with the consequent greater likelihood of error . 
Nevertheless, a further overriding question exists : can 
any given administration afford to allocate sufficient personnel 
to permit internal review of all determinations made by its 
examining force ? So sweeping an effort obviously would ab ­
sorb a tremendous amount of talent. And on this score, the 
European countries, all of which utilize the non- self-assess ­
ment system, are in a situation quite different from that of 
the United States, which relies on the self-assessment system. 
These countries necessarily use vast amounts of talent in the 
examination function itself, though not one actually makes a 
complete examination of every return. 84 Their coverage, how­
ever, does extend far beyond that of the United States, which 
annually only examines about three and a half million returns 
out of the sixty-seven million annually filed. 85 This compari­
son suggests that the difference in basic assessment systems 
is the prime reason why, relatively speaking, the United States 
finds it easier to spare the talent required to review internally 
its examiners '  determinations. In summary, the non-self­
assessment countries tend to expend their technical personnel 
in achieving wide coverage at the examination level, whereas 
the United States tends to concentrate much more talent on 
each return included in the relatively small sample actually 
subjected to examination. That few administrations are likely 
83 See note 76 supra. 
84 See § 3.2 , Chaps. VII, XI, XV, XIX, and XXIII infra . 
85 See note 25 supra . 
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to be able to afford both is evidenced by the fact that even 
the United States is able to allocate to the automatic review 
function only enough personnel to review somewhat less than 
one million of the three and a half million returns annually 
examined, 86 despite an obvious chance for error in many of 
the other examined returns. The unreviewed category, con­
sisting only of "agreed" adjustments to small returns, is 
examined by the administration's least talented technicians. 
Though the asserted deficiencies were agreed to by the affected 
taxpayers, 87 the fact they are even less knowledgeable obvi­
ously leaves room for mistakes, no doubt to the detriment of 
the affected taxpayers in many cases. Nevertheless, only a 
small sample of the adjustments to these returns are re­
viewed, and then only for quality-control purposes.  
Far less costly in talented manpower than the automatic 
and fairly broad-ranging internal review program maintained 
in the United States is the non-automatic and selective type of 
arrangement used by most European countries.  Examiners 
themselves are permitted to decide when they will request the 
technical advice of a higher, more able, and experienced offi­
cial.88 No doubt this practice does contribute to the prospect 
of uniform correctness at the examination level; however, the 
incidence of err or is deterred in reality only if the examiner 
himself recognized the difficulty. Moreover, this arrangement 
can contribute little, if anything, to the maintenance of integrity . 
3 . 7 Jurisdictional screening function re administrative appeals 
For reasons previously noted, authority to compromise 
administratively a debatable issue of the type which, if liti­
gated, a court would decide entirely for one side or the other, 
should be reserved to a relatively small but fairly decentral­
ized cadre of able and experienced officials who understand 
and, therefore, can appraise properly the litigation hazards.  89 
86 Typically, the number of reviewers on a district review staff 
will equal about 10 percent of the number of revenue agents (examiners) 
in the district' s Field Audit Branch. 
87 Small cases not agreed to at that level are reviewed. 
88 As to legal issues deemed open to serious doubt, such countries 
would be well-advised to maintain a single centralized technical advice 
office at the national level, as described in Chapter II supra, and as 
is maintained in the United States. Reliance should be placed on local 
senior official s ,  however ,  if the examiner' s doubt concerns a question 
of fact or mixed questions of law and fact of the type which must be 
decided entirely for one side or the other. 
89 See § 3.5 supra . 
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Moreover, where a dispute between an examiner and taxpayer 
involves to a significant degree an issue of this type, much 
time and effort will be saved by routing the whole case di­
rectly to a member of that cadre.  9 0  
Their unique power and particular competence are not 
essential, however, to the proper resolution of many types of 
questions about which examiners and taxpayers will be in dis ­
pute . Illustrative are those issues involving a mere amount, 
such as the valu::ttion of property. These fall within the com­
petence of any fact finder .  Again even as to a legal issue 
which a court would decide entirely for one side or the other, 
a given taxpayer may be unquestionably in the wrong though 
his particular examiner could not convince him of this.  Never­
theless, there is nothing to compromise . In such cases as 
these, an official more experienced and able than the examiner, 
though lacking true compromise authority, frequently can per ­
suade the taxpayer to accept a proper disposition of the matter .  
Because, proportionately, s o  many disputes will b e  of this type, 
they should be routed directly from the examiner to just such 
an official . Otherwise, either the more talented small cadre 
possessing complete compromise authority will become over ­
loaded-though only because it receives cases not requiring 
special authority or competence -or that cadre must be ex­
panded in size and, thus, include less experienced and talented 
officials . 91 
The foregoing suggests that a country which contemplates 
empowering at least some officials with true compromise 
authority may well find, as did the United States, that its ad­
ministrative appeal process can make effective use, whether a 
given appeal 1s formal or informal, of two different sets of 
90 This is so whether the case raises either a single issue of this 
type or multiple issues of which only one or more of the significant 
ones are of this type. In the latter circumstance, since the one issue 
of this type cannot be accommodated properly by lower levels , both 
parties should reserve disposition of the other issues to facilitate a 
proper overall disposition. 
91 In the United States ,  during fiscal year 1966,  this cadre (regional 
Appellate Divisions , consisting of 7 17 technically trained conferees) 
obtained agreements in 27 ,428 cases. Tremendous expansion would 
have been required had not a lower administrative appeal office (District 
Conference Offices , staffed with about half as many technically trained 
conferees )  reached an agreed result in another 2 5 ,231 cases which 
usually were les s  complex and did not require 1 1 settlement 1 1 authority. 
See Commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit. supra note 2 5 ,  at 2 5 ,  
6 8 ,  133 ,  and 134. 
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officials, with only the higher ranking set, in contrast to the 
less restrictive practice in France and the Netherlands,92 ex­
ercising true compromise authority. 
While United States practice has long employed these two 
levels of officials, 9 3 at one time all U.s.  taxpayers who dis ­
agreed with their examiners were systematically encouraged, 
though not compelled, to take the dispute, first, to the lower 
ranking appeal office (District Conference Office) which lacked 
true compromise authority. 94 However, where the case which 
went through this lower office involved at least one significant 
debatable issue of the type a court would have decided entirely 
for one side or the other, substantial duplication of adminis­
trative and taxpayer effort took place. True, in many of these 
cases the lower ranking appeal official did help sharpen the 
issues .  But this gain did not offset the cost of an ensuing 
wasteful and predictable duplication. For it was inevitable, in 
view of the lower appeal office 's lack of compromise authority, 
that a substantial proportion of its adverse decisions would be 
92 There, in practice, the inspector who heads the local office, as 
well as officials at the regional level, may exercise such authority. 
See infra Chap. XI, §§ 3.2a and 3.4b, and Chap. XXIII, §§ 3.2a and 
3.4a. However , in the Netherlands the inspector in charge of each 
local office does understand, and presumably can appraise properly, 
the litigation hazards , for he has at least the equivalent of a law de­
gree and performs the representation function at the trial level if 
litigation ensues. In France the law degree possessed by each in­
spector and the two years of intensive training at the National School 
for Taxes likewise gives him a basis with which to appraise litigation 
hazards. All French inspectors , however, do not perform the repre­
sentation function at the trial level. To represent the government in 
litigation before an administrative tribunal, an inspector must be 
located in one of the cities where an administrative tribunal sits. No 
inspectors from outside such a city are brought in for this purpose. 
See § 1.5 of Chaps. IX and XXI, and § 4. 3  in Chaps. XII and XXIV, 
infra . 
93 In a realistic sense, however ,  as before noted, the United States 
actually has three sets of administrative appeal offices ,  for the legal 
staff which performs the litigation-representation function also shares 
authority administratively to compromise cases. See § 3 .1  supra,. 
note 30. This function is performed by Regional Counsel (part of the 
Chief Counsel's Office) in Tax Court cases and by the Tax Division of 
the Justice Department in refund cases before federal district courts 
or the Court of Claims. 
94 See § 3.2 supra regarding a reorganization completed in the early 
1960's, hopefully to discourage the tendency of some p ractitioners to 
bypass that office. 
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appealed to the yet higher office (Regional Appellate Division) 
possessing that special authority. 
Recently, the United States reversed this earlier practice.  
It now seeks to avoid predictable seriatum use of two officials 
to hear successive administrative appeals of the same case .  
To this end, distinctly different officials, who internally review 
the administrative file in all cases not agreed to at the ex­
aminer 's level, perform the necessary screening function. They 
determine the type of office95 to which the taxpayer should be 
encouraged 96 to take the dispute in the first instance . 97 If a 
given taxpayer is urged, because of the nature of his dispute, 
to take it first to the District Conference Office, he still is 
able, if agreement is not achieved there, to invoke the juris­
diction of the higher administrative appeal office.98 
Other countries which do not provide for internal review 
of cases unagreed at the examiner level, but do propose to use 
two sets of appeal officials in the manner described above, 
can assign the screening function to the examiners themselves, 
imposing on them the responsibility to choose the type of offi­
c ial to whom the taxpayer should be encouraged to appeal ini­
tially. 
95 If their initial determination is to the effect that the taxpayer 
should be encouraged to bypass the lower administrative appeal office, 
the Chief of the latter office does review that determination before 
the invitation letter goes out. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601.105 (c) (2) (iv). 
96 This encouragement is reflected in a letter which advises the 
taxpayer that he has 30 days in which to enter the appeal. Rev. Proc. 
64-38, C.B. 1964-2 , 965,  superseded by Rev. Proc. 67-27 , I.R.B. 
1967-20 , 45. For an argument that a taxpayer, in his own interest, 
always should process the case first through the district procedure, 
see Carey, 1 1  Choosing Tax Procedures for Tactical Advantage," 40 
Notre Dame Law. 363 (1965) .  
97 Even s o ,  in fiscal 1966, o f  the 39 ,023 cases dealt with b y  the 
lower administrative appeal office because encouraged to go there 
first, 13,792 ended in disagreement and most of these then were ap­
pealed to the higher office. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
op. cit. supra note 25, at 25. 
98 Jbid. U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(b). Indeed, that taxpayer could 
have disregarded the advice of the screening office and taken the dispute 
to the higher office in the first instance. The important point, how­
ever, is that no taxpayer should be denied the right to take his dispute, 
at some point, to an official possessing true compromise authority­
assuming that there is such an official. The taxpayer, rather than the 
screening office, may be right in believing the dispute properly is 
compromisable though, to repeat, this can be done only by an official 
having the special authority. 
· 
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The use of two sets of appeal officials, with only the higher 
set being given complete settlement authority, may generate a 
peculiar burden for small cases. Many such cases  do involve 
a debatable issue of the type a court necessarily would decide 
entirely for one side or the other .  And in fairness, these 
small taxpayers should be granted the same measure of justice 
as large taxpayers. This includes, if equally available to large 
taxpayers, a convenient opportunity-test cases aside -to com­
promise truly debatable questions by reference to an impartial 
appraisal of the litigation hazards . Because there are so 
many disputes of this type, it may be necessary to give the 
lower ranking appeal officials, to whom complete compromise 
authority otherwise is denied, authority to compromise small 
cases, a ceiling limitation being fixed by reference to a given 
amount of tax in dispute . Indeed, fairness may render this 
essential if the higher ranking appeal officials to whom that 
special authority otherwise is reserved, are assigned, as in 
the United States, to the regional level and hold conferences 
only in widely separated metropolitan centers.9 9  otherwise, 
small taxpayers may find it is against their economic self­
interest to hold a conference with the one set of officials to 
whom the government has reserved total settlement authority. 
While the United States, in disputes not involving more than 
$2, 500 in tax for any one year, recently extended true com­
promise authority to its lower ranking and more conveniently 
located set of appeal officials, this authority is limited to 
"selected issues, " where the higher regional office previously 
had worked out a compromise covering a "substantially identi­
cal issue . "100 
3 . 8  Requiring written pro tests 
For reasons previously noted, ordinarily a country ought 
not require a taxpayer to submit at the administrative-hearing 
stage all evidence and arguments he later formally would sub­
mit if the dispute is taken to court.1 01 On the other hand, 
two considerations will render the administrative procedure 
grossly inefficient unless a taxpayer is required to submit an 
appropriate written document prior to the oral conference held 
with the appeal official. 
99 These regional offices maintain only about forty geographically 
spread posts of duty in the United States and ride circuit to approxi­
mately twenty other metropolitan centers. 
100 See Rev. Proc. 67-27 , I.R.B. 1967-20 ,  45. 
101 See § 3.3 supra . 
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The first consideration relates to the conferee himself. If 
he is not forewarned regarding the grounds of the taxpayer 's 
objections and the rationale upon which the latter relies, he is 
deprived of a chance, in advance, to read all the relevant legal 
data (decisions, regulations, rulings, etc .), and to think through 
their implications and the questions he should ask regarding 
both the legal and the factual sides of the controversy. Lack­
ing such preparation, in too many cases the first conference 
will be only exploratory, and an otherwise unnecessary and 
wasteful second conference will be required to enable the 
parties to discuss the refinements of the matter at issue . This 
need for a second conference leads also to a frequently un­
recognized waste in that the conferee, at the first conference, 
must prepare a more detailed record of the points developed 
there than otherwise would be necessary. Further, because he 
inevitably will deal with many other cases during the interim 
between the two conferences, he must take yet further time, 
before that second conference, just to re-orient himself with 
respect to the earlier exploratory discussion. 
The second consideration relates to the taxpayer. If not 
required to submit a written document before the conference, 
he will tend to handle his side of the dispute less efficiently 
and thereby contribute directly to the official 's own inefficiency. 
This is particularly true where a taxpayer brings in a practi­
tioner for the first time at the point of the first administrative 
appeal. Under such circumstances-if no advance document is 
required-there is the great risk that the practitioner actually 
will use the first conference as his starting point, i.e. ,  to 
orient himself regarding the nature of the controversy and the 
type of showing required if the conferee is to sustain his 
client's position. 
In spite of these considerations, throughout most of the 
1 950's, no advance written document was required oy the United 
States in the case of those taxpayers who elected to appeal 
first to-and hold an oral conference with-the District Con­
ference Office .102 Such a document ("protest") was required, 
however, of taxpayers who elected to bypass that office and 
appeal directly to the higher Regional Appellate Division, or 
102 See e.g., Kev. Proc. 56-34 ,  C.B. 1956-2 ,  1396 ,  ultimately super­
seded by Rev. Proc. 67-27 , I.R.B. 1967-20 ,  45. The obj ective of that 
procedure was to surround that conference arrangement with as few 
formalities as possible in the belief this would facilitate resolution 
of issues at the earliest possible moment. 
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who appealed to the latter office after failing to achieve agree­
ment with the district's appeal office.103 In 1964, the admin­
istration extended this requirement, with an exception noted 
below, to all appeals lodged initially with the district office . 104 
Presumably it believed this would tend to force taxpayers and 
their representatives to become more fully informed before 
that first district office conference and simultaneously enable 
the officials at that level to accommodate more efficiently the 
thousands of appeals they rece ived. 
Exempted from this general requirement were cases fall­
ing in the so-called small category-i.e. ,  where the disputed 
amount for any one year did not exceed $ 1, 000. 105 In early 
1967 this ceiling was revised upward-to $2, 50Q 106_a revision 
which probably would have exempted more than half of the 
42 ,381 cases those district offices received in the preceding 
fiscal year . 1°7 
Such an exemption is unnecessary where, as in Germany 
and the Netherlands,108 the taxpayer's document need do noth­
ing more than protest the examiner 's determination. No argu­
ments in support of the protest need be set out. That type of 
document, however, does not achieve the purposes heretofore 
described.109 Contrariwise, if a country actually intends to 
enforce a more demanding and informative type of require ­
ment, such as that now imposed in the United States, as a 
practical matter some small-case category, however defined, 
must be exempted. Small taxpayers would find it against their 
economic self-interest to incur the expense necessary if the 
U.s. requirement were imposed on them; it calls for a written 
statement outlining "the facts, law, and arguments upon which 
the taxpayer relies . "  110 
103 Ibid . 
104 Rev. Proc. 64-38 , C.B. 1964-2 , 965. 
105 Under the 1964 procedure, the immunity also automatically ex­
tended to so-called office-audit cases which, collectively, made up 
about 40 percent of the appeals to the District Conference Offices 
and typically involved substantially less than $1,000. 
106 Rev. Pro c. 67-27,  I.R.B. 1967-2 0 ,  45. The new dividing line 
($2 ,500) apparently applies alike to office audit and the typically larger 
field-audit cases. 
107 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue,  op . cit. supra note 2 5 ,  
at 2 5 .  
108 See § 3.4a, Chaps. XV and XXIII infra . 
109 At most it merely alerts the office to the fact of appeal. 
110 Rev. Proc. 67-27 , I.R.B. 1967-20 , 45. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION BY INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS1 
Section A. Analytic Comparison: Judicial 
Structures of the "Six " 
4 . 1  Introduction: The goals 
An administrator who examines returns cannot avoid taking 
some position on a given issue even though he may believe the 
truly "correct" substantive answer is open to substantial doubt. 
In consequence, errors inevitably will be made even by ad­
ministrators who strive to be objective-and not all will or 
can be.  And some such erroneous results inevitably will be 
adverse to the affected taxpayers, whether due to the laws of 
chance or to an administrative belief that the government's 
interest in cases deemed marginal should not be conceded 
since separate tribunals exist to resolve just such cases. How­
ever, whether any given administrative determination actually 
is erroneous cannot be known at that stage . The administrator 
may hold one view and the taxpayer another, but in essence 
both views are mere predictions regarding the result an in­
dependent tribunal would reach if the matter were litigated. 
The only feasible method of ascertaining precisely which 
of the many administrative determinations actually are errone­
ous is to assure all taxpayers who disagree with the adminis­
tration, either as to the facts or the law, that they then can 
submit the case to a tribunal which is completely impartial. 
This is the essence of "living under law." Moreover, escape 
valves of this type are the only means of assuring an equally 
essential byproduct. The mere existence of that type of tri ­
bunal provides the best possible guarantee that the administra­
tion itself, during the earlier administrative stage, at least 
will try to be fair in resolving conflicts. 
This right of taxpayers, to invoke the jurisdiction of im­
partial tribunals, will be meaningful in practice, however, only 
1 For a recent comparative treatment of this subject in the setting 
of countries now developing, see Liker, " The Legal and Institutional 
Framework of Tax Administration in Developing Countries/'  14 
U. C . L . A . L .  Rev.  240, 325-45 (1966). 
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if structural arrangements enable the latter to provide con­
venient forums.  Also, in the interest of the whole tax system, 
those arrangements should facilitate decisions of high quality 
and interpretations having fairly lasting effect. Finally, they 
should permit efficient fulfillment of all these criteria-thereby 
avoiding undue drain on the totality of a nation's resources 
and talented manpower. 
Unfortunately, no structural arrangement can assure, though 
it can foster, impartiality on the part of a tribunal. Further, 
neither this impartiality nor decisions of high and durable 
quality can be promoted in the fullest sense if efficiency be ­
comes so much an end in itself that man-hours expended per 
case must be held to the bare minimum, or if the forum must 
provide convenient access in an absolute sense . These com­
peting criteria are in inherent conflict, and arrangements 
which tend to stress one tend to slight another .  Consequently 
any given structural arrangement can hope only to achieve 
some reasonable balance among these competing interests. 
Because this presents a problem of degree, it is not surpris ­
ing that, among the six countries covered by this study, dif­
ferences exist regarding the relative emphasis placed on each 
of these criteria. Reflections of these differences appear 
throughout the judicial structures : in the appointing procedures; 
in the types of persons who fulfill the decision-making function 
at the trial and appellate levels; in the extent decisions are 
made not by single persons but instead-as to the law, facts, 
or both-by a deliberative body; in the scope of review at the 
appellate level; in the arrangements which affect uniformity 
and certainty, including the role of precedent; and finally in 
the degree convenient access is accorded both small and large 
taxpayers.  
4 .2  Trial tribunals : Impartiality and the relevance of a spe ­
cialized bench 's perspectives 
Looking solely at the standard of impartiality, tradition in 
any one of these countries actually may compensate for par ­
ticular excessive deficiencies in its structural arrangements.  
But these structural shortcomings should be shunned by other 
countries, for the structure ,  on transplant, will not be accom­
panied automatically by the compensating tradition. Further, 
a mere image of impartiality, whatever be the fact, in itself 
is important to taxpayer morale, and structural deficiencies 
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can impair that image . 2 For both these reasons, countries 
now evolving or reconsider ing their structural arrangements 
should adopt plans which at a minimum tend to preclude the 
tax administration itself from having any control over the ap­
pointment, tenure, or future promotions of those named to such 
tribunals. Other methods of appointment, less likely to im­
pinge on the tribunal's impartiality, are numerous, too obvious 
to recite, and have been invoked by four of the six countries 
covered here .3 And as to a fifth, though Britain's Treasury 
does make the appointments to one of that country's two pri­
mary trial level tax tribunals, 4 the Lord Chancellor {Minister 
of Justice) controls appointments to the other . 5 Only in Ger ­
many do finance officials appoint all of the technically trained 
trial judges who sit on tax cases .  6 
Bias does not spring, however, solely from self-interest. 
The sum of a prospective appointee's past experiences ines­
capably affects the perspective he  brings to  such a tribunal 
and, consequently, his attitude toward the interpretative process . 
Thus, it could be argued, to the extent professionals are used, 
that individuals who have devoted their lives almost exclusively 
to the tax administration itself should be rendered ineligible 
for appointment to the separate trial tribunals .  But this 
2 Indeed, proponents of a bill to shift the otherwise independent 
U .S .  Tax Court from the executive branch to the judicial branch rely 
upon the above argument as one reason justifying the change. See 
remarks of Senator Long, 113 Cong. Rec .  S9035 (daily ed. June 28 ,  
1967). Also , Gribbon, " Should the Judicial Character o f  the Tax Court 
Be Recognized?" 24 Geo . Wash.  L .  Rev. 619, 626 (1956).  
3 In Belgium, where the courts of appeal sit as trial forums in 
tax cases ,  the King makes the appointment from two lists of nominees 
submitted respectively by the courts of appeal themselves and by the 
conseillers provinciaux. See Belgium Constitution, Art. 99. In France, 
most judges on its trial tribunals are drawn from the civil service. 
See Chap. XII, § 4.2 infra . As to the Netherlands, see Chap. XXIV, 
§ 4.2  infra . The U.s. Declaration of Independence criticized King 
George III because he had ' 'made Judges dependent on his will alone,  
for the tenure of their offices ,  and the amount and payment of  their 
salaries." Not surprisingly, therefore, while the President appoints 
the judges on all U.S. trial forums , the nominations must be approved 
by the Senate. See U.S. Constitution Art. II, § 2. 
4 See Chap. XX, § 4.2b infra . 
5 Except in Scotland, where a city or county council makes the 
appointment. See Chap. XX, § 4.2a infra. 
6See Chap. XVI, § 4.2 infra . Finance officials there also exercise 
a veto over possible promotion of these same judges to the appellate 
fiscal court. Id . § 4.4 infra . 
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argument, if valid, cuts two ways, for there are two parties 
to every tax controversy . Thus, a reasonable application of 
the same standard would render ineligible any profess ional 
who consistently had opposed the administration, always having 
represented taxpayers .  And in practice, as to a given country, 
the two prohibitions together could preclude appointment of any 
professional possessed of tax expertise, thereby rendering the 
tribunals less efficient and in the view of some -given the 
complexities of tax law-less capable of handing down high 
quality decisions . Certain critics take issue on this latter 
count; indeed, believing that specialization makes it more diffi­
cvlt to maintain an "impartial" perspective and to reach deci­
sions of "proper" quality, they also oppose granting exclusive 
jurisdiction over tax affairs to specialized tribunals. 7 Other ­
wise, so one argument goes, the professionals appointed, what­
ever be their backgrounds, will become too far removed from 
the general law, will become overly devoted to the tax code 
itself and to its perfection, and-for judges-will become too 
zealous in trying, through the interpretative process, to give 
the whole code a somewhat more symmetrical impact by ref­
erence to the substance of transactions than the legislatively 
inspired language of the code 's diverse parts deserve, usually 
to the advantage of the tax administration. 
It is one thing to contend, as do these critics, that pro­
fessionals on a specialized tribunal, if not otherwise restrained, 
ultimately would tend to go too jar in this particular direction. 
It is quite another to acknowledge that these professionals 
would have the opportunity, in contrast to those on courts of 
general jurisdiction, to develop a more complete understanding 
and a deeper "concern" for the total implications of the tax 
code. In consequence, professionals on specialized tribunals, 
as a group but not necessarily so in any single instance ,  
7 See Sutherland, "New Roads to the Settlement of Tax Contro­
versies:  A Critical Comment," 7 Law ;& Contemp. Frob . 359 (1940) ;  
Angell, "Procedural Reform in the Judicial Review of Controversies 
Under the Internal Revenue Statutes :  An Answer to a Proposal,11  34 
Ill . L. Rev. 151 (1939);  Prettyman, 1 1A Comment on the Traynor Plan 
for Revision of Federal Tax Procedures ," 27 Ceo . L .,J. 1038 (1939).  
That the ultimate objective of the Hoover Commission Report was to 
prevent this,  see Guy, "An Administrative Labor Court: Some Ob­
servations of the Hoover Commission Report," 24 Ceo. Wash. L .  Rev . 
656,  666 (1956). Also in general, see Rifkind, 11 A Special Court for 
Patent Litigation: The Danger of a Specialized Judiciary ,1 1  37 AB.A. J. 
425 (1951). 
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should be more inclined than judges on the other type of tri­
bunal to interpret the diverse substantive provisions of the 
code to achieve results responsive-from a policy standpoint­
to the multiple but often competing purposes of the whole code 
and, to that end, be more inclined to consider the substance 
of transactions, not just their mere legal form. 
These modest projections do not indicate that professionals 
on specialized tribunals are likely to go too far, or conversely 
not far enough, in this direction. They indicate only a mere 
"Probability, " not otherwise measurable on any count, that as 
between the two types of tribunals, specialized types at least 
will tend to go somewhat further in that direction. As so de ­
fined, this "probability" should be viewed by a legislature as 
one of the positive factors supporting assignment of some sig­
nificant tax role to a professionally staffed specialized trial 
tribunal . 
Relevant to the positive quality of this one factor is the 
awesome function of a tax code. These codes, alone among 
all public laws, must respond, one way or another, to almost 
the whole factual terrain covered by the entire private law. 
Given this all encompassing quality and the inherent limitations 
of the legislative process, a legislature's own substantive ef­
forts all too often will fall far short of achieving equity in a 
timely fashion if the interpretative machinery, because lacking 
in tax expertise, does not have the capacity, in individual 
cases, to take account of the multiple but often competing pur­
poses of the whole tax code and, in consequence, gives scant 
attention to the substance of transactions . Avoidance of this 
latter consequence should be of real concern to the legislature 
itself, for taxation is peculiarly and essentially a legislative 
function. Unfortunately, however, apart from careful use of 
substantive language, there is only one practical way in which 
a legislature can attack that consequence, namely, by assign­
ing some significant role to a professionally staffed special 
tribunal. 
A further alternative does exist but only in theory . The 
legislature could try to complement its substantive language by 
indicating, as has been done in legislation much more limited 
in thrust, S its own expectations regarding the standards of ju­
dicial construction to be applied. But it would be extremely 
BE. g., New York, Alternative County Government Law, § 7 00, and 
Private Housing Finance Law, § 600. 
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unwise to undertake such a delineation of standards in the 
setting of a comprehensive tax code. 9 Such a code contains 
countless competing substantive ideas . No one standard of 
construction could suffice. To help sharpen understanding re ­
garding the relative vitalities of each single competing idea, 
the legislature would have to indicate the particular standard 
to be applied in each single instance .  The resulting product 
would be appallingly cumbersome . Further, the legislature 's 
human inability to anticipate the shape of countless factual 
situations means, to this extent, that however carefully it 
sought, by enacting standards of construction, to clarify the 
relative vitality of its competing tax ideas, it actually would 
be trying to respond to the unknown. Finally, s ince the weight 
which the legislature might want to attach to substance will 
vary depending upon the competing tax ideas in issue, the im­
precision of the type of language associated with standards of 
construction suggests that appropriate substantive language ac­
tually could define the legislaturevs intention more precisely, 
though not so precisely as to eliminate the need for technically 
competent, concerned, and efficient interpretative machinery . 
Whether or not the countries covered by this study actually 
looked upon the above discussed "probability" as a positive 
factor, each one in fact has chosen, at least at the trial level, 
to make some use of the potentially greater competence, con­
cern, and efficiency of a specialized or semi-specialized tri­
bunal, composed entirely or predominantly of persons having 
some type of professional training or experience.  Britain has 
its Special Commissioners, 10 Germany its fiscal courts, ll and 
the United States its T ax Court. 12 Belgium13 and the Nether­
lands 14 differ only slightly; they use specialized chambers in 
their regular courts of appeal as trial forums. And France 
9 As to the utility of canons of construction generally, cf. Frank­
furter ,  "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes," 47 Colum. L .  Rev. 
527 , 544 (1947) with Jackson, " The Memory of Statutes :  What Congress 
Says or What the Court Says," 34 A.B. A.J.  535 (1948). 
1 0 See Chap. XX, § 4.2b infra . 
11 See Chap. XVI, § 4.2 infra . 
12 I.R.C., §§ 7441-87. Of the three different types of trial forums 
used by the United States ,  a second-the Court of Claims-should be 
put in the semi-specialized category. About one-third of its docket 
concerns federal tax cases. See Kipps ,  " A  Unique National Court: 
The United States Court of Claims," 53 A. B. A J. 1025, 1026 (1967). 
13see Chap. VIII, § 4.2 infra . 
14 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.2 infra . 
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assigns to special administrative tribunals three types of ac­
tions to which the government is a party; included are fiscal 
cases . 15 
Relevant also to the perspectives of these tribunals are 
differences in the backgrounds of their more or less permanent 
personnel . In contrast to Belgium, Germany, and the United 
States, not all of Britain's eight Special Commissioners pos­
sess legal training. 16 The latter are drawn in roughly equal 
proportions from practising barristers and from non-legally 
trained but senior Inland Revenue officials who on appointment 
sever their connections with the administration. 17 As to this 
matter of prior association with the tax administration, both 
the Netherlands and the United States tend to maintain a some­
what similar balance on their specialized tribunals. About 
half the sixteen legally trained persons on the U. S. Tax Court 
usually will have had some prior connection with the tax ad­
ministration's legal staff, oftentimes in addition to outside ex­
perience as a practitioner .  In the Netherlands, of the three 
judges who serve each of the specialized tax chambers, typi­
cally one previously served as a tax inspector, another first 
gained tax expertise on the outside, and the third served as a 
jurist on a yet lower nonspecialized tribunal. 18 No such 
balance exists, however, in Germany or France . These two 
illustrate the competing extremes.  All permanent German 
appointees, though legally trained, are drawn from the various 
state finance ministries from which they too sever their con­
nection.19 French administrative tribunals, on the other hand, 
include no counseillors who possessed tax expertise at the 
time of appointment. The great majority, however, will have 
received legal training. This follows because most appoint­
ments are made from graduates of the National School of Ad­
ministration, and only a relatively small minority of these did 
not obtain a law degree before being admitted to that school. 
Moreover, while nongraduates of that school who are appointed 
to the administrative tribunals must have a law degree, in the 
intere�t of impartiality and independence these are drawn 
15 See Chap. XII, § 4. 1 infra . 
16 That the Netherlands' departure from this requirement is tem-
porary, see Chap. XXIV, § 4.2 infra . 
17 See note 10 supra . 
18 See note 14 supra . 
19 See note 6 supra . 
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from the Ministries of Interior or Justice, not from the tax 
administration. 20 
4 . 3  Trial tribunals : Other factors relevant to the goals 
The potentially greater technical competence, concern, and 
efficiency of specialized tribunals are not the only considera­
tions to which a nation properly might accord weight in decid­
ing whether, how, or the degree to which it will utilize such 
tribunals. 
Involved also is the matter of convenience and factors 
which compete with it. A practical dilemma may arise .  If 
such a tribunal is available to the more complex and larger 
cases, where geographical convenience is a relatively minor 
problem, equitably speaking it should be equally available in 
fact to the host of smaller cases certain to arise, where geo­
graphical convenience is a major problem. However, such a 
wholesale requirement of convenience, with the consequent ex­
pense and drain on a nation's reservoir of able professionals, 
may present insurmountable difficulties to some countr ies, 
particularly those now developing. A professionally staffed 
specialized trial tribunal, nevertheless, is relevant to the needs 
of a small case -though admittedly the peculiar nature of such 
a tribunal 's contribution in this circumstance does differ from 
that associated with complex cases .  In the setting of a small 
case, the tribunal itself should assume the duty of assuring a 
fair deal for the taxpayer .  In all cases, the government itself 
will be represented by a person expert in tax affairs .  In a 
small case, however, the taxpayer simply cannot afford that 
type of representation. The consequent unreliability of the 
adversary system to promote justice in this circumstance re­
quires that the tribunal be sufficiently expert to assist the 
taxpayer in presenting his case effectively and efficiently. 21 
For a government not to accommodate this need is peculiarly 
unbecoming in tax cases, for the government itself always is 
a party and, as before noted, typically is well represented. To 
grant small taxpayers access to such a tribunal will have little 
practical meaning, however, if they are required to travel a 
substantial distance to have their cases heard. In the absence 
2 0 See Chap. XII, § 4.2 n. 6 infra . 
21 This consideration, while relevant here and actually responsible 
for introduction of a bill in the U.S. Senate to establish a Small Tax 
Division within the u.s. Tax Court, relates primarily to practices and 
procedures and is, therefore, dealt with more fully in § 4 . 9  infra . 
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of geographical convenience, the small taxpayer, previously 
having taken time away from his job to process the case 
through the administrative stage, may find it is against his 
economic self-interest to spend additional time on the road. 
The expense and drain in providing genuinely convenient 
access to a specialized tribunal will be multiplied further if, 
pursuant to the otherwise justified belief that a deliberative 
body provides the best means of reaching decisions of proper 
quality, a given country also prefers to use more than one 
judge in each case be it large or small. 
Of concern also is the type of person who should be em­
powered to find the facts and the related question of whether 
the deliberative process should be extended to this function. 
Some believe, relevant to this, that there is an important dif­
ference between a full-time tax-case jurist and a judge who 
sits on a court of general jurisdiction where tax cases con­
stitute only a small part of the docket. The full-time tax 
jurist, so the argument goes, is more likely, because he will 
more frequently encounter somewhat similar fact patterns, to 
develop preconceptions about these and, in consequence, more 
frequently will prejudge the facts of a particular case . 22 Some 
also argue that even judges on courts of general jurisdiction 
tend, on hearing case after case, year after year, to become 
somewhat bored and thus less attentive than persons who hear 
only a few cases and for whom each such case is an interest­
ing new venture . These two suppositions argue for ad hoc 
infusion of ordinary laymen into the fact finding process. 23  
This position gains further support if the comparison is  be ­
tween a panel of lay fact finders and a single judge who alone 
would decide questions both of fact and law. The panel ar­
rangement itself creates the additional prospect, at least as to 
the fact finding process, that preconceptions of one man will 
tend to be neutralized through the interchange arising from the 
panel's deliberative process. 24 Further, a panel of laymen, if 
at all representative of the community, may be more sensitive 
than any judge or panel of judges to the community 's sense of 
what is reasonable, 25 and factual controversies in tax cases­
as in other cases-often turn on just that.  Further, from any 
22 See Joiner, Civil Justice and the Jury 66 (1962) .  
23 An empirically based analysis of the American jury appears in 
Kalven & 2eisel, The American Jury (1966) .  
24 See Joiner, op . cit . supra note 22 , at 66. 
25 See id. at 65. 
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such division of power between judges and laymen emerges a 
system of checks and balances which alone may inspire tax­
payer confidence in the fairness of the system.26 
Finally, a given legislature, though impressed by the po­
tentially greater technical competence and concern of a spe ­
cialized tribunal, may fear, as do the previously mentioned 
critics, that such a tribunal, absent some checkrein, might be ­
come too far removed from the general law and indulge "too 
much" in what some call judicial legislation. And this fear of 
the unknown may lead that legislature to cast about for suitable 
restraints, to be applied at either the trial or appellate levels 
or at both. 
E ach of the countries dealt with here, while making some 
use of a specialized or semi-specialized trial tribunal staffed 
entirely or predominantly with persons of professional training 
or experience, has responded also, though in diverse ways and 
degrees, to most of the additional considerations recited above . 
Presumably to assure convenient access with a minimum 
of taxpayer travel, four of the Six (Belgium, France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands) have decentralized their specialized trial 
tribunals . 27 The Netherlands located these courts in five dif­
ferent cities, Belgium in three, France in twenty-four, and 
Germany in fifteen. 28  Each court in the Netherlands, on the 
average, accommodates 2, 570 square miles which, if the court 
were located in the center of that hypothetical square,  would 
place it only twenty-six miles from taxpayers residing in the 
remote corners of the square.  The comparable number of 
miles in Belgium would be forty-five, in Germany fifty-seven, 
and in France sixty-seven. In contrast to this decentralized 
approach, Special Commissioners in Great Britain29 and judges 
who sit on the U. S .  Tax Court are centrally located, but miti­
gate the taxpayer 's travel burden by riding circuit. The U . S .  
court has the more serious problem, for the territory it must 
26 See id. at 64 and 67 ; Angell , op . cit. supra note 7 , at 154. For 
conflicting views regarding the use of the jury system in tax cases,  
compare Walston, " The Use of  Juries in Federal Civil Income Tax 
cases," 39 Taxes 144 (1961) with Glaser, "Taxation-Is the Tax­
payer Neglecting the Jury?" 28 U. Cine . L .  Rev .  352 (1959). In 
general, see Ferguson, "Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax 
Controversies ," 48 Ia . L .  Rev . 312 (1963 ) .  
27 For consideration of  convenience as  affected by procedural re­
quirements and use of counsel , see §§ 4. 9 and 4. 10 infra . 
28 See § 4.2 , Chaps. XXIV, VIII, XII, and XVI infra . 
29 See Chap. XX, § 4.2b infra . 
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cover is fifteen times as great as the entire territory of the 
largest of the Western European countries .  Further, because 
it holds hearings in only fifty cities, 30 geographically speak­
ing it is a substantially less convenient forum than any of its 
European counterparts . 31 
The United States taxpayer, however, is not limited to the 
Tax Court. Two other alternative types of trial forum are pro­
vided, one of which is highly accessible. In fact, this country, 
compared to the other five, offers taxpayers the widest choice 
of forums from among the most varied types of trial tribunals.  
Their differences go beyond ordinary procedures 32  to include 
important structural differences which affect much more than 
mere convenience of access. These structural differences run 
the gamut, for they evidence extreme forms of both specializa­
tion and reliance on the deliberative process. 
The Tax Court is the most specialized of these tribunals; 
there typically one judge alone decides questions both of fact 
and law. However, about one -third of the officially published 
decisions, because they involve peculiarly important or mar ­
ginal questions of law, are subjected to the deliberative process 
through internal review by the whole court. But this practice 
is triggered internally,  usually on order of the Chief Judge, 33 
not upon request by the taxpayer . 
A geographically more convenient hearing is available to 
the U. S.  taxpayer if he elects to utilize a regular federal dis­
trict court of general jurisdiction 34 where his case will be 
tried before a single nonspecialized legally trained judge . 
These courts are spread across the country and sit in over 
three hundred and eighty cities, seven times the number visited 
30 See Appendix to Tax Court Rules ,  implementing the broad direc­
tive in I.R.C. § 7446. 
31 The figure for this court, comparable to those cited above re­
garding other countries,  is 192 miles. 
32 As to these , see Ferguson, op . cit . supra note 26, and Brown & 
Whitmire, " Forum Reform: Tax Litigation," 35 U. Cine . L .  Rev.  644 
(1966 ). Also see § 4. 10 infra . 
33 Pursuant to I.R.C, § 7 460 (b). Internal practices of this court are 
considered in articles by three of its judges. See Kern, " The Process 
of Decision in the United States Tax Court," 8 N. Y. U. lnst.  on Fed. Tax .  
1013 (1950);  Murdock, "What Has the Tax Court o f  the United States 
Been Doing?" 31 A.B.A. J. 297 (1945);  Raum, "Tax Court Litiga­
tion," 1957 So. Calif. Tax lnst .  631. 
34 2 8  U.S.C. §§ 1 346, 1491, and I.R.C. § 7402(a). For a summary of all 
the features peculiar to these courts , see Brown & Whitmire, op. cit. 
supra note 32;  Ferguson, op. cit. supra note 26. 
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by the Tax Court. 35 Peculiar to this election is the comple­
mentary right of either party to have the facts found by a 
deliberative body, a jury of laymen impanelled on an ad hoc 
basis for this purpose . To invoke the jurisdiction of a district 
court, however, the taxpayer suffers an encumbrance-often­
times at very great inconvenience-not encountered in litigation 
before the Tax Court. 36 He must pay the asserted deficiency 
in advance, for a tax can be challenged in a district court only 
through a suit for refund. 37 
By invoking a yet third alternative, which again is avail­
able only if payment is made in advance, a U. S. taxpayer can 
be sure that questions of law also will be decided by a de ­
liberative body-the multijudge Court of Claims. 38 This is a 
semi-specialized tr ibunal. Despite the sweep of its jurisdic­
tion-covering any claim running against the United States ex­
cept those founded on tort-it has developed considerable tax 
expertise if only because a significant part of its docket (34 
percent in one recent year) concerns federal tax questions. 39 
One of fifteen legally trained, circuit-riding commissioners40 
will make preliminary findings of fact and submit recommen­
dations regarding the legal questions . The actual decision, 
however, will be rendered by legally trained judges of whom 
there are seven, concurrence by four being required in cases 
where the court sits en bane, though recent legislation permits 
it to sit in divisions composed of two or three j udges .  41 
35 Register, Department of Justice and the Courts of the United 
States 21-111 (1966). 
36 The latter court acquires j urisdiction after a deficiency has been 
proposed, but prior to assessment, provided the taxpayer files a peti­
tion with the court within 90 days after receiving a formal notice of de­
ficiency. I.R. C. §§ 6212 and 6213. In general, therefore, it has no 
jurisdiction over refund suits. 
37 Flora v. U.S.,  357 U.S. 63 (1958 ) ,  aff'd on reh . ,  362 U.S, 145 
(1960). 
38 28 U.S. C. § 1491.  For a survey of features peculiar to this 
court, see Kipps ,  op . cit . supra note 12 ; Miller, "Tax Litigation in 
the Court of Claims ," 55 Ceo. L .J.  454 (1966) ; Ferguson, op . cit. 
supra note 26; Pavenstedt, " The United States Court of Claims as a 
Forum for Tax Cases," 15 Tax L ,  Rev . 1 201 (1959, 1960). 
39 Kipps,  op. cit. supra note 12 , at n. 10. 
40 Even so, the bar in Washington, D.C., where the judges sit, tends 
to dominate litigation before this court. See Pavenstedt, op . cit , supra 
note 38 , at 12. 
41 28 U.S. C. § 175(d) and (e). Many practitioners before that court 
are urging it to continue to sit en bane. Kipps, op . cit. supra note 12,  
at 1025 n.  5,  
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That the specialized Tax Court's jurisdiction is shared 
both with the semi-specialized multijudge Court of Claims, 
and with the regular nonspecialized single -judge district courts 
where a deliberative body of laymen may be invoked to find 
the facts, inevitably gives rise to forum shopping. This prac ­
tice is further stimulated by other differences in their ordi­
nary procedures42 and also by the subsequently discussed ab­
sence, for all practical purposes, of a common or centralized 
court of appeal. 43 And from this forum-shopping opportunity, 
certain unfortunate effects, examined later in § 4 .6, admittedly 
do follow. As noted there, however, it is the absence of a 
common court of appeal, not the opportunity to choose from 
among different types of trial tribunals, that is the pivotal de­
fect. No one trial judge or jury (or set of such) can hear 
every case .  Therefore, except for the difficulty noted at the 
appellate level, spreading litigation through these different 
types of trial tribunals, instead of forcing resort to a common 
type, has great merit. By offering Americans a choice (sub­
ject to the unfortunate previously noted encumbrance regarding 
prior payment) from among all of what many deem to be really 
meaningful alternatives, this structure has the advantage of 
building confidence in the system. Further, this trial-level 
structure enables the tax system itself to benefit from the po­
tentially greater technical competence, concern, and efficiency 
of a specialized tribunal, while incorporating also what some 
view to be the first of two worthwhile restraints 44 on that 
tribunal of specialists . At least the proponents of this view 
argue that the Tax Court's own awareness of the right of tax­
payers to choose other forums tends to place a subtle and 
meaningful, though quite unmeasurable, restraint on that tri­
bunal. 45 Whether this be an actual restraint or simply a 
42 As to these, see Ferguson, op . cit. supra note 26 , and Brown & 
Whitmire, op . cit . supra note 32. Also see § 4. 10 infra . 
43 See § 4. 6 infra . 
44 The second is at the appellate level and relates to the fact that 
the judges there are generalists. See § 4.5 infra . 
45 See Sutherland, op . cit . supra note 7 ,  at 360. For a conflicting 
view, to the effect that only specialized tribunals should be used at the 
trial level , the one restraint being that "judges of general outlook" 
should sit on appeal, see Miller, "Can Tax Appeals Be Centralized?" 
23 Taxes 303,  306 (1945). To the effect that both should be spe­
cialized, see Traynor, "Administrative and Judicial Procedure for 
Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes - A  Criticism and a Proposal," 
38 Colum . L .  Rev .  1393 (1938). To the effect that the present choice 
of forum should be left intact at the trial level, with appeals from all 
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belief of taxpayers, the fact is-given this structure with its 
alternative choices-a large proportion of litigants do choose 
the specialized tribunal. It decides over one and a half times 
as many substantive tax cases as all the other trial tribunals 
combined. 46 This might suggest that taxpayers have a rela­
tively high degree of confidence in that one tribunal. Their 
choice, of it, however, may be due in part to their opportunity, 
peculiar to that one court, to litigate before paying the amount 
in contest. And to this must be added the fact that taxpayers 
now know also, should they lose, that they can appeal as a 
matter of right to nonspecialized appellate courts . 47 
Both of these latter considerations, however, are presently 
under attack. An important group of American practitioners 
believe it is unfair to confine the litigate-first-pay-later privi­
lege to those taxpayers willing to submit their cases to this 
specialized body .  This group favors extending the same privi­
lege to those taxpayers who prefer to try their cases before 
generalists who sit on the federal district courts.48 Yet 
(footnote continued) 
three to go to a specialized Court of Tax Appeals, see Griswold, " The 
Need for a Court of Tax Appeals," 57 Harv . L .  Rev .  1153 (1944). 
Each of these writers is aware that a decision as to whether the appellate 
function should be centralized in a specialized court, or left to judges 
with a "generalist' s outlook ," involves much more than the question 
of whether the latter is needed as a restraint on lower specialized trial 
tribunals. As observed in the discussion of appellate tribunals in § 4.6 
infra, central to the issue is the problem of obtaining reliable interpre­
tative guidelines having uniform significance across the nation. In 
general , see Ferguson, op. cit. supra note 26. 
46 In fiscal 1966, for example , the Tax Court decided 726 cases on 
the merits , the district courts 448 , and the Court of Claims 58. See 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue , Annual Report 1966, 134 (Table 17 B) 
and 135 (Table 20 n. 1). 
47 In the same year in which the Tax Court decided 726 cases on the 
merits, of which the government won outright or in part a substantial 
majority , taxpayers alone filed appeals in 257 and were j oined by the 
government in appealing another 34 cases, a total of 291. The govern ­
ment alone initiated only 41 appeals. However, of all the tax cases 
originating with the Tax Court and finally decided on appeal in that year 
(total , 250 ) ,  taxpayers prevailed entirely or in part in only 47 , or in 
18 . 8%. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue ,  op. cit. supra note 46 , 
at 44 , 134 (Table 17B) , and 135 ( Tables 19 and 21). 
48 Proposal of the Committee on Court Procedure, Taxation Section , 
American Bar Association. See Program and Committee Reports, 
Twenty-Third Annual Meeting, Taxation Section, A .B .A . ,  at 55 (1962). 
For competing views , see articles by Miller and by Traynor, op . cit. 
supra note 45. 
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others have proposed that appellate jurisdiction be shifted from 
courts having general jurisdiction to a specialized court of tax 
appeals, 49 a matter dealt with more fully in §§ 4 .5  and 4 . 6  
infra. Be  that as it may, given the large number of American 
taxpayers, the aggregate number of substantive tax cases ac­
tually decided by all three types of trial tribunals is rela­
tively-and in absolute terms is among-the smallest of the 
six countries .  In no recent year has the total reached 1, 300 
cases .  50 
Britain's volume of decided cases at the trial level is at 
the other extreme, on the high side-with the caseload being 
from 8, 000 to 9, 000 a year . 51 It is, however, the only other 
country among the Six which provides even a limited choice of 
forum. Given the heavy caseload, not surprisingly most de­
cided cases involve relatively small amounts and concern 
Britain's standard income tax, not its surtax. To provide 
convenient access for this large volume of small cases, Britain 
maintains 700 different geographically dispersed sets of General 
Commissioners . 52 This far exceeds, of course, the number 
of tribunals maintained by any one of the other five countries .  
Necessarily it involves a substantial sacrifice in professional 
quality. Indeed, two unpaid laymen, domiciled in the local 
finance district in which the taxpayer lives, constitute a de­
liberative quorum for any given case, though frequently more 
than two sit and a paid clerk-often legally trained-is always 
there to assist. 5 3 Given their background, they obviously are 
not well equipped to resolve questions of law,54 as occasionally 
they must. However, the great preponderence of these small 
cases actually turn on questions of fact and to this extent the 
use of such personnel is as commendable, or at least can be 
as easily defended, as the American jury . 
For the typically larger and more complex surtax cases, 
the British Parliament created the earlier mentioned circuit-
49 See articles by Traynor and Griswold , op . cit. supra note 26.  
50 For example , see text accompanying note 121 infra . 
51 Excluding so-called "delay" cases. See Chap. XX, §§ 4.3a and 
4.3b. 
52 For a full description of these tribunals, see Chap. XX, §§ 4.1,  
4.2a-d, and 4.3a. 
5 3 see id. ,  § 4.2a. 
54 The writer' s belief that every practice has its exceptions was 
borne out here when he learned by mere happenstance that one of the 
world' s great lawyers,  Professor Otto Kahn- Freund, serves as a lay 
Commissioner for the district which includes Oxford University. 
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riding, professionally trained or experienced Special Commis ­
sioners . 55 While these Special Commissioners alone exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction over surtax cases, 56 a quorum of two 
again being a minimum for each case, 57 this is not their sole 
responsibility. They share with the lay General Commissioners 
concurrent jurisdiction over a fairly wide range of income tax 
questions. 58 In this respect, the British taxpayer enjoys a 
privilege similar to that of an American: he may elect be ­
tween alternative types of trial tribunals. 59 This right in 
Britain to choose between generalists and specialists is not 
burdened, however, as it is in the United States, by any en­
cumbrance :  in neither case need the British taxpayer pay the 
disputed amount in advance of the tribunal's determination. 60 
Also in contrast to U .S .  practice, far more cases are taken to 
the generalists . than to the specialists . Out of the total large 
volume of tax cases decided annually by British trial tribunals, 
8, 000 to 9, 000, the Special Commissioners decide less than 
1, 000. 61 
Presumably, therefore, taxpayer willingness to resort to 
the General Commissioners has not been affected adversely by 
the fact that every such election alerts at least two ordinary 
locally domiciled citizens to that taxpayer 's financial affairs .  
The community at large is  not alerted, however; rules pro­
hibiting administrative disclosure of a taxpayer 's financial 
affairs extend both to the General and Special Commissioners. 62 
It is otherwise in the United States :  the findings of fact and 
decisions of all its trial tribunals are published. 
Germany 's experience with disclosure of private financial 
affairs, even to a small group of local private citizens, appears 
to differ from Britain's . Until recently, a German taxpayer 
had an election somewhat similar to that existing in Britain. 
As he now can, he could have his protest l.eard first by local 
assessing officials63 and, if dissatisfied, could appeal de novo 
55 For a full description, see id ., §§ 4. 1 ,  4.2b, and 4.3b. 
56 See id ., § 4.1 infra . 
57 See id., § 4.2b infra . 
58 see id., § 4. 1. 
59 For a description of two other types of trial tribunals (Board of 
Referees and the 1960 Act Tribunal) ,  the jurisdiction of which is very 
narrow, see id ., §§ 4.2c ,  4.2d, 4.3c, and 4.3d infra . 
60 see id ., §§ 4.3a and 4. 3b. 
61 Excluding delay cases. See id., § 4.3b infra , 
62 See id ., §§ 4. 3a and 4. 3b infra . 
63 See Chap. XV, § 3 .4a infra . 
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to one of the specialized fiscal courts.64 Alternatively, in­
stead of having the protest heard by a local assessing official, 
he could have had the dispute referred to a tax committee 
composed predominantly of private citizens drawn from the 
local finance office 's district. While the local assessor served 
as chairman, the presence of at least two private citizens was 
required to constitute a quorum, and all members voted on 
questions both of fact and law.65 Should the taxpayer have 
been dissatisfied with the result reached by the tax committee, 
he still could have appealed de novo to the appropriate fiscal 
court. 66 
Proportionately, only about one percent of those German 
taxpayers who filed protests elected to have their disputes 
heard first by the appropriate lay committee ; 67 the remainder 
chose local assessing officials . Apparently it was not enough, 
in the eyes of German taxpayers,  that the rule of secrecy at 
the administrative level extended, like the British rule, to 
these lay bodies .  68 And because jurisdiction of the latter was 
invoked by so few taxpayers, Germany recently ceased using 
these committees in the conflict resolution process.  69 Lay 
citizens nevertheless, do continue to play a role, albeit re­
duced, in resolving tax conflicts. 
Laymen involved now, however, typically are less likely 
to reside close to the taxpayer .  They are drawn from a pre ­
viously selected panel to sit on the fifteen fiscal courts, al­
though no one citizen will sit for more than twelve days in any 
given year . 70 In contrast to the U.S. jury, these laymen help 
decide questions of law as well as of fact, constituting two of 
a deliberative quorum of five, the other three being legally 
trained with specialized experience-having been appointed from 
the state 's finance ministry from which they then severed con­
nection. 71 As before noted, these fiscal courts are spread 
geographically, being divided among and maintained by the in­
dividual German states .  Because of different case-load levels, 
64 see Chap. XVI, §§ 4.2 and 4.3 infra . 
65 see Chap. XV, § 3.4a n. 23 infra . 
66 See ibid. 
67 See id ., § 3.4a infra . 
68 see ibid. 
69 See id., § 3.4a n. 24. 
70 For a full description of these courts, see Chap. XVI, §§ 4.2 and 
4.3 infra . 
71 Until recently, the ratio was reversed, with lay members making 
up a majority. See Chap. XVI, § 4.2 n. 6 infra . 
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the courts themselves range in size. Each has two to eight 
Senates, the respective jurisdictions of which are fixed by vari­
ous criteria, including geography as well as types or subjects 
of tax. These courts decide a volume of income cases far ex­
ceeding their counterparts in the United States, the number 
being almost equal to the total decided in Britain. Their yearly 
work-load of 20, 000 tax . disputes of all types includes from 
6, 000 to 8, 000 involving individual and corporate income tax 
matters . 72 
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands are similar to Ger ­
many i n  one respect : in the litigation stage, the taxpayer is 
not given a choice between different types of tribunals.  These 
three countries differ from Germany, however, and also from 
Britain and the United States, in that at this stage ordinary 
lay citizens have no participation whatsoever in the decision­
making process.  Each assigns exclusive trial jurisdiction to 
a specialized or semi-specialized tribunal composed of persons 
possessing some type of professional training or experience. 
While these judges ordinarily are generalists at the time of 
appointment, they develop tax expertise in the course of their 
work. In two of these three countries (Belgium and France), 
ordinary laymen may be allocated a limited responsibility dur ­
ing the earlier administrative stage . 73 Midpoint in that stage, 
i.e ., before a dispute is taken by the taxpayer to the tax ad­
ministration's own regional echelon, the dispute could be re ­
ferred to an outside body staffed primarily with laymen. 74 But 
even here, those panels act in an advisory capacity alone, with 
the further limitation that, like the American jury and unlike 
Britain's General Commissioners, they decide only questions 
of fact and never questions of law. As before noted, once the 
litigation stage is reached, both Belgium and the Netherlands 
rely on specialized tax chambers in their regular courts of 
appeal to perform the trial function. 75 Belgium has three 
such geographically dispersed courts, each having either one, 
two, or three tax chambers composed respectively of three 
legally trained judges who deliberate in each case . While they 
decide, in aggregate, far fewer income tax cases than do their 
counterparts in England or Germany, they do render almost 
72 See id.. § 4.3. 
73  For a full description of their role , see Chap. VII, § 3.2a infra 
and Chap. XII, §§ 3.3 and 3.4a infra . 
74 see Chap. VII, § 3.2a infra, and Chap. XI, §§ 3. 3  and 3.4a infra. 
75 For a full description, see § 4.2 in Chaps. VIII and XXIV infra . 
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as many income tax decisions (1107 in one recent year) 76 as 
do all of the federal trial tribunals in the United States, the 
population of which is 1 8  times as large . In the Netherlands, 
aggregating income, profits and wage tax cases, a roughly 
comparable total number of trial decisions 77 is handed down 
by the special tax chambers included in each of its five geo­
graphically dispersed courts of appeal, two of which have two 
such chambers . In contrast to Belgium, however, the majority 
of all cases in the Netherlands are heard by a single judge, 
though ordinarily each chamber will honor a request that all 
three members sit on a given case .7 8  Franceis twenty-four 
geographically dispersed administrative tribunals, of which two 
have been sectionalized, bear a much heavier tax caseload. 
Each of these tribunals or sections is composed of five mem­
bers, with three sitting as a deliberative body in each 'case . 79 
In one recent year, they decided an overall total of 4, 578 in­
come tax cases. SO 
4 .4 Appellate tribunals: The right and scope of review 
The multiplicity of trial tribunals in each of these coun­
tries requires some unifying means to correct their errors .  
The aim should be  to  provide an impartial81 review body which 
will limit itself to those corrective efforts it can carry out 
effectively and efficiently, through high quality decisions likely 
to produce fairly durable interpretations . However, if these 
76 See Chap. VIII, § 4. 3  infra . 
77 Approximately 70% of the 1900 tax decisions in one recent year 
fell in these categories. See Chap. XXIV, § 4.3 infra . 
78 See id., § 4.2 infra . 
79 See Chap. XII, § 4.2 infra . 
80 See id ., § 4.3 infra . 
81 Impartiality in this area requires ,  just as it did in the case of 
trial tribunals, that the tax administration be denied a voice in the 
appointment or tenure of the judges. Given the existence of so many 
other alternative methods of selection, this criterion-as a formal 
matter-could be satisfied easily by any country. However, the continu­
ing task of conforming actual practice to this standard no doubt is less 
difficult in countries where the app ellate tribunals are courts of general 
jurisdiction , as in the United States ,  than in countries where the tribunal 
specializes solely in tax appeals , as in Germany. Indeed there, even as 
a formal matter ,  the judges are elected by a twenty-three member 
committee composed of the Federal Finance Minister, the eleven State 
Finance Ministers, and eleven persons named by the Bundestag. While 
the Federal Finance Minister has no vote , he does exercise a veto 
power. One redeeming feature is that judges thus elected are then 
appointed for life, by the President. See Chap. XVI, § 4.4 infra . 
JUDICIAL STRUCTURES 121  
latter purposes do not coincide perfectly with a given country 's 
practice in non-tax cases, such fact will make their implemen­
tation in tax cases more difficult and well-nigh impossible if 
the country 's regular appellate structure is used. 
To give aggrieved parties an absolute right to appeal is 
the only effective, feasible, and efficient method of ferreting 
out errors at the trial level. Laying aside subsequently con­
sidered limitations relating to the scope of review, this right 
is accorded taxpayers with respect to decisions of au82 but 
one of the previously discussed trial tribunals, specifically 
the U . S .  Court of Claims . Its decisions are reviewable by 
the Supreme Court, but only upon the latter 's seldom-granted 
leave . 83 And over the last twenty years, leave actually was 
obtained in less than twenty cases. 84 Indeed, during, the most 
recent five -and-one-half years of that period, it was allowed 
in only three of the approximately two hundred tax cases de­
cided by the Court of Claims. 85 
This one apparent exception to the otherwise prevailing 
practice of granting review as a matter of right is less real, 
however, than it appears .  In part, this is because, when a 
U .  S. taxpayer decides to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Claims, he elects, voluntarily, not to have his case tried by 
either of two other trial forums (the Tax Court or a regular 
federal district court) from which there would have been an 
absolute right to appeal. Of even more significance, the Court 
of Claims itself actually has the dual characteristics of both 
a trial and a review tribunal. 86 As previously noted, legally 
trained trial commissioners make preliminary findings of fact 
and submit recommendations regarding questions of law. Either 
party may file exceptions thereto, and these always are re­
viewed internally by a panel of the court's legally trained 
judges .  87 In practice, this panel is larger, and in theory, 
82 See §§ 4.4 and 4.5 of Chaps.  VIII, XII, XVI, XX, and XXIV. 
83 An official but general statement regarding appropriate grounds 
appears in Supreme Court Rule 19. 
84 See Miller, op . cit. supra note 38, at 458. 
85 Brown and Whitmire, op . cit . supra note 32 , at 652. 
86 See Kipps ,  op. cit. supra note 12. 
87 Since the judges on the Court of Claims also review the deter­
mination of a commissioner even in cases where neither party filed 
an exception, in practice, reviews there are automatic . See Miller, 
op . cit. supra note 38 ,  at 461. This contrasts sharply with the theo­
retically more efficient procedure applied to federal district courts 
where review by an appellate body is limited to appeals filed by a party 
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never less, 88 than regular appellate tribunal panels to which 
appeals would lie from the other two trial forums . 89 And 
many practitioners choose the Court of Claims precisely be ­
cause they can telescope the whole conflict into one proceeding 
and still be assured that the legal issue will be dealt with by 
a legally trained deliberative body, 90 rather than by a single 
judge who typically would render the trial decision in cases 
filed with the Tax Court or a federal district court. 
Both efficiency and quality of the total conflict-resolution 
effort will be enhanced if a reviewing body restricts its cor ­
rective efforts to those it can carry out effectively . Assuming 
that body is properly constituted, this limitation would permit 
it to substitute freely its judgment for that of the trial tribunal 
(footnote continued) 
who feels aggrieved. The difference in this instance ,  however, is largely 
theoretical; little real waste actually ensues from the automatic review 
by the j udges of the Court of Claims. The fact is that exceptions to 
their trial commissioners' determinations are filed in the great pre­
ponderence of cases , the proportion in 1966 being 82.5% of the decided 
cases. Moreover the j udges of that court undoubtedly devote much more 
energy per case to cases where an exception has been filed than to the 
others. In the latter ,  the court typically hands down a short per curiam 
decision adopting the Commissioner's determination, explaining that it 
does so because 11it agrees with the trial commissioner' s findings, 
opinion , and recommended conclusion of law, as hereinafter set forth." 
For example, see Dodge v. U.S.,  362 F.2d 810 (Ct. Cl. 1966). No doubt 
also , taxpayers who invoke this court' s  jurisdiction realistically antici­
pate at the outset that the side adversely affected by a trial commis­
sioner' s  determination probably will file exceptions thereto, if only 
because the average amount involved in cases which are filed with this 
court involves a far larger sum than the average in cases filed with the 
other two trial forums. See Kipps ,  op . cit . supra note 12 , at 1026. 
As noted elsewhere, because the third trial forum (Tax Court) is 
a multijudge court but employs only a single judge to hear a case, it 
too has developed an internal review procedure. In contrast to the 
Court of Claims , however ,  not every case is subj ected to an internal 
review. Prior to release of a decision, the Chief Judge is empowered 
to refer it to the whole court. And for thirty days after release, any 
j udge on the Tax Court can request such a referral. See Kern, op. cit., 
Murdock, op. cit ., and Raum, op . cit. supra note 33. Typically, about 
one-third of the decisions are reviewed. 
88 That the court traditionally has sat en bane, all seven participat­
ing, see § 4.3 supra . 
89 Typically a division of three sit, though a maj ority of a court' s 
j udges on regular active service can require the court to sit en bane. 
28 U.S.C. § 46 (c). 
9 0 see Kipps ,  op. cit . supra note 12 , at 1026 ;  Miller, op . cit . supra 
note 38 , at 459. 
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with respect to all questions of law, though most certainly not 
as to all questions of fact. 
Completely at odds with this latter limitation is the re ­
view arrangement within the U.S. Court of Claims . True, that 
court does treat its own commissioners ' factual findings as 
"Prima facie correct . . .  in the absence of exceptions thereto. u 91 
However, in case of an exception, that court believes "the law 
casts the ultimate burden of making findings on the judges of 
the court, and wherever we are convinced that the weight of 
the testimony is contrary to the finding of the [ trial ] com­
missioner,  it is our duty to substitute for the commissioner 's 
finding what we consider to be the correct finding. "92 
This all embracing view has led the judges on that court, 
in the face of conflicting evidence, to reverse the finding of a 
trial commissioner even with respect to a subjective factual 
matter where the credibility of the taxpayer-witness was at 
issue and where no one but the trial commissioner had occa­
sion to observe him. In that particular case, the question, 
involving only the taxpayer 's initial intention, was whether he 
had "purchased land for the purpose of farming it. " 93 Perhaps 
less open to criticism was the j udges '  action in the case of a 
given officer-stockholder .  There in the face of conflicting evi­
dence, they reversed a commissioner's finding regarding the 
precise amount of salary deemed "reasonable " for deduction 
purposes .  94 At least this action is defensible if limitations 
on the scope of review actually are imposed only because of 
the inherent difficulty of a review body confined to a written 
record. But even in this type of case, free substitution of 
judgment is a questionable practice if overall efficiency also 
is to be stressed, to the end of enabling the review body to 
focus primarily on significant and relatively durable interpre ­
tations . 
Surveying all the trial tribunals covered by this study, 
there is wide variation in the scope of review severally avail­
able on appeal .  The sweeping character of review applied 
within the Court of Claims is at one extreme, shared only by 
France . Though the latter 's appellate tribunal is physically 
91 See Miller v. u.s. , 3 39 F.2d 661, 662 (Ct. Cl. 1964) . Italics added. 
92 Id . at 662. Italics added. 
93 Id. at 662. Cf. the dissent of Davis , J. , at 664 and the cases 
cited therein. Italics added. 
94 Bringwald, Inc. v. U.S.,  3 34 F.2d 639 (Ct. Cl. 1964) ;  Gordy Tire 
Co. v. U.S. 296 F.2d 476 (Ct. Cl. 1961). 
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distinct from the trial echelon, questions of fact may be raised 
on appeal and even new evidence may be presented. 95 In 
short, both bodies approach the case anew, though the nature 
of the question submitted originally to the trial tribunal cannot 
be changed on appeal. 96 
At mid-point between that position and the other extreme 
are the fairly restrictive standards applied to the regular U.S. 
courts of appeal on reviewing cases originating in the other 
two U.S. trial forums. If a jury of laymen, after being in­
structed correctly by the trial judge regarding questions of 
law, decides a federal district court case, an appellate tribunal 
cannot reverse if "reasonable men could reach differing con­
clusions on the issue ."  97 And if a trial is conducted by a 
federal district court judge without a jury, or by a judge of 
the Tax Court which never uses a jury, the lower court's 
findings of fact must stand on appeal unless "clearly errone­
ous ."  9 8  Unquestionably these standards, when compared to 
those applied within the U.S. Court of Claims, do gauge more 
accurately the limited capability of a review body confined to 
a written record. Hopefully, they also have some restraining 
effect on the number of appeals-thereby, enabling the regular 
U.s. appellate tribunals to spend more of their time on legal 
questions which are better suited to their peculiar competence .  
But even these restrictive standards can accomplish their aim 
only if the types of determinations to which they apply are 
clearly defined. In the United States, they obviously apply to 
pure questions of fact which are readily discernible .  Also 
covered are "factual inferences from undisputed basic facts" 99 
95 See Chap. XII, § 4.5 infra . 
96 Ibid . 
97 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 27 8 ,  291 (1960). 
98 Ibid . Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 52 (a) ; I.R.C. § 7482 (a). A "finding is 
'clearly erroneous ' when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed." U.S. v. United States 
Gypsum Co. , 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) ,  quoted with approval in the 
Duberstein case, id. at 291. Italics added. 
Appeals from Tax Court decisions are to be distinguished from the 
internal review that court may choose to give its own trial judge's 
decision. See note 87 supra . There are instances,  for example, where 
the Tax Court reversed its own trial judge's findings of fact and was 
sustained on appeal because its findings were not deemed clearly er­
roneous. See Latchis Theatres of Keene, Inc. v. Commissioner, 2 14 F.2d 
834 (1st Cir. 1954). 
99 Id ., note 97 supnl . 
JUDICIAL STRUCTURES 125 
though, as before noted, not legal conclusions. Here difficulty 
does arise because, in a statutory tax setting, the line be ­
tween the latter two categories is not always easily discerni­
ble . In consequence, courts of appeal occasionally disagree 
as to whether a given situation turns on a "factual inference 
from undisputed basic facts" (subject to the "clearly errone ­
ous" limitation) or instead involves an indivisible mixed ques­
tion of law and fact (where a court feels entirely free to sub­
stitute its judgment) ,lOO 
Finally, at the opposite pole from the sweeping review 
conducted within the U.s. Court of Claims and by the French 
Conseil d'Etat is the Belgian practice . There the Appellate 
Court may not consider anything other than a pure question of 
law; appeal of a so-called mixed question of law and fact 
would be dismissed. 101 The same is true in Great Britain. 
There, however, the concept of a pure question of law is broad 
enough to permit an appellate tribunal to reverse if it appears 
that the trial tribunal could not have drawn from the evidence 
before it the inferences of fact upon which it relied in reach­
ing its final decision. 102 
4 . 5  Appellate tribunals : Quality of review 
Obviously bearing on the quality of appellate decisions is 
the quality of the bench itself. In practice, neither of the only 
two countries (England and Germany) which make some use of 
ordinary lay citizens as judges at the trial level utilizes such 
persons on the appellate courts which hear tax cases . 103 In­
deed, only in France and Germany is it even likely that pro­
fessional persons without legal training might be appointed. 104 
In the rare circumstance where this occurs in France, the 
appointee would have been at least one of the top graduates of 
the National School of Administration.1°5 In Germany, the 
100 For example , compare Mathews v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 101 
(6th Cir. 1963) and Rubino v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 
1951) , cert . den . 342 U.S. 814 (195 1) with Fahs v. Taylor, 239 F.2d 
224 (5th Cir. 1956 ) ,  cert . den . 353 U.S. 936 (1957 ) ,  and Goldberg v. 
Commissioner, 223 F.2d 7 09 (5th Cir. 1955) .  
101 See Chap. VIII, § 4. 5 infra . 
102 See Chap. XX, § 4.5 infra and Ferguson, op . cit . supra note 2 6 ,  
at 364 n. 273. A s  to the Netherlands ,  see Chap. XXIV, § 4.4 infra . 
1 0 3 see § 4.3 supra and § 4.4 of Chaps. XVI and XX infra . 
1 04As to Belgium and the Netherlands ,  see § 4.4 of Chaps. VIII and 
XXIV infra . 
105 See Chap. XII, § 4.4 infra . 
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exceptional nonlegally trained appointee typically has had pre ­
vious experience in tax affairs and has sat for a minimum of 
three years on one of the specialized trial tribunals . l06 
As a further quality control device, all six countries uti­
lize the deliberative process . Typically, the number of appel­
late judges who sit on a given case equals or exceeds the 
number who sat on the trial tribunal. 1 07 The two exceptions 
to this are Great Britain, though only for cases arising in 
England and Wales, and the United States, but only in the case 
of appeals from certain Tax Court decisions . With respect to 
the former, the exception is more shadow than substance : it 
pertains only to the first appeal, and England and Wales stand 
alone in allowing as a matter of right appeals to two different 
appellate levels . There,l08 decisions of both the General 
Commissioners (where two ordinary laymen constitute a quorum) 
and the Special Commissioners (where a minimum of two per ­
sons with professional training or experience is required), are 
appealed first to the High Court of Judicature, where one 
legally trained judge of the Chancery Division, sitting alone, 
will decide the case.  Further appeal may then be taken to the 
Court of Appeals, where typically three legally trained jurists 
constitute a panel, though from two to five may sit. Also, by 
leave of that court or of the House of Lords, the trial tribu­
nal's decision may be reviewed a third time, before a bench 
of up to five legally trained Lords of Appeal. The United 
States, as an exception, is such only in a very limited sense, 
since most appeals are heard by a larger bench than was in­
volved at the trial level. This follows from the fact that the 
great preponderance of trial decisions are rendered by judges 
sitting alone, e ither on the Tax Court or a federal district 
court, 109 and appeals from both courts go to a court of appeal, 
where typically three judges hear the case . llO This latter 
number, however, is substantially exceeded by the number of 
1 06 See Chap. XVI, § 4.4 infra . 
1 07 See text accompanying notes 128 , 130, 132 , and 135 infra . 
108See Chap. XX, § 4.4 infra and Jackson, The Machinery of Justice 
in England 84 (4th ed. 1964). 
1 09 See note 46 supra . 
110 The eleven courts of appeal have a varying number of judges ,  de­
pending on workload, and each does have the power, by order of a 
majority of a court in regular active service, to order that the court 
sit en bane on a particular case. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (c). It was anticipated, 
however, that this practice would be invoked only in rare cases. See 
H. Rep. No. 1246,  77th Cong. , 1st sess. 1 (1941). 
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trial judges involved in those Tax Court cases where, prior 
to any appeal, the decisions of single Tax Court judges are 
reviewed internally by that sixteen member court111 _as about 
one -third are .  Following an appeal to a court of appeal, it 
also is possible in the United States to secure an additional 
hearing before the nine -member Supreme Court, but only by 
its leave which seldom is granted.112 
Germany is the third and final country among the six to 
permit two appellate reviews of a trial tribunal 's decision, with 
the second-like Great Britain and the United States -being to 
its High Court, but only in the case of constitutional issues . l1 3  
While France and the Netherlands, 114 and perhaps as a prac­
tical matter Belgium also,l15 permit only one such review, 
two of these three, further to promote high quality decisions, 
do make use of an additional procedural device unique among 
the Six. Belgium requires its Attorney General to submit to 
the appellate body l16 (as well as to the trial tribunal) 117 his 
own impartial view of the case, arrived at independently and 
presented separately from the view pressed on the court by 
the tax administration's representative . For the same purpose, 
France uses an official attached to its appellate body. 118 
The perspectives of the appellate bench itself, and in this 
limited sense the character of its decisions, will be affected, 
of course, by the degree of its specialization in tax affairs-as 
was indicated more fully in the earlier discussion regarding 
trial tribunals. 119 There it also was suggested that, if a 
legislature fears-as do some critics-that a newly created 
specialized trial tribunal might lose touch with the general law 
or indulge too freely in what some characterize as judicial 
legislation, establishment of concurrent trial jurisdiction in 
111see text accompanying note 33 supra . 
112 See text accompanying note 123 infra . 
113see Chap. XVI, § 4. 1  infra . 
114See § 4.4 of Chaps. XII and XXIV infra . 
115While Belgium, in tax case s ,  employs only two layers of courts, 
the fact that its appellate court (Court of Cassation) , should it disagree 
with a trial tribunal, always remands the case to a yet different lower 
court for re-trial , does give rise to more than one appellate review. 
See note 143 infra . However, unless the Court of Cassation itself 
changes its mind on a yet second appeal to it, the view it took on 
the first appeal ultimately prevails. 
116 Chap. VIII, § 4.4. 
117Id.,  § 4.2. 
118 Chap. XII, § 4.4. 
119see § 4.2 supra . 
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both a specialized tribunal and a general court might reduce 
this risk without forfeiting completely the benefit of the spe­
cialized tribunal 's potentially greater competence, concern, and 
efficiency. This has been done, as before noted, by two of the 
countries covered here, the United States and, though to a 
lesser degree, Britain. Alternatively, or as an additional more 
direct restraint on the specialized trial tribunals, appeals 
therefrom can be lodged, as in Britain and the United States, 
in appellate courts of general jurisdiction. The latter, on re ­
viewing cases, hardly would ignore completely the expertise of 
the lower specialized tribunal and, in any event, would benefit 
substantially from exposure to its views. Hence, the peculiar 
contribution this type of trial tribunal can make to a tax sys ­
tem would not be totally dissipated. 120 
In deciding upon the type of appellate court to be used, 
however, legislators cannot cater just to their own peculiar 
preferences as between the perspective and competence which 
an appellate court would acquire from constant exercise of 
general jurisdiction and those which it would derive from spe ­
cializing in tax cases.  Relevant also to their choice are the 
interrelated factors of workload and the question of whether 
the requisite certainty and uniformity can be achieved if juris ­
diction is lodged in other than a single court. 
The significance of the relationship between these two 
factors is best illustrated by the contrasting circumstances in 
the United States and Britain. These two countries,  it will be 
recalled, were at opposite ends of the six-country spectrum 
with respect to the actual number of trial decisions handed 
down each year with Britain on the high side . Their relative 
positions are just the reverse, however, with respect to the 
proportion of trial determinations appealed. For example, the 
various U.s. trial forums together resolved by decision only 
1,232 substantive tax cases in fiscal 1966.121 During that 
same period, the eleven geographically spread u.s. appellate 
courts of general jurisdiction had to decide 373 civil tax 
120Even in reversing the U.s. Tax Court on a question of law, one 
American court of appeals said: "Indeed, the only thing which would 
give us pause is the unanimous decision of the Tax Court, whose expert 
view is always entitled to respectful consideration." Commissioner v. 
Whitney, 169 F.2d 562 , 565 (2d Cir. 1948), cert . den . 335 U.S. 892 (1948). 
121 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit . supra note 4 6 ,  at 
134 and 135 (Tables 17B and 20).  
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cases . 122 This was the highest proportion (approximately 30  
percent) among the Six. Numerically, it was great enough, if 
all these cases were assigned to one appellate court, to re ­
strict that court to the role of a specialized tr ibunal operating 
under the U.S. Supreme Court which, in that same year, de­
cided only 10 tax cases123 -all of which reached it with its 
individually-granted consent (writ of certiorari) . 
Britain is a complete contrast. Its General and Special 
Commissioners annually decide from 8, 000 to 9, 000 tax cases 
at the trial level. However, in 1965, the first appellate level 
for England and Wales (High Court of Judicature) issued deci­
sions in only 14 such cases. 124 Also in that year, the second 
such level (Court of Appeal)-even if account is taken of deci­
sions by the distinct but single levels to which appeal could be 
taken as a matter of right in Scotland (Court of Sessions) 125 
and Northern Ireland (Court of Appeal)-decided only 7 . 126 The 
House of Lords -on the basis of discretionary jurisdiction ex­
ercised over the whole of the United Kingdom-resolved 8. 127 
Appeals to the intermediate British courts represent by far 
the smallest proportion of trial determinations among the Six. 
Numerically, they obviously are not sufficient to keep one court 
occupied even if all such appeals were assigned to it. Since 
a large proportion of its docket would have to come from out­
side the income tax field, centralization, if otherwise justified, 
would not be accompanied, by either expectation or fear that 
the centralized court would develop the peculiar competence 
or perspective of a specialized tribunal. 
122 Id. at 135 ( Table 21). Little variance appears between the propor­
tion of cases appealed from the district courts and from the Tax Court. 
In fiscal 1966 ,  during which the district courts handed down 448 sub­
stantive tax decisions, the appellate courts decided 123 cases originating 
with district courts. Corresponding figures for the Tax Court were, 
respectively , 726 and 250. Ibid. As previously noted, however, none of 
the 57 cases resolved by the third trial forum (Court of Claims) could 
be appealed as a matter of right, though all decisions recommended by 
that court' s trial commissioners were reviewed by the judges of that 
court. See note 87 supra . 
123 Of these, 4 originated with the Tax Court and 6 with the district 
courts. Op . cit. supra note 122. 
124 0f these , 4 originated with the General Commissioners and 10 
with the Special Commissioners. 
125 As to this one court, it was necessary to use figures for 1964. 
126 Of these, 6 were decided by the Court of Appeal for England and 
Wales ,  1 by the Court of Appeal for Northern Ireland, and none by the 
Court of Sessions in Scotland. 
127 All figures based on the writer' s  count. Cj. Chap. XX, § 4.5  infra. 
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In each of the other four countries, the proportion of ap­
pellate decisions to trial determinations falls far short of the 
U.S. 30 percent figure-always being nearer 10  percent. Yet 
the proportion is far larger than in Britain and numerically 
speaking would permit some degree of specialization if those 
countries were so minded. All four are .  In three (Belgium, 
France, and the Netherlands), the appellate tribunal which hears 
tax cases also hears other types of cases. However, these 
tribunals are multi-chambered with one or more assuming 
prime responsibility for tax cases. In Belgium, one of the two 
chambers into which its highest court (Court of Cassation) is 
divided performs this function, with five Counseillers sitting 
on each case. 128 In 1965, 57 of its decisions involved impOts 
sur les revenus. 129 The Netherlands Supreme Court has three 
chambers of five judges each. Here too one chamber is re­
sponsible for tax appeals.l30 Over a fairly recent two-year 
period, this chamber handed down 486 decisions involving vari­
ous types of taxes and of these, 340 involved the wage tax and 
corporate and individual income taxes . 131 The French govern­
ment has entrusted to its Council of State a judicial as well 
as a consultative function. One of its five sections handles 
appeals from decisions in the various types of cases against 
the government originating in the 24 so-called administrative 
tribunals. This section du contenieux has nine subsections, 1 32 
each having three Conseillers. Three of these subsections 
specialize in tax cases. 133  In one recent year, they decided 
608 cases involving direct taxes, and of these 316  involved 
corporate and individual income taxes. 134 Germany alone 
among the Six utilizes a physically distinct specialized court 
for tax appeals.  In 1964, with five judges sitting on each 
case, seven different chambers (Senates) of its Federal Fiscal 
Court 135 dealt with a total of 2, 000 tax cases of which 7 80 
128 See Chap. VIII, § 4.4 infra . 
129 By the writer's count of cases published in the Pacicrisie Belge. 
130 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.4. 
1 31 Id., § 4.5. 
1 32 Decret 63-766, Art. 38 (July 30, 1963). Formerly there were 11. 
See Chap. XII, § 4.4 infra . 
1 33 While these sit separately , a reorganization decree (id.�  note 132 
supra\ apparently anticipates that at some future time they will begin 
to sit together in tax cases. See Drago, " Some Recent Reforms of the 
French Counseil D ' Etat," 13 Int . & Comp . L..,Q . 1282 , 1296 (1964). 
134 See Chap. XII, § 4.5 infra . 
135 See Chap. XVI, § 4.4. 
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concerned corporate and individual income taxes.  However, 
out of the 2, 000 tax cases of all types, final decisions were 
rendered in only 380.136 The largest proportion of the balance 
was dismissed, being deemed without merit. 
4 . 6  Appellate tribunals: Unifying interpretations 
The final consideration in shaping the appellate structure 
to be used in tax cases involves the need that it be capable 
of producing unifying and fairly durable interpretations. Such 
capability markedly affects the fairness and efficiency with 
which thousands of administrators can be expected to adminis ­
ter a tax system. Alsc, especially in self-assessment sys­
tems, it affects the extent to which taxpayers themselves can 
be expected to respond with an acceptable degree of uniformity. 
The ultimate question is whether interpretations of the requi­
site quality can be achieved adequately at the judicial level 
without vesting appellate jurisdiction in a single appellate 
court-or chamber, i.e. ,  a division. Such a court would tend 
to become specialized should the anticipated appellate work­
load in a given country equal that in any one of five of these 
six countries.  
Observe preliminarily that, whether the appellate tribunal 
be specialized or generalist, publication of its decisions (facts,  
conclusion, and supporting rationale) is  an absolute prerequisite 
if taxpayers and administrations alike hope to possess guides 
for the future or any chance to question the applicability of 
past decisions in the context of other factual situations . 137 
This initial requirement is completely satisfied, however, in 
four of the six countries covered here (Belgium, France, Great 
Britain,138 and the United States) through publication of all 
appellate decisions . And, in the other two (Germany and the 
Netherlands), at least those appellate decisions deemed im­
portant or of general interest 139 are published,l40 
1 36 [d. ,  § 4. 5. 
137 Publication also helps preserve integrity and enhances the disci­
pline with which the court approaches its work, for only by publication 
can a court be subject to the critical views of writers. 
1 38 See § 4. 5 ,  Chaps. VIII, XII, and XX infra . 
1 39 See § 4. 5 of Chaps. XVI and XXIV infra . 
140 Publication of trial decisions in these six countries ranges ,  how­
ever, from none in Britain to practically all such decisions in the 
United States. In between, a few are published in France and, in the 
three other continental countries , those deemed important are published. 
See § 4.3 of Chaps. VIII, XII, XVI, XX and XXIV infra . 
132 INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS COMPARED 
Publication in itself, however, does not bring unification 
unless appellate court decisions bind lower courts for the 
future .  Nor will the desired degree of certainty follow unless, 
in practice, appellate courts themselves tend to follow their 
own decisions . Since final decisions of appellate tribunals in 
the four continental countries covered here bind formally 
neither the lower courts nor the appellate tribunals them­
selves, theoretically their decisions have no precedent value .l41 
In theory, they bind neither the administration nor taxpayers 
with respect to future situations . Fortunately, however, prac­
tice and theory differ somewhat. 142 It is generally recognized 
that, in fact, these appellate tribunals ordinarily do follow 
their own prior decisions. And the lower tribunals, therefore, 
do tend to treat the appellate decisions as precedents-though 
a fairly complicated procedure is required in Belgium to ac­
complish this . 143 A further practical consequence is that the 
tax administrations in these continental countries ordinarily 
do adhere to the principles decided at the appellate level and 
seldom force relitigation of an issue in a yet different case .144 
But this, no doubt, is due in substantial part to one par ­
ticular structural feature of their appellate courts not shared 
by the United States and, in theory, not by Britain. And this 
differe::-.ce is one of the prime causes for the not insubstantial 
degree of uncertainty which does exist in the United States .  
Whereas each of the four continental countries lodges ordinary 
tax appeals in one tribunal, 145 the United States employs eleven 
141 See § 4.5 of Chaps. VIII, XII, XVI, and XXIV, infra . 
142[bid. 
143 The Belgian difficulty actually relates to the doctrine of res 
judicata . In theory, its High Court (Court of Cassation) does not hand 
down a final decision on appeals to it. If the chamber which handles 
tax appeals concludes that the lower court erred in law, the latter' s 
decision is quashed and the case is referred to another lower court for 
retrial on both the facts and law. That court is completely free to 
differ with the chamber of the High Court. But should it do so as to 
the legal question, on a second appeal by the aggrieved party , both 
chambers of the Court of Cassation sit in judgment. If the two chambers 
together agree with the single chamber which dealt with the earlier 
appeal, the case again is referred to another lower court which now, 
however, is bound to enter judgment in accordance with the views of 
the High Court. See Chapter VII, § 4.5. 
144 op . cit . supra note 141. 
145 See § 4.4 of Chaps. VIII, XII, XVI, and XXIV infra . Constitutional 
issues in Germany, however , may be carried yet another step, i.e. , to 
its Supreme Court. See Chap. XVI, §§ 4.4 and 4.5 infra . 
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coordinate courts of appeal. Each has jurisdiction over a 
given geographical area, 146 with its decisions reviewable by a 
single High Court only with its leave . Because of the latter 's 
heavy non-tax docket, over a recent ten-year period, it granted 
such leave and rendered a full opinion in only 7 8  cases (aver ­
aging 7 . 8  a year). 147 Moreover, far more typically than not, 
such leave was granted only after a conflict had emerged be ­
tween two or more of the intermediate appellate courts. 148 
Before such a conflict emerges, however, i .e . ,  where only one 
intermediate court has passed on an issue, uncertainty con­
tinues .  The possibility always exists that in some future case, 
on petition either of the commissioner or another taxpayer, a 
second appellate court might reach a contrary view which the 
Supreme Court might then adopt as it often has-proportionately 
speaking149 -after granting certiorari. Because the geographi­
cally spread intermediate appellate courts are coordinate, the 
precedents of one do not bind the other, 150 though each does 
treat the decisions of the others with respect-apparently in 
lesser degree, however, than do Britain's three intermediate 
courts of appeal. 151 
146 That, in effect, there is a twelfth which actually is coordinate on a 
nationwide basis, see text accompanying note 161 infra . 
147 See Brown and Whitmire, op. cit. supra note 32,  at 658. In fiscal 
1966,  the High Court approved only 4 of the government' s 8 petitions for 
certiorari and only 8 of the 82 requested by taxpayers. See Attorney 
General of the U .s.,  Annual Report 1966, 335. 
148 See Brown and Whitmire, op . cit . supra note 32. That study in­
dicates that over a ten-year period, in two-thirds (52) of the federal 
civil tax cases decided by a full opinion of the High Court, a conflict 
between courts of appeal was cited as a reason for hearing the case. 
In 6 of the remaining 26 ,  such a conflict existed though it was not 
referred to by the High Court. Thus, on the average, only in 2 civil tax 
cases a year was the Court able, in view of the demands of other areas , 
to assume jurisdiction merely because an issue was important to the 
tax system. 
149 A study, Brown and Whitmire, op. cit. supra note 32, at 659, 
indicated that in one-half of the High Court opinions involving conflicts 
between the lower appellate courts, the first appellate decision was found 
to be incorrect. 
150 It is precisely because of this that the Supreme Court views , as one 
of its important functions , resolution of conflicts that arise among these 
appellate courts. As to the frequency with which this does serve as a 
ground for Supreme Court review, see Brown and Whitmire, op . cit . 
supra note 32. 
151 Cf. Chap. XX, § 4.5 with the results of the U.S. study reflected in 
Brown and Whitmire, op. cit. supra note 32. The chance that conflicts 
will emerge in the U.S. is relatively greater also because,  compared to 
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France and Germany, though employing only one appellate 
tribunal for ordinary tax litigation, 152 could have encountered 
the same difficulty as the United States, because their tax de­
cisions are handed down by each of several coordinate divi­
sions (three in France, seven in Germany) within their respec­
tive tribunals. l53 These two countries, however, faced up to 
the obvious problem generated by this structure ;  they estab­
lished compensatory and somewhat similar internal referral 
arrangements . In Germany, 154 when one Senate (a division) 
of the Federal Fiscal Court encounters an appeal deemed to 
involve one or more important new issues of law, it may refer 
the case, in advance of a decision, to the Great Senate, a body 
composed of representatives from the separate Senates and 
presided over by the President of the Court. About five such 
referrals occur each year . 155 Further, should a given Senate, 
in considering a case, tentatively decide against following an 
earlier decision of another Senate, it must refer that case to 
the Great Senate for decision. In France, 156 though tax cases 
are dealt with by only three of the nine subsections which 
make up the judicial section of the Council of State, the Presi­
dents of all nine subsections together with representatives of 
the consultative sections of the Council, sit as a plenary as­
sembly, to which problems can be referred. So constituted, 
this plenary assembly considers important new tax questions 
as well as cases which may lead the Council to alter its posi­
tion regarding an earlier enunciated tax principle .l57 
(footnote continued) 
Britain, it has four times as many intermediate appellate courts and far 
more cases reach that level. See text accompanying notes 122 and 127 
supra . U.S. district courts (trial tribunals) in the geographical circuit 
of a given intermediate appellate court are expected, however , to follow 
the decisions of the latter. But, that the other two trial forums do not 
feel bound by prior decisions of any particular court of appeals,  see text 
accompanying notes 161 and 162 infra . 
152 That constitutional issues in Germany may be further appealed, 
however, to its Supreme Court, see Chap. XVI, § 4.4 infra . 
15 3 See § 4.4 of Chaps. XII and XVI infra . 
154 See Chap. XVI, §§ 4.4 and 4.5 infra . 
155 A similar internal referral system is employed at the trial level by 
the U.s. Tax Court. See text accompanying note 33 supra . As noted 
there, however ,  the Tax Court internally reviews a much larger share of 
its cases , no doubt because of a tradition that the Chief Judge is expected 
to resolve " doubts in favor of court review." See Murdock, op . cit . 
supra note 3 3 ,  at 298. 
156 See Chap. XII, §§ 4.4 and 4.5 infra, and note 132 supra . 
157 For other devices used to secure uniformity in France ,  see Chapter 
XII, § 4.4. Also, see note 123 supra . 
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Obviously, such referral arrangements can neither elimi­
nate uncertainty completely nor guarantee absolute uniformity 
among divisions . For example, not all important issues of 
first impression will be recognized as such and be referred 
in advance of a decision. Further, a given division may de­
cide improperly that an earlier decision by another division 
is not in point and, quite logically though incorrectly, conclude 
referral to be unwarranted. 
Far less perfect, however, is the device which links to­
gether the various intermediate U. s. courts of appeal. No 
arrangement exists enabling one such separate court to consult 
with the others before rendering a decision. Nor, as before 
noted, do the decisions of one bind the other. Further, it is 
unlikely the Supreme Court will involve itself, to the end of 
fixing a nationwide rule, until at least two circuits are in con­
flict. Consequently, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
having nationwide responsibility for tax administration, feels 
that he must be free, on losing before one court of appeals, 
to test the issue before yet another , 158 In the interval, which 
can run to several years,  159 uncertainty reigns. But the ulti­
mate fault is not that of the Commissioner . It is inherent in 
the courts-of-appeals structure itself. The above mentioned 
second taxpayer also would have been free, had the theory of 
the court in the other circuit favored the Commissioner, to 
require his own court of appeals to address itself to the matter 
as one of first impression,l60 This particular consequence 
of the multi-courts-of-appeals arrangement takes on a yet dif­
ferent dimension when account is taken of one further feature 
of the appellate structure . One of the alternative trial forums 
having nationwide jurisdiction-the Court of Claims-has no al­
legiance to the decisions of any particular court of appeals .l61 
158 His decision not to conform to a given court of appeals decision is 
often reflected in a published Technical Information Release. 
159 A study of Supreme Court decisions from 1955 to 1959 shows ,  as to 
these cases, that the median time involved in the development of con­
flicts between the circuits was 50 months. See Del Cotto, " The Need 
for a Court of Tax Appeals: An Argument and a Study," 12 Buffalo L .  
Rev .  5, 29-30 (1962). For a survey of other studies,  see Brown and 
Whitmire, op . cit . supra note 32, at 669. 
160 For a statistical analysis , based on one assumption and to the effect 
that history indicates the courts of appeal will not agree on 25% of the 
cases involving a difficult substantive issue, see Brown and Whitmire, 
op . cit . supra note 32, 
161 The significant degree to which it has exhibited independence is 
analyzed in Pavenstedt, op . cit . supra note 38. See also note 16 6 infra . 
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It considers itself coordinate to the regular courts of appeal 
because it too is reviewable only by leave of the Supreme 
Court. In consequence, a taxpayer who believes a previous 
decision of his own court of appeals is unfavorable to his 
cause, from the very beginning has the option, if the Court of 
Claims has not considered the issue, to invoke the latter 's 
jurisdiction. And where the Court of Claims alone has spoken 
on an issue, no one-whether taxpayers or the Commissioner­
is bound as to future situations . After all, this tribunal is 
only one of twelve coordinate courts . It has nationwide juris ­
diction but the entire nation is subdivided geographically among 
the other eleven coordinates .  
In further aggravation, though not attributable to the ap­
pellate structure itself, is the fact that another trial forum, 
the Tax Court, essentially just because of its nationwide juris ­
diction, also denies allegiance to any particular court of ap­
peals. 162 And this is so, though in contrast to the Court of 
Claims, Tax Court decisions are appealable, illustratively in 
the case of an individual, to the particular court of appeals 
having jurisdiction over the area where the particular taxpayer 
resides .  Precisely because of this, neither the Commissioner 
nor other taxpayers, as to future situations, feel bound by Tax 
Court decisions .163 
In summary, neither the Commissioner, nor any of these 
tribunals, nor taxpayers themselves  accord binding precedent 
to any decisions other than those of the Supreme Court. 164 
Yet that Court seldom involves itself until one court of appeals 
differs from the previous decision of another . To some ex­
tent, however, the problem is mitigated by the Commissioner 's 
usual practice of conceding an issue should he lose before two 
courts of appeal. For the uncertainty which prevails in the 
interim, however, the appellate structure bears the prime 
162 0ther reasons are also advanced in Lawrence v. Commissioner, 
27 T.C. 713 (1957 ) ,  rev ' d  258 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958). For an ex­
tended analysis, see Ferguson, op. cit . supra note 2 6 ,  at 366. As noted 
there, at 367 n. 285,  a federal district court, on the other hand, is ex­
pected not only to follow decisions of the court of appeals for its circuit 
but, in the absence of any such controlling decision, tends also to attach 
great weight to appellate decisions of other circuits. 
163 Typically, his reaction to adverse decisions is published, either as 
an acquiescence or non-acquiescence in the Internal Revenue Bulletin 
which is available to taxpayers. 
164 That the one exception is a federal district court, see note 162 
supra . 
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blame, though the above mentioned Tax Court practice at the 
trial level is a significant aggravation. Together, these two 
circumstances lead (i) taxpayers to shop for the most "appro­
priate" forum165 and (ii) the Commissioner to test an adverse 
result in yet another coordinate forum. Both the "shopping" 
and period of uncertainty are affected also by the prospect 
that a second coordinate court, perhaps because of slight fac­
tual variations, may be willing to distinguish the previous de ­
cision of another and thus avoid even the appearance of a 
conflict. If it does distinguish, and if the forums are alterna­
tives, yet other taxpayers will be affected in their choice of a 
forum by what then are deemed to be differences in judicial 
attitude -if only in degree .  166 
Certain individuals propose, through legislation, to handle 
the problem by requiring the Commissioner to follow the de­
cisions of courts according to a given sequence . 167 Others 
would establish a centralized court of tax appeals, with some 
of these proponents content to leave the tribunal subordinate 
to the Supreme Court, 168 while some would make its decisions 
final.169 Qt;her reformers would start at the bottom, at the 
trial level, by eliminating the existing right of taxpayers to 
choose between a specialized court and courts of general 
jurisdiction. They would put exclusive trial jurisdiction in 
specialized courts, 170 thereby also removing the right of jury 
trial,171 with appeals from these courts going to a single spe ­
cialized court. 172 A completely opposite approach is taken by 
those who would eliminate at the trial level the encumbrance 
165 Literally dozens of articles have been published to educate practi­
tioners regarding the considerations they should take into account in 
choosing a forum. For collection of a large sample, see Brown and 
Whitmire, op . cit. supra note 32 ,  at 650 n. 52. 
166 Pavenstedt, in op . cit . supra note 38 , identified 17 areas where 
the Court of Claims was the more favorable forum and 7 where it was 
less favorable. 
167 See H.R. 6914 ,  89th Cong. , 2d sess. (1966). 
168 See, e.g. , Griswold, " The ·Need for a Court of Tax Appeals," 57 
Harv . L, Rev . 1153 (1944). 
169 Lowndes, " Federal Taxation and the Supreme Court," 1960 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 222 , 257. 
170 For example, see Traynor, op . cit. supra note 45 ,  at 1425. But 
cf. text following note 43 supra . 
171Id . , at 1426. However ,  the architect of this proposal would pre­
serve the deliberative process by having decisions of a single judge in­
ternally reviewed by the other judges on a court. 
172Id . ,  at 1426. 
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taxpayers now suffer should they prefer to  try the case before 
a federal district court of general jurisdiction, perhaps with 
a jury, rather than before the specialized Tax Court. This 
group would establish true concurrent jurisdiction by enabling 
a taxpayer who prefers the former type of court to litigate 
there before paying the amount in dispute, as he now can do 
should he choose the Tax Court. 173 
The ultimate controversy is between two groups. One 
places a high premium on efficiency, certainty, uniformity, and 
the peculiar competence and concern of specialized tribunals . 
The other values more highly both the perspective associated 
with courts of general jurisdiction (including juries) and the 
wholesome effect of permitting intermediate coordinate courts 
of this type to examine the same issue to the end, should they 
differ, of placing before the Supreme Court well reasoned but 
competing views of objectively oriented appellate court judges .  
The whole matter, as  it relates to  the United States, is now 
the subject of a comprehensive study by a colleague 174 of this 
writer.  
Section B. Analytic Comparison: Litigation 
Practices of the "Six" 
4 .  7 Introduction 
In conducting trial litigation, each party has certain le­
gitimate concerns peculiar to it. Practices particularly im­
portant to the tax administration, and those primarily of 
interest to taxpayers, are considered separately in the suc ­
ceeding two subtopics . Thereafter the focus shifts t o  yet 
other practices -of common concern and basic to the entire 
conflict resolution process. 
4 . 8  Practices peculiarly important to the tax administration 
Each of the six tax administrations covered here must 
deal individually with thousands of suits initiated at many 
different locations across each nation. 175 In consequence, 
173 See Committee on Court Procedure , Taxation Section, A.B.A., 
op . cit. supra note 48. Cf, Sutherland, op . cit . supra note 7. 
17 4 Professor Alan Polasky, under the auspices of the American Bar 
Foundation. 
175 As to the number of suits actually tried, see § 4.3 supra . How­
ever, in most of these countries many other docketed cases required 
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their most important administrative problems emerge from an 
inherent conflict between two competing administrative needs: 
to handle this extremely burdensome effort efficiently, and to 
preserve for top policy makers the opportunity to formulate 
litigation policy. Whereas the latter necessitates at least some 
degree of centralization, maximum efficiency in handling the 
litigation function requires decentralization. The problem is 
to strike a proper balance between the two. 
Considering only efficiency, the aims should be to avoid 
{i) duplicating, in the litigation stage, work that had to be done 
during the last administrative stage, and (ii) duplication of 
effort within the litigation process itself. 
The first of thes'3 two ends obviously is best served by 
holding litigation to the necessary minimum, i.e . ,  by closing 
out through reasonable settlements as many controversies as 
possible during the administrative stage itself. Practices most 
likely to achieve this were fully considered in Chapter III 
supra. As explained there, the foregoing objective cannot be 
reached merely by requiring taxpayers to exhaust their ad­
ministrative remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of an 
independent tribunal. Far more important is the imperative 
of maintaining an image of impartiality at the administrative 
level. And, as further explained in an earlier chapter, this 
image of impartiality ultimately is enhanced inter alia by 
imposing on the person who hears the final administrative 
appeal the further responsibility of representing the govern­
ment at the trial level should litigation ensue . l76 This poten­
tial responsibility would remind him during the earlier ad­
ministrative phase that it is he (in a representative capacity) 
who faces the risk of loss if the dispute is not settled ad­
ministratively . Such a reminder should contribute to his sense 
of reasonableness and facilitate administrative settlement. And 
as to any cases 1Wf so settled, the proposed arrangement would 
(footnote continued) 
attention but were settled before trial. For example, of the 6 ,234 U.S. 
Tax Court cases disposed of in fiscal 1966, 5 ,195 were settled before 
trial, and only 726 actually were tried on the merits. The remaining 
313 were withdrawn or dismissed. See Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, op . cit . supra note 46 , at 134 (Table 17B). Of the 1 ,504 
refund suits filed that same year with the district courts and the Court 
of Claims (Attorney General, Annual Report 1966, 326 and 339 n. 20) ,  
previous experience would indicate that at least 1 ,000 will be settled 
before trial. 
176 See Chap. III, § 3.2 supra . 
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further the cause of efficiency. It avoids the expensive dupli­
cation of effort which otherwise follows when, at the point of 
litigation, one more professional employee must master com­
plexities and nuances of a controversy. Implementation of this 
plan demands as a corollary that the official who hears the 
final administrative appeal possess the requisite skill to repre­
sent the government properly before the appropriate independ­
ent tribunal. This skill, however, is not irrelevant to the task 
he performed during the earlier administrative phase.  His 
actions at that time should have been affected, in the interest 
of administrative fairness,  by a careful appraisal of the antici­
pated litigation hazards . And assuming proper training, per­
sonal experience of such hazards provides the best possible 
preparation for making such appraisals .  
The Netherlands actually utilizes the arrangement proposed 
here . The local inspector who dealt with the taxpayer in the 
last administrative stage ordinarily represents the government 
before the trial tribunal . 177 His training, formerly in the ad­
ministration's own academy but now entrusted on a subsidized 
basis to law faculties ,  is intended to equip him for this re ­
sponsibility . 178 Likewise the British Inland Revenue, in those 
cases -typically small-tried before General Commissioners ,  
is  represented by the inspector who heads the local office or 
by his assistant.179 For surtax cases tried before Special 
Commissioners, however, the responsibility for the represen­
tation ordinarily does not remain with the Surtax Office but 
shifts to the centralized Solicitor 's Office . 180 France uses  
yet another device to  save, for the benefit of the litigation 
stage, much of the effort that went into the administrative 
stage . There the taxpayer 's final administrative appeal is at 
the regional level (Departmental Director 's Office), not the 
local level. If litigation ensues, the responsible official at 
that higher office typically prepares the memorandum of law 
which will be filed with the independent tribunal, though the 
administration actually is represented in court by an ordinary 
inspector residing in the city where the tribunal s its .181 
177 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.3 infra . 
17 8 See Chap. XXI, § 1. 5 infra . 
179 See Chap. XX, § 4.3a infra . 
180 Id. ,  § 4.3b infra . 
181 See Chap. XII, § 4.3  infra . Its inspectors typically do have legal 
training. See Chap. IX, § 1.5 infra . 
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In contrast, Belgium and the United States, though in in­
verse order, probably suffer the greatest duplication of pro­
fessional effort when a controversy shifts from the final ad­
ministrative phase to the litigation phase.  Belgium, alone 
among the Six, shifts trial responsibility outside the govern­
ment, turning it over to a regular practicing member of the 
bar to whom the Minister of Finance has given a permanent 
part-time appointment to defend the government at this level.182 
In the United States, the shift takes place within the govern­
ment. Trial responsibility moves to the government's own 
full-time legal staffs . But the resulting duplication of effort 
is further compounded, irrespective of whether the taxpayer 
invokes the jurisdiction of the Tax Court or one of the other 
two trial forums. 
When a case is docketed with the Tax Court, the adminis­
trative official (Appellate Division) who heard what in theory 
was the final administrative appeal continues, after docketing, 
to share jointly -with an attorney from the separate Chief 
Counsel 's office -the responsibility to seek an administrative 
settlement of the case before the Court convenes for the ses­
sion during which the case otherwise would be tried. 183 Where 
settlement is not achieved, that same attorney will represent 
the government in the Tax Court. 1 84 However, because almost 
182 See Chap. VIII, § 4.3 infra . 
183 Rev. Rul. 60 -18 , C. B. 1960-2 , 988. Once the court convenes and 
the calendar is called, settlement authority then vests exclusively in the 
Chief Counsel' s office. Typically, as in fiscal 1966 ,  about 70% of all 
docketed cases actually bypass the last administrative stage. See Com­
missioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit . supra note 46 , at 134 (Table 
17 A). However, as to these cases also, the two separate offices 
(Appellate Division and Chief Counsel) continue, as above, to share j oint 
settlement responsibility. 
184 Under present conditions it would not be feasible to avoid his dup­
lication of the study and analysis previously put into the problem by the 
administrative official who heard the last administrative appeal. 
Too frequently, the latter official is not in a position to handle the 
trial if one ensues. Many of these officials are not legally trained. Be­
cause of the procedures followed by the Tax Court, typically only persons 
with legal training appear before it. See § 4. 9 infra . 
Nor at the moment would it be feasible to avoid the consequent 
duplication by having the attorneys in the Chief Counsel's office take over 
the entire settlement function. A substantial proportion of those attor­
neys are recent law school graduates who stay with that office only 
during the four years for which they make a moral commitment. While 
there is no doubt about the quality of their work, not having the long ex­
perience enjoyed by the technically oriented administrative officials in 
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85 percent of all docketed cases are settled during the pretrial 
period, 185 this phase of the litigation process should be, and 
in practice is, viewed as yet another administrative appeal, 
though now with two quite separate government offices-each 
having its own internal review arrangement- sharing the re­
sponsibility for settlement. 
When a refund case is filed, whether with a U.S. federal 
district court or the Court of Claims, responsibility shifts 
from the administrative officials, not to the office of the ad­
ministration's own Chief Counsel, but to other lawyers in the 
even more separate Tax Division of the Justice Department. 186 
Here too, of the cases filed, well over a majority will be 
settled before trial. l87 But once again, as to a significant 
proportion of these, yet another office becomes involved. To 
help preserve a uniform litigation policy, many but not nearly 
all of the proposed settlements are cleared by the Justice 
Department with the tax administration's own Chief Counsel's 
Office . 188 Consequently, this latter office also must acquaint 
itself with the details of these cases. 
Germany, among the Six, probably achieves the maximum 
degree of efficiency, by giving local finance offices the greatest 
possible autonomy. It even avoids duplicating in the appellate 
(footnote continued) 
the Appellate Division, they would not be nearly as efficient in settling 
the far greater number of cases which are and must be resolved admin­
istratively even before petitions are filed with a court. There were 
over 22 ,000 such dispositions at the Appellate Division level in fiscal 
196 6. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue , op . cit . supra note 46 , at 
133 (Tables 15B and 16B) .  In short, to consolidate the two functions in 
one office would require very different staffing arrangements than those 
now utilized by either office. 
185 See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. cit. supra note 46,  at 
134 (Table 17B). 
186 While this shift took place pursuant to an executive order issued 
under the Economy Act of 1932 , the Justice Department itself defends 
it on substantive merit. See note 208 infra and Statement of Honorable 
Mitchell Rogovin , Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Department 
of Justice , on S. 2041. Before the Subcommittee on Improvements of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 90th Cong. , 1st sess. (1967). 
187 See note 175 supra . 
188 And for this purpose, the Chief Counsel's office maintains a special 
division-the Refund Litigation Division. A " Settlement Option Pro­
cedure" instituted in 1964 permits the Justice Department to settle many 
of the less important cases without this referral. See Attorney General, 
Annual Report 1964, 320. By fiscal 1965 , this covered 43% of the cases. 
See Attorney General, Annual Report 1965, 307. 
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phase of the litigation stage the professional effort invested in 
the earlier or trial phase of that stage . If litigation does take 
place, the inspector who heads the local office or a senior 
subordinate who had dealt with the dispute typically continues 
to handle the case; he represents the government before both 
the trial and appellate tribunals . 189 Further, ordinarily he 
alone decides whether to appeal an adverse decision of the 
trial tribunal . Indeed, should either the state or Federal 
Finance Ministry or both decide to intervene in the appeal, 
whether voluntarily or at the invitation of the appellate tri­
bunal, a Ministry-intervenor appears as a separate independent 
party to the action, using its own representatives and not in­
terfering with the local office 's presentation of its case . 190 
If feasible, it is desirable, of course, to minimize dupli­
cation of effort by having the same professional appear before 
both tribunals . 191 It is quite another matter to stress effi­
ciency or a local office 's autonomy to a point that precludes 
National Office involvement and, thus, some duplication of effort 
regarding the question of whether to appeal a trial determina­
tion. Most countries covered here, however, actually experi­
ence duplication on both counts, i .e. ,  the representation function 
does shift to a yet different professional at the point of appeal, 
and the National Office does involve itself in the question of 
whether to appeal. 
As to the matter of representation, Belgium, for example, 
instead of having the trial attorney handle any subsequent ap­
peal, employs a regular member of the Court of Cassation's 
own bar .192 In the United States, at the point of appeal the 
representation function shifts from the government's own trial 
attorney to appellate attorneys who work full time in the Justice 
Department's Appellate Section. 193 
Much more easily defended is that duplication required of 
the National Office in trying to control litigation policies ac­
tually carried out at lower levels . In the last analysis, formu­
lation of litigation policy is another form of administrative 
189 See Chap. XVI, §§ 4.3 and 4.5 infra . Ordinarily this senior class 
local official does have legal training. Ibid. Also see Chap. XIII, § 1.5 
infra . 
190See Chap. XVI, § 4.5 infra . 
191 The prime problem here is that some persons who make excellent 
trial advocates are less able in the appellate setting, and vice versa . 
t92 See Chap. VIII, § 4.5 infra . 
193 If the case goes to the Supreme Court, the representation function 
understandably shifts again to a high official-the Solicitor General. 
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rule making. Where the latter is accomplished through more 
typical forms, such as rulings, Chapter II supra 194 argued 
that the tax administration's own central office should assume 
final responsibility, primarily to achieve uniformity and to 
assure that the more important policy choices required by the 
interpretative process actually are made by senior officials 
having some Policy orientation, not by technically oriented 
personnel who staff the lower echelons . The same rationale 
applies to litigation policy. Consequently, generally speaking, 
the central office itself should have at least the opportunity to 
decide whether or not a given trial determination should be 
appealed. Britain adheres to this practice,  even though its 
central office otherwise does not carry on a major, published 
interpretative rule-making program. 195 The Board of Inland 
Revenue itself decides whether a trial decision will be ap­
pealed, but only after its secretariat has consulted with ad­
ministrative experts in the affected substantive area and, if 
need be, its Solicitor 's Office _ l96 Roughly similar practices 
are followed in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands .l97 
In sharp theoretical contrast, the U.S. tax administration's 
own central-office officials do not decide the · question of 
whether to appeal. Ultimate authority rests with lawyers in 
the centralized but wholly separate Justice Department, 198 
Any assessment of this arrangement must take into considera­
tion the fact that U.S. appellate courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction. They must be able to accommodate all types of 
cases. A department with concerns extending far beyond the 
tax area is better able to take appropriate account of over­
crowded appellate court dockets-if any. Moreover in practice, 
the Justice Department does try to be sensitive to policy con­
cerns expressed by the office of the tax administration's own 
Chief Counsel. 199 And the latter's subordinates normally are 
194 See §§ 2.6 and 2.7. 
195 See Chap. XVIII infra and, for comparative purposes , Chap. II, 
§ 2.5 supra . 
196 See Chap. XX, § 4.5 infra . 
197 See § 4. 5 in Chaps. VIII, XII, and XXIV infra . 
198 This is a function of the Solicitor General. See Attorney General, 
Annual Report 1965, 300. 
199 Typically, the file which reaches the Justice Department' s Tax Di­
vision includes a memorandum from the Chief Counsel' s office explain­
ing why an adverse lower court decision should be appealed. Before for­
warding the file to the Solicitor General for a final decision, a reviewer 
in the Tax Division' s Appellate Section will add a memorandum reflecting 
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expected to try to preserve the administration's own interpre ­
tative policies as reflected in its administrative regulations, 
rulings, and other official pronouncements . 200 
In some of the countries covered here, central-office con­
trol over litigation policy begins not at the point of appeal but 
earlier, at the inception of the trial stage . In Belgium, for 
example, three centralized administrative branches are re ­
sponsible for tax litigation. The appropriate one works closely 
with the appointed private practitioner who actually represents 
the government before the trial court. 201 In France, while 
both control and conduct of trial litigation ordinarily are de ­
centralized, exceptions as to the former do exist. The regional 
Departmental Director whose office prepares the memorandum 
of law to be filed with the trial tribunal is expected, prior to 
the preparation thereof, to consult with the Director General 
of Direct Taxes at the national office in any one of four cir ­
cumstances .  And these circumstances include the situation 
where an issue is not covered either by case law or adminis ­
trative instructions. 202 
The United States, which likewise decentralizes  the actual 
representation function in trial litigation before the Tax Court, 
goes beyond France in centralizing policy control at the incep­
tion of that stage . To this end, the administration's Chief 
Counsel maintains a mechanized two-way reporting system 
(Reports and Information Retrieval Activity) between his central 
office and his 40 field offices which handle those cases even­
tually to be tried before the circuit-riding Tax Court. This 
system, known as RIRA, provides his central office with an 
indexed inventory of issues involved in all pending Tax Court 
litigation complemented by an abstract of the facts in each 
case . RIRA performs two functions vital to central office con­
trol of litigation policy, and a third purpose important to effi­
cient exercise of such control. 203 
(footnote continued) 
his own views. While officials in the Tax Division are expected to make 
an "independent review" of the litigation possibilities ,  they also are 
expected by the head of that Division to be as "fully responsive as possi­
ble to the policy direction of the Internal Revenue Service.' ' See Attorney 
General, Annual Report 1965, 298 , 300 ,  and 307. 
200 See Cohen, "Current Developments in the Chief Counsel' s Office," 
42 Taxes 663 (1964). 
201 See Chap. VIII, § 4.3 infra . 
202 See Chap. XII, § 4.3 infra . 
203 See note 200 supra , and Link, " RIRA-A Legal Information System 
in the Internal Revenue Service," 43 Taxes 231 (1965). 
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The first two functions coincide with those of the above 
mentioned but less sweeping reporting requirements imposed 
by the French administration. RIRA enables the central office 
to assure that geographically spread trial counsel take con­
sistent positions across the nation. Further, it assures that 
any position thus taken is sound from a Policy standpoint. 
Assurance that policywise -sound positions will be adopted 
even at this early trial stage has long-run significance not 
always recognized. The at least defensible technical position 
which technically oriented local offices can develop as to a 
disputable issue may in fact be indefensible in terms of tax 
policy. To urge such a position even at the trial stage can 
have unfortunate long-range consequences. A given trial judge 
may adopt that position and the taxpayer then may lodge an 
appeal .  If it is not until this stage that the central office be ­
comes involved, the likelihood is reduced that it will give the 
full policy implications of that technical position their just due. 
This is understandable . Once a trial court "has approved the 
Government's position in a case, the reconsideration of that 
position at the national office level is complicated by a natural 
reluctance to repudiate a view successfully urged upon a 
court. "  2 04 Not irrelevant is the risk of affecting the future 
attitude of the trial bench toward the government's local trial 
representatives .  Confidence the trial bench otherwise might 
have in future arguments advanced by those representatives 
may be shaken should a central office, making its first ap ­
praisal of a question at the belated point of appeal, confess 
error before the appellate court regarding a position the local 
trial representative had urged successfully upon that trial 
bench. Trial judges are human. Both the foregoing risks as 
they relate to U.S. Tax Court cases are avoided, in large part 
because RIRA permits the central office to trigger its policy 
consideration of a case prior to the trial. Further ,  to this 
same end, all briefs prepared by field offices are reviewed in 
the Chief Counsel's central office before submission to the 
Tax Court. And subordinates conducting that review are in­
structed, as before noted, to maintain positions consistent with 
the regulations, rulings, and other official pronouncements 
previously approved by · the Service's senior administrative 
officials .  205 
204 Attorney General, Annual Report 1965, 301. Italics added. 
205 See note 200 supra. 
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RIRA, by enabling the central office to identify at an early 
point important or frequently recurring issues, also contributes 
to efficient and effective implementation of litigation policy .  
From the cases raising such an issue, the central office can 
select the test case best suited to clarify the law. 206 The 
others can be settled or "put on ice" until the test case has 
been resolved. 
Central office control over trial litigation pending in the 
wide -flung U.S. district courts and in the Court of Claims is 
accomplished through a yet different system. Almost all 
lawyers who represent the government in these cases are 
based at the office of the Justice Department in Washington. 207 
To accommodate the geographically dispersed trials, they ride 
circuit. Thus it is easy for the Justice Department to raise­
with the administration's Chief Counsel-questions pertaining 
to the desirability or undesirability of maintaining a given 
position. In theory, however, the former-rather than the tax 
administration or its Chief Counsel-makes the ultimate de ­
cision. 208 
206 Ibid. RIRA also contributes in a yet different way to the efficiency 
of decentralized trial counsel. The latter are fed information regarding 
the status of similar cases pending in other offices. Thus, should a given 
local office find that a similar case, pending elsewhere, has reached a 
more advanced stage , it can minimize duplication of effort by soliciting 
the relevant memoranda, briefs , etc. 
207 Of the 202 attorneys in the Justice Department' s Tax Division at the 
close of fiscal 1966, only 6 were based elsewhere in a field office sub­
ject to central control. See Attorney General, Annual Report 1966, 367. 
208 One who headed this activity for the Justice Department described 
the actual practice as follows: "Separation of responsibility has proved 
successful because it affords an opportunity for a fresh, intensive, and 
intelligent reexamination of the Government' s position in each tax con­
troversy at the point in time when that controversy emerges from the 
administrative level into full public view in Federal court. The Internal 
Revenue Service has a responsibility to examine tax returns with a view 
to developing arguments which maximize the Government' s revenue in 
the specific cases at hand along with its responsibility to establish rules 
and policy without regard to their dollar impact in a particular case. 
While the Internal Revenue Service leadership has made great strides 
toward encouraging a balanced even-handed judgment by its agents, the 
administration of justice and the tax laws are well served by the inde­
pendent review and direction given by the Tax Division to the tax cases 
going into Federal courts. The Tax Division of the Department of Justice 
is not free to direct revenue policy. But, when its examination convinces 
it that it would be a mistake to argue the position advanced by Internal 
Revenue, the matter is taken up with the Chief Counsel and through a 
process of conference and persuasion , a mutually acceptable position is 
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A final problem confronting an administration relates to 
adverse trial determinations not appealed. Any number of 
reasons, in a given case, might cause an administration to 
decide against appeal. If formulation of litigation policy as to 
a given issue is another form of administrative rule making, 
for the reasons earlier set forth with respect to rulings them ­
selves, 209 the government should state openly, at least as to 
the more important unappealed trial decisions that are pub ­
lished, whether it will conform to such published decisions . 
A similar statement of intent should be made, where a country 
utilizes an intermediate layer of appellate courts, with respect 
to their adverse decisions if published and allowed to become 
final without further appeal. In both instances, by publishing 
such statements, the central office (i) can contribute to uni­
formity-efficiently and fairly, (ii) can assure that administra­
tive reactions to such decisions are fixed by senior policy­
oriented officials rather than by technically-oriented local 
officials, and (iii) can neutralize risks regarding prospective 
transactions. Accomplishment of these goals, however, re­
quires two complementary practices .  
The first such practice relates to the special care that 
must be taken to guard against the possibility that the admin­
istration's published reaction will be misleading. This presents 
a problem quite distinct from that encountered in publishing 
an ordinary ruling. In the latter circumstance, the adminis ­
tration itself can and should identify the facts it deems pivotal 
and supply its own rationale . 210 In short, by these means an 
administration controls the dimensions of the ruling. In the 
case of an adverse trial court decision, however, the adminis ­
tration may be willing to accept the result but not the totality 
of the court's rationale. Or a fact the administration deemed 
(footnote continued) 
sought. From its independent vantage point the Division is able to per­
suade Internal Revenue that, viewed from the standpoint of litigation, 
certain positions should not be pursued in court. 
"If this prior examination were not carried out, the resulting re­
sponsibility placed on the Federal courts, of making an extensive inves ­
tigation into the long-range implications of each Government position 
urged before them, would be too great. If the courts can be satisfied that 
only carefully considered positions are presented in court, they will have 
greater confidence in the Government' s presentation." Attorney General, 
Annual Report 1965, 300. 
209 See Chap. II, §§ 2.5 through 2.8 and § 2 . 17 supra . 
21 0 See Chap. II, § 2. 17 supra . 
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essential in accepting the result may not have been explicitly 
treated as such by the tribunal. In consequence, published 
administrative reactions to some adverse trial determinations 
either must state that the acquiescences or non-acquiescences 
relate only to the results themselves or must become what 
are at least abbreviated versions of complete published rulings . 
The second practice relates to reliability . The announce­
ment of administrative intent will not achieve all three of the 
previously enumerated purposes unless it is as reliable as 
published rulings should be . 211 Absent this, it cannot be de ­
pended upon to neutralize risks regarding prospective trans­
actions . However, if an administration is to assign to these 
announcements the high degree of reliability it should attach 
to ordinary published rulings, the two should be processed ap­
proximately in the same manner . 212 
Among the six countries covered here, only the United 
States carries on an official publication program providing ad­
ministrative reactions to adverse but unappealed trial deci­
sions, though in the Netherlands something roughly equivalent 
to an unofficial program does exist. 213 
As to the United States, in the case of unappealed adverse 
Tax Court decisions published by the court itself, the admin­
istration typically publishes in its own weekly bulletin a bare 
acquiescence or non-acquiescence,214 often with a footnote 
stating that the announcement relates only to the result 
reached.215 However, while these acquiescences and non­
acquiescences are intended to serve the first two of the three 
previously enumerated vital purposes, 216 the administration 
211 See Chap. II, §§ 2.3 , 2.4, 2.8, and 2.17 supra . 
212 Id. §§ 2.12 and 2. 17. 
21 3 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.3 infra . 
214 For example, see C.B. 1967-1 ,  1. The Administration does not 
publish its reactions to the court's so-called memorandum decisions. 
This may be due to the fact that these decisions are not published by the 
court itself, but by private publishing houses, and until recently the Tax 
Court itself never cited its own prior memorandum decisions as prece­
dents. 
215 For example , see id ., at 3 n. 7. 
216 However, even those previously enumerated and vital purposes ac­
tually were not the original reasons why this program was instituted. 
Because of the long period the government once had (one year) in which 
to decide whether to appeal an adverse trial decision by what now is the 
Tax Court, an acquiescence was issued as a means of informing the tax­
payer as to whether the government intended to appeal. See Rogovin , 
" The Four R' s :  Regulations , Rulings , Reliance and Retroactivity," 43 
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presently is unwilling to assign to them the high degree of 
reliability it accords regular published rulings . As to a given 
decision, the administration not only reserves the right to 
change its published reaction by substituting, for example, a 
belated non-acquiescence for a previously published acqui­
escence. 217 It ordinarily actually does so, in contrast to the 
practice followed as to published rulings, without exercising 
the discretion it also has 218 to give the change prospective 
effect only. 219 In consequence, in contrast to an ordinary 
published ruling, an acquiescence in itself cannot be relied 
upon to neutralize the tax risk associated with an important 
prospective transaction. 220 The bare quality of these an­
nouncements, and the fact they are not processed in the same 
painstaking manner as published rulings, are at the root of 
the difficulty. And, as observed by a former Chief Counsel 
while still in office, to do that which is necessary to upgrade 
the degree of reliability would require such substantial man­
power that, as a practical matter,  only the more important 
adverse Tax Court decisions could be so processed. 221 
Indeed, the tax administration has not even extended the 
present program in any comprehensive way to the other two 
trial forums (district courts and Court of Claims).  However, 
on an ever -increasing scale it is tending to publish its reac ­
tion to adverse intermediate appellate court decisions (in­
cluding Court of Claims decisions), using for this purpose 
(footnote continued) 
Taxes 756, 771 (1965). However, the government' s allowable "cogita­
tion' ' period was reduced many years ago to three months. Rev. Act. of 
1932 ,  1101. Since then , it generally has been recognized that the pro­
gram was maintained to serve the first two of the previously enumerated 
purposes. See Rogovin, supra, at 772 and 773. 
217 Dixon v. U.S.,  381 U.S. 68 (1965) .  
218 Under I.R.C. § 7805 (b). 
219 See Rogovin, op . cit. supra note 216 ,  at 772 and 773. It applied 
the change retroactively in one case though eleven years elapsed before 
the previously published acquiescence was withdrawn and a non­
acquiescence substituted. See Acq. to Caulkins v. Commissioner in 
C.B.  1944 , 5 and the subsequent non-Acq. in C.B.  1955-1, 7. In another 
case involving an interim of twenty years, the change was given prospec­
tive effect only. However, this was characterized by the then Chief 
Counsel as an "unusual circumstance" because the substantive issue 
was of widespread importance and, during the interval, the Service had 
issued a number of private rulings relying on the earlier acquiescence. 
See Rogovin , supra, at 773. 
220 See Rogovin, op , cit. supra note 216, at 773. 
221 Ibid. 
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Technical Information Releases (so-called TIR's) which typically 
do resemble exceedingly abbreviated published rulings . It even 
follows this practice for a very few district court cases . 
4 .9  Practices peculiarly important to taxpayers 
Taxpayers in irreconcilable conflict with a tax adminis ­
tration also have peculiar concerns extending beyond the in­
dependent tribunals ' structural arrangements. These pertain 
primarily to practices affecting the convenience of litigating a 
dispute . 
Insofar as affected by geography, the convenience of tax­
payer access to a trial tribunal was discussed earlier in con­
nection with structural arrangements . Relevant also, however, 
to convenient access are other practices relating to (i) the 
point in time when the disputed amount must be paid and 
(ii) the matter of representation. 
If it were true that a "king can do no wrong, " 222 i.e. ,  if 
the sovereign never forced to litigation issues other than those 
it was sure to win, there would be scant reason to object if 
payment of the amount in actual dispute were required before 
according access to a trial tribunal . Governments, however, 
like private citizens, often are adjudged wrong by trial tribu­
nals . For example, of those U.S. Tax Court decisions which, 
in fiscal 1966, became final because not appealed, taxpayers 
were held to be wholly right in 18 percent and partially right 
in another 34 percent, for a total of 52 percent. 223 In simi­
lar circumstances involving suits between private parties, no 
government would dare have the temerity to enact a law which 
presumed an alleged debt was owing and which required pay­
ment before a trial court had spoken. Is  it not then unbecom � 
ing for that same government to establish a different norm 
for cases where it is a party, solely for its benefit? There 
is, moreover, a second consideration: requirement of such 
prior payment can seriously inconvenience many taxpayers .  
D o  not these reasons suggest that no prior payment should be 
required? Until an independent tribunal has spoken, it is 
enough that-as in the case of private litigation- {i) interest 
continue to run against the taxpayer should he lose and 
222 See 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 254 (1st 
ed. 1768). 
223 This meant the government was wholly right in 48% and partially 
right in 34%, for a total of 82o/o- See Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
op . cit . supra note 46 , at 44. 
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(ii) remedies be available to safeguard the government's chance 
to collect if there is reason to believe it otherwise would be 
in jeopardy. 
The Belgians apparently think this is not enough. As a 
matter of law at least, there the duty to pay is not suspended 
pending resolution of the controversy by a trial tribunal. 224 
The exact contrary is true in Britain: there payment is post­
poned when a dispute is carried to either the General or Spe ­
cial Commissioners. 225 
The United States, as to substantive income tax disputes, 
has never decided which of the two competing practices is 
correct. Though it is entitled to interest on unpaid amounts 
owing 226 and does possess remedies to safeguard its chance 
to collect, 227 it follows the Belgian practice (prior payment) 
if the taxpayer prefers to litigate before either the appropriate 
district court or the Court of Claims . But it is content with 
the British practice (postponement) if a taxpayer tries his suit 
before the U. S .  Tax Court. 228 Germany 229 and France, 230 
while less equivocal, adopted a yet different practice which 
falls between the Belgian and British usages. In Germany, for 
example, the local finance office itself generally has discre­
tion in the matter .  However, postponement must be authorized 
in either of two circumstances, both of which can be tested by 
summary judicial review even before an action on the substan­
tive issue is filed. The two circumstances involve cases 
where either genuine doubt exists regarding the merits of the 
government's position or prior payment would have an un­
necessarily harsh effect on the taxpayer . 
Representation requirements also can affect adversely the 
convenience of taxpayer -access to a trial forum. In small 
224 See Chap. VII, § 3.4 and Chap. VIII, § 4.3 infra . 
225 See Chap. XX, §§ 4.3a and 4.3b infra . 
226 See I.R.C. § 6601. 
227 Perhaps the most important is the j eopardy assessment. See 
I.R. C. § 6861 et seq.  
228 This is because by statute-absent a j eopardy assessment-the dis­
puted amount cannot be assessed until the government serves notice of 
the taxpayer' s right to appeal to the Tax Court and, assuming a timely 
appeal, until the decision of that court becomes final. I.R. C .  § 6213. 
However, should the taxpayer appeal the Tax Court' s decision, payment 
will not be further postponed unless the taxpayer files an appropriate 
bond. I.R.C. § 7485. The Tax Court is an available forum, however, only 
as to income, estate , and gift taxes. 
229 See Chap. XVI, § 4.3 infra . 
230 See Chap. XI, § 3.4b, and Chap. XII, § 4.1 infra . 
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cases particularly, it actually may be against taxpayer economic 
self-interest to employ the particular type of representative 
required or, for that matter, any representative at all. How­
ever, given the adversary system, every such taxpayer has a 
conflicting concern, namely, that his case be presented effec­
tively. Trial tribunals themselves have a stake in that con­
cern. First, in the interest of their own efficiency, they would 
prefer not to waste any time on cases obviously and completely 
devoid of merit, but instituted because completely unknowledge­
able taxpayers sought to represent themselves.  Second, it is 
difficult for a tribunal to wear two hats, to try to serve as an 
advocate for the taxpayer and be also an objective judge . 
In resolving these conflicting concerns, all six of the 
countries covered here permit a taxpayer to represent him­
self.231 However, in Germany, should the trial tribunal con­
clude that a given taxpayer is incapable of this, a new law 
permits the court to require him to secure counsel232 though, 
as later observed, not necessarily a lawyer . In France, the 
difficulties which so-called pro -se cases pose for the tribunal 
are mitigated by a yet different practice, actually applicable 
to all cases .  A subordinate of the tribunal itself is  required 
to submit to it his own objective analysis of a case.  233 This 
analysis is in addition to and independent of those submitted 
by the two competing parties .  In the United States, it has been 
proposed that a small claims division, with simplified pro­
cedures, be added to the Tax Court. In effect, an independent 
Commissioner would serve as judge, and often also as the 
advocate for taxpayers subjected to small (le ss than $2,  500) 
proposed deficiencies . 234 
Closely related to the foregoing problem is the question 
of whether taxpayers who do desire representation should be 
barred from employing non-lawyers. In the case of general 
(non-tax) legal matters, tradition, society 's interest, and af­
fected tribunals are served where a country maintains, for the 
benefit of those who seek representation or mere legal advice, 
2 31 See § 4. 3 ,  Chaps. VIII, XII, XVI, XX, and XXIV; and 28 U.S . C ,  
§ 1654. 
2 32 See Chap. XVI, § 4.3 infra . 
233 See Chap. XII, § 4.3 infra . Belgium, in "public interest" cases , 
follows a similar practice though the role is performed by a member of 
the Attorney General' s staff. See Chap. VIII, § 4,2 infra . 
234 See s. 18, 90th Gong. , 1st sess. (1967).  Also see 113 Cong. Rec . 
(daily ed. ) ,  Jan. 11, 196 7 ,  S55. The commissioner' s decision would be 
subj ect to internal review by a j udge. 
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a class of professionals (lawyers) whose prescribed training 
tends to assure a minimum level of competence .  In  a given 
country, however, circumstances may deprive the legal pro­
fession of any justifiable claim to a monopoly over certain 
matters that otherwise might be deemed to involve lawyer -like 
activity. For example, even in several of the highly developed 
European countries covered here, law schools have almost en­
tirely ignored fiscal law. In consequence, given the complexity 
of the subject, lawyers as a class did not have the preparation 
necessary to pre-empt the advisory role in tax affair s. As 
legally trained individuals were unable to meet an obvious 
societal need, the resulting partial vacuum was filled by gradu­
ates of other disciplines (accountants or economists), by persons 
formerly employed and trained by the tax administration, or by 
self-educated and self-styled "experts . "  2 35 These persons not 
only prepared returns but, as disputes arose, also represented 
taxpayers in their dealings with the tax administration itself. 
All the European countries covered here except France 
responded to this extensive use of non-law trained counsel by 
permitting non-lawyers who work in this field to represent 
taxpayers fully before their respective trial tribunals.  And 
France imposes only one limitation. 236 No doubt factors con­
tributing to their decision included taxpayer convenience and 
the supposition that subject-matter knowledge -not just the skill 
qua skill of an advocate -counted for something. 
According these considerations special weight and effect 
in the tax setting doubtless was facilitated in Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Great Britain by one further fact. Since 
these countries utilize separate specialized tribunals or cham­
bers for the trial of tax cases, it was possible, without dis ­
rupting normal judicial procedures elsewhere, to develop in­
formal procedures for these cases.  The decidedly informal 
petitions and procedures utilized in Germany and the Nether ­
lands237 make it possible to carry on a conflict resolution 
process though German and Dutch lawyers rarely appear at 
this level. 238 It also is very unusual for a British barrister 
to appear before England's General Commissioners. Taxpayers 
represented there typically employ accountants or solicitors; 
and the government itself is represented by a non-legally 
235 See §§ 1. 5 and 1.6 in Chap. V, IX, XIII, XVII, and XXI infra . 
236 See text accompanying note 242 infra . 
237 See § 4.3 in Chaps. XVI and XXIV infra . 
238Jbid. Also see § 1. 6 ,  Chaps. XIV and XXI infra . 
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trained inspector . 239 Not surprisingly, the procedures followed 
there are not as formal as those adhered to by the Special 
Commissioners before whom typically only solicitors and bar ­
risters appear for taxpayers, with the government usually being 
represented by its Solicitor 's Office. 240 Comparably in Bel­
gium, though non-lawyers are permitted in tax cases to per­
form the same function as lawyers, the fairly formal pro­
cedures followed taken in conjunction with the fact that the 
government itself is represented by a regular practicing mem­
ber of the bar probably help explain why a lawyer customarily 
serves as the taxpayer 's representative . 241 
France, the only European country of the five to subject 
taxpayers to a formal detriment should they employ non­
lawyers at the trial stage, does permit such a representative 
to prepare petition, brief, or any other essential document. 
The only restriction: he may not participate in oral argument 
before the tribunal . 242 In actuality, however, French tax­
payers most frequently are represented by persons who do 
hold a law degree and who, earlier in their careers, served 
as government inspectors .  And their adversar ies  are of like 
quality, i .e. ,  come from the legally trained inspectors presently 
employed by the government. 243 
Practice at the trial level in the United States differs 
from every one of the foregoing usages, though it most nearly 
approximates that of Belgium. Prior to World War II, U.S. 
law schools-like so many of their present European counter ­
parts-tended to ignore tax law. In consequence, at an early 
point in time accountants began to perform a substantial ad­
visory role in tax affairs, prepared returns, and-as disputes 
arose -represented taxpayers in dealing with administrative 
officials .  Even in that period, however, the heavy turnover 
suffered by the tax administration's legal staffs supplied the 
bar with a significant number of practitioners  trained in tax 
matters.  Since the war, this continuing reservoir has been 
complemented by graduates of law schools, practically all of 
which have instituted substantial course programs in taxation. 
In consequence of these two facts, though the bar never has 
monopolized either the giving of tax advice or taxpayer 
2 39 See Chap. XX, § 4.3a infra . 
240Id., § 4.3b. Also see Chap. XVII, § 1.6 infra . 
241 See Chap. VIII, § 4.3 infra . Also see Chap. VI, § 1. 6 infra . 
242 See Chap. XII, § 4.3 infra . Also see Chap. IX, § 1.6 infra . 
243Ibid. 
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representation at the administrative level, it has been able to 
maintain in fact, if not in law, a virtual monopoly in repre­
senting taxpayers before trial tribunals . Indeed, before two 
of the three alternative trial forums (district courts and Court 
of Claims), lawyers alone may appear in a representative 
capacity, 244 and each tribunal follows the formal procedural 
rules it otherwise applies to non-tax cases. 245 Only before 
the Tax Court are non-lawyers permitted to appear in a rep­
resentative capacity. 246 While its procedures, in practice,  are 
not quite as well calculated as those of a district court to 
assist the parties in refining the issues and discovering evi­
dence, 247 these same procedures mirror those of a judicial 
proceeding, not those of informal administrative hearing. 
Partly in consequence of this, appearance even there of a 
non-legally trained representative rarely occurs. Even tax­
payers who were represented by large accounting firms during 
the administrative phase of the conflict resolution process 
typically employ a lawyer when moving into the litigation stage . 
In fact, were it otherwise, the accounting firms themselves 
would become entangled in the forum selection process and in 
what then becomes tantamount to a conflict of interest. Only 
a lawyer lacks self- interest when advising a taxpayer as to 
which of the three alternative trial forums would be most 
appropriate for his case.  248 
At the appellate level, both Britain and the United States 
utilize courts of general jurisdiction to hear tax cases. 249 
While Belgium utilizes a semi-specialized chamber in its 
Court of Cassation, 250 there, as in the United States,  even 
those taxpayers who employ counsel at the trial level almost 
always hire attorneys.  Hence, it is not surprising that all 
three countries permit only lawyers to serve in a represen­
tative capacity at the appellate level. 251 France and the 
Netherlands, on the other hand, permit others to fulfill this 
244 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11; Court of Claims Rules, 
Rule 2. 
245 For a comparison of their respective rules, see Ferguson , op. cit. 
supra note 2 6 ,  at 339 and 348 ,  and § 4. 10 infra . 
246 Tax Court Rule 2. 
247 See Ferguson, op , cit. supra note 26, at 356, and § 4.10 infra , 
248 0nly a lawyer may act in a representative capacity before all three 
alternative forums. 
249 See § 4. 5  supra and Chap. XX, § 4.4 infra . 
250 See § 4.5  supra and Chap. VIII, § 4.4 infra . 
251 See § 4.5  in Chaps. VIII and XX infra . 
LITIGATION PRACTICES 157 
function-subject to the limitation that they may not make an 
or al argument. 252 Germany does not even impose this re ­
striction. 25 3  
4.10 Practices of common concern 
Of the three parties associated with tax litigation at the 
trial level {taxpayer, administration, and tribunal), at least 
two have a common stake in three different goals . Each party 
shares an interest in fostering practices which efficiently and 
in a timely manner strip down the issues to the absolute es­
sentials .  Then, as to any issues remaining in dispute, prac­
tices which assure one party of the opportunity to obtain evi­
dence under the control of the other become equally important, 
most often to the government but sometimes to the taxpayer. 
Finally, all three would appear to be benefited, should bilateral 
agreement then become possible, by permitting the two con­
testing parties themselves to terminate the proceedings . On 
balance, however, a practice of entering into agreements at 
this belated stage may be against the long-range procedural 
interests of the administration and of the tribunal, and of net 
benefit only to the particular taxpayer . 
Timely refinement of issues is calculated to avoid both 
waste and surprise . The central need is to complete the 
process well before either party is "up against the gun. " Most 
illustrative is the situation where a tribunal schedules oral 
hearings quite far in advance with consideration of evidence 
limited to that introduced at the hearing itself. Only if the 
issues are refined well before that hearing can the parties 
avoid the burdensome waste of collecting evidence affecting 
matters not actually in dispute, and prepare adequately to deal 
with all issues that actually will be put in conflict. 
In France, 254 the need for advance warning is less serious 
than in most of the other countries .  In the adversary sense, 
oral hearings in France, as in Belgium, 255 are of less sig­
nificance .  256 Further, typically the evidence is in before the 
parties are put "up against the gun."  Before the hearing is 
252 See § 4.5 in Chaps. XII and XXIV infra . 
25 3 See Chap. XVI, § 4.5 n. 25 infra . 
254 See Chap. XII, § 4.3 infra . Some parallel between French practice 
and that of the U.S. Court of Claims is noted in Ferguson, op, cit. supra 
note 26 ,  at 348. 
255 See Chap. VIII, § 4.3 supra . 
256 Cf. § 4. 3 in Chaps. XVI, XX, and XXIV supra . 
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scheduled but after the petition and answer have been filed, 
the parties continue to sharpen the issues and arguments and 
to introduce evidence, by exchanging repeatedly through the 
tribunal further memoranda and supporting documents . They 
continue this process until one party fails to reply in a timely 
manner to the last memorandum submitted by the other . 257 
The hearing which then follows consists of little more than 
oral argument. Ordinary witnesses do not appear .  258 And 
should the tribunal itself inquire into a matter which leads a 
party to invoke a yet new ground, it must allow the other 
party time to prepare a responsive written memorandum and 
supporting documents . 
The extent of responsibility a tribunal itself assumes 
necessarily affects all three of the previously mentioned com­
mon concerns .  This is best illustrated by the contrasting ex­
periences in Germany and the United States, two countries 
which do permit oral hearings with witnesses, etc . 
The German fiscal courts reserve a more dominant role 
for themselves than do their U. s. counterparts . 259 Neither 
contestant bears the burden of proof. The fiscal court itself 
has the ultimate responsibility to unearth the truth and to de­
cide the case in accordance with law. In consequence, the 
court does not accept formal agreed stipulations of fact. 
Further,  if either party files a statement lacking sufficient 
specificity, the court-to satisfy its own need-may require 
submission of another, addressed more precisely to the issues 
in controversy. To that same end, it may require a party to 
submit evidence in response to matters introduced by the 
other .  Finally, because it i s  the court's responsibility to de ­
cide the case in accordance with law, the parties themselves 
cannot terminate the proceedings on reaching a bilateral agree­
ment. Only if the court deems the latter to accord with the 
tax law, will it be approved and the proceedings terminated. 
Thus, even if the parties were so-minded, the proceedings 
would not be dismissed should such an agreement attempt to 
25 7 If these exchanges are continued unnecessarily, the tribunal can 
terminate this stage. See note 26 supra . 
258 While the parties may agree upon a nonpartisan " expert" witness 
to determine a question of fact, or have the tribunal appoint such a per­
son as head of a three-man panel, findings of fact by the expert also are 
submitted in writing, See note 26 supra . 
259 See Chap. XVI, § 4.3 infra . 
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split an issue which the tribunal itself necessarily would have 
had to decide entirely for one side or the other .  260 
A trial in the United States, on the other hand, tends to 
be more adversary in character, as distinguished from the 
inquisitorial type of proceeding. 
In litigation before the Tax Court, for example, one of the 
parties always has the burden of proof. Generally, it is the 
taxpayer . 261 At the least he bears the burden of proving that 
the deficiency asserted by the Commissioner was "arbitrary 
and excessive . "  262 This, taken in conjunction with two facts, 
that the date of the session at which the trial will take place 
typically is set three months in advance 263 and that the court 
frowns on continuances, 264 emphasizes his need to have the 
issues sharpened well in advance . 
Ideally, he should have been informed of the administra­
tion's precise position before he filed his petition. The final 
notice he received from the administration, 265 rejecting his 
contention as to a disputed item, should have indicated the 
specific ground for so doing. This is not always possible, 
however, and is not a requirement. One recurring reason why 
the administration cannot be specific at that point is attributa­
ble to the taxpayer himself, and grows out of the fact he need 
not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a petition 
with the Tax Court. A taxpayer, who does not invoke the last 
administrative appeal (regional Appellate Division) available 
before a petition must be filed, in effect forces the adminis­
tration to issue the notice before its most trusted field offi­
cials have had a reasonable chance to work out the specific 
grounds upon which it ultimately would want to rely.  That 
these officials are bypassed at this point in approximately 
260 That the German tax administration itself would not be so-minded, 
see Chap. XV, § 3.4a infra . 
261 With respect to matters belatedly raised (see text accompanying 
note 268 infra ) and the issu�s of fraud and transferee liability, the 
government bears the burden. I .R,C. §§ 7454 and 6902 (a). 
262 Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.s. 507, 513 (1934). However,  once 
the taxpayer satisfies this burden, the Commissioner has the burden of 
establishing the correct but lesser deficiency owing. Ibid. It is other­
wise in the case of a deduction. Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 
869 (2d Cir. 1941) ,  cert. den. 314 u.s. 660 (1941). 
263 Tax Court Rule 27 (c). 
264 Tax Court Rule 27 (d). 
265 This is a statutorily required notice of deficiency. I.R.C. §§ 6212 
and 6213. 
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two-thirds of all cases petitioned to the Tax Court 266 indi­
cates the dimensions of the government's difficulty. Be that 
as it may, the final administrative notice is legally sufficient 
if it indicates the amount of the asserted deficiency and the 
years involved. 267 Indeed, there is a complementary principle 
which tends to deter specificity: should the notice set forth a 
specific ground, later adoption-in the government's answer to 
the taxpayer 's petition-of a yet different inconsistent ground 
will shift the burden of proof as to that ground from the tax­
payer to the administration. 268 
While the petition the taxpayer subsequently files must 
contain "Clear and concise assignments of each and every 
error which the petitioner alleges to have been committed by 
the Commissioner, " and "Clear and concise . . .  statements of 
the facts upon which the petitioner relies as sustaining the 
assignments of error, " 269 it includes neither evidence nor 
legal arguments . Once filed, the petition of course can be 
amended. 270 
266 Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note 46 , at 134 
( Table 17 A). The problem of reviewing statutory notices which then must 
be issued by lower echelons (District Director) is further complicated by 
the fact that approximately 200 ,000 taxpayers annually receive such final 
administrative notices only because they defaulted on all mail received 
from the tax administration. 
267 Luke v. Commissioner, 23 TCM 1022 (1964 ) ;  Holmes v. Com­
missioner, 22 T.C. 2 14 (1963). 
268 Tax Court Rule 32. Tauber v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 179 (1955). 
Also see Papineau v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 54 (1959). Buf, if the 
notice merely cites the "Internal Revenue Code, 1 1 without identifying a 
specific section, the burden will not shift though the government later 
places its reliance on a given section. Sorin v. Commissioner, 2 9  T. C.  
959 (1958 ) ,  aff'd 271 F.2d 741 (2d Cir. 1959). Cj. Luke v.  Commis­
sioner, 23 TCM 1022 (1964) ; Spangler v. Commissioner, 32 T . C .  782 
(1959),  aff'd 278 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1960) , cert . den .  364 U.S. 825 
(1960). 
269 Tax Court Rule 7. 
270 Tax Court Rule 17. Indeed, should the taxpayer, at the subsequent 
hearing, introduce testimony bearing on an ultimate fact not pleaded, he 
can make a motion to be permitted to conform the pleadings to the proof 
(Tax Court Rule 17 (d) ) ,  in which case, to avoid surprise, the government 
can request an extension of time within which to reply. Tax Court Rule 
20.  But in contrast to practice before the district courts, should the tax­
payer introduce such testimony without amending his pleading, thereby 
creating the possibility of misleading the government, that testimony will 
not be considered by the court. Factor v. Commissioner, 17 TCM 459 
(1958) ,  aff'd 281 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960 ) ,  cert . den. 364 U.S. 933 (196 1).  
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Again to avoid surprise, the government's answer to the 
petition must indicate "fully . . . the nature of the defense . "  
Further, it must contain a "specific admission or denial of 
each material allegation of fact . . .  and a statement of any 
facts upon which the Commissioner relies for defense . . . .  " 271 
Finally, if the government desires to raise a new issue not 
covered by the previously mentioned final administrative notice, 
the facts pertaining thereto must be stated. 272 As to these, 
as before noted, it assumes the burden of proof. 
Either party can test the degree of factual specificity ac­
tually necessary for either the petition or the answer by a 
motion that the other party be required to file "a further and 
better statement of the nature of his claim, of his defense, or 
of any matter stated in any pleading. t t273 No doubt the court's 
attitude toward such a motion in any given case is and should 
be affected by two considerations : (i) the extent to which the 
non-moving party could be expected at this early point to know 
the facts in more specific detail, and (ii) the fact that, by the 
time the case is ready for trial, the court "expects," in con­
trast to German practice, that the parties will have stipulated 
formally "evidence to the fullest extent to which complete or 
qualified agreement can be reached including all material facts 
that are not or fairly should not be in dispute . " 274 To  this 
latter end, the court expects the parties to commence to dis ­
cuss stipulation possibilities not later than that point when 
they receive the typical three months ' advance notice setting 
the date when the trial session will begin. 275 Until recently, 
however, this expectation was toothless .  Not until the trial 
began was it necessary for a non-moving party to answer a 
motion to show cause why he should not stipulate facts and evi­
dence contained in the moving party 's proposed stipulation. 276 
271 Tax Court Rule 14. 
272 Jbid. Thus if a new ground is asserted for the first time in the 
legal brief which the government files after the hearing is over,  it will 
not be considered by the court. Weisner v. Commissioner, 20 TCM 1150 
(1961). Cf. Commissioner v. Licavoli, 252 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1958). 
But cf. Luke v. Commissioner, 23 TCM 1022 (1964) where surprise 
was not involved. 
27 3 Tax Court Rule 17 (c). 
274 Tax Court Rule 31(b) (1). Italics added. See Commissioner v. 
Licavoli, note 272 supra . 
275 Tax Court Rule 37 (b)(2). 
276 See Epstein, " The New Stipulation Procedures in the Tax Court: 
How They Are Working ? "  22 J. Taxation 180, 181 (1965) .  
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By amending its rules in two respects, however, the Tax Court 
put teeth into its expectation. The non-moving party now must 
answer the show-cause order not later than ten days before 
the session begins . 277 More importantly, the Tax Court has 
instituted a pretrial conference procedure 278 somewhat simi­
lar to that district courts have long followed. 279 Upon request 
of either side, a judge will sit with the parties to facilitate 
the process of "narrowing issues, stipulating facts, simplifying 
the presentation of evidence, or otherwise assisting in the 
preparation for trial or possible disposition of the case in 
whole or in part without trial ."  280 
With respect to one matter, however, the Tax Court has 
not caught up with the district courts. The latters '  procedures 
are considerably more helpful in discovering evidence, i .e . ,  in 
assisting a given party, in advance of the trial, to obtain evi­
dence which is under the control of the other party. District 
court and the Tax Court procedures alike enable a party to 
take pretrial depositions alone or on written interrogatories .  281 
District court procedures also enable a party before trial to 
request admissions or inspection of documents controlled by 
the other party. 282 
Because it is the taxpayer who usually controls most evi­
dence pertaining to his case, comprehensive discovery pro­
cedures are of greatest benefit to the government. That it 
can be served in two respects, not just one, is best illustrated 
by the effect of a change made in the way the Justice Depart­
ment deals with tax cases pending in district courts. Until 
1961, when a taxpayer filed his complaint in court, the depart­
ment tended "to await further moves by the plaintiff . " 283 
Since 1961, however, it has taken the offensive . Well before 
trial, it has used the comprehensive discovery procedures 
available in district courts not only to unearth the truth in 
277 Ibid. Tax Court Rule 3 1 (b) (5).  Even so, because Tax Court judges 
ride circuit and do not arrive in a city until the day before a session is 
to commence, it is still inconvenient to obtain a hearing on the show­
cause order until the first day of the session. 
278 Tax Court Rule 28. See Epstein, op . cit. supra note 276 
279 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. , Rule 16. 
280 Id., note 278 supra . 
281 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rules 26 through 33; Tax Court Rules 45 
and 46. See Ferguson, op . cit. supra note 2 6, and Kamisky, " The Case 
for Discovery Procedures in the Tax Court," 36 Taxes 498 (1958). 
282 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rules 34 and 36. 
283 Attorney General , Annual Report 1966, 366. 
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preparing for trial should such ensue but also to  stimulate 
more and better settlement offers 284 from taxpayer-adversaries  
who began to  realize that discovered evidence increased their 
hazards of litigation. 
This raises the question of whether the government, at 
this belated stage, should encourage bilateral settlements . That 
the United States does just this is apparent from the fact that 
the bulk of all docketed district court and Tax Court cases  are 
settled before trial285 -as in the Netherlands 286 and in sharp 
contrast to France where few cases are settled after docket­
ing. 287 Also, there is no doubt but that the effect in the United 
States benefits immediately both contestants. Avoidance of a 
given trial there, as would be true elsewhere, conserves the 
contestants ' time and reduces their costs. Further,  in con­
trast to the situation in France, 288 Britain, 289 and the Nether ­
lands, 290 where even trials in tax cases are not open to the 
public, only if a bilateral agreement is reached can the U. S. 
taxpayer avoid exposing his financial affairs to public view. 
Finally and of imperative importance, the U. S.  Tax Court 
itself is freed of a caseload it could not possibly decide on 
the merits . In fiscal 1966, of the 6,234 docketed cases closed 
out, it was able to decide on the merits only 726. 291 Practi­
cally all the rest were settled. This fact-that the Tax Court 
otherwise could not accommodate the case load-is the precise 
reason why the U. s. tax administration now actually has no 
choice but to encourage bilateral settlements even at this be ­
lated stage . The same reason explains why the Tax Court, in 
contrast to the German courts, has no choice but to accept 
each such settlement whether or not it is in strict accordance 
with the tax law itself. 292 However, given the propriety of 
284 Attorney General, Annual Report 1965, 308. 
2 85 See note 17 5 supra, and Chap. III, §§ 3.1 and 3.4 supra . 
286 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.3 infra . 
287 See Chap. XII, § 4.3 infra . 
288 See Chap. XII, § 4.3 infra . 
289 See Chap. XX, § 4. 3a infra . 
290 See Chap. XXIV, § 4.3 infra . 
291Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. cit. supra note 46. At 
year' s end, 10,024 cases were still pending and, of course, most of 
these will be settled by agreement. 
292 For all practical purposes, the settlements reached at this stage , 
including those which split a single issue, conform to the same policies 
as those which are reached during the earlier administrative stage. See 
Chap. III, § 3.4 supra . 
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the aggressive settlement policy the Uo S. tax administration 
pursues during the earlier administrative phase, the pivotal 
question facing a country just now evolving its procedures is 
this : Over the long haul, would the U. s. tax system have 
worked more smoothly had its administrators-on first formu­
lating its procedures years ago-treated the inception of the 
litigation stage as a cut-off point, after which cases would not 
be settled bilaterally? 
As things now stand, the United States has neutralized the 
otherwise existing taxpayer incentive to make an all out at­
tempt to settle a case before docketing it with a court. 
Partly in consequence of this, only after a case has been 
docketed do many U. S. taxpayer-representatives (4,489 in fiscal 
1966) 293 make their first attempt at settlement. While certain 
advantages in so doing are peculiar to the United States, 294 
an additional advantage would be equally operative elsewhere.  
By delaying discussions until just before the trial date, 295 the 
taxpayer rs representative can prepare simultaneously for settle ­
ment discussions and the trial-should one actually ensue . 
For a variety of reasons, a second group of taxpayer­
representatives will make two trys at settlement, one before a 
case is docketed and, if unsuccessful, one afterward. 296 But 
293 Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. cit. supra note 46 , at 134 
(Table 17 A). Some actually had no other choice, for the District Director 
had issued a final statutory notice before giving the taxpayer a chance to 
enter settlement discussions at the regional level. This circumstance 
may arise, for example, where the statute of limitations was about to run 
on the proposed deficiency. 
294 Most such advantages are discussed in Chap. III, § 3.3 supra . 
Further, since the requisite statutory notice of deficiency will have been 
issued prior to se�tlement discussions, these taxpayers-should a trial 
actually ensue-are freed of the burden of proof regarding any new af­
firmative issues raised by the government during the settlement discus­
sions. See text accompanying note 268 supra . It would have been other­
wise if the affirmative issue had been raised in settlement discussions 
which preceded issuance of the statutory notice. See text accompanying 
notes 261 and 262 supra . 
295 While the U.S. tax administration has tried, as to docketed cases, 
to induce taxpayers to hold their settlement discussions before cases 
actually are scheduled on a trial calendar (Rev. Proc. 60-18, C.B. 
1960-2 , 988), the fact is that a majority of all docketed settlements occur 
thereafter. 
296 The great preponderance of those who follow this route actually 
achieve a settlement during the first of the two stages. In fiscal 1966 ,  
this was true for 21,475. However, 4,251 failed to reach agreement at 
that point. See Commi ssioner of Internal Revenue, op . cit. supra note 
46 , at 133 (Table 15B). 
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because they know, at the point of the initial attempt, that a 
second opportunity is available, many do not make an all out 
attempt to prepare their cases for the first try. 297 In con­
sequence of this, their first effort did not achieve the type of 
settlement which they were willing to accept. Hence, a second 
belated try . 
Repetitious time drain on the administration 1s personnel 
is the peculiar consequence of this second practice.  298 The 
practices of both groups, however, contribute to delay in 
settling old disputes and create, for the administration, an un­
becoming image, akin to that of a private litigant "negotiating 
right up the courthouse steps ."  
A now developing country will have a chance to  avoid the 
dilemma in which the U. s. tax administration finds itself only 
by deciding at the outset whether the foregoing consequences 
are sufficiently adverse to warrant terminating settlement ac­
tivities at the point a petition is filed with a court. Once such 
a country extends its settlement activity beyond that point, 
retrenchment may become impossible . Taxpayers who other ­
wise might have settled prior to the litigation stage will begin 
to delay serious attempts at settlement until after the litiga­
tion stage is reached. In due time, this number will be so 
great that the practice cannot be ended without overwhelming 
the trial tr ibunals. 
297 See Chap. III, note 64 supra . 





Jean Van Hontte 
CHAPTER V 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
PERSONNEL FRAMEWORKS 
Section A.  Administrative Organizational 
Framework 
1 . 1  Introduction 
The Belgian Ministry of Finance has three branches charged 
with the levying of taxes : 
Administration of Customs and Excises, Administration des 
douanes et accises: collects customs and excise duties 
Administration of Registration and National Property, Ad­
ministration de l 'enregistrement et des domaines :  col­
lects recording and stamp fees, inheritance taxes , 
transfer taxes, and similar levies 
Administration of Direct Taxes, Administration des contri-
butions directes: collects the direct taxes 
So-called direct taxes fall into two main categories : the income 
taxes, properly so-called, and other taxes of somewhat less 
importance . 1 The true income taxes2 include the following: 
Individual income tax, ImPot des personnes physiques 
Corporate income tax, ImPot des socwtes 
Income tax on juridical persons, Impot des personnes 
morales 
Nonresident income tax, Impot des non-residents 
1 other taxes under the jurisdiction of the Administration of Direct 
Taxes fall into the two following groups: 
(a) Special taxes of which the most important is the tax on motor 
vehicles ' taxe de circulation sur les vehicules a moteur. 
(b) Additional taxes for the benefit of provinces and municipalities , 
additionnels provinciaux et communaux, on income from immovable 
property , and on the global income of corporations and individuals. 
Law of July 31, 1963. 
2 Law of November 20 , 1962 ,  in force from fiscal year 1963 for 
corporations , societes par actions, and from fiscal year 1964 for in­
dividuals , partnerships , and private companie s ,  socilftis de personnes . 
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The bulk of these income taxes are prepaid through a sys­
tem of withholding tax, pre·comptes:  
Withholding on income from immovable property, precompte 
immobilier 
Withholding on income from personal property such as se­
curities, loans , royalties , bank deposits, precompte 
mobilier 
Withholding on income from wages, salaries,  etc . , pre­
compte projessionel 
At the head of the Administration of Direct Taxes is the 
Director General of Direct Taxes, Directeur General, who is 
responsible to the Minister of Finance .  Under the Director 
General are (a) the heads of the five divisions, and (b) the 
general inspectors, Inspecteurs Generaux. These latter, the 
general inspectors, have two functions : they maintain liaison 
with the offices of the regional directors and they supervise 
the Special Office of Direct Taxes to which interpretative ques­
tions posed by the regional directors are referred. 
These regional directors, with whom the central adminis­
tration maintain liaison through the general inspectors, are 
responsible for all revenue activity within their respective re­
gions . This includes the resolution of interpretative questions 
referred to them by taxpayers in the course of administrative 
appeals. 
There are fourteen regional directors for direct taxes ,  dis­
tributed as shown in the following table : 
Number of 
Province Population Dire ctors 
Antwerp 1 ,455,644 2 
Brabant 2,011,842 4 
East Flanders 1 ,276,803 1 
Hainaut 1 ,249 ,536  2 
Liege 1 ,007, 516 1 
Limbourg 586,279 1 
Luxembourg 216,975  1 
Namur 370,870 1 
West Flanders 1,075,949 1 
The office of each regional director maintains liaison with 
the field offices through another group of inspectors, inspec­
teurs des contributions .  There are two types of field offices : 
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the controles and the rece veurs des contributions . The con­
troles are concerned primarily with the examination of tax re­
turns, assessment, and audit. Some, however, have a particular 
area of specialization such as the taxation of corporations 
throughout an entire regional area. The offices of the collec­
tors, rece veurs des contributions, handle tax payments and 
prosecute delinquent taxpayers. 
1 . 2  Organizational framework, national office level 
Chart I (pages 172-73) reflects the organization of the Cen­
tral Administration of Direct Taxes at the national level. 
The head of the Central Administration of Direct Taxes ,  
the Director General, has under him (a) the heads of the five 
divisions plus (b) the general inspectors, Inspecteurs Genereaux. 
Of the five divisions, the first four are organized along both 
functional and tax lines . The fifth division's  prime responsi­
bilities are administrative in character, covering the areas of 
statistics, accounting, personnel, housing, and equipment. 
The first division has two subdivisions . The first deals 
with legislative matters (i.e . ,  drafting of bills, assisting the 
Ministry of Finance in the course of the legislative process) 
and with the implementation of legislation by Royal Decree.  
The second subdivision deals primarily with the taxation of non­
residents and in consequence conducts tax treaty negotiations . 
The first of those two subdivisions is not concerned directly 
with the resolution of interpretative questions, but should a 
court resolve an interpretative issue adversely to the govern­
ment, the Ministry of Finance frequently decides to introduce 
corrective legislation. In consequence, the first subdivision, 
through its legislative activities, necessarily becomes involved 
in matters of interpretation. 
The second division deals primarily with the taxation of 
corporations, juridical persons, private companies, and partner­
ships, as well as with the prepayments of taxes on movable 
property, precompte mobilier. 
The third division deals with individual income taxes .  
The fourth division has five subdivisions . The first three 
have two main functions : representing the administration in tax 
litigation and in interpreting old tax legislation (i. e . ,  laws in 
force prior to the effective dates of the major reform enacted 
November 20, 1962) . The fourth subdivision supervises the 
collection of taxes . The fifth has two areas of concern: pre­
payment of tax on income from immovable property, precompte 
immobilier, and various minor taxes, such as those on motor 
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The divisions of the Central Administration of Direct Taxes 
deal only indirectly with interpretative problems, by reviewing 
regional inspectors ' decisions on interpretative issues submit­
ted by taxpayers in the course of administrative appeals . In 
contrast, the Special Office of Direct Taxes (staffed by general 
inspectors but responsible also to the General Director) deals 
directly with interpretative issues . Those interpretative ques­
tions which are laid before regional directors are sent to the 
Special Office of Direct Taxes which, lacking a superior office 
to which it may refer them, handles them itself. 
1.3 Organizational framework, regional office level 
Chart II (page 17 5) sets out the structural arrangement of 
both regional and local offices concerned with direct taxes . 
As noted supra, liaison with the 14  regional directors of 
direct taxes, distributed through the 9 provinces, is maintained 
by the Director General of Direct Taxes (the head of the Cen­
tral Administration of Direct Taxes) through the general in­
spectors . In turn the regional director, the chief administrator 
for his area, 3 maintains liaison with the local offices through 
the inspecteurs de contributions . This group of inspectors is 
subdivided into three groups . The members of the first group, 
the accounting inspectors, handle the collection of taxes and 
supervise the local collection offices, headed by the rece veurs 
des contributions . The two other groups, inspectors A and the 
inspectors for litigated matters, deal with assessment of taxes . 
Inspectors A supervise those local offices which deal with in­
quiries and with assessments , controles .  This supervision in­
cludes a review of uncontested decisions made by the local 
assessing officials . In addition, inspectors A furnish advice to 
the local assessing officials in connection with interpretative 
issues encountered prior to making the actual assessment. 
Inspectors for litigated matters, in contrast to inspectors A, 
do not supervise the work of lower officials . They assist the 
regional director in resolving administrative appeals lodged 
with the regional director by taxpayers following assessment 
by the local assessing offices.  
Thus, through the two different sets of inspectors, the re­
gional director is concerned with the resolution of substantive 
interpretative income tax questions at three points : first, when 
3 As chief administrator ,  he is assisted by one or two assistant 
directors as to matters such as housing, equipment of offices ,  and 
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inspectors A are consulted by the local assessing officials prior 
to actual assessment; second, indirectly, as inspectors A re­
view uncontested decisions made by the local assessing officials ; 
and third, directly, when inspectors for litigated matters deal 
with administrative appeals lodged by taxpayers with respect 
to assessments made by the local assessing officials . 
1 . 4  Organizational framework, local office le ve l 
In 1 . 3  supra, it was noted that inspectors A, in addition to 
other specified duties,  supervise the locally situated assessing 
offices, controles .  Each inspector A is in charge of some par­
ticular part of the region to which he is assigned. Each such 
area has a number of local assessing offices. 
These local assessment offices are of three kinds : (1 )  typi­
cal local assessment offices which deal with income tax returns 
of individuals within their respective areas, ( 2) central assess­
ing offices which are located only in more populous areas and 
handle the less complex returns of individuals, leaving to the 
first mentioned local assessing offices within that same popu­
lous area the task of examining and assessing more complex 
individual returns, and (3) corporation assessing offices which 
are responsible solely for the income tax returns of corpora­
tions and private companies . 
Irrespective of the type of return with which a particular 
assessing office is concerned, the basic pattern of its activity 
is similar to that of all other assessing offices. Each assess ­
ing office distributes,  examines,  and corrects returns . An at­
tempt is made to iron out differences of opinion with taxpayers . 
If such differences cannot be resolved, the head of the local 
office, controleur, makes whatever decision he believes to be 
correct, including resolution of interpretative issues . On the 
basis of such decision, assessment is made . Administrative 
appeal from such an assessment is lodged with the controleur's 
superior, the regional director. 
Belgium has about 325  local assessment offices to accom­
modate the returns of individuals . Where such an office is 
located in a city, it is responsible for between 1 5,000 and 
20,000 people . Where located in the country, the number rises 
to about 30,000. Since the territorial area fixed for a particu­
lar local assessment office is governed by population density, 
there is considerable variation. Illustratively, 20 or more 
small municipalities may be included within the area for which 
one rural assessment office is responsible, while Antwerp and 
Brussels, suburbs excluded, have respectively 1 5  and 16 local 
assessment offices . 
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More populous cities of this type also have central assess­
ment offices which are responsible for the more or less routine 
examination and assessment of wage-earners ' returns (which 
present fewer interpretative questions than do other returns) .  
Such central assessment offices also accomplish the prepara­
tory work in collecting information about other taxpayers who 
fall under the jurisdiction of the various local assessment of­
fices in that same area, and also the tax withholding. Thus 
local assessing offices within the area covered by the central 
assessing office are free to concentrate on a thorough exami­
nation of the more complex individual returns . 
To increase efficiency in the examination of ordinary indi­
vidual income tax returns, the larger local assessment offices 
classify such returns on the basis of the business or profes ­
sion of the taxpayer. Each such occupational group then will 
be assigned to a particular official who specializes in that par­
ticular category. Because he becomes familiar with the tax 
problems likely to be encountered by such individuals, he can 
resolve more readily questions relating to expenses and deduc­
tions . 
The duties of the third type of locally situated assessment 
offices (those which handle income tax returns of corporations 
and private companies) parallel the duties of the offices con­
cerned with individual returns. They distribute and examine 
returns, resolve differences of opinion with taxpayers, and 
make assessments . While these offices concentrate on corpo­
rate returns, they necessarily work in close contact with the 
central assessment offices.  Throughout Belgium there are 
about 80 corporation assessment offices . On the average, each 
examines the returns of about 600 corporations or private com­
panies.  There is no uniformity in size of the territory each 
covers, since it depends upon the number of corporations or 
companies within a given area. Illustratively, the entire prov­
ince of Luxembourg has one corporation assessment office, 
while Brussels and its suburbs have twenty-five. 
Section B. Personne l Framework (Gove rnmental 
and Non-Gove rnmental) 
1 . 5  Governmental professional personnel 
All employees of the Administration of Direct Taxes are 
subject to a statute covering all government officials or em­
ployees . For an individual to be employed at any level in the 
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Administration of Direct Taxes, he must pass a competitive 
examination, administered by the central government recruiting 
office.  Such an examination is held when requested by the Ad­
ministration of Direct Taxes, usually once a year. 
While there are four categories of government employees, 
tax administration employees charged with interpretative mat­
ters fall into the first two. The first category includes the 
heads of assessment offices, controleurs, chief collectors of 
taxes, receveurs principaux, inspectors, directors, and other 
higher ranking officials . The second category includes the tech­
nical clerks, redacteurs, as well as collectors and verifier­
accountants . 
Typically personnel dealing with income tax matters enter 
the Administration of Direct Taxes at the second category. En­
trance at the first category, which requires a university degree, 
is very unusual. 
Admission to the examination for the second category re­
quires that the applicant be between 17 and 30 years of age 4 
and have completed a secondary education-i.e . ,  college, tech­
nical school, etc . The examination is designed to measure the 
applicant's general knowledge and includes questions on elemen­
tary mathematics, geography, and Belgian history. In addition, 
each candidate attends a lecture dealing with a topic of general 
interest. Without taking notes , he must summarize and com­
ment thereon. 
Successful candidates are admitted on probation. The pro­
bation period, for both the first and second categories, lasts 
two years, at the end of which comes a final examination deal­
ing only with income tax laws . In case of failure, a second 
examination may be taken, but failure here entails dismissal 
from the service on three months ' notice. 
After at least four years ' satisfactory service in the sec­
ond category, officials are eligible for a competitive promotion­
examination to qualify for appointment to the first category. 
This examination tests know ledge not only of areas included 
within the earlier entrance examination but also of tax laws 
and regulations, civil and commercial law, accounting, etc . 
However, once an individual reaches the first category of gov­
ernment employees, promotions no longer depend upon exami­
nations . 
4 Some members of the metropolitan or former African adminis­
tration are excepted from the age limit . 
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There is an extensive in-service training program, partly 
to prepare probationers for their final examination and partly 
for all levels of permanent employees, whether in preparation 
for promotion -examinations or in an effort to keep abreast of 
current developments in the statutes, decisional law, and ad­
ministrative regulations . This training takes place almost en­
tirely outside the regular hours of employment; "full-time" in­
service training is completely unknown. 
The government also pays the full expense of technical 
clerks who subscribe to a correspondence course dealing with 
commercial, industrial, and corporate accounting and with bal­
ance sheet analysis . Under exceptional circumstances-as in 
the case of the sweeping tax reform of November 20, 1962-ad­
ditional lecture courses are given. Otherwise, in-service train­
ing is based primarily on private study of material published 
by the Central Administration of Direct Taxes .  This material 
includes codifications of laws, the regulations, and official in­
structions (available to the public as well), and manuals such 
as the following: Organization of Public Administration, Rela­
tions with the Taxpayer, Public Finance, Elementary Concepts 
of Public and Private Law, Auditing Handbook. 
1 . 6  Private tax practitioners 
Two classes of private tax practitioners handle the tax af­
fairs of individuals or corporations : tax lawyers and tax experts . 
The tax lawyer has a university background, with a degree 
either as docteur en droit or licencirf en notariat. While he 
has passed an examination in tax law, this constitutes insuffi­
cient background for tax practice. Typically, a young law grad­
uate planning to specialize in tax law spends many years in the 
office of one of the very few experienced tax lawyers, first as 
stagiaire and then as assistant. During that period, he gains 
practical experience and studies all types of tax materials . 
The tax lawyer acts as a barrister in representing a tax­
payer in the courts, and also furnishes advice when a taxpayer 
has a major difference of opinion with the tax administration 
as well as when an important transaction is under considera­
tion. 
The so-called tax expert, on the other hand, typically is 
not an attorney, although a few have graduated from a univer­
sity with a degree in law or economics . The majority are 
accountants and have acquired their knowledge of taxation 
through experience. The government has not established any 
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formal rules governing recognition of tax experts ,5 although the 
major professional associations act as winnowing agents by 
accepting as members only those who have a good reputation 
and essential qualifications . If a tax expert is a member of 
an accounting firm, the firm usually will handle both the ac­
counting and tax affairs of a client. However, some tax ex­
perts maintain an office as independent consultants or, at the 
other extreme, are employees of a large corporation. Such 
corporations expect the heads of their accounting departments 
to be knowledgeable and experienced in tax problems . In what­
ever capacity a tax expert works, he is likely to be engaged on 
a continuing basis in dealing with the current tax matters of 
one or more individuals or corporations . He is responsible 
not only for the annual preparation of income tax returns with 
their supporting documentation, but also represents his client 
or clients in resolving those differences of opinion with the 
tax administration which do not require a legal opinion. 
5 Other than the negative provision of the law of November 2 0 ,  
1962 , Art. 60 , which enables the Minister of Finance to deny a t ax  ex­
pert the right to represent a taxpayer before the tax administration if 
he has not observed the ethical standards of his profession. 
CHAPTER VI 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS 
Section A. Character of the Unde rlying Statute 
2 . 1  Precision of the statute itself 
The Code of Income Tax1 is divided into 437 sections cov­
ering about 100 pages with an average of 400 words a printed 
page . Most but not all substantive tax principles are set out 
in the Code. Those located outside the code include: 
1 .  Such laws as temporary tax relief measures, 2 or those 
granting provinces and municipalities a restricted power 
to tack surcharges on the national income tax, 3 
2 .  Laws approving international tax treaties, 4 and 
3 .  Royal decrees which particularize on the Code 's tax 
principles ,  pursuant to a specific delegation of legisla­
tive authority in a substantive section of the statute.  5 
The Code of Income Tax is divided into ten parts, each 
with a varying number of sections totaling 429 . Of these, sec­
tions 206 through 3 59 deal primarily with procedural matters . 
1 The Royal Decree of February 26, 1964 , known as the Code of 
Income Tax, coordinates the reform law of 1962 , "the reform of direct 
taxation" and the "coordinated laws on income tax" put into effect in 
1948. 
2 E . g. , enactment of July 15 , 1959 , providing for the partial or total 
exemption of capital gains to promote investments.  
3 E , g. , enactment of July 31 ,  1963 , authorizing municipalities to levy 
a tax of 5% in addition to the regular corporate tax and/or individual 
income tax. 
4 E .g. , the statute of July 27 ,  1953, approving the income tax con­
vention between Belgium and the United states , signed at Washington 
October 28 , 1948 , as modified and supplemented by the convention of 
September 9 , 1952. 
5 The "reform of direct taxes ," November 20, 1962 ,  makes frequent 
use of this delegation of power. Decrees so issued must be distin­
guished from regulations bearing upon tax administration in a more 
precise sense of the term. Regulations of course , are the proper task 
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Title of Part 
Definition of the income tax 
Individual income tax 
Corporate tax 
Tax on juridical persons 
Nonresident tax 
Provisions common to the four taxes 
such as prepayments , etc . 
Assessment and collection of taxes 
Allocation to provinces and municipalities 




1 -2  
3-93 
94- 1 3 5  
136-138  
139 - 1 52 




Despite its length, the statute itself is not expected to pro­
vide clear-cut answers to all problems . 6 Every effort is made 
to be as precise as possible and to set out broad rules with a 
minimum of deviations . Nevertheless, administrative regula­
tions are necessary to supplement the text of the statute itself 
and the judiciary also is called upon to settle many interpre­
tative issues.7 Here, however, it is possible only to illustrate 
the statutory approach and the variation in the extent to which 
the statute anticipates with precise language the range of 
problems which arise.  
Consider first the methods by which it determines the tax­
able base from professional activity. 
Article 43 of the Code provides as follows : 
From the gross income of each professional activity are 
deducted the expenditures [depenses ou charges] allocable to 
it. 8 
The next section defines deductible professional expendi­
tures : 
Deductible professional expenditures are those the taxpayer 
proves have been made or supported during the taxable period 
in order to acquire or preserve the taxable income. 9 
6 The only problems susceptible of such ready solution would be 
questions such as those relating to the tax rate for a net income of a 
given number of francs ,  or to the final day for submitting a claim. 
7 Every other consideration aside, the government, on introducing 
the bill or in discussing it before Parliament , cannot be expected to 
forecast all possible future developments in the area expected to be 
covered by a particular provision. 
8 Art. 10 , 1° , law of November 20 ,  1962 . 
9 Art. 1 1 ,  § 1 ,  law of November 20 , 1962 . 
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It still must be determined whether an expenditure is  made 
"in order to acquire or preserve the taxable income."  While 
the statute goes on to enumerate certain deductible items-i.e . ,  
rent, heat, utilities for professional premises; wages and fringe 
benefit costs for employees; "normal" amortization of profes­
sional equipment-the list is not conclusive.10 The tax admin­
istration must also permit a deduction for any operational ex­
pense reasonably incurred in the course of the taxpayer 's  
business activity. Illustratively, the cost of litigation concern­
ing business would qualify, 11 but not fines or punitive dam­
ages . 12 
A second example of the statutory approach involves amor­
tization, as to which the Code contains only two broad provi­
sions . It authorizes "necessary amortization" of material and 
movable objects used in the business, to the extent such amor­
tization corresponds to real depreciation occurring during the 
taxable period. 1 3  Prior to 1963 straight line depreciation was 
the only authorized method. 14 The officer in charge of the 
assessing office computed it by category of assets, in agree­
ment with the taxpayer. Beginning in 1963, however, the Code 
authorized the tax administration, at the request of the tax­
payer, to prepare a schedule of amortization charges computed 
on the declining balance method for assets purchased or con­
structed from 1963 onward.15 Clearly, these broad statements 
of policy do not cover with any precision all amortization prob­
lems .16 While it seems clear that amortization must be based 
10 The items are listed in Art. 45 of the Code, originally enacted 
as Art. 26 , §§ 2 and 4, Coordinated Laws on Income Tax, Regent' s De­
cree of January 28 , 1948 , which is referred to in Art. 11 ,  § 1 ,  of the 
law of November 20,  1962. 
11  Lucrum non intelligitur nisi omni damno deducto . Cass.  July 4, 
1865 , Pasicrisie [hereinafter cited as " P." ] ,  1865 , I ,  291. See Jean 
Van Houtte , Principes de droit fiscal belge, No. 254. 
12 Art. 50, 5° of the Code, Cass .  October 26 , 1954 , p. 1�, 1 ,  167 . 
That is the reason why some provisions in the Code make some ex­
penditures related to the business activity not deductible, such as-in 
contrast to the statute in force prior to the law of November 2 0 ,  1962-
the individual income tax (Art. 50, 3°) or the corporate tax (Art. 109) . 
13 Art. 45 , 4° of the Code (Art. 26 ,  § 2 , 40 , Coordinated Laws) . 
14 Under straight line depreciation, the basis is deducted in equal 
annual installments over the estimated useful life or annual overall 
percentage. 
15 Art. 49 of the Code (Art. 13 , law of November 20, 1962) . 
16 In considering the scope of the amortization problem, it must be 
recalled that all objects used in any productive capacity are subject to 
deterioration or obsolescence. This includes not only machinery, in­
dustrial buildings , furniture,  and office equipment, but also the purchase 
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on the cost of an investment and not on the cost of replace ­
ment, a large area lies open for interpretative administrative 
regulations . Thus , one looks to royal degrees to find that the 
declining balance method may be used only in the case of mov­
able assets having a useful life of not less than six and not 
more than nineteen years. 17 Also, they provide that the al­
lowable depreciation percentage is double that used for corre­
sponding assets under the straight line method. Thus, the 
basis against which that percentage is applied in any given 
year is said to be the original cost less depreciation taken to 
date . Further, whichever method is used, the percentage mu­
tually agreed upon can be changed whenever economic contin­
gencies arising from operation so justify. 
A third example of the statutory framework concerns valu­
ation of corporate assets . Such valuation is necessary in draw­
ing up a balance sheet and, in Belgium, is an integral step in 
computing both ordinary gross income and, under certain cir­
cumstances, capital gains .18  The Code does not specify a 
particular method of valuation to the exclusion of all others.19 
Initially, it lies within the discretion of the tax administration 
to determine whether a given valuation is erroneous and serves 
to avoid tax. Its determination, however, is subject to judicial 
review. Indeed, such a case can reach the Supreme Court, 
Cour de Cassation, if a principle is in issue . Illustratively, 
in one case a corporate taxpayer had paid 3 . 840 francs per 
share for stock of another company. At the close of a later 
year, immediately before the taxable year in question, it en­
tered these shares on its balance sheet at a value of 3 . 810 francs 
though the stock at that point was quoted on the market at 
1 .9 50 .  The corporate taxpayer sought to correct the error in 
the succeeding taxable year by showing a year-end valuation of 
1 . 950, the intention being to take advantage of the earlier year ' s  
loss in this later year. T o  preserve the integrity of the annual 
(footnote continued) 
value of a patent , the expenses and premiums paid for issues of stock 
and bonds, the preliminary expenses in forming a company , and all the 
other true expense items included in the asset valuations appearing on 
the balance sheet. 
17 Art. 1 ,  § 3 , Royal Decree of October 8 , 1963. 
18 Since the tax reform of November 20 , 1962 , in certain circum­
stances , capital gains are subject to a special tax of 15% instead of 
being subject to the corporate tax of 25% ,  30%, or 35%. Code of In­
come Tax, Art. 93, § 2 ,  20 . 
19 The valuation must be reasonable. If there is any overvaluation, 
the directors are responsible. Art. 62 of the Company Law. 
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accounting concept, however, the High Court determined that, 
since no further decline had taken place in the current year, 
the shares had to be given the same value as that which had 
been used the close of the preceding year . 20 A final example 
bearing on the degree of precision found in the statute involves 
dividends. Although Article 171  of the Code provides that a 
dividend is taxable when allocated or made payable by the com­
pany, it does not specify when a dividend will be deemed "al­
located" or "made payable." Ultimately, the courts had to 
resolve this ; logically and consistently they held that a dividend 
is not earned and the shareholder has no right to it until the 
general assembly (board of directors) reached a decision as to 
the company's  profit distribution.21 Then, however, to prevent 
possible tax evasion, the legislature added a limited exception 
under which all sums allocated to working partners in private 
companies are taxable to them as of the last day of the com­
pany's  fiscal year, whether or not the general assembly had 
decided to distribute a dividend. 22 
A minority of controversies between taxpayers and the tax 
administration involve interpretation of the statutory language . 23 
The great majority are purely factual, not developing out of 
any question as to the meaning of the statute, but rather re­
quiring substantiation of amounts, such as gross income, or the 
exact amount of losses incurred, etc . As explained later,24 in 
either type of case, a taxpayer who does not agree with the 
"tax-paper" from the local assessor's office may file a peti­
tion with the regional director. If the petition is rejected, ap­
peal lies to the competent Court of Appeal of which there are 
three.  25 Decisions of that court can be appealed to the Supreme 
20 Cass. September 10 (S. A. Overcor) , P. 1964 , I ,  35. 
21 cass. December 11 , 1962 (Suz. Van de Velde) , P.  1963 , I, 455 ; 
Cass.  June 11 ,  1963 (Grimard) , P. 1963, I ,  1076; Cass.  September 10 ,  
1963  (Steinberg) , P.  1964, I ,  42 . 
22 Law of April 30 , 1958, Art. 2. 
23 Illustratively , the deductible trade or busines s  expenses listed in 
the statute did not include litigation expenses developing out of the con­
duct of the business.  A court decision established that litigation ex­
penses constituted properly deductible expenses. Decision, Cour de 
Cassation, 4 July 1865, P. 1 865,  I, 1291. 
24 see Chap. VII infra . 
25 Court of Appeal for Ghent for decisions of regional directors in 
the provinces of E ast Flanders and West Flanders; Court of Appeal 
for Brussels for decisions of regional directors in the provinces of 
Antwerp, Brabant, and Hainaut; Court of Appeal for Liege for deci­
sions of regional directors in the provinces of Liege, Limbourg, Namur , 
and Luxembourg. 
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Court only with respect to questions of law. Thus the annual 
number of Supreme Court decisions involving direct taxes, as 
set forth in the following table, is some indication of the num­
ber of important interpretative issues raised each year : 




























Despite the care exercised to draft precise statutes 26 with 
a minimum of deviations, it is considered likely that interpre­
tative controversies will increase in the immediate future be­
cause of the new issues which will arise out of the tax reform 
law of November 20, 1962, and the related decrees .  
2 . 2  Legislative pre -enactment aids to interpre tation 
In interpreting the substantive statutory provisions, docu­
ments showing the progress of a statute through the legislative 
process can be of material assistance, particularly where the 
legislation is complex, as is true of the tax reform law of 
November 20, 1962. This does not mean that all stages of the 
legislative process are equally significant in providing helpful 
background material. Moreover, there will be great variation 
in the amount of material available.27 For major tax legisla­
tion, such as the 1962 statute, hundreds of printed pages 28 are 
26 Illustratively, in the discussions preceding the drafting of that 
section of the statute allowing deductions from gross income for con­
tributions made to the four universities , the original version allowing 
such deductions for contributions to institutions of higher learning was 
rejected as imprecise and the specific names of the several institutions 
were inserted. Art. 54 , § 4, Code of Income Tax. 
27 The fact that all Belgian parliamentary documents are printed 
folio-size in two columns , the Dutch text next to the French, doubles 
the amount of printed material. 
28 The floor debates are printed in the Annales Parlementaires, 
with two series: Chamber of Representatives , Chambre des represen­
tants, and Senate , Senat . These are edited by the Government . as a 
supplement to the official gazette (Moniteur Belge,  published at 40-42 , 
rue de Louvain, Brussels 1 .  
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needed to set out the official documents and records of the 
draft of the bill, the introductory comments on the draft, the 
committee reports, and the floor debates . 29 For minor tax 
legislation, it is unlikely that helpful floor debate will precede 
the vote, for the scope and technical niceties of the proposed 
amendment will have been explained sufficiently in the intro­
ductory comments and the committee reports . 
The Minister of Finance may introduce a draft of a bill 
(projet  de loi) in either the Chamber of Representatives or in 
the Senate . All drafts are printed and made available to the 
public. After introduction, the bill is turned over to the Com­
mittee on Finance of the house where the draft has been intro­
duced. There the draft is discussed thoroughly, not only by 
the committee 's regular members but also by members ap­
pointed by the respective houses, the Minister, members of his 
staff, and top-level officials of the central administration of 
direct taxes . While the committee does not hold formal public 
or private hearings, opportunity for comment and criticism is 
afforded to representatives of the various private interests 
concerned with the proposed legislation. 
Amendments to the draft may be proposed by members of 
the committee and by the government's representatives. There 
must be an individual vote on each proposed amendment, each 
section, and the entire bill. A member of the committee-very 
29 Illustrative of the bulk of such pre-enactment materials is the 
amount produced in connection with the legislative progress of the law 
of November 20,  1962 , the reform of direct taxes . The draft of the 
bill (89 articles) with the government's introductory comments covered 
190 folio-size printed pages. Chamber of Representatives , Session 
1961-196 2 ,  Doc. No. 264/1 . About 400 amendments were introduced by 
the Minister of Finance and by members of the Chamber of Represen­
tatives' Committee on Finance. One hundred and ten were approved. 
The report of the Finance Committee itself covered 190 folio-size 
printed pages together with the three annexes , each about 100 pages , 
containing miscellaneous notes and documents. Chamber of Represen­
tatives , Session 1961-1962 , Doc. No. 264/2 . The floor debate is re­
corded in 294 folio-size pages of the "Annales Parlementaires ." Meet­
ings of June 6 ,  7 ,  1 2 ,  13 , 14 , and 15 , 1962. When the bill was under 
consideration by the Committee on Finance of the Senate , about 200 
amendments were proposed. Sixty were adopted. The report com­
prises 418 folio-size pages. Senate, Session 1961-1962 , Doc . No. 263. 
The floor debates cover 226 folio-size pages . Meetings of October 2 ,  
3 ,  4 ,  10 , 1 1 ,  and 16 , 1962 . The bill as amended by the Senate was 
passed by the Chamber of Representatives on October 31 , 1962 , after 
a two-day debate which was reported in 66  pages of the "Annales 
Parlementaires ." Meetings of October 30 , 31, 1962 . It was finally 
promulgated on November 2 0 ,  1962. 
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rarely two members-then prepares an explanatory report to 
accompany the bill. After approval by the committee,  the re­
port is turned over to the house of origin as an official record 
to be printed and made available to the public . 
This explanatory report makes every effort to supplement 
deliberately the text of the statute and hence to resolve in ad­
vance possible interpretative questions . For example, when 
the deduction for child-care expenses was introduced, the re­
port made it clear that the deduction was available only for a 
child for whom the taxpayer had a legal obligation. It was not 
available for a child casually sheltered. 
The process of justification and explanation takes place in 
large measure within the committee . Nevertheless, the floor 
debates (contained verbatim in the official printed record) can 
be decisive in later resolving an interpretation dispute. 3° For 
example, it is not uncommon during the debate for the Minister 
of Finance or the reporter for the committee to answer an in­
terpretative question. 
On approval by the house of origin, the bill goes to the 
other, where the foregoing process is repeated: deliberation in 
the Finance Committee,  report, floor debate, and vote . If the 
second house amends the bill, as originally submitted, it must 
be resubmitted to the house of origin. Only after both houses 
have agreed on the same text of all provisions can the King 
promulgate and publish the enactment in the official gazette, 
whereupon it becomes a law. 
As noted previously, the statutes are supplemented by the 
royal decrees . 31 These do not pass through the same process 
as do the formal enactments . Absence of official pre-enactment 
aids has led, however, to the use of administrative commen­
taries to identify the objectives of the degrees and to clarify 
the meaning of a principle or of a word. But these have less 
stature than legislative pre-enactment materials explaining a 
formal statute . 
2 . 3  Standards of construction followed by the judiciary in in­
terpreting the statute 
The Belgian constitution provides that only the body hold­
ing legislative power can enact taxes .32 Hence the first question 
30 See note 28 supra . 
31 See 2 . 1  supra . 
32 This is explicit in the Constitution of February 7 ,  1831,  Article 
110.  This is not a mere application of the fundamental rule that all 
powers are derived from the nation. Constitution, Article 25 .  R ather , 
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raised in any substantive controversy pertains to the legality 
of the principle asserted by the administration, i .e . ,  has it 
been formulated in a statute or in a decree pursuant to a spe­
cific delegation of power. 33 
Belgian courts cannot hold a statute unconstitutional. Even 
an unconstitutional law must be applied. The courts , however, 
are entitled to determine whether any decree of the executive 
power-whether royal or ministerial-is valid, should the ques ­
tion of such validity arise in any controversy, whether or not 
taxes are involved. Article 107 of the Constitution specifically 
provides that courts may not apply any provision of a decree 
demonstrated to be illegal. 
In a tax controversy, unless the statutory language pre­
cludes any question as to its clear meaning, the judge first 
must determine the will of the legislature . The judiciary has 
no power to create requirements in addition to those prescribed 
in the literal language of the statute. While gaps in a statute 
must be filled in, this is the responsibility of the administra­
tive authorities acting pursuant to a request from the govern­
ment, not a task for the courts . 34 When the language of a 
provision is ambiguous or obscure, the judge must try to as­
certain the unquestioned common purpose of all who contributed 
to the making of the law: the government which introduced the 
bill and both houses of Parliament which discussed it. If, after 
using all interpretative methods compatible with the principle 
of legality, the judge is still in doubt as to whether the legis­
lature intended to tax a person in the manner asserted by the 
administrative agency, the taxpayer must prevail. 
(footnote continued) 
it is a formal recognition in the written constitution of the principle , 
" no taxation without legislation," a principle found generally in the ori­
gin of all parliamentary democracies. 
33 Fifty years ago, it was thought that only the legislature itself 
could formulate substantive tax provisions. This constitutional deter­
rent to the exercise of power by other than the legislature is no long­
er enforced so strictly. On several occasions , substantive tax provi­
sions have been formulated by decrees under a specific delegation of 
power. While some constitutional law experts consider this delegation 
to be incompatible with the Constitution,  Article 110,  even an unconsti­
tutional law must be applied by the courts . The Belgian judiciary can­
not overturn the work of the legislature.  Nevertheless,  even in recent 
year s ,  deviations from the constitutional rule are the exception. 
34 The Court of Cassation, i.e. , the Supreme Court , has so decided 
on several occasions. See Cass.  February 12 , 1940 , p. 1940 , 1 ,  48; 
Cass.  June 10,  1952, P. 1952 , I ,  656. 
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Explanation of the legislative history described above 35 
often reveals the legislative intention. Nevertheless, contra­
diction is possible, illustratively between the clearly stated 
text of the statute and, for example, comments made in the 
course of the floor debate. In such a situation, the text pre­
vails .36 From time to time, however, the preliminary ma­
terials will show that a given statutory term is used to convey 
a meaning quite distinct from the meaning conveyed by that 
word in common usage or in non-tax sections of the Belgian 
statutes . 37 
A judge, interpreting a provision of a new tax law, may 
refer to the pre-enactment reports concerning an earlier stat­
ute, now repealed, on the same subject, provided the text in 
the new statute-as debated in Parliament-and the text in the 
old one are identical. 38 
Section B. The Regulations Program 
2 .4  Types and force of regulations 
The Belgian constitution empowers the King-i.e . ,  the execu­
tive-to make necessary regulations and decrees for the en­
forcement of the laws, an overriding limitation being that the 
King may not suspend an act of the legislature or create an 
exemption from its application. 39 
The tax administration's authority is not limited to issuing 
procedural instructions . It also issues substantive interpreta­
tive regulations without which all too often the law would mean 
little. However, it is not uncommon for procedural or admin­
istrative regulations and interpretative regulations to be com­
mingled in one particular publication, whatever be the form in 
which it is issued-i.e . ,  ministerial decree, in-service order, 
or published instruction. 
The administration of direct taxes issues many interpreta­
tive regulations . Illustratively, the Income Tax Code provides :  
35 See 2 .2  supra . 
36 Court of Appeal Ghent, June 5 ,  1951,  Revue Juridique, Financi€we 
et Fiscale 321 (1951) . 
37 Concerning the sense of the words " suspension of the period of 
normal legislation," see Cass. February 23 , 1955 (Aerts) P .  1955, I ,  
693. 
38 Concerning the deduction of professional losses , see Cass. June 
15 ,  1956 (Jockin) , P. 1956, I, 1 133. 
39 Constitution, Art. 67.  
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Deductible professional expenses are those the taxpayer 
proves to have made or supported during the taxable period 
in order to acquire or preserve the taxable income. 40 
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The statute itself furnishes a few examples to amplify this bare 
statement of the rule. To aid both taxpayers and assessing 
officers, the tax administration goes beyond these, using about 
300 pages of 400 words each to comment on the foregoing stat­
utory language and to list those expenses deemed "professional."  
This type of regulation, issued by the tax authorities without 
specific legislative delegation, ordinarily contains numerous ex­
amples, most of which are drawn from court decisions . When 
such regulations are challenged before the courts, the first 
question is to determine whether or not the regulation conforms 
to the standard of legality, i .e . ,  constitutes a valid interpreta­
tion. 
A second type of amplifying regulation rests on a specific 
legislative delegation to the tax administration to exercise leg­
islative authority. Unless the delegated power deals solely 
with procedural matters, such delegation conflicts with the con­
stitutional provision which restricts establishment of a tax to 
that body holding legislative power. However, as explained 
previously, the courts cannot overrule the legislature 41 and, 
therefore, do not have the power to rule on the validity of its 
delegation of legislative power.  In consequence, courts have 
only the power to determine whether the government did or did 
not exceed the limits of the specific delegation granted by the 
law. For some t;me the legislature has turned over to admin­
istrative authorities much of its legislative power, including 
promulgation of substantive tax rules. The pretext is that the 
legislature is unable to deal in sufficient detail with those par­
ticular matters. While this may not be a completely satisfac­
tory explanation, the fact is that the tax reform law of Novem­
ber 20, 1962, contains more such specific delegations than any 
previous statute. Two delegations drawn from this law will 
serve to illustrate the scope of such delegations . 
As to the first, the general statutory rule is that all busi­
ness associations, whether corporations or partnerships, are 
40 Art. 44 , § 1 ,  of the Code of Income Tax, Art. 11 ,  § 1 , of the law 
of November 2 0 ,  1962; Art. 26 , § 1 ,  of the Coordinated Laws of Income 
Tax. Except insofar as the deduction of taxes is concerned, these pro­
visions are largely identical. 
41 See 2 .3 supra . 
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subject as entities to the corporate tax.42 However, under the 
new law, 43 partnerships , sociitis en nom collectij, limited 
partnerships, societes en commandite simple, limited liability 
companies, societes de personnes a responsibilite limitee ,  and 
cooperatives, may elect-subject to formalities and conditions 
"to be determined by the King"-to be taxed under the individ­
ual income tax, on the basis of the individual members' respec­
tive shares in the profits .  Under this delegation of power, a 
royal decree was promulgated 44 prescribing as formalities and 
conditions the maximum permissible capital, maximum permis­
sible number of members, and a requirement that all members 
agree to be so taxed. 
The second illustration pertains to the statutory principle 
that all taxable income, irrespective of its source, is subject 
to a single global tax. 45 In general this tax is prepaid through 
a series of withholding taxes known as precomptes, the spe­
cific amount of prepayment being dependent on the source from 
which the income is derived, i .e . ,  whether derived from im­
movables,  movables, or professional activity. However, the re­
form tax law provides that, as to income from certain sources 
"the King can renounce" entirely or partially the right to col­
lect the prepayment (the pre compte mobilier) . 46 In keeping 
with this delegation of power, royal decrees prescribed the 
conditions and limits under which income from movable �rop­
erty is exempt from the prepayment otherwise required. 4 
2 . 5  Precise purpose of "interpretative " regulations 
The tax administration drafts its regulations with great 
care. While judicial decisions are incorporated, usually as 
specific illustrations of how the statute is applied in practice, 
the administration on its own initiative drafts regulations in a 
deliberate effort to supplement the statute and provide an in­
terpretation in addition to the interpretation set out in the ex­
planatory report. For example, recent legislation extended the 
42 Art. 94 of the Code (Art. 24, § 1, law of November 20, 1962) . 
43 Art. 95 of the Code (Art. 24, § 2 ,  law of November 20 ,  1962) . 
44 The royal decree was promulgated November 4, 1963. 
45 This was one of the basic principles in the tax reform of 1962 
as noted in 1.1 supra . 
46 Art. 170 of the Code (Art. 43, § 2 ,  al. 1 ,  law of November 2 0 ,  
1962) . 
47 Royal decree of December 2 ,  1962 , as amended by royal decrees 
of January 30 , 1963 ,  March 13 , 1963 ,  January 31,  1964, and December 
7 '  1966 . 
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scope of the existing tax on new building construction. The 
tax administration prepared a regulation to the effect that the 
tax would not apply to the home-owner who attached a garage 
to his house, even though the garage was entirely new. 
As noted previously, interpretative and legislative regula­
tions are often commingled in the same document. Moreover,  
sometimes it is difficult to determine what part of an admin­
istrative commentary on a given substantive tax provision in­
terprets it and what part rests on a coordination of that provi­
sion with other statutory provisions dealing with the same 
subject. 
In general, there is a great reluctance to rephrase sub­
stantive statutory language into lay terms . 48 Even so, the 
statutory language is often supplemented by administrative ex­
planation-with examples where feasible 49-to provide ma::�i­
mum clarity for laymen as well as for experienced practitioners . 
Many interpretative difficulties will remain uncovered, however, 
because they are not likely to be foreseen except where pre­
enactment materials focused attention on and provided solutions 
for the interpretative problems . 50 Then, after the statute has 
been in force for a time, the unanticipated interpretative issues 
reach the judiciary. Not until a significant number of decisions 
have been handed down on a particular issue which tend to fix 
its dimensions, is it likely that the administrative regulations 
will incorporate the judicial decisions on that issue. Despite 
this reluctance to incorporate within the regulations the results 
of judicial decisions, experience shows that administrative com­
mentaries on any particular piece of tax legislation tend to in­
crease and become more detailed throughout the first fifteen 
or twenty years after enactment. Then follows a period of 
stability, assuming interim statutory amendments have been 
relatively few and insignificant. 
Since the tax reform law of 1962 became effective for cor­
porations during fiscal 1963 and for individuals during fiscal 
48 This reluctance stems from the inevitable increase in disputes 
should a discrepancy appear between the official language of the stat­
ute and its rephrasing in an official commentary or instruction man­
ual. The lack of precision in the statutory language itself causes 
some controversy but, in general, tax practitioners-whether represent­
ing the government or a taxpayer-possess adequate acquaintance with 
the technical terminology of the revenue administration. 
49 Examples will be issued on occasion even in so-called "black and 
white" situations . 
50 See 2 .2 supra . 
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1964, it is unlikely that there will be a court of appeals deci­
sion on an interpretative issue until early 1966 and yet another 
year probably will elapse before there is a Court of Cassation 
decision. In the interim, the official administrative commen­
taries on the tax reform law consist of a compilation of the 
text of the statute together with the following: 
1 .  Extracts from the legislative history of the statute-i.e . ,  
introductory comment on the bill, reports of the Finance 
Committees of both houses, floor debate; 
2 .  A paraphrase of the language of the statute, including 
examples ; and 
3 .  Answers given by the Minister of Finance in response 
to questions posed by members of Parliament with re­
spect to the application of the statute .51 
The comparative extent to which a regulation will elaborate 
on a new, as contrasted with an old, provision of the statute 
can be shown best by illustration. As previously noted, Arti­
cle 44 of the Code-an old provision-defines "deductible pro­
fessional expenses" in broad terms . The relevant commentary 
in official instructions covers about 300 pages of 400 words 
each. 52 A new provision, Article 98  of the Code, 53 subjects 
to the corporate tax the taxable net profits of a corporation, 
whether undistributed, distributed to shareholders, or paid to 
directors and auditors. 54 Relevant official administrative regu­
lations dealing with this include only seven pages of about 300 
words each, with an annex of seven pages containing examples .  
The contrast reflected by that illustration is also apparent 
from a comparison of the overall magnitude of the regulations 
dealing with the old and new tax systems . Regulations cover­
ing the old, which is still partially in effect,55 fill seven loose­
leaf volumes . 56 About 3,000 pages deal with the professional 
tax, 300 with the tax on income from movable property, and 
200 with the personal complementary tax. Regulations for the 
new tax system-i.e . ,  the Law of November 20, 1962-as of 
51 See 2 .  7 infra . 
52 See 2.4 supra . 
53 Art. 25 ,  law of November 2 0 ,  1962. 
54 Except for the special allowance to directors having special execu­
tive functions in the company. 
55 See 2 .1  note supra . 
56 Loose-leaf volumes are used to facilitate replacement of pages 
superseded by amendments to the regulations .  
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June 1, 1964, used only 351 pages to deal with the individual 
income tax, 1 50 with the corporate tax, and about 100 with 
other taxes and miscellaneous provisions . In 1965 the tax ad­
ministration commenced to publish new, more detailed regula­
tions for the new tax system. Issued in loose-leaf volumes, 
as of March 1967-and admittedly incomplete-it already covers 
approximately 4, 500 pages of 400 words on each page . 
2 . 6  Manner of processing regulations 
Income tax regulations are drafted by the first branch­
legislation -of the first division of the central administration 
of direct taxes . Typically, the officials of that branch will be 
familiar with the new statute 's provisions . Usually they worked 
on the draft bill at the time of its submission to the legisla­
ture and attended the deliberations in both houses of Parlia­
ment. And if a commentary is to be prepared on a royal 
decree, these same officials also will have written that decree. 
All persons who work on an income tax regulation belong 
to the first of the two categories of government officials . 57 
However, regulations do pass through several levels . The ini­
tial draft customarily is prepared by a junior assistant, after 
which it is reviewed by a senior officer. Then it must be 
signed, on behalf of the Minister, by the Director General. In 
fact, the Minister entrusts to experienced top level officials of 
the revenue administration full responsibility for classification 
and coordination of regulations issued by the administration at 
different times, for cancellation of regulations relating to re­
pealed enactments and decrees, and for preparing the text to 
be printed. Since there is a continuing amendment of adminis­
trative regulations, to take account of important decisions of 
the courts of appeal and of the Court of Cassation, drafting of­
ficials necessarily maintain close contact with officials in 
charge of the Treasury's  litigation. Formal public hearings 
are not held prior to promulgation of the final version of a 
regulation. Nevertheless,  representatives of industrial federa­
tions, chambers of commerce, trade unions , professional groups , 
etc . ,  normally do communicate their views and observations to 
the revenue administration prior to the point a regulation is 
issued. Thus, the legitimate interests of affected groups can 
be taken into consideration to the extent the interpretation they 
foster is not incompatible with the legislature 's  intention. 
57 See Chap. V, 1 .5 supra . 
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Typically about two months elapse from the date of enact­
ment to the time an initial commentary is available to taxpayers 
and to revenue personnel. Under this time schedule, the com­
mentary usually will appear a few weeks before a new law 
takes effect. The initial commentary, however, is brief, and 
must later be enlarged upon and amended as new interpretative 
problems arise. 58 
Where a royal decree-because of specific legislative dele­
gation-contains one or more substantive tax provisions, an ex­
planatory comment very often is published in the official gazette 
on the day of promulgation or within a very few days there­
after . 59 
Section C. The Rulings Program 
2 .  7 Formal advance written rulings to taxpayers 
With respect to proposed transactions, the Belgian admin­
istration of direct taxes has no special program for issuing to 
taxpayers written advance rulings upon which taxpayers can 
rely. Since the basic criterion in interpreting the statute is 
legality, the administration could not legally commit itself in 
advance to apply the statute in a given way should that inter­
pretation later appear to be erroneous . If a tax official, how­
ever highly placed, interprets the statute in a manner later 
shown to be contrary to the legislative intention-whether that 
interpretation takes place in oral conference, in a letter to a 
taxpayer, or in a printed instruction-the administration remains 
free to change its position. 60 Since the courts have held that 
they are not bound by administrative interpretations, 61 the 
58 See 2 . 5  supra . 
59 For example, both royal decrees on the prepayment of tax on in­
come from movable property (Pnfcompte mobilier, December 2 ,  1962) 
and the complementary prepayment of tax on income from movable 
property ( Complement de pre compte mobilier, December 3 ,  1962) were 
promulgated in the official Belgian gazette, Moniteur Belge, for Decem­
ber 29,  196 2 ,  and were accompanied on that date by an official com­
mentary of about 14 pages , each approximately 500 words. The com­
plementary prepayment has been abolished, effective January 1 ,  196 7 ,  
law o f  July 15 ,  1966. 
60 This is true even of the Director General or the Minister of 
Finance. 
6 1  Cass .  November 22 (Convents) , P. 1950 , I, 182. Recent decisions , 
unpublished, of the Courts of Appeal include the following: Lil.�ge, 
March 4, 1959 (Assurance Liegeoise) ; Brussels , March 15 ,  1962 (Frere) ; 
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revenue administration is unwilling to run the risk of issuing 
written advance rulings with which the courts might disagree 
should litigation later arise. 
Distinct from a formal rulings program are responses by 
the Minister of Finance to questions raised by members of 
both houses of Parliament, who are entitled to interrogate the 
government on all points of general interest, including the in­
terpretation of a law administered by a particular Minister, 
such as the Minister of Finance .  Question and answer alike 
are printed in an official periodical, and thus constitute a val­
uable source of documentation in interpreting the law. 62 Later 
these answers are inserted in the administrative regulations . 
However, no Minister will answer a question concerning a par­
ticular case in which the tax'payer is mentioned by name . The 
major purpose of such questioning, especially in tax matters, 
is to elicit official interpretation of obscure provisions of the 
law. Further, it should be understood that the answer of a 
Minister to a parliamentary question is not binding. Like all 
administrative interpretations, theoretically it can be altered 
before or after publication if shown to be contrary to the leg­
islature 's will. 
2 . 8  Informal technical advice to taxpayers on proposed transac­
tions 
Although Belgium has no formal rulings program, officials 
at all levels are free to give informal advice concerning the 
tax effects of proposed transactions . 
However, a tax officer is not obliged to give such advice. 
He may conclude the circumstances are such that he should re­
fuse. In such case, the taxpayer is told that no opinion will be 
issued until the transaction has been consummated, and that its 
tax effects will be determined when the yearly return is audit­
ed. Clearly any request should be refused if the officer be­
lieves that the facts have not been completely disclosed or that 
the prospective transaction involves fraud or tax avoidance .  63  
(footnote continued) 
Liege , November 2 ,  1963 (Hamels & Louis) ; Liege, January 2 0 ,  1964 
(Baguette-Gorman) ; Liege, February 17, 1964 (Transports routiers Veuve 
Julien Richard et fils) . 
62 Questions et reponses appear fortnightly in two parallel columns 
of French and Dutch text. There are two series : Senat and Chambre 
des Representants . Official printing office Moniteur Belge, 40-42 , Rue 
de Louvain, Brussels I. 
63 No data is available to show the extent to which the revenue ad­
ministration is consulted informally as to the tax consequences of pro­
posed transactions. 
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While it must be emphasized that a taxpayer has no legal 
right to rely on any informal advice given him, even where it 
comes from the highest echelon, theory and practice are not 
precisely identical. Since the officer who answers a taxpayer 's  
question concerning the tax consequences of a proposed transac­
tion is also usually the officer who later will supervise exami­
nation of that taxpayer's  return, in practice there is a substan­
tial prospect that the advice will turn out to be reliable. 
The level at which such informal advice may be given de­
pends primarily on the importance of the prospective transac­
tion and the difficulties it presents . Obviously, if the issue is 
presented clearly and succinctly, and if no dispute as to inter­
pretation exists, the head of a local assessment office can de­
cide whether such a transaction is subject to taxation. In more 
complex situations where the interpretation of the statute is 
less certain, or in situations where it is anticipated that a sub­
stantial tax will be involved, the taxpayer or his adviser is 
likely to deal with higher ranking officials, generally with an 
inspector general in the central administration or possibly with 
the Director General himself. Customarily, one or more oral 
conferences are held with the tax official, but the informal ad­
vice so given probably will not be reduced to writing inasmuch 
as the administration is not in a position to make a binding de­
cision before the transaction has taken place. However, in 
practice the taxpayer knows that if he shapes the proposed 
transaction precisely as it was described to the official, he can 
rely on the advice given to him. The ability of taxpayers to 
secure these advance statements as to the tax consequences of 
proposed major transactions tends to decrease the number of 
interpretative issues which might otherwise arise with respect 
to completed transactions . 
2 .9  Technical advice to field offices 
Lower officers are free to request the advice of higher 
echelons when faced with specific situations .  The charts in 
Chapter V, 64 showing the administrative framework at the na­
tional, regional, and local levels, indicate that the head of a 
particular local assessing office decides whether and to what 
extent an individual or corporation is subject to taxation. Since 
the activities of the local assessment offices are supervised at 
the regional level by the so-called inspectors A, officers in 
charge of the local offices are not only permitted but encouraged 
64 See Chap. V ,  1 . 2 ,  1 .3 ,  and 1 .4  supra . 
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to seek the inspector 's advice regarding difficult situations, 
whether interpretative or factual . 65 Generally, but not neces­
sarily, the taxpayer is informed if such advice is to be sought. 
Since an oral conference with the higher echelon official is 
never refused, the taxpayer will have an opportunity to argue 
his point of view. 
In addition to request for advice from the assessing offices 
to the higher echelons, frequently taxpayers or their advisers 
request intervention by a higher echelon (by the inspector gen­
eral, Director General, or by a member of the Finance Minis­
ter' s  cabinet) . 66 Such intervention is requested to insure a 
supplementary and thorough examination of some problem prior 
to actual assessment. 
There are no formal procedural requirements to be met in 
seeking intervention of a higher echelon, whether the request 
comes from a taxpayer or the head of a local assessing office.  
Typically the higher echelon is forwarded the file of the tax­
payer, containing his return and all relevant documents . Rare­
ly is the matter handled by telephone; at a minimum, the in­
spector whose intervention is requested expects to receive a 
memorandum analyzing the matter in dispute. 
While the prime purpose of the foregoing practice is to 
insure certainty and uniformity in the application of the law, 
it serves also to decrease litigation. No publication sets forth 
all advice given by the higher administration echelons at the 
request of the lower ranking tax officers ; however, where such 
advice is considered to be of general interest, it is inserted 
in the official printed instructions of the revenue administration 
which are more fully described below. 
2 . 10 Publication of technical advice given taxpayers and local 
offices 
The revenue administration issues a number of publica­
tions for the benefit of taxpayers as well as for the guidance 
of tax offices . Each appears in both a Dutch and French lan­
guage edition. While they are distributed to all tax personnel, 
anyone outside the administration is free to subscribe to them. 
The technical advice which is published is not limited to 
a bare statement of the rule to be applied. It includes not 
only the justification for the conclusions reached-that is, the 
65 No statistical data are available concerning the number of ques­
tions laid before inspectors A by the local assessing offices. 
66 No statistics are available to show the actual number of such in­
terventions which take place. 
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references to the statutes and to the regulations-but also the 
legal reasoning itself. 
The publications fall into four groups . The first includes 
a text of the basic tax statute accompanied by all royal decrees 
promulgated either to fill out (in the case of specific legisla­
tive delegation) or to enforce the law. As of June 1, 1964, 
each language edition was set forth in two loose-leaf volumes 
totaling 600 pages with about 3 50 words a page . 
The second is a loose-leaf coordinator containing impor­
tant nonstatutory material, including administrative instructions 
concerning direct taxes . These instructions do include digests 
of the technical positions taken in response to informal requests 
for information by taxpayers or by local assessment officers, 
although the instructions in full are not officially published. 67 
The coordinator also contains the legislative history of the 
statute, public answers made by the Finance Minister to par­
liamentary questions, and a summary of the decisions handed 
down by the courts of appeal and the Court of Cassation. 
The third, a monthly bulletin, is the most popular publica­
tion of the Finance Ministry. It is designed to keep in-service 
personnel and practitioners up to date, and to that end contains 
recent laws and decrees, administrative regulations, court de­
cisions, parliamentary questions, statistical surveys, and other 
data. Each language edition now runs to about 2, 500 pages of 
400 words a page . 
The fourth is published at irregular intervals (usually bi­
monthly) . It contains the full text of important decisions hand­
ed down by the courts of appeal and of the Court of Cassation 
on direct taxes .68  Each such publication runs to about 40 pages 
of 400 words each. 
67 For the length of the instructions dealing with certain portions 
of the "old" and the "new" statutes , see 2 . 5  supra . 
68 However ; most other judicial decisions do not appear in Finance 
Ministry publications. All decisions of the Court of Cassation are 
printed, however, in the "Pasicrisie" Part I. See footnote 11 supra. 
CHAPTER Vll 
ASSESSMENT, REFUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL PROCEDURES 
Section A. Assessment and Audit Procedures 
3 . 1  Introductory note 
The levying of taxes can be divided into three distinct and 
successive phases: ( 1) the assessment, i .e . ,  the definition of 
the exact amount of income or profit subject to taxation under 
the statute, ( 2) the computation, i .e . ,  the application of a pro­
gressive or proportional rate on the taxable amount, and (3) the 
collection, i .e . , the procedure used to secure payment absent 
voluntary payment. 
Essentially, Belgian assessment and audit procedures are 
the same for both individual and corporate taxpayers and with 
two prime exceptions for all types of income. The two spe­
cial procedures relate to imputed income from immovable 
property situated in Belgium, the so-called "cadastral income," 
and to income arising from certain categories of professional 
activity. 
3 .2a Details of the typical assessment and audit procedure 
All individuals (residents as well as no!ll'esidents subject 
to the nonresident tax), 1 corporations, juridical persons, and 
unincorporated communities must file an annual return showing 
taxable income .2 In essence, however, this is an information 
return, for the taxpayer himself does not compute the tax it­
self. The return, with the attached reports, is supposed to 
provide such complete information that the assessing official 
can rely on it to compute the correct tax. 
The returns, in the form of questionnaires, are mailed by 
the Minister of Finance, during the year's  first quarter, to all 
1 Art. 212 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 55 , § 1 , Coordinated 
Laws and Art. 53 ,  1° ,  of the law of November 20 ,  1962) requires the 
filing of a return by nonresidents , whether on their entire Belgian 
income or on remuneration earned in Belgium. 
2 Art. 218 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 54, § 1 ,  of the Co­
ordinated Laws as amended by Art. 9 of the law of July 13 , 1959) . 
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persons subject to taxation.3 Different types of questionnaires 
are used: ( 1) for corporations, (2) for wage earners and those 
individuals whose income is derived from only two or three 
sources, and (3) for individuals whose income is derived from 
many sources . These returns are designed to supply the 
assessing officer with all possible data concerning the taxpayer, 
his family, his occupational activity, his real and personal 
property, and related expenditures. In the course of complet­
ing a return, a taxpayer or his representative may have to 
resolve one or more questions of law or mixed questions of 
law and fact. An officially prepared explanation of the law, 
covering 8 pages of about 1400 words each, is attached to each 
questionnaire for the benefit of the declarant who is otherwise 
legally presumed to know all of the provisions of the tax law. 
The statute requires certain supplementary statements to 
be attached to specified types of returns . Corporation returns 
must be accompanied by copies of the balance sheet, profit and 
loss statement, and minutes of the corporation's general meet­
ing where these financial reports were approved.4 Returns 
filed by partnerships must be accompanied by a statement of 
all amounts paid to the associates on the basis of the com­
pany's  accounts .5 In certain cases individuals also must sup­
ply certain documents . Illustratively, when foreign income is 
declared, the taxpayer must identify its nature and the country 
of origin. 
In addition to the statutorily required supplementary state­
ments the administration is entitled to call for other informa­
tion it anticipates using during the course of assessment and 
audit. For example, corporations filing the 1964 return were 
requested to add copies of about fifteen records or statements . 
These included (in addition to the documents noted previously) 
a list of directors, an account of sums paid to directors and to 
stockholders, a detailed depreciation schedule, and a valuation 
3 This list is subject to annual revision on the basis of informa­
tion communicated by the municipal authorities . However , the King 
is empowered to decide that individuals (not juridical persons) who , 
on the basis of the return previously filed , appear to earn an income 
below the taxable limit need not file a new return annually . This de­
cision is subject to revision at any time. Art. 216 ,  al. 1 ,  Coordinated 
Laws , Art. 53 , 2°, of the law of November 20 , 1962 ,  Art. 144 of the 
Royal Decree of March 4, 1965. 
4 Art. 218 ,  al. 2 ,  of the Code of Income Tax. 
5 Art. 219 of the Code of Income Tax, Art. 54, § 2 ,  al. 1 ,  of the 
Coordinated Laws , Art. 54 of the law of November 20 , 1962.  
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schedule of the stocks and bonds owned by the corporation. 
Included also in the assessing official 's file for each taxpayer 
is other information drawn from returns filed by yet other 
taxpayers6 or received from other governmental authorities and 
agencies. 7 
Typically, returns are examined by local assessing offices, 
though special offices at the local level handle all corporations 
except very large enterprises which are dealt with by the cen­
tral administration's own special office for direct taxes . 
The assessing office assumes a return to be correct until 
it determines otherwise .  8 Its examination involves a verifica­
tion both of the factual data on the return and attached docu­
ments and of the taxpayer's  application of the statute in arriving 
at taxable net income. Any legal evidence, other than a sworn 
statement, can be utilized in the verification process.  9 
In practice, however, individuals who have returns showing 
a low income or income from an easily verified source will 
not have their returns audited except for such returns of this 
character as are selected for audit on a sampling basis. Indi­
viduals whose income is in the neighborhood of 500,000 Belgian 
francs ($10,000 .00 U.S.  dollars) have their returns checked, 
however easily verifiable the sources . However, if such an in­
dividual has a stable income from approximately the same 
sources year after year, the local assessor tends not to check 
6 The return of one taxpayer can be an extremely valuable source 
of information in verifying the return of another. For example, when­
ever a taxpayer includes within his deductible expenses the interest 
paid on borrowed money or the fee paid to a professional expert, he 
must show the name and address of the payee. When this information 
is placed before the appropriate assessing official, he can readily de­
termine whether the payee has included such payment within his de­
clared income. 
7 When requested by the revenue administration, governmental ,  
provincial , and municipal authorities (with the exception of the National 
Institute for Statistics ,  the Institute for the Study of E conomic and So­
cial Problems of the Middle Clas s ,  the credit institutions maintained 
by the government, and the Postal Checks and Clearing Service (Art. 
2 35 ,  § 2 ,  of the Code of Income Tax)) must forward all records which 
an assessing or collecting official considers necessary for the assess­
ment or collection of taxes. Art. 235, § 1, of the Code of Income Tax 
(Art. 57 , bis § 1 ,  of the Coordinated Laws , Art. 58 of the law of No­
vember 2 0 ,  1962) . 
8 Art. 245 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 55 ,  § 1 ,  of the Coordi­
nated Laws , Art. 5 6 ,  § 1 ,  of the law of November 20 , 1962) . 
9 Art. 245 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 55 , § 2 ,  of the Coordi­
nated Laws , Art. 56 , § 1 ,  of the law of November 20 , 1962) . 
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his return after the first two or three years in the belief that 
this taxpayer's  honesty can be relied upon. 
During the examination, the assessor frequently finds him­
self in disagreement with the taxpayer, either as to the amount 
of the latter's income or the manner in which the taxpayer re­
solved a question of law or mixed question of law and fact. 
Typically, such a taxpayer is called into the office to be ques­
tioned in detail. During the course of such a discussion, the 
taxpayer may submit a statement, attesting to the accuracy of 
his figures and signed by an accountant belonging to an official­
ly recof511ized group known as Institut des re viseurs d 'entre ­
prises. l While great weight is attached to such a statement 
insofar as it relates to the mere accuracy of figures, the state­
ment is not at all conclusive with respect to whether the tax 
law was properly applied in determining the tax treatment of 
each item. 
The assessor is very likely to request informal advice 
from the appropriate inspector A or even from the central ad­
ministration whenever he confronts a new problem regarding 
proper application of the law to the situation before him, or 
other issues which emerge from the return of an important 
company or a return involving a substantial sum of money. It 
is entirely within his discretion whether he informs the tax­
payer that he has requested this advice, but in practice the 
taxpayer is told. 11 The taxpayer is free to request an oral 
conference. Comparably, and with equal informality, the tax­
payer himself may try to resolve the problem in a conference 
with a higher ranking official and not infrequently he is suc­
cessful. No  statistics are available to  show the number of 
taxpayers who seek such a conference at this level. 
In practice, however, both assessor and taxpayer discuss 
exhaustively every aspect of the tax return. A complicating 
10 There are no so-called chartered or certified public accountants 
in Belgium. Certain experienced accounting experts of good reputation 
have been selected by an official group, Institut des reviseurs d' entre­
prises, to act as auditors for corporations whose stocks and bonds are 
quoted on the stock exchange. In some circumstances, the members 
of this group have been appointed by the government or by a govern­
mental agency to supervise the application of special regulations deal­
ing with banking, insurance, etc. These appointments , however , do not 
authorize them to substantiate in any official sense the accuracy of the 
figures set out in a tax return. 
11 There will, however, be relatively few situations where an inter­
pretative question arises under the Belgian statute; its minimal num­
ber of deviations and broad statements of policy tend to curtail auto­
matically the number of potential interpretative issues. 
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factor is the requirement that the assessor complete his work 
within a given period in a particular year. This may effec­
tively preclude a conference with an official at a higher eche­
lon, for all assessments must be made by the end of the year . 
Nevertheless,  the taxpayer is aware that if he is not fully 
satisfied with the results of whatever discussions have taken 
place, appeal to the regional director need cost no more than 
a postage stamp and is fully available .  However, it not in­
frequently happens that the assessor and the taxpayer are able 
to reach an agreement as to matters of fact. At this local 
level, as to which there are no available statistics, there is a 
good deal of adjustment as to purely factual issues, such as 
those involving the value of an inventory at the end of the year 
or the amount of expenses incurred for some clearly business 
purpose. Illustratively, a taxpayer may claim 2 5,000 Belgian 
francs and have records showing expenditures of 1 5,000 Bel­
gian francs .  The assessor may say that from his station in 
life, it would be reasonable to assume expenditures of 20,000 
Belgian francs and both agree as to this figure .  The assessor, 
however, has no power to resolve interpretative issues and he 
cannot engage in settlement activities . He may only adjust 
fact questions where substantiation is the major problem.  
The taxpayer is  not allowed to bypass the detailed discus ­
sions with the assessor and go directly to the regional direc­
tor. However, merely because the taxpayer cannot bypass the 
assessor prior to assessment, does not affect his right to file 
a petition with the regional director after assessment. 
Certain taxpayers, in the course of the assessing official's  
interrogation, may assert that they are bound by professional 
secrecy and unable to communicate what they claim to be privi­
leged information. l2 Under such circumstances,  the assessing 
officer consults a special advisory board, Comite d 'avis, com­
posed of the president and two members of the local profes­
sional or occupational group-lawyers, doctors,  notaries-to 
which the taxpayer belongs . Within ten days after referral, 
the board must give its opinion as to the taxpayer 's  probable 
income . 
12 Art. 458 of the Belgian Penal Code punishes physicians , surgeons , 
chemists , midwives " and all other persons who have a professional 
responsibility to keep secrets" -i.e. , lawyers ,  solicitors ,  notaries,  etc.­
should they reveal facts of which they have been informed in secrecy 
unless they must appear as witnesses in court or legally are obliged 
to reveal them. 
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While such a board does not consider any question of law 
and has no power to make a final decision, in effect there is 
a presumption that its opinion accurately reflects the taxpayer 's  
income . 13" 
Should an assessing officer finally decide that a taxpayer 
has filed an incorrect return, informal interchange of views 
ends . But before the assessing officer can make a final ad­
justment to the income as reported, he must send the taxpayer 
a carefully prepared rectification, stating what he believes is 
the taxpayer's  net taxable income. The rectification also re­
quests that the form be returned within twenty days , together 
with the taxpayer's written objections, if any, to the proposed 
adjustment. 
Until the twenty days have elapsed, no definitive assess­
ment can be made. But if this period goes by without receipt 
of written objections from the taxpayer, the assessing official 
is free to act although, 14 for reasonable cause, he may grant 
the taxpayer a twenty-day extension. Further, the mere fact 
that the taxpayer does file written objections will not neces­
sarily postpone the assessment. The assessing officer is not 
required to reconsider arguments previously raised by the 
taxpayer if he believes the taxpayer's  rationale to be in error . 
He may disregard them and proceed without delay to an assess­
ment. However, on filing his written objections, the taxpayer 
has a right to request that the case be submitted to an advisory 
committee, Commission fiscale . 15 This request is not auto­
matically granted. It is approved only when the assessing of­
ficial believes the referral will contribute to a proper determi­
nation of the taxpayer's  income. 
Such committees exist in each locality where there is an 
assessing office. The chairman is a tax inspector; the other 
members are private citizens, i .e . ,  are representatives of 
trade, industrial, agricultural, professional, and wage-earners 
organizations . Designated by their officially recognized oc­
cupational organizations, they are appointed for three-year 
terms . 
13 Arts. 254-255 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 44, § 13 ,  of the 
Coordinated Laws,  Art. 56 ,  § 3, of the law of November 20 , 1962) . 
14 Art. 251 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 55 , § 12 , of the Coordi­
nated Laws,  as completed by Art. 5 6 ,  § 2 ,  of the law of November 20 ,  
1962) . 
15 Art. 252 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 55,  § 14, al. 1 to 3 , of 
the Coordinated Laws,  as amended by Art. 56 ,  § 4, of the law of No­
vember 2 0 ,  1962) . 
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Such committees never deal with interpretative issues . As 
before noted, an assessor can obtain informed advice regard­
ing that type of question from the so-called inspectors A or 
from the central administration. The advisory committees are 
competent to deal only with questions of fact . They are ex­
pected to answer only one question: Did the taxpayer make 
realistic estimates of his gross income, professional expenses, 
etc . ?  
Once a question is submitted to the fiscal committee, the 
assessing officer and the taxpayer, or his tax advisor, are re­
quested to forward all notes and documents . In addition, each 
side is given an opportunity to offer an oral explanation and 
argument. 
In theory, the committee 's  decision does not bind the as­
sessing official; its sole function is to advise.  However, should 
the assessing officer assess a tax in excess of the amount con­
sidered proper by the committee and should the taxpayer sub­
sequently appeal, a legal presumption arises, to the effect that 
the assessing officer erred and that the committee 's  finding 
represents the maximum possible amount of taxable income.!€> 
Should a taxpayer fail to file a return or to turn over rec­
ords or data upon request, the assessing officer estimates the 
tax due. Under such circumstances, the assessing officer need 
not prove the exact amount of net income he estimates the tax­
payer to have received. l7 The taxpayer, however, must prove 
that he did not earn that income. 18  
3 . 2b Details of assessment and audit procedure re cadastral in­
come 
As noted above, there is a separate assessment procedure 
for income from real property located in Belgium. The tax­
payer himself neither calculates nor estimates the amount of 
his so-called cadastral income. This is not an amount actually 
received by the owner .  Instead, taxable income of this type is 
a presumed income, i .e . ,  cadastral income. The Land Register, 
16 Art. 253 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 5 5 ,  § 14 , al. 4 and 5 ,  
of the Coordinated Laws , Art. 5 6 ,  § 4 ,  of the law of November 20 ,  
1962) . 
17-Art. 248 , § 2 ,  of the Code of Income Tax. 
18 Except where the taxpayer can give acceptable reasons why the 
filing of the return or the answer to questions of the assessing offi­
cer have been delayed. Art. 257 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 56 , 
al. 2 ,  of the Coordinated Laws, as amended by Art. 57 ,  § 2 ,  of the 
law of November 20 , 1962) . 
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Administration du cadastre, determines the presumed income 
from each piece of such real property for a twenty-year peri­
od, by estimating the average normal income for one year, de­
ducting a lump sum (one-fourth for buildings and one-tenth for 
land) for costs, maintenance, and repairs . Except where im­
portant changes are made to such property, the amount so de­
termined remains, in principle, fixed for twenty years . 
When this determination takes place, each owner is in­
formed officially. Should he disagree with the conclusion of 
the Land Register, he has thirty days in which to send a let­
ter to the official in that office, complementing his request for 
review of that estimate with his own proposal as to the net 
taxable income from the property . 19 
If the Land Register officials and the taxpayer cannot agree, 
the taxpayer-owner may have the property appraised by an in­
dependent expert appointed by the Justice of the Peace for the 
locality where the property is situated. The appraisal proce­
dure provided by statute is followed,20 and once made the ex­
pert 's appraisal of the cadastral income binds both the taxpayer 
and the assessing official. 
The cadastral income was revised last in 1956-1960.21 The 
next revision occurs in 1975.  While the cadastral or presumed 
income from real property cannot be increased before that 
year, a supplemental income tax must be paid on the owner 's  
actual net income therefrom to the extent it exceeds 200% of 
the cadastral income .22 Further, if there is no actual income 
or if the actual income has declined, an exemption or reduc­
tion of tax can be obtained.23 
3 .2c Details of assessment and audit procedure re income aris ­
ing from certain categories of professional activity 
The legislature recognizes that it is not easy for some 
taxpayers to determine the precise amount of their occupational 
net income. In consequence, the tax administration, either at 
19 Arts . 412-415 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 1 ,  § 1 ,  of the 
Coordinated Laws) . 
20 See Arts . 417-428 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 61 , § 1 ,  of the 
Coordinated Laws, as amended by Art. 10 of the law of July 14,  1955) . 
21 Law of July 14, 1955. 
22 Only, however , when the rent paid to the owner can be deducted 
by the tenant as a professional expense. Art. 7 ,  § 1 ,  1° b ,  of the Code 
of Income Tax (Art. 4, § 1 ,  of the law of November 20 ,  1962) . 
23 Art. 9 ,  § 1 ,  of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 4 ,  § 2 ,  20 and 3° , of 
the law of November 1962) . 
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the national or regional level, may reach agreement with occu­
pational associations fixing an estimated base by which the tax­
able net income of their members will be determined for a 
period not to exceed three years . 24 
Some such agreements, as in the case of agriculture, are 
on a nationwide basis ,  Others, as in the case of bakers and 
butchers, are regional in scope, and in these cases the esti­
mated base for occupational income differs from place to place .  
Members of  an occupational group subject to  such an 
agreement are required, nevertheless, to file an annual return. 
But instead of listing both the gross income received and de­
ductible expenses, they provide other factual information. Il­
lustratively, in the case of farmers, they state for the given 
year the area of land cultivated, in the case of butchers or 
bakers the amount of wares sold. Using this factual data, the 
net income of such individuals is estimated, in accordance with 
the agreement reached between their occupational associations 
and the tax administration. 
Foreigners running a business in Belgium also are subject 
to a system of estimated minimum taxable incomes . Since 
they remain subject to the regular assessment procedure, the 
estimation arrangement is intended only to assure that they 
will pay at least some personal or corporate income tax on a 
minimum base with reference to the number of employees, 
etc . 25 
Section B.  Administrative Appeals 
3 . 3  Introductory note 
To recapitulate briefly, the process of taxpayer assess­
ment in Belgium places the responsibility for the actual assess­
ment of the income tax on the assessing official, although only 
after opportunity for an informal exchange of views between 
the assessing official and the taxpayer and for referrals seek­
ing nonbinding advisory opinions on factual matters from cer­
tain consultative boards . 
Once the assessment has been made, the taxpayer may ap­
peal the assessing official 's decision to a higher level within 
the tax administration. Should the decision there be unfavor­
able, he may lay his case before the judiciary. 
24 Art. 248 , § 1, of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 28, § 1, of the Co­
ordinated Laws) . 
25 Art. 248, § 2 ,  of the Code of Income Tax. 
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3 . 4  De tails of the administrative appeal procedure re assess­
ments 
Two situations permit a taxpayer to secure a full adminis­
trative review of the facts and of the law relating to any dis­
agreement with the assessor. The first is where tax payments 
exceed the amount the taxpayer believes to be correct, either 
because of an excessive withholding of taxes or because of ex­
cessive payments of estimated tax. The second is where the 
assessor, having completed his examination of a taxpayer 's  re­
turn as a prelude to making a regular assessment, does not 
agree with the taxpayer regarding the amount of tax due, all 
procedures available to resolve their differences having been 
utilized without success . The assessing officer then sends a 
formal notice of his conclusion (the so-called "tax paper") re­
garding the tax due and directs that payment be made within 
the legally prescribed period of two months . 26 
Should the taxpayer disagree with the tax paper-a likely 
situation since the parties failed to reach agreement earlier­
or should he believe that his previous payments exceeded the 
amount properly owing, he can file a petition with the regional 
director of direct taxes for his area. This enables him to 
secure a full administrative review of the case, not only as to 
questions of fact but interpretative questions of law. 
As pointed out earlier, the twelve regional directors of 
direct taxes perform two functions in the overall tax adminis ­
tration. They constitute the authority to which an appeal is 
taken after formal assessment, and they supervise all local 
revenue offices within their respective regions, including the 
work done by assessing officials .27 In dealing with petitions 
for review, the directors are assisted by inspectors for litiga­
tion matters, whose assistance is necessary because of the 
large number of petitions filed annually. In many such cases, 
the taxpayer does not request an oral hearing because of the 
nature of the alleged error, for example, a claimed miscalcu­
lation. However, according to the following table of petitions 
filed during a recent six-year period, in approximately half 
the cases there is an oral hearing. But the bulk of the cases, 
even where there is a hearing and a detailed examination of 
the taxpayer's  contentions, did not involve interpretative 
26 Art. 304 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 53 ,  § 1 ,  al. 3 and 4 ,  of 
the Coordinated Laws,  Art. 63 of the law of November 20 ,  1962) . 
27 See Chap. I, 1 . 1  supra for discussion of the territorial compe­
tence of the twelve regional directors .  
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issues . 2 8  Rather, they concerned questions of fact such as 
computation of gross income, the exact amount of business ex­
penditures, losses, etc . Moreover, the petty cadastral property 
cases-which raise only issues of fact and which involve very 








PETITIONS FILLED WITH THE REGIONA L DIRECTORS 
OF DIRECT TAXES 
With Without 
Preliminary Preliminary 
Examination Examination Total 
61 ,142 56 ,971 118 ,113 
6 1 ,625 61 ,996 123,621 
58 ,448 67 ,011 125 ,459 
53 ,754 58,744 112,498 
58 ,494 60 ,143 118 ,637 
69 ,199 66 ,113 135 ,312 
The procedure governing this administrative appeal is both 
simple and common to all taxpayers-resident or nonresident, 
individual or corporate-and for all forms of income tax. To 
file a petition, the taxpayer need only mail a letter to the ap­
propriate regional director, briefly explaining his objections to 
the tax as determined by the assessing official or as previous­
ly withheld or paid. The director or that inspector for litiga­
tion matters who actually subjects the taxpayer's  return, to­
gether with the attached documents , to a new and thorough 
examination, possesses all the investigative powers of the origi­
nal assessing official, 30 and in addition he may request any 
other potentially useful information from banks, other credit 
institutions, and the postal check and clearing service . 
Since the regional director derives his review powers di­
rectly from the statute, not from the central tax administration, 
he is under no legal obligation to consult the central adminis­
tration prior to making any decision on the taxpayer 's  petition. 
In the interest of uniformity, however, in practice the regional 
2 8  The fact that a taxpayer can secure an unofficial informal opin­
ion on the tax consequences of his prospective transaction means that 
if he completes the transaction precisely as he has described it, he 
will have no problems and hence no interpretative issues will arise. 
29 The very minimal cost of a petition tends to make many tax­
payers think it worth their while to appeal an assessment s ince they 
possibly may benefit themselves . 
30 Art. 275 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 64 of the law of No­
vember 2 0 ,  1962) . 
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director does seek the advice of the central administration on 
encountering an interpretative problem not previously treated 
in the official regulations or publications of the Finance Minis­
try. 
When the regional director does consult the central admin­
istration, he is not required to, but in fact usually does, inform 
the taxpayer. Whenever the taxpayer knows that such consul­
tation has occurred, he may and usually does request an oral 
conference with the central administration; such requests are 
always granted. 
There is no opportunity at the regional director' s  level for 
settlement in the sense of compromise where interpretation or 
application of the statute is concerned. There is opportunity 
only to make corrections . Further, the only possible adjust­
ments relative to issues of fact where proof is unavailable took 
place at the assessor 's level. 
The regional director informs the taxpayer of his decision 
by registered letter .31 If he rejected the taxpayer 's arguments 
and dismissed the petition, or concluded that the original as­
sessing official underestimated the taxpayer 's income with the 
consequence that the taxpayer owes more than even the amount 
shown by the formal assessment, the taxpayer can turn only to 
the courts for further consideration. Should the regional di­
rector sustain the taxpayer, however, the tax administration is 
bound. 
While no definite statistics are available, informed sources 
believe that about 40 percent of all petitioners at the regional 
director 's level feel that they have secured whatever relief they 
sought. Of the remaining 60 percent, only a small percentage 
will carry their cases to the courts . A postage stamp is all 
that is needed for a petition to the regional director ; an action 
in the Court of Appeal requires a lawyer and entails procedural 
costs . Thus a taxpayer does not commence a court action for 
a trivial reason. It must be worth his while . Further, it may 
happen that a number of petitions filed with regional directors 
in a given year raises a single issue, e .g . ,  such as one relat­
ing to a particular type of professional or commercial activity. 
Under such circumstances, the trade or professional organiza­
tion frequently selects the dispute of a single taxpayer to try 
as a test case and sometimes shoulders the entire financial 
expense, with everyone involved fully aware of what is happening. 
31 Art. 276 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 65 ,  al. 1 of the Coordi­
nated Laws) . 
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In the meantime, instructions from the national office will di­
rect the regional directors to refrain-as they may do, not 
being under any limit as to time-from handing down a deci­
sion on all the other appeals raising the same legal question. 
Comparably, there is a close enough cross-communication be­
tween the regional directors to insure their awareness if a 
number of taxpayers throughout the country independently file 
petitions raising a similar legal issue. Under such circum­
stances, the national office usually selects one petition for liti­
gation and holds back decisions on the others . 
Section c.  Extent Administrative Processing of 
Refund Claims Departs from Administrative 
Processing of Assessments 
3 . 5  Introductory note 
Except in the limited instance described in the next sub­
topic, the Belgian tax system has no separate procedure for 
refunds distinct from those which may be paid automatically 
in connection with the assessment procedure itself. In other 
words, generally speaking, a taxpayer must raise his obj ec­
tions , if any, in a timely manner during the course of the as ­
sessment procedure, and the dispute will be handled in the 
same manner whether he had paid less or more than the as­
sessment as finally determined. This stems from the fact that 
the tax return is essentially an information return, the tax on 
income (as originally stated or as corrected) is calculated and 
assessed by the administration. Once calculated, the taxpayer 
receives the so-called tax paper showing the total tax, which 
must be paid within two months . It is quite possible, however, 
that some or all of this tax was paid prior to that assessment, 
because of ( 1) withholding at the source or (2) voluntary pay­
ments of estimated tax which arc made in certain cases to 
avoid supplementary exactions equal to 7. 5 percent or 1 5  per­
cent of the total tax. 32 If the amounts paid through either 
32 See 3.3 supra . No supplement is due if the advance payment is 
made before July 15 of the year during which the taxable professional 
income will be earned. A supplementary payment of 7 .5% is paid on 
the corporate or personal income tax, as calculated at the normal rate 
on the professional part of the total income, if the advance payment is 
made fifteen days after the closing of the taxpayer ' s  financial year.  
The supplementary payment is  15% if payment of  the tax takes place 
at the usual time, i.e. , at least two months after the tax-paper has 
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method exceed the assessment fixed by the local office, a re­
fund is in order, but this will be paid automatically. No spe­
cial refund claim is required. 
In other cases, should a taxpayer conclude that the assess­
ment shown in the tax-paper is  excessive and file a timely 
petition for review with the regional director, the full amount 
of the asserted tax need not be paid while the administrative 
appeal is pending. While the filing of the petition does not ac­
tually suspend the legal obligation to pay the entire assessment 
within the legally prescribed two-month period, in practice 
the tax administration will not commence a collection action if, 
within that two-month period, the taxpayer pays the undisputed 
portion of the tax. 
Should the regional director, after examining the taxpayer 's  
petition, decide in favor of the taxpayer, he  will automatically 
refund overpayments, if any. However, should the taxpayer owe 
other taxes ,  the refund will serve instead as a credit against 
them. 
Should the regional director decide against the taxpayer, 
the previously disputed portion of the assessment as to which 
payment may have been postponed must now be paid, with in­
terest at six-tenths of one percent per month. However, to 
induce regional directors to avoid delay in processing adminis­
trative appeals, the legislature provided that such interest shall 
cease to run from a point six months after a petition has been 
filed to the point when the director's  decision is forwarded to 
the taxpayer. 33 
3 .6 Details regarding refund procedure in cases of "material 
error" 
A taxpayer who fails to contest an assessment by filing a 
timely petition for review with the regional director may not 
thereafter secure a re-examination of his return for the pur­
pose of recapturing a claimed overpayment, except on a show­
ing of material error. Such an error, whether discovered by 
the taxpayer or a revenue official leads automatically, without 
any formal requirement, to a refund if an overpayment is in­
volved. This is subject, however, to two limitations . Refunds 
(footnote continued) 
been dispatched. Art. 89 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 2 2 ,  § 2 ,  al. 
1 to 3, law of November 20 ,  1962 ,  as amended by Art. 1 0 ,  law of 
July 15 , 1966) . 
33 Art. 306 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 5 ,  al. 2 of the Co­
ordinated Laws , Art. 11, law of March 2 8 ,  1955) .  
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cannot be made following the lapse of three years from the be­
ginning of the year to which the tax relates . Further, if the 
taxpayer had filed a timely petition for review of his original 
assessment to which the claimed overpayment relates, and a 
final decision on that petition has been handed down, that final­
ly determined assessment cannot be reopened even upon later 
discovery of a material error . 
Subject to those two limitations, the types of error accom­
modated under this procedure included mathematical mistakes 
which favored the government (whether made by the taxpayer 
himself or by a revenue official) or double computations of a 
taxable term. Also treated as tantamount to material error is 
the situation where the taxpayer, after the assessment is made, 
produces new records or facts which for completely valid rea­
sons he was unable to submit prior to assessment. A new 
legal argument or a change in the administrative or judicial 
interpretation of the statute will never be considered a "new 
fact," however. 34 
34 Art. 277 of the Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 1 ,  § 6 of the Coordi­
nated Laws as amended by Art. 2 ,  law of May 30,  1949 , Art. 233 ,  law 
of July 27 , 1953 , Art. 2 0 ,  § 2 ,  law of March 2 8 ,  1955 , Art. 2 ,  law of 
March 24,  1959 , and Art. 6 3 ,  § 5 ,  law of November 2 0 ,  1962) . 
CHAPTER VIII 
RESOLUTION OF INTERPRETATIVE INCOME TAX 
QUESTIONS BY INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS 
4.1  Introduction 
As pointed out earlier, a taxpayer must exhaust the ad­
ministrative processes before he may carry into court a dispute 
with the tax authorities .  The government, however, faced with 
an adverse administrative appeal decision by the statutorily 
endowed regional director, does not have the right to carry its 
case to the courts. The taxpayer alone has this privilege . 
The judiciary possess final authority to interpret the tax 
statute . The Belgian Constitution insures the absolute inde­
pendence of the tribunal to which the taxpayer has an absolute 
right to appeal in the event of an adverse decision at the ad­
ministrative level. 
The courts with jurisdiction over tax matters are not spe­
cialized courts, limited either to tax litigation or to disputes 
between administrative agencies and individual citizens . They 
are courts of general jurisdiction-civil, commercial, criminal, 
etc . -fully competent also to resolve substantive income tax 
questions . However, these general courts do have specialized 
chambres for tax matters. To the extent necessary, they will 
re-examine the regional director 's conclusions of fact and of 
law. 
The Belgian judicial organization has no precise counter ­
part to trial and appellate tribunals . Nevertheless,  two levels 
of competence exist. The Courts of Appeal make findings of 
fact de novo, to which they apply their view of the law. The 
Court of Cassation, the supreme court to which lies an appeal 
from the Courts of Appeal, is limited to questions of law. 
Section A. Organization and Procedures:  
Lower Courts 
4.2 Organization of the lower courts 
Belgium has three Courts of Appeal each with a specified 
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seat and territorial jurisdiction. 1 A petition for revision of a 
director 's decision must be brought before the Court of Appeal 
with territorial jurisdiction over the office of the regional di­
rector who handed down the decision. 
Each Court of Appeal is divided into the number of sec­
tions , Chambres, reflected in following schedule, the number 
having been determined on the basis of average workloads : 
Court of Total Taxation Total Members Taxation 
Appeal Chambres Chambres (Conseillers) (Conseillers) 
Ghent 8 1 26 3-4 
Brussels 24 3 60 9-12 
Liege 12 2 33 6-8 
Every case coming before a section is heard at least by three 
members . 
Irrespective of the section of the court of which they are 
members, all conseillers are doctors of law. Generally they 
have spent ten to twenty years as justices of a district tribunal 
or as members of a district office of the public prosecutor. 
As a rule, members of the tax section were not tax specialists 
prior to appointment, but they normally serve such long terms 
that they develop a high level of expertise. Whenever a matter 
of general interest is argued before a Court of Appeal, a mem­
ber of the Attorney General 's staff-usually a deputy attorney 
general-is present. He submits an advisory opinion in each 
case. 2 
Like the conseillers, the members of the Attorney Gener­
al 's staff are generalists upon appointment but after advising 
on hundreds of tax cases they acquire a thorough knowledge of 
tax law and experience in interpreting the statute . 
4.3 Processing cases through the Court of Appeal 
Should the taxpayer 's administrative appeal be decided 
adversely in whole or in part, he will be so informed by a 
1 The courts at Ghent, Brussels,  and Liege exercise jurisdiction, 
respectively , over (1) West Flanders and E ast Flander s ,  (2) Brabent , 
Antwerp, and Hainaut , and ( 3) Liege, Limbourg, Namur , and Luxem­
bourg. 
2 This device of an advisory opinion is a requisite part of Belgian 
judicial procedure whenever the public interest, l '  ordre public, is con­
cerned. The office of the attorney general is not involved in the con­
troversy between the parties . Hence ,  the representative of the attorney 
general' s office , in tax cases the deputy attorney general, has the duty 
of delivering an impartial opinion which semetimes will favor the Min­
ister of Finance and sometimes the taxpayer ,  depending upon his esti­
mation of the merits of the case. 
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registered letter from the regional director. The taxpayer 
then has forty days within which to file with the appropriate 
Court of Appeal a new petition, a copy of which is sent to the 
regional director. 3 
Neither administrative nor judicial appeal affects the tax­
payer's obligation to pay his tax as assessed, nor is the run­
ning of interest suspended should the taxpayer delay paying that 
portion of the tax in dispute . 4 
It is possible to settle cases after invoking the jurisdic­
tion of the Court of Appeal. Where this occurs, the taxpayer 
officially waives the right to dispute further the regional direc­
tor's decision. The Court, however, must decide whether it 
will approve the settlement. Should the Court conclude that 
the settlement is based on an incorrect interpretation of the 
statute, it can refuse to permit the petition to be withdrawn 
and hand down a decision as if no administrative settlement 
had been made.5 Should the Court be satisfied with the settle­
ment, it will recognize withdrawal of the petition by a formal 
decision. No statistics are available to indicate the frequency 
with which such administrative settlements are reached. 
Once a taxpayer files a petition with a Court of Appeal, 
the tax administration must defend the case.  Communication 
of the taxpayer 's  petition to the regional director in effect 
summons the tax administration to appear before the court . At 
the hearing the government is represented by a lawyer, a regu­
lar practising member of the bar who also holds a .permanent 
appointment from the Minister of Finance to defend the revenue 
administration in court. These lawyers maintain contact with 
the fourth division of the central Administration of Direct 
Taxes, three branches of which handle the work on tax cases, 
in litigation before the courts . 6 
Contrary to the customary procedure in the civil cases, 
taxpayers are not required to be represented before a Court 
of Appeal by a solicitor, avoue. Theoretically, any taxpayer 
may represent himself at such hearings, with or without the 
3 Arts. 278-280 , Code of Income Tax (Arts . 66 and 67 of the Co­
ordinated Laws) . 
4 See Chap. VII, 3.5 supra . 
5 See , for example, Court of Appeal of Brussels , June 2 7 ,  1956 . 
(Chevalier pour Despatures) , Recueil Special de Jurisprudence ,  XII, 
no. 649. 
6 The personnel of the office for litigated matters belong to the 
first category of government officials,  whose educational background 
was discussed in Chap. V supra . 
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assistance of a tax expert who may or may not be a member 
of the bar . In practice, however, the taxpayer is represented 
by a member of the bar, i .e . ,  by lega� counsel authorized to 
plead before any Belgian tribunal. 
The proceedings are formal. 7 Both facts and legal argu­
ments must be stipulated in writing by taxpayer and tax ad­
ministration alike . According to the general principle actori 
incumbit probatio, sed reus in exceptione fit actor, proof of 
facts and legal arguments must be borne by the party invoking 
them.  8 
Upon receipt of a copy of the petition, the regional direc­
tor must deposit all documents concerning the dispute, together 
with a certified copy of his decision, with the Court of Appeal, 
where the taxpayer is free to examine them.9 Should the tax­
payer wish to rely on new documents or memoranda not intro­
duced previously when the matter was before the regional di­
rector, he must file them at the same office of record where 
the director, in turn, may examine them. The director then 
has thirty days in which to respond, by submitting additional 
documents or memoranda in support of his position.10 With 
the court 's  permission, the taxpayer can reply by filling yet 
further records, documents , or memoranda. 
In the end, both the tax administration and the taxpayer 
must have submitted formal documents, so-called conclusions, 
setting out their arguments . The view of the Attorney General 
is also submitted in writing. 
There is , however, a typically exercised right to oral ar­
gument with respect both to the facts and applicable legal prin­
ciples .  But this is in addition to and not a substitute for the 
conclusions . Further, it is most unusual for the taxpayer him­
self to be interrogated, for other oral evidence to be intro­
duced, or for witnesses to be used. 
The court rarely hands down its decision on the day in 
which the hearing is completed. The time lag between the 
close of the hearing and the decision itself ranges from two 
weeks to two months, depending on the difficulty of the case. 
7 Art. 287 ,  Code of Income Tax (Art. 67 ,  al. 1, of the Coordinated 
Laws) . 
8 Except where the advice of the "Fiscal Committee" was in favor 
of the taxpayer. See Chap. VII, 3.4 
9 Art. 281 , Code of Income Tax (Art. 67 , al. 1, of the Coordinated 
Laws) . 
10 Art. 283,  Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 7 ,  al. 1 ,  of the Coordinated 
Laws) . 
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The Belgian Constitution requires that the decisions of all 
tribunals be announced in public, but the litigants themselves 
need not be present. Since the Constitution also requires that 
decisions include more than the bare judgment, each decision 
sets out a detailed statement of facts as well as the legal rea­
soning which led the court to its conclusion. 
The schedule which follows indicates the number of cases, 
involvmg direct taxes, decided by the Courts of Appeal in re­
cent years : 
Judiciary All Courts Individual Courts of Appeal 
Year of Appeal Brussels Ghent Liege 
1959-60 1 ,727 1 ,075 341 311 
1960-61 1 ,537 1 ,003 329 205 
1961-62 1 ,283 825 260 198 
1962-63 1 ,107 778 166 163 
Tax periodicals, whether officially or privately printed, 
publish only those decisions of the Courts of Appeal which seem 
of particular importance, either to taxpayers or to revenue of­
ficials . 11 Illustrative are decisions involving a new application 
of the statute or interpretations resolving a known disputed 
point of law. 
In theory, except for decisions of the Court of Cassation 
under special circumstances, decisions of courts do not consti­
tute precedents . In practice, however, it obviously is helpful 
in tax litigation to refer to comparable decisions by courts with 
like jurisdiction or, a fortiori, by the particular court itself. 
Section B. Organization and Procedures :  
The Court / of Cassation 
4 .4  Organization of the Court of Cassation 
The Belgian constitution provides for one Court of Cassa­
tion for all Belgium and limits its jurisdiction to questions of 
11 See Chap. VI, 2 .10 supra for a discussion of the official publica­
tions issued by the central administration of direct taxes . The most 
important privately published tax periodicals are Journal Pratique de 
Droit Fiscal et Financier, Algemeen Fiscaal Tijdschrijt, Revue Fis­
cale, Revue Pratique des Socitftes Civiles et Commerciales, Revue 
Pratique du Notariat, Tijdschrift voor Notarissen, Annales du Notariat­
eet de l ' Engistrement . 
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law.12 This tribunal has its seat at Brussels, the national 
capital. 
The Court is divided into two sections, Chambres.  The 
first deals with civil and commercial cases, the second inter 
alia with tax cases . The total number of members is twenty­
three with eleven or twelve in each section. Five must sit on 
each case . In every case brought before the Cour de Cassa­
tion, either the Attorney General himself or his deputy must 
submit his views . 
In general, the members of the Court of Cassation and the 
members of the office of the attorney general are selected 
from the members of the Courts of Appeal. The majority of 
members in that court's second section were not tax special­
ists prior to their appointment. Knowledge of and experience 
in the handling of tax problems typically are acquired while 
serving on the bench.l3 
4. 5 Processing a case through the Court of Cassation 
There are two important differences between the Court of 
Cassation and the Courts of AppeaL 14 
First, the Court of Cassation's jurisdiction is limited to 
issues of law. Thus an appeal must be based solely on an al­
leged misapplication of law, and should it appear that questions 
of fact or mixed questions of law and fact are involved, the 
claim is dismissed. 
Second, while the taxpayer alone can invoke jurisdiction of 
a Court of Appeal, both the revenue administration and the tax­
payer can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Cassation. 
Should a decision of a Court of Appeal be unfavorable to the 
government, the Director General of direct taxes, advised by 
members of the fourth division of the general direction of di­
rect taxes (responsible for litigated matters), decides whether 
it will be appealed to the Court of Cassation. 
An appeal to the Court of Cassation, as was true of an 
action brought before a Court of Appeal, does not suspend the 
taxpayer's obligation to pay the tax or the running of interest 
if the disputed part of the tax has not been paid. 
12 Belgium Constitution, Art. 95. 
13 Some members of the second section may have been appointed 
after lengthy service on the tax section of a Court of Appeal. 
14 This is apart from the fact that all tribunals in Belgium are sub­
ordinate to the Court of Cassation in the sense that the Court super­
vises the manner in which the law (used in the broad sense of the 
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A party who wishes to appeal a Court of Appeal's decision 
has ninety days after receiving official communication of the 
decision in which to file a Retition and all relevant documents 
with the Court of Cassation. 15 Within forty days after notifi­
cation by the Court of Cassation's recorder that a petition has 
been filed, the defendant must file all documents and memoran­
da in support of his position. The petitioner is free to inspect 
these matters. 16 
The taxpayer, whether petitioner or defendant, must be 
represented before the Court by a member of the bar of either 
the Court of Cassation or a Court of Appeal. Memoranda set­
ting forth the taxpayer 's arguments frequently are prepared by 
the lawyer, a tax specialist, who handled the case before the 
Court of Appeal. 
The government, whether as petitioner or defendant, is not 
represented on appeal by a tax official or by the permanently 
appointed counsel who handled the case before the Court of Ap­
peal. Instead the government's case is handled by a member 
of the bar of the Court of Cassation. 
Procedure before the Court of Cassation is even more 
formal than before the Court of Appeal. There is no right to 
oral argument and all material must be submitted in writing. 
Like all decisions of the Court of Cassation, tax decisions 
set out the legal reasoning which led the court to the result 
reached. The Bulletin des arrets de la Cour de Cassation17 
publishes all of the court's  decisions but decisions of major 
importance appear also in both official and private legal peri­
odicals . 1 8  
Should the Court of Cassation conclude that the law has 
been misapplied, it will quash the decision and, because it 
never finds facts, then send the case to another Court of Ap­
peal. Within thirty days after notice of the decision, the peti­
tioner must bring the case before the particular Court of Appeal 
specified in the decision. l9 
(footnote continued) 
word to include implementation of royal and ministerial decrees) is 
interpreted and the rules of procedure observed. 
15 Art. 289 , Code of Income Tax (Art. 6 7 ,  al. 1 ,  of the Coordinated 
Laws) . 
16 Art. 290, Code of Income Tax (Art. 67 , al. 1 ,  of the Coordinated 
Laws) . 
17 The decisions appear in French and in Dutch versions. 
18 Of particular importance are the Bulletin des contributions and 
the Recueil Special de la Jurisprudence . 
19 Art. 292, Code of Income Tax (Art. 67 , al. 1 ,  of the Coordinated 
Laws) . 
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This Court of Appeal decides both questions of law and 
fact. It is not bound by the action of the Court of Cassation, 
and may apply the statute as it sees fit, completely disregard­
ing the Court of Cassation's decision. Should the second Court 
of Appeal reach the same conclusion as the first, the petitioner 
is free to file a second petition with the Court of Cassation 
using the same legal arguments as in the first. 
The Court of Cassation then re-examines the case at a 
common session of both sections . If the Court of Cassation's 
second decision is based on the same legal reasoning as the 
first, the Court of Appeal to which the case is now sent must 
conform its decision to that handed down by the Court of Cassa­
tion. 
Subsequently, the Attorney General will call the attention 
of the Minister of Justice to this situation so that the govern­
ment can introduce an interpretative bill in Parliament, to pre­
vent further interpretative difficulty with respect to the particu­
lar point of law which gave rise to the dispute. 20 
In general, the Minister of Finance does follow the princi­
ple of any case in which the Court of Cassation hands ctown a 
decision, but there have been a few exceptions . Also, since 
there is no opportunity for further appeal, the potential impact 
of an adverse decision has sometimes led the government to 
introduce in the Parliament a so-called interpretative bill to 
nullify or modify the holding of the Court of Cassation.2 1  
20 In t ax  matters , recent interpretative laws which do not nullify or 
modify judicial decisions include the following: A cts of May 24, 1948; 
May 30 , 1949; March 19 ,  1953; March 18 , 1955 ; March 24 , 1959; De­
cember 21 ,  1962; February 13 , 1963; March 16 , 1964. 
21 Interpretative laws which nullify or modify judicial decisions in­
clude the following: A cts of July 13 , 1930 ;  April 7 , 1936; May 30 ,  






ADMlN1STRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL 
FRAMEWORKS 
Section A. Administrative Organizational 
Framework 
1 . 1  Introduction 
French standards of assessment for each tax, whether im­
posed for national or local purposes, are uniform throughout 
the country. While rates imposed by local units are not uni­
form, the subject-matter of all assessments, i .e . ,  the property 
or transactions against which taxes are imposed, are governed 
by standards fixed at the national level. Thus the General Di­
rector of Taxes, 1 as head of the division charged with ad min­
istration and collection of all direct taxes, must provide for 
uniformity in the subject-matter · of assessment while simul­
taneously utilizing decentralized administrative organization to 
determine and collect local taxes in accordance with locally­
set rates,  as well as national taxes . 
There are three levels in the French tax administration: 
the central or national office, departmental or regional offices, 
and local tax offices which, while covering geographical areas 
of varying sizes, are supposed to have approximately identical 
work loads . 
1 . 2  Organizational framework, national office le vel 
At the head of the central administration, L 'Administration 
centrale de la Direction Generale des Impots, is the Director 
General. Serving under the authority of the Ministry of Finance 
and of Economic Affairs , he is concerned both with tax policy 
and administration of the French tax system at the national and 
local levels . His office has three important subordinate divi­
sions, excluding those responsible for personnel matters or for 
supervision of departmental and local offices : the International 
Relations Service, Le Service des Relations Internationales,  the 
1 The Director General of the Customs occupies an equivalent po­
sition with respect to this class of tax. The administrative divisions 
headed by these two officials bear the prime responsibility for French 
taxes . 
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Legislative Service, Le Service de la Legislation, and the Legal 
Service, Le Service du Contentieux. 
The International Relations Service handles the preparation, 
negotiation, and interpretation of tax conventions . 
The Legislative Service has two subdivisions : one deals 
with income taxes on enterprises with particular attention to 
industrial and commercial activity, Sous -Direction des impOts 
sur les enterprises, and the other with taxes on individual in­
comes, Sous-Direction des impots sur les personnes physiques .  
By allocating to each subdivision of the Legislative Service 
responsibility for a particular type of tax, a coordinated ap­
proach to that tax becomes possible . The same office proposes 
reforms to the Ministry and, if the proposal is approved, goes 
on to draft the bill together with the accompanying explanation 
of its objectives and significance .  When the draft bill reaches 
the Council of State, the office participates in the discussion. 
And when the bill reaches the legislature, the office assists the 
Ministry in preparing for the debates, by developing the Minis ­
try's statements of explanation, interventions, and in advising 
the Ministry on the significance of any proposed amendment. 
Since the debates are published in the official journal, the Min­
istry 's  interventions are considered of major importance should 
it later be necessary, because of interpretative difficulties, to 
determine the legislative intent. Finally, upon enactment, the 
same office prepares a variety of implementing materials . 
These range from statements designed to explain to agents of 
the administrative division the interpretative position of the 
Director of Taxes 2 to formulation of decrees which, in effect, 
are supplements to the legislation itself. 
A French statute tends to do no more than state the basic 
principles of a tax, i. e . ,  general rules .  Subsequently, an ap­
propriate administrative office drafts a decree which sets out 
the method of application. Illustratively, when use of the de­
clining balance method of depreciation was authorized by statute, 
the determination of the consequent depreciation rates was left 
to the tax administration. Its draft of a decree setting out this 
rate pattern was then submitted for examination to the Council 
of State, with the appropriate office participating in the discus­
sion. Should unforeseen interpretative difficulties arise there­
after, the same office prepares an explanation which, upon 
2 These statements are published in an official bulletin distributed 
to all agents. Private publishers make this information available to 
the public, 
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approval by appropriate superiors in the administrative hierar­
chy, then becomes the administration's official position. 
1 . 3  Organizational framework, regional office le vel 
A regional office has been placed in each of the ninety de­
partments in France,  except for the Seine, which, because of 
the heavy population concentrated in and around Paris, has two 
such offices . Since the departments vary in population density 
and economic activity, there are marked differences in work­
load among the ninety-one offices . 
At most, a departmental office will have ten qualified tech­
nical personnel on its staff, though the average is five to an 
office (including the director) . The offices will also have an 
average of four other less qualified agents who are, however, 
well acquainted with fiscal legislation. These offices perform 
two functions, overseeing local office activity and dealing with 
specific problems arising at the local office level. 
A wide variety of controls are exercised by the depart­
mental office over the local offices under its supervision. Prin­
cipal inspectors, attached to the departmental office, each 
supervise two or more local offices and advise the departmental 
director of the state of affairs in each. 
After a local office has assembled the figures relating to 
the income and deductions for taxpayers within its geographi­
cal jurisdiction, it sends this data to the departmental office, 
which then computes the tax for each taxpayer on the basis of 
the figures supplied. Only then are taxpayers informed of the 
tax due . 3 Auditing programs for the local offices are also 
fixed at the departmental level. Further,  it develops the for­
mulae used in estimating the actual taxes to be paid by certain 
groups of French taxpayers-small tradesmen, skilled artisans, 
professional men including doctors,  dentists, architects, and 
lawyers-who are subject to the regime du forfait, a form of 
estimated or presumptive taxation.4 Similarly, farm income 
assessment bases are determined at the departmental level 
after consultation with farm organization representatives . 5 
Specific problems arising at the local level also are brought 
to the departmental office, some by the local office but most 
by taxpayers . A local office may encounter either a factual 
situation not dealt with at all by statute or regulation or an 
3 Local offices also forward the relevant information upon which 
the departmental office fixes penalties. 
4 See Chap. XI, 3.2b infra . 
5 Id. 
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ordinary interpretative question it cannot resolve . Either may 
be laid before the departmental office .  If the question cannot 
be resolved there, the matter is forwarded to the Director 
General. Some taxpayers encounter problems which fall within 
the peculiar competence of departmental offices.  These prob­
lems spring from unexpected financial hardship, arising from 
circumstances beyond the taxpayer 's control, such as the death 
of a husband or a catastrophe such as fire or flood which 
terminates productive activity. Under such conditions , the de­
partmental office may remit the tax in whole or in part up to 
specified monetary limits . Should the amount exceed such 
limits, the taxpayer's petition goes to the Director General, 
accompanied by the taxpayer's file and a report prepared by 
an agent of the local office reflecting the petitioner's tax base 
and the agent 's  opinion regarding available resources and the 
accuracy of the facts alleged. 
Other taxpayers may challenge the imposition of a tax on 
the basis of an interpretative issue. Here scrupulous adher­
ence to  the strict conditions of a form set out by statute is 
required: failure to comply results in automatic rejection of 
the claim. Such claims are submitted initially to the same 
departmental office which earlier made the final determination 
of his taxes. If the form is correct, the claim is then for­
warded to the appropriate local office where the inspector who 
determined the income analyzes the facts and points of law and 
prepares a report reflecting his opinion on the merits . The 
report goes to the departmental office, which is empowered to 
waive the tax if the taxpayer's  claim is considered valid. If 
it is not, the claim is rejected by letter. After such a rejec­
tion, a taxpayer must use the courts for any further challenge. 
1 . 4  Organizational framework, local office leve l 
Below the departmental directions and directly responsible 
for preparing the assessment rolls are the 1700 local offices 
distributed throughout France.  Each office has approximately 
the same work-load, though the territory under each-termed 
a section-varies, depending as it does upon population density. 
Thus a section in a rural area may include several communes, 
while a so-called mixed section may include a town and one or 
more adjacent rural communes . Sections in urban areas may 
include all of a small city, or only a portion of a major one . 6 
6 Illustratively, an urban section might include a portion of Mar­
seilles , a rural section might include St. Valery en C aux, located in 
Normandy , a mixed section might include a city of 9 ,000 such as Vitre 
with the neighboring communes. 
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The following table illustrates the number of communes and of 
taxpayers likely to be found in each of the three major types 
of sections : 
Type of Section 
Urban Rural Mixed 
Extent of section, or 
number of communes Part of the city 82 30 
Number of inhabitants 22 ,236 31 ,659 31,900 
Number of files (tax on 
income, local taxes) 15 ,068 9 ,440 7 ,500 
Number of taxpayers sub-
ject to income tax 3 ,538 2 ,382 2 ,442 
Each section is headed by an inspector, assisted by one 
or more tax examiners and several clerks . There are 2400 
inspectors for the whole of France, for certain sections have 
two. Technically qualified agents assisting these inspectors 
total 1200. 7 , 
Each section's  prime responsibility is to determine the 
tax base.  About one-third of its effort goes into preparation 
of assessment rolls for local taxes (the land tax upon real 
property, the tax on occupancy, and license and franchise taxes) .  
Even more effort is involved in preparing assessment rolls 
for income taxes, based either upon taxpayer declarations of 
income (as in the case of income from salaries, sales of per­
sonalty, and from commercial and industrial activity) , or upon 
estimates of income (as in the case of profits from agricul­
tural activity, from small shops, or from the exercise of the 
liberal professions) . 
To assist the inspector to make the assessments for all 
these taxes each section maintains individual files for each 
taxpayer.  A file includes not only the declarations or esti­
mates of the taxpayer 's income but also reports sent in from 
other sources.  These reports may be from the local bank 
(covering the opening or closing of bank accounts, and income 
from securities collected by the bank for the taxpayer), or from 
the registry of automobiles reporting on a taxpayer's  purchase 
or sale of an automobile, or from other sources indicating his 
purchases or sales of realty or other property. 
7 The insufficient number of personnel is recognized but all French 
administrative agencies experience difficulty in securing sufficient per­
sonnel. 
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An effort presently is being made to regroup the local of­
fices in metropolitan centers, though without any fundamental 
change in functions or organizations . Even now, the offices of 
more than one section are sometimes housed in the same build­
ing and are called tax centers, some consolidation of minor 
administrative functions having also been accomplished, such 
as receipt and dispatch of mail. A principal inspector of taxes 
supervises the work of the inspectors of one or more of these 
tax centers, and reports directly to the departmental director . 
Section B. Personne l Framework (Go ve rnmental 
and Non-Go ve rnmental) 
1 . 5  Governmental professional personnel 
Quite different methods of recruitment and standards of 
qualification are applied to the two principal groups of officials 
associated with the tax administration: the top echelon of the 
national office, and all other officials . 
Prior to 1945, officials in the top echelon of the national 
tax administration, and in all other comparable divisions of the 
government, had worked up through the lower levels of the par­
ticular agency, qualifying on the basis of seniority and rank 
for a rigorous competitive examination. While this system 
produced men with great technical competence, it did not con­
tribute to their awareness of non-agency factors and problems 
relevant to the governing process .  
T o  remedy this situation, the provisional government in 
1944 established a school, under the Prime Minister, to recruit 
and train top level officials for all ministries, L 'Ecole Nationale 
d 'Administration. Upon admission the students are considered 
as officials, and are paid by the state 8 during the course of 
study which lasts for twenty-eight months . The competitive 
examination for admission may be taken by two groups . To 
qualify for the first, an individual must be less than 26 years 
of age, and either hold a degree of bachelor of laws or possess 
a <:liploma from the Institute of Political Studies,  L 'Ins titut 
d 'Etudes Politiques, or from some other comparable institute.  
To qualify for the second, an individual must be a public offi­
cial, less than 30 years of age, with a minimum of five years 
8 Between 1946 and 1964 , the School of National Administration 
graduated 1282 administrators.  Of these 45 have been appointed to the 
tax administration, representing about half the effective force of that 
agency. 
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of public service.  Only about ten percent of the candidates 
survive the initial examination and the majority of these hold 
both the degree of bachelor of laws and a diploma from the 
Institute of Political Studies, courses which can be pursued 
simultaneously. 
The written portion of the initial competitive examination 
has a broad economic, social, and political orientation, cover­
ing (1)  the evolution of some ideas and political, soc.ial, or 
economic developments since the eighteenth century, (2) policy 
considerations bearing on a contemporary economic issue, 
( 3) the current political institutions of some important nation, 
international organization, or constituent of French administra­
tion, and ( 4) a translation into French of a text in a foreign 
language chosen by the candidate . Candidates who survive that 
test then take a penetrating oral examination designed to test 
the candidates '  ability to deal competently and exhaustively with 
some matter of political or economic philosophy, within the 
framework of a brief speech, prepared on short notice, followed 
by questioning from the board of examiners.9 Then follows a 
series consisting of four additional oral examinations dealing 
with the following areas : ( 1) the candidates '  general knowledge, 
( 2) some social question, (3) either administrative law or 
fiscal legislation, as chosen by the candidates themselves, and 
(4), again at the choice of the candidates, either international 
organizations or economic and human geography. This series 
of examinations is concluded by a test dealing with the candi­
dates '  physical qualifications . 
The candidates receive points on the basis of their per ­
formance in each examination, and the totals are multiplied by 
individual coefficients . From these come the rankings which 
determine the comparative standing of each individual. lO 
9 "For the second examination, the corresponding interrogation 
consists of a conversation with the board of examiners ,  lasting about 
twenty minutes after a preparation of ten minutes , having as a point 
of departure a text which both interests the tax administration and en­
ables the board to determine the experience acquired by the candidate. 
"This interrogation is entirely conversational , born of the idea 
that practical experience of some years is as valuable as academic 
training and that equality between the candidates is better assured if 
each is considered in terms of the personal training which he is sup­
posed to have acquired in service. But the examiners obviously can­
not confine themselves . to subjects too technical and do not limit them­
selves to administrative techniques." Ecole Nationale d'Administration, 
Concours et scolarite 35 (1964) . 
10 " . . .  at each examination, the members of the board of examin­
ers are careful to test, as to these matters , the extent of the education 
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Upon admission to the National School of Administration, 
the students are sent to some unfamiliar part of France or to 
a foreign country, where for eleven months they work with top 
level French or international officials to provide practical ex­
perience as well as an awareness of administrative realities . 1 1  
The second period of study, lasting some seventeen months, 
is spent attending lectures, administrative conferences, and in 
working in either private or public offices and on practical 
exercises. 
At the conclusion of this second period, the students are 
ranked, and select their careers in the order of rank. l2 Be­
fore commencing work, however, a student must sign a pledge 
to serve the state for at least ten years. If he refuses to 
sign, he must refund the salary he received during his period 
of study. 
Only at this point do the young administrators or judges 
begin to familiarize themselves with the specific requirements 
of their assigned functions . Illustratively, at the Ministry of 
Finance, administrators attached to the office of the Director 
General of Taxes now begin to learn the details of the French 
tax law. Previously, they knew only the principles and major 
outlines of that law, but with the typical background in law and 
economics, adjustment is rapid. 
(footnote continued) 
of the candidates ;  this is equally true with respect to basic and ele­
mentary ideas which, as to pr,actical subjects , one has the right to 
expect of a future student of l 'Ecole nationale d'administration . 
1 1As another president wrote , 'The examination should permit the 
selection of students capable of benefiting from the full complement of 
the training given at l 'Ecole and of adaptation to the functions of top­
level administration; it is less important to probe the extent of the 
candidates' knowledge than their presence of mind, their skill in shift­
ing from one subject to another , and, this done, to consider the new 
subject in its totality , their frankness in acknowledging ignorance or 
their skill in palliating this , and finally their possibility of growth 
within the service. ' " Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Concours et 
scolarite 34 (1964) . 
11  At the conclusion of this period, each student prepares a detailed 
memorandum on some aspect of political , economic financial , social , 
or administrative problems. 
12 The posts to which the , students may be appointed include the 
Council of state , le Conseil d'Etat, the Court of Accounts , le Cour des 
Comptes, the administrative tribunals, les tribunaux administratifs, the 
Office of the Inspector of Finances , l 'Inspection des Finances, Admin­
istrator for the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs , Work, National 
�ducation, and of the Interior.� Ministe'res des Finances, des Affairs 
Etrang{wes, au Travail, de l 'Education Nationale, de l 'Interieur. 
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Other lesser officials enter the tax administration by tak­
ing either the examination for examiner or that for an inspec­
tor. 
To qualify for the former, a candidate must be less than 
26 years of age, and hold a diploma evidencing his completion 
of the secondary level of education. 13 Success on the exami­
nation is followed by a one-year training period during which 
trainees are paid. The training period includes a three and a 
half month period of study at the National School for Taxes ,  
L 'Ecole Nationale des Jmpots. and an eight and a half month 
period of on-the-job training in the field.14 Then after five 
years service as an examiner, during which he assists an in­
spector, an individual may take the examination for inspector. 
One-fifth of the inspector vacancies are reserved for examin­
ers.15 
Otherwise, admission to the examination for inspector re­
quires that the candidate be less than 28  years of age and have 
completed at least one year 's study toward a bachelor's  degree 
in law. Indeed, the written examination itself covers some of 
the matters studied in that first year, for it requires prepara­
tion of ( 1) memoranda on some phase of economic policy or 
fiscal legislation, and on some aspect of civil or commercial 
law, and (2) at the choice of the candidate, either the solution 
of certain mathematical problems or a memorandum on consti­
tutional law and political institutions . 16 The candidate is sub­
ject also to oral interrogatories . 
Students who successfully complete the examinations are 
then paid while taking the two-year course of study for inspec­
tors at the National School for Taxes, L 'Ecole Nationale des 
Imp8ts . This program includes two periods of practical ex­
perience in the field and two periods of study in Paris . l7 The 
13 The written portion of the examination requires the candidate to 
solve certain mathematical problems, to prepare an essay on a sub­
ject of general information and a memorandum on some aspect of 
France' s  goverumental organization. Also the candidate must explain 
orally a text of general significance and submit to interrogation on 
financial legislation. 
14 Located since October 1966 in Clermont-Ferrand. 
15 The examiners have the further advantage of being excused from 
the requirement of further academic study, i.e. , they need not secure 
the degree of bachelor of laws. 
16 While optional with each candidate, competence in foreign language 
and/or accounting may be demonstrated in addition to the required 
proofs of admissibility. 
17 Since October 1966 ,  located in Clermont-Ferrand. 
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schedule deliberately is planned to permit the students to attend 
simultaneously the law school and thus secure their degrees in 
law. The first period of study emphasizes comparative tax 
systems, social and economic aspects of the French tax struc­
ture, principles of taxation embodied in French fiscal legisla­
tion, and principles of commercial accounting. Before the first 
year ends, the students choose between specialization in turn­
over taxes, taxes sur le chijjre d 'ajjairs, or in registry and 
direct taxes, contributions directes e t  enregistrement. This 
choice largely controls the materials to be studied during the 
second year, though all students also continue to study account­
ing principles and procedures . 
If the candidates for the rank of inspector did not possess 
a bachelor of laws degree upon entering the training program, 
they are required to obtain the degree before completing that 
program. Those candidates who are unable to obtain such a 
degree are classified as examiners . 18 Upon graduating from 
the National School for Taxes, students must agree to serve 
the state for at least eight years; sums previously advanced 
must be refunded if the agreement is broken. 
New inspectors are assigned to either the national or de­
partmental offices, or placed at the head of a local office .  
After ten years, they may take the competitive examination for 
the rank of principal inspector . 19 
Principal inspectors may work under departmental direc­
tors, supervisory inspectors who either audit accounts or es­
tablish the assessment rolls . Alternatively, a principal inspector 
may be given specific duties of his own relative to either audit 
or assessment. Occasionally, principal inspectors also serve 
as technical associates in the national office or as departmental 
directors. 
1 .6 Private tax practitioners 
There are three main groups of tax advisors : former in­
spectors of taxes, expert accountants ,  and specialized advocates .  
1 8  Since the training program includes two periods of residence, ini­
tially in Paris , since October 1966 in Clermont-Ferrand, it is entirely 
feasible to acquire the required law degree. 
19 While account is taken of the professional qualities and general 
abilities of the candidates ,  each candidate also must prepare an essay 
on an economic or financial problem and a very detailed memorandum 
on a specific tax question, his only reference being to the general tax 
code. Finally , oral examinations also are given to test his technical 
knowledge, his reasoning abilities , qualities of judgment, and his gen­
eral aptitude in administrative and control techniques .  
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Former inspectors of taxes comprise the largest single 
group of lawyers specializing in tax practice.  These men have 
a bachelor 's degree in law, 20 have been trained at the National 
School for Taxes, and couple their practical experience with 
intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the tax system.  
In consequence, this group typically represents taxpayers 
in contested cases, both at the administrative level and in the 
courts. 
Because other lawyers who lack this in-service experience 
do counsel on business matters, some inevitably also give ad­
vice on tax problems . Their earlier formal education did not 
deal with the fine points of tax legislation. The subject was 
touched upon in only two of their courses : Public Finance,  and 
Commercial and Tax Law of Business Transactions , which is 
required of students concentrating in private law but not of 
public law concentrates . In consequence, except for the very 
few who have devoted much time mastering the details of tax 
law, these advocates tend to be far less competent in tax mat­
ters than the previously described group of former inspectors. 
Members of a final group of tax advisers were trained as 
accountants in accounting offices, though some have completed 
studies at the university level in either schools of commerce 
or law. The examinations for an accountant's  diploma empha­
size primarily accounting techniques and only secondarily touch 
upon legal matters . These accountants, after preparing the 
financial statements for a business enterprise, apply the tax 
law in extracting the data necessary to fill out declarations of 
income from taxable profits . 
20 Except for former examiners who qualified for the rank of in­
spector and were excused from this requirement. 
CHAPTER X 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS 
Section A. Characte r of the Unde rlying Statute 
2 . 1  The precision of the statute itself 
There are more than 2,000 articles in the General Code 
of Taxes which covers all taxes levied in France by the central 
government, departments , communes, and certain public insti­
tutions . Of these, only 248 articles deal with determination of 
the tax on income . These cover 80 pages,  each of which in­
cludes about 600 words . An added 28 pages deal with collec­
tion, penalties, procedure,  and litigation. 
To the statutes enacted by Parliamentl must be added the 
regulations2 which are issued by administrative agencies and 
which may be tested, as to legality, before the judiciary. Tax 
regulations appear in an annex to the General Code for Taxes . 
Those relating to the income tax cover 77 pages,  and thus , in 
bulk, almost equal that part of the code to which they relate. 
A factor contributing to the importance of these regulations 
is the form of French tax statutes .  Principles and fundamen­
tal concepts are not defined, although the terms-for example, 
income, profits, etc. -- are used constantly. Ultimately, inde­
pendent tribunals hammer out the general meaning of such 
terms . 
Special rules and exceptions, though relatively few in num­
ber, are set out in both the statute and in the regulations . And 
when these come before the independent tribunals, they are 
construed strictly. 3 Illustrating the degree of specificity found 
in the exceptions is Article 1 57 of the Code, which enumerates 
the types of income which need not be taken into account in 
determining the total net income of an individual. Excludable 
income under this article includes (1 )  income from properties 
1 Article 34 of the French Constitution gives Parliament exclusive 
power , in the case of all taxes , to enact statutes relating to the tax 
base, the rates , and the methods of collection. 
2 Parliament, in enacting a statute , can delegate expressly to the 
administrative agency the power to fix the method of applying the law 
which itself states only a general principle. 
3 See 2.4 infra . 
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classed as historical monuments subject, however, to such 
conditions as may be imposed by the classifying decree, ( 2) in­
terest on Treasury bonds with a maturity date of five years or 
less, (3) gratuities given to long-time workers to whom the 
Minister of Work has conferred a medal of honor, (4) arrear­
ages on certain bonds issued in 19 52 and 19 58. 
As distinguished from the exceptions, however, the general 
rules leave room for much interpretation. To illustrate, Arti­
cle 209 states that corporations are subject to the corporate 
income tax only to the extent that profit is derived from enter­
prises conducted in France .  4 The Code does not define the 
meaning of "conducted in France ."  An indication of the degree 
to which this created interpretative questions is implicit both 
from the following description of criteria which evolved out of 
case law and administrative regulations , and from the fact that, 
despite these criteria, difficulty in practical application per­
sists . The criteria which evolved include : ( 1) operation of an 
establishment in France, (2) activity in France of an agent 
whose legal identity, in concluding contracts in the name of the 
enterprise, is not distinct from that of the enterprise itself, 
and (3) realization in France of profits from operations entire­
ly carried on in France, e .g . ,  purchases and sales of merchan­
dise there. 
Also illustrating the generality of France's statutory pat­
tern is the area of depreciation deductions . The Code itself 
does nothing more than authorize deduction of "amortizations 
really effectuated by the enterprise, within the limit of those 
generally admitted according to the usages of each particular 
type of industry, of commerce or of operation."5 Under this 
general provision, enterprises are free within the limits of the 
particular industry 's customary usage, to determine their own 
depreciation deductions in the first instance .  The tax adminis­
tration is also free, however, to prove those deductions exces­
sive. 6 In this same connection, a recent statute which permits 
4 The text of Article 209 follows in part: " . . .  en tenant compte 
uniquement des benefices realises dans les enterprises exploitees en 
France ." 
5 Article 39-2 reads in part as follows: " . . .  amortissements 
reellement effectues par l 'entreprise,  dans la limite de ceux generale­
ment admis d' apres les usages de chaque nature d' industrie, de com­
merce ou d' exploitation." 
6 In actuality , the rate of depreciation is less of a problem in 
France than in other countries , such as the United states ,  where very 
precise and detailed rules have been set. There is little interest in 
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the use of the declining balance method in calculating deprecia­
tion states only the principle; the method of application is left 
entirely to administrative regulation. 
2 . 2  Legislative pre -enactment aids to interpre tation 
The initial characterization applied to proposed legislation 
depends upon its source.  If presented by the government, it is 
termed a draft, if by a member of Parliament, a proposal. In 
either case, however, the initial presentation of the bill is ac­
companied by a written statement of the motives , expose des 
motifs . This statement explains the purpose and scope of the 
proposed legislation. It also puts into lay language the techni­
cal terminology of the proposed bill which frequently will con­
tain cross-references to existing statutes .  
The proposed bill is examined by the Committee on Finan­
ces of the National Assembly. The Minister of Finance, ac­
companied by senior civil servants from the office of the 
Director General of Taxes, attempts a full explanation of the 
bill and answers inquiries . These hearings are not open to the 
public, nor are they published. The final report prepared by 
a reporter appointed by the Committee is published and dis­
tributed to the members of the Parliament. However, profes­
sional groups get in touch with individual members of Parliament 
and make known their opinions or objections . Further, the 
press usually carries a critical analysis of the bill as pro­
posed. 
In contrast to the non-publication of the Committee's hear­
ings, the debates which follow in the National Asse mbly are 
fully published in the official journal. These parliamentary 
discussions are preceded by an explanation of the entire draft 
or proposal. Spokesmen for different groups state their gen­
eral views on the proposed bill. Discussion of the bill then 
follows, article by article, with proposed amendments to any 
article being discussed before the article itself. 7 Deputies 
state their positions , and the Minister of Finance, assisted by 
technical counselors (officials from the office of the Director 
General of Taxes), states his view of any proposed amendment, 
(footnote continued) 
France in instituting such a system. Under French law , all gains de­
rived from the sale of active elements , assets , are taxed as ordinary 
income , and hence excessive depreciation cannot yield a preferentially 
treated capital gain on subsequent sales. 
7 Any deputy is free to propose such amendments during the hear­
ings before the Committee br before the debate opens . 
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whether in criticism or assent. He also explains the govern­
ment's interpretation of the proposed text . Finally a vote is 
taken on the article in question. 
Because debates are published in full, the public has ready 
access to the Minister 's  stated opinions, explanations, and the 
answers he gave to the questions posed. These are extremely 
valuable in future attempts to interpret the statute, for in them 
may be found the intention of the legislature . Indeed, deputies 
frequently address interpretative questions to the Minister, in 
writing or orally, to force disclosure of the administrative in­
terpretation of particular clauses . 8 These questions usually 
are prepared by tax practitioners and provoke wide interest. 9 
In addition to publication in the official journals, the official 
tax administration bulletins and the tax law reviews reprint 
them with added commentaries . 
2 . 3  Standards of construction followed by the judiciary in in­
terpreting the statute 
Administrative tribunals, with the Council of State at the 
apex, and not the ordinary judiciary, have jurisdiction both to 
determine the legal status of tax laws and regulatory acts (de­
crees and orders) and to interpret them. It is most unusual, 
however, for the tribunals to encounter a case wherein the tax­
payer seeks to have even a regulatory act declared invalid for 
reasons of illegality, recours pour exces de pouvoir, on the 
ground the regulation exceeds the limits set by the law. But 
where such an action is successfully maintained, the act being 
declared ultra vires,  it will suffer that impediment as to all 
taxpayers, present and future, erga omnes .  
The prime function of administrative tribunals in tax cases 
is to apply the law and regulatory acts, and if their texts be 
silent, obscure, or inadequate, the tribunals must interpret 
them. This interpretative function has become an increasingly 
significant source of law because of the increasing complexity 
of legislation and the wide ranging diversity of transactions . 
Marginal and paradoxical situations heretofore unforeseen con­
tinually arise .  Consequent imperfections in the regulatory texts 
8 The oral questions are known as orales, Actually , they are writ­
ten but are termed orales, because their text and the answer , also in 
writing, are read aloud. 
9 These questions frequently relate to an anticipated interpretative 
difficulty which the recently enacted statute will create for some sec­
tion of the tax codes , or to an apparent conflict between a taxpayer 
and some local tax official as to a particular situation. 
242 FRANCE :  RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS 
are inevitable, have become every day matters, and their firm 
resolution is the important task of the administrative tribu­
nals . 10 The manner in which these tribunals have approached 
their task has been marked by at least two tendencies. 
The first has been facilitated by the generality of the 
French statute's basic principles. As distinguished from other 
areas of case law, the results actually reached by these tribu­
nals reflect a greater concern for similarities in the net effect 
of transactions than for differences involving mere legal nice­
ties. That facts and factual effects are stressed, n rather than 
legal arguments based on the subtleties of the private law, 
warrants the conclusion that these tribunals tend to construe 
the basic provisions of the statutes broadly, not narrowly or 
pedantically. This rests on the supposition that France 's pub­
licly oriented income tax statute was intended, to a greater 
extent than the private law, to focus on the economic essence 
of transactions, and this necessarily renders formal legal dis­
tinctions less significant. Thus account may be taken of illegal 
situations or those lacking an equivalent in private law-e.g. ,  
illegal commercial practices, the existence of irregular cor­
porations, or prohibited activities (drug traffic, white slave 
traffic, etc . ) .  This is not to suggest, however, that the tax law 
is completely independent of the private law. Indeed, it appears 
primarily in instances where the broadly based general princi­
ple of a statute or regulatory act is  coupled with a precise 
identification of those matters to be excepted. 
A second tendency reflected in the results reached by the 
administrative tribunals shows their interest in guaranteeing 
certain basic rights to taxpayers , by imposing what might be 
called due process requirements . For example, it was the 
Council of State that first established the principle that a regu­
latory act could not have a retroactive effect if it  established 
a tax covering the past.12 Again, the Council of State held 
that, to the end of preserving to a taxpayer the chance of mak­
ing an adequate defense, a judge in a tax case could not take 
judicial notice of facts, submitted by the tax administration, if 
access to the source was denied to the taxpayer . While these 
guarantees may represent nothing more than an extension to 
the tax area of general legal principles,  it is noteworthy that 
10 C. Lasry , The Council of State, Studies and Documents (1955) . 
1 1  See Conclusions Corneille , Order of January 21 , 1921.  Sirey 
1921. 3. 38. 
12 0rder , December 23, 1949 , Lebon 567 ; Order March 16 , 1956 ,  
Lebon 121 .  
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that the extension was accomplished in the first instance by 
courts . Only afterwards were they confirmed by the legisla­
ture. 13 
Where a court is faced with an interpretative question as 
such, it seeks to determine the intention of the legislature in 
order to clarify its own understanding of the text of the statute. 
It will give prime attention to the expose de motif, the expla­
nation presented by the government at the time the bill embody­
ing the presently considered statute was under consideration by 
the Parliament. In addition, the court will read carefully the 
debates to note the comments made prior to enactment, such 
comments frequently providing considerable assistance in the 
resolution of issues . In general, it may be said that the courts 
do not seek to limit the tax statute by strict construction but 
instead seek to effectuate what they conceive to be the basic 
purpose of the provision in question. 
Section B. The ''Regulations " Program 
2 .4  and 2 . 5  Types, force , and purpose of "regulations " 
In France,  the expression, regulations, has a quite differ­
ent meaning than that accorded the term in United States tax 
administration. In France,  the term covers both regulatory 
texts-that is, the decrees-which as a part of the law must be 
followed and thus possess true legal significance,  and adminis­
trative instructions which do nothing more, on the substantive 
side, than reflect the administrative view. 
The legal effect of the regulatory texts stems from the 
constitution, which vests regulatory power in the Prime Minis­
ter . 14 These texts may be promulgated under the general regu­
latory power or pursuant to a particular statute which delegates 
to regulatory texts the establishment of details regarding a 
general principle and its application. The regulatory texts are 
published in the official journals and must be taken into account 
both by the tax administration and the tribunals . 
In no case,  however, · may these regulatory texts be con­
trary to the statutes themselves .15 While the judiciary must 
recognize their force, it may inquire into their legality. Should 
the occasion arise, careful consideration will be given to the 
13 Acts of 1959 and 1963. 
14 Art. 21, Constitution of 1958. 15 See 2 .3 supra . 
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question of whether a regulatory text creates a taxpayer obli­
gation exceeding that prescribed in the law. 
As noted earlier, taken together, these regulatory texts 
have considerable bulk as well as importance, 1 in part be­
cause they both implement and supplement the statutes them­
selves. Thus not only do the regulatory texts complete the 
gaps left in the statute by the legislature but further they speci­
fy the manner in which the statute is to be applied in practice .  
All such texts, however, are not issued by the same govern­
mental level and all are not of equal weight. The formal clas­
sification is significant, for the provisions of the text cannot 
be revoked or modified by a text of lesser weight. The revok­
ing text must be at least of equal or greater weight. Thus a 
simple decree cannot cancel a decree issued by the Council of 
State, whereas a decree from the Council of State can revoke 
a simple decree or a ministerial order. A description of the 
different types of regulatory texts, ranked in descending order, 
follows . 
Decrees which take the form of a regulation of the public 
administration spring from language of a specific statute which 
delegates the rule-making function regarding details and methods 
of application. They are issued by the Prime Minister after 
consultation with the general assembly of the Council of State . 
Drafts are prepared in the office of the Director General of 
Taxes and forwarded to the Ministry of Finance which submits 
them to the Council of State . There they are examined fully. 
Senior civil servants from the Director General's office are 
present for the purpose of explaining the regulation's  general 
purpose and specific objectives, as well as to answer queries . 
The Council of State renders an opinion, favorable or unfavor­
able . It is free to propose changes both as to form and sub­
stance . Proposed changes of form are generally, but not al­
ways, accepted by the office of the Director General. Proposed 
substantive changes raise questions of public policy which the 
government itself ultimately must resolve, as such matters are 
not left to civil servants. 
A second type, decrees of the Council of State, arise from 
the government's  request that the Council of State render an 
opinion, which takes the form of a decree . It is not necessary 
to convoke the general assembly of the Council of State for this 
purpose ; one of the administrative divisions acting alone is 
competent to act. As suggested earlier, such a decree carries 
16 see 2 . 1  supra . 
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less weight than a decree in the form of a regulation of the 
public administration. And should the Council of State render 
an unfavorable opinion, the government may disregard it. More­
over, opinions by the Council of State, falling in this second 
category, are never published. 
Simple decrees issued by the Prime Minister constitute a 
third type . While he customarily consults the Council of State, 
this is not required . 
Ministerial orders, a fourth type, are issued by the com­
petent minister as he considers necessary or desirable . 
Apart from these regulatory texts, circulars,  instructions , 
and memoranda are prepared by the office of the Director Gen­
eral of Taxes for use by the tax administration. Unlike most 
regulatory texts, these publications are not submitted to the 
Council of State. Nor are there any public hearings, though in 
some cases officials will contact representatives of affected 
trade and professional groups17 or officials of other interested 
Ministries . These publications rephrase in lay language the 
statutes and the implementing decrees . 18  They specify the 
procedures to be followed by the local tax officials who must 
abide by these instructions . Taxpayers are not bound by the 
interpretations set out in the instructions but they find them 
an excellent source of information regarding the governmental 
interpretation of the statute. They are free, however, to con­
test the application of such instructions to their personal cases 
before competent tribunals, citing in support of their position 
the statutes and regulatory texts . These administrative inter­
pretations differ from the regulatory texts not only by refer­
ence to  their respective official sources and in the weight ac­
corded them, but also in the form they follow . Regulatory texts 
follow a legal form, similar to a statute . Administrative in­
structions are expository in that they seek to explain the law 
and the implementing decrees, using as an aid numerous exam­
ples . The examples cover not only the most frequently arising 
situations, but also some unusual ones . Often the administra­
tive position they reflect is more liberal than strict construc­
tion of the statute would permit. These instructions are not 
considered unalterable; additional ones are published where 
17 Typically, as soon as a statute is passed by Parliament , affected 
groups clamor to be heard that they may express their opinions on 
the implementation of the statute. Thus it is very easy for the office 
of the Director General of Taxes to learn their views and reactions . 
1 8 rn a typical instruction, the official text of the statute and the 
regulatory texts appear in an Annex. 
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modification appears desirable, e .g . ,  where new unforeseen in­
terpretative difficulties arise. Unfortunately, however, the 
instructions do not cover all of the legislation enacted. Ir­
regularly, the tax administration collects instructions which 
have been issued intermittently over a period, rearranges them 
in logical order and republishes them in a major circular . 
The prime shortcoming of the instructions is that they do not 
cover all of the legislation enacted. 
2 . 6  Manner of processing "regulations " 19 
While regulatory texts and the administrative instructions 
have the important differences noted above, there is a strong 
unifying force. The same office prepares both. In fact the 
same officials will have drafted the ori:f:inal bi1120 to which the 
regulatory text and instructions relate. 1 This preserves con­
tinuity of thought beginning with the draft of a bill through its 
implementing regulatory text and complementary instructions . 22 
The time which elapses between the enactment of a statute 
and the appearance of the regulatory texts is not uniform. If 
the statute itself fixes a specific period of time, usually an at­
tempt is made to comply. However, some regulatory texts have 
never been prepared for publication, despite statutory direc­
tives . This is most likely to occur where the statute was en­
acted as a result of parliamentary initiative, over government 
opposition stemming from a belief the statute itself is unwork­
able in practice. Illustratively, in 19 59 a member of Parlia­
ment proposed-and Parliament enacted-a provision imposing 
a complementary tax of 1 5  percent on income derived by work­
ers who took on additional jobs during their free time, that is, 
over the weekends and vacations . 23 Complaints had arisen over 
19 The diverse types of French regulations required that their pur­
poses be dealt with in 2 .4 and 2 .5  supra . 
20' Changes , of course, may have been made in the course of the 
parliamentary debate. 
21 Where a circular treats the administrative matters outside the 
tax law area itself , it will be prepared by another group of officials 
who are charged with a different level of activity-i.e. , administrative 
duties. 
22 As pointed out in Chap. IX, the office of the Director of Taxes 
is divided into groups of officials by reference to particular types of 
taxes or activity. Thus the office responsible for taxes on industrial 
and commercial profits prepares , as to that subject, the drafts of any 
law, implementing or supplementing decress ,  and the administrative 
instructions. 
23 Law of December 22, 1959 , Art. 22, paragraph 45 . 
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this practice, travail noir, and the legislation was in response 
thereto. However, the tax administration considered that it 
was impossible to apply the measure, recognizing the clandes­
tine nature of the activity and the difficulties in securing in­
formation. In consequence, it made no effort to take any actual 
steps to implement the legislation and hence addressed no in­
struction to the men in the field. 
Administrative instructions tend to appear within one to 
four months after publication of the law and the implementing 
decree. The law of December 28,  1959, instituting the use of 
the declining balance method of depreciation, can be used to 
illustrate the typical time pattern. The regulatory text or 
decree was issued on May 9, 1960. The first administrative 
instruction was dated August 22,  19 60, and since then a few 
decisions on particular points have been published by the ad­
ministration. 
Section c .  The Rulings Program 
2 .  7 Formal advance rulings to taxpayers 
France makes no provision for advance rulings requested 
by individual taxpayers on prospective transactions . On occa­
sion, however, collective rulings are issued in these circum­
stances, and even private rulings may be obtained in the case 
of completed transactions . 
The so-called collective rulings are issued in response to 
requests received from the tax departments of trade or pro­
fessional organizations, to resolve interpretative difficulties or 
unanticipated situations encountered by that trade or profession. 
Such tax departments constantly study new laws, implementing 
decrees, and instructions, to ascertain possible effects on the 
association's  members . A commentary on the law, taking due 
account of administrative interpretations, is prepared and dis­
tributed to the members.  Not infrequently, an organization's  
tax division contacts the appropriate officials in the office of 
the Director General to resolve a question or raise an objec­
tion bearing, e . g. ,  on the rate of depreciation regarding new 
types of equipment or on the variations in the provisions re­
garding risks insured by insurance companies .  If the matter 
lends itself to easy resolution, the competent official 's  oral 
opinion may suffice .  If the matter does not lend itself to such 
informal treatment, detailed and thoughtful consideration being 
required, no oral answer is given. Instead, after the informal 
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discussion, the organization's representatives submit the prob­
lem in writing to the office of the Director General of Taxes .  
This memorandum is turned over to the same group of officials 
who drafted the bill, decrees, and administrative instructions 
which provoked the inquiry. This group prepared the official 
response .  The importance of the question posed by the trade 
or professional organization determines at what official level 
the response will be signed.24 Should a quite liberal interpre­
tation be considered desirable, the Minister, who is responsible 
to Parliament, will make the actual decision, not the civil serv­
ants . In any event, any written response is always in the form 
of a memorandum which the administration is willing to have 
published. Once transmitted to the tax division of the particu­
lar association, the administration feels bound by the decision. 
The association itself will distribute this decision to its mem­
bers, and the tax administration will send it to all officials . 
Individual taxpayers may, though rarely do, request that 
the administration advise them of the effect of a statute, regu­
latory text, or administrative instruction on a given completed 
transaction. Such a request must be written, and should be as 
clear, complete, and precise as possible, explaining each de­
tail of the completed transaction, so the administration's agents 
can obtain readily all of the requisite information and factual 
proof. Requests of this kind, addressed to the departmental 
Director of Taxes ,  are investigated by an inspector who makes 
a field audit. Should the departmental Director feel uncertain 
regarding the proper response, the taxpayer 's  request is for­
warded on to the Director General of Taxes . The written re­
sponse of this office is then forwarded to the taxpayer. A 
declaration of income prepared by a taxpayer in accordance 
with the official response will not be challenged if his own situ­
ation, and the relevant law and regulations, remain unchanged. 
However, the official response binds the administration only as 
to that taxpayer alone; it does not have general application. 
While the above procedure is seldom used, another is em­
ployed fairly often. Trade associations or tax advisors will 
contact a deputy in the National Assembly and request that he 
pose an interpretative question to the Minister of Finance .  The 
deputy will submit the question to the Minister in writing. The 
24 rn the order of increasing importance, the response will be signed 
by the head of the office , the under director charged with the tax on 
enterprises,  the chief of the legislative service, or by the Director 
General himself. 
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resulting answer from the Minister, contrary to a private rul­
ing on a completed transaction, will apply to all taxpayers and 
as to both prospective and completed transactions, absent a 
statutory or regulatory change . 
2 . 8  Informal technical advice to taxpayers on proposed trans ­
actions 
It is most unusual for a French taxpayer to request in­
formal advice from a tax agent on the tax consequences of a 
proposed transaction. Occasionally, legal advisors of large 
corporations do contact officials in the office of the Director 
General of Taxes to discuss orally some anticipated tax ques­
tions . Such officials do indicate their own opinions, and on 
occasion, at the request of the taxpayer, these are reduced to 
writing. 25 
2.9 Technical advice to field offices 
Should a local inspector be unable to resolve interpretative 
questions which arise during the course of an assessment, he 
will refer the question to the departmental Director. Should 
the Director, in turn, feel the need for advice from a yet higher 
echelon, the question is forwarded by him to the appropriate 
officials in the office of the Director General. The officials , 
to whom the matter is referred there, previously will have 
drafted the bill, implementing regulatory texts or decrees, and 
administrative instructions, and served also as the earlier de­
scribed point of contact with trade associations . Thus con­
sistency of interpretation is assured. These in-service requests 
for advice can be handled informally-i.e . ,  by telephone or in 
a written communication not sent through the usual channels. 
More often than not, they are forwarded as official requests, 
and the formal answer of the superior relieves his subordinate 
of all responsibility. The taxpayer is not informed that such a 
request has been made, is not given a hearing by the higher 
echelon, and the response is confidential. 
Most frequently, these requests for advice are settled at 
the departmental level. Those which reach the Director Gen­
eral's office usually raise questions having both broad theoreti­
cal and practical significance. Occasionally, conclusions reached 
25 While this procedure is rarely requested by French taxpayers , 
American law offices located in France request advice with great fre­
quency , without doubt to relieve them of responsibility or because of 
the well established American practice to invoke such a procedure. 
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at the national level are published in the official weekly bulle­
tin of the tax administration. 
2 . 10 Publication of technical advice given taxpayers and local 
offices 
The tax administration publishes a weekly bulletin which 
reprints statutes and decrees which appeared earlier in the 
official journal. Also included are the instructions, circulars, 
and interpretative memoranda sent out by the office of the 
Director General. Where deemed appropriate, the bulletin also 
sets forth the previously published answer to the written ques­
tions posed by deputies in the National Assembly, significant 
case law, accompanied by official comments, as well as other 
memoranda reflecting administrative positions . There is no 
systematic pattern as to the publication of such memoranda. 
Those bulletins appear in looseleaf form with an index. 
They are distributed to the local inspectors, and taxpayers may 
subscribe to the edition which omits directives relating to in­
ternal procedures and policies.  Unfortunately, the publication 
of the clarifying memoranda is seriously in arrears ; the ap­
propriate offices have not had time to complete the necessary 
synthesis and coordination. Further, in actual practice, out­
side publishers in contact with the tax administration and with 
government officials have taken over the prime responsibility 
of integrating such material as is made available, and prepare 
commentaries thereon. 
CHAPTER XI 
ASSESSMENT, REFUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL PROCEDURES 
Section A. Assessment and Audit Procedures 
3 . 1  Introductory note 
French income tax law relies on two procedures to make 
final assessments . The first begins with an annual declaration 
of actual income by all taxpayers not in receipt of certain 
types of income . The tax administration retains the right to 
verify and where necessary correct these declarations . The 
second, applicable only to small enterprises, the professions, 
and agricultural pursuits, is designed to minimize the burden 
both of record keeping by the taxpayer and of verification by 
the tax administration. It relies ultimately on estimates of 
income. Estimates may also be used where the external evi­
dence of the taxpayer 's wealth varies substantially from his 
declaration. 
3 . 2a Details of assessment and audit procedures re actual in­
come 
Every taxpayer, whether individual or corporate, submits 
annually on appropriate forms furnished by the administration, 
a declaration of income. 1 The head of the household includes 
any income received by his wife and dependent children. The 
declaration includes taxpayer identification data 2 as well as in­
formation identifying each source of income. 3 Where an indi­
vidual, carrying on an industrial, commercial, or professional 
activity, must or chooses to be assessed on the basis of actual 
1 Most taxpayers must submit their returns by February 2 8 . How­
ever , taxpayers with income derived from industrial, commercial, or 
professional activities need not submit their returns until March 31 if 
such are based on actual profits .  
2 Address , date and place of birth, nationality , social security 
identification number , as well as the names and dates of births of de­
pendent children. 
3 Where wages are listed as a source of income, the name and ad­
dress of the employer must be shown. Where there is income from 
real property , the address of each piece of real estate must be given 
and the gross as well as the net rents. 
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rather than estimated profits, 4 the return must be accompanied 
by sufficient documentation to establish the net profit. This 
documentation includes profit and loss statement, a balance 
sheet, and a detailed abstract of the depreciation schedule and 
of inventories on hand. Individual taxpayers, who must or 
choose to be taxed on the basis of actual profits, calculate the 
total amount of taxable income but not the tax itself.5 The 
assessor will do the latter .  Corporate taxpayers, however, not 
only calculate the total amount of taxable income but also the 
tax, forwarding with the return whatever tax may be due. 6 
Declarations, upon receipt by the appropriate local office, 7 
are classified on the basis of taxpayer files , arranged accord­
ing to street addresses in the cities and by alphabetical order 
in little communes . These files, one for each taxpayer, 8 con­
tain all the information which has been built up over the years 
concerning his affairs, this being derived in part from his an­
nual declarations and in part from outside sources . 9 
4 see 3 .2b infra . 
5 Thus there is a significant spread between the time the taxpayer 
files his return and the time he is notified of the amount owed. The 
administration must verify statements on his return, as well as check 
it for mathematical accuracy. Upon discovery of an error , the tax­
payer will be notified , and further delay ensues , until he responds . 
Thus , commencement of the collection process , preceded by comple­
tion of the tax roll , does not begin until early autumn and the tax it­
self will not be paid before the end of the year. Because of this de­
lay ,  individual taxpayers , whose tax is on an income for the preceding 
year exceeding 200 francs , must pay two installments during that year , 
each amounting to one-third of the preceding year's  tax. When the 
final assessment is made for that year , only the balance will remain 
due. 
6 In actuality , any corporation will have been making quarterly 
payments throughout a given year , covering the taxes for that year , 
the several installments each amounting to one-fifth of the total taxes 
paid in the preceding year. Adjustments in the event of decreased in­
come may be made. However , should the tax owed prove to exceed 
the payments , a penalty for late payment is imposed. 
7 Each is dated by the mail room (and an acknowledgment sent out) 
to avoid disputes over the application of the penalty for late filing. 
8 Each local office , as pointed out in Chap. IX ,  is charged with a 
particular geographic section. If the taxpayer moves to another geo­
graphical area, the file is forwarded to the local office bearing re­
sponsibility for that area. 
9 The local office uses other official sources to make sure its files 
include every taxpayer. For example ,  all inhabitants of each commune 
pay an annual local tax, and this requires an annual listing of all resi­
dents. In cities with populations in excess of 9 ,000 there is an annual 
census , each landowner being required to declare the names of his 
tenants. Identification of the landowners presents no problem because 
there is a cadastral survey. 
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Once received and classified, the declarations are divided, 
those showing income in excess of 25,000 francs being placed 
in a separate category. This group is processed first. File 
sheets (constituting the original of the assessment role) are 
set up, with the taxpayers ' names appearing horizontally at 
right angles to vertical columns showing dependents, type of 
income, etc . 10 Once the declarations are checked for math­
ematical accuracy and the entries on the assessment roll are 
completed, the declarations themselves are placed in the tax­
payers ' files, to be fully examined for verification at a later 
date . The sheets are forwarded 11 to the office of the depart­
mental Director which calculates the tax12 and prepares the 
notices to be sent out to the collectors for each geographic 
district. l3 The collector, the official personally responsible 
10 The file of the taxpayer actually is made up of a permanent file 
and annual sub-files. The permanent file contains , inter alia, data 
bearing on his income from land (i.e. , reports on the purchase and 
sale of real property , location of his real property , cadastral identi­
fication of real property and buildings thereon, if any) , from industrial 
and commercial activity (including, if incorporated , articles of associ­
ation and other relevant data) , from choses in action, from stocks and 
bonds , and other reports showing the opening and closing of bank ac­
counts (forwarded by the depository banks) , purchase of auto�obiles 
(forwarded by the office handling registration of vehicles) , contract of 
marriage , declaration of succession, and the declaration of capital in 
1945 for the assessment of the national solidarity tax. The annual 
files are prepared on a yearly basis and include only documents relat­
ing to that year : the declaration of income with supplementary state­
ments relating to income from land or to industrial and commercial 
profits , and also statements supplied by others ,  i.e . ,  by payors re­
garding wages , fees for professional services , pension payments , and 
dividends.  
11  Income is  broken down according to its source,  i .e. , income from 
real property , wages , stocks and bonds . 
12 The local offices are not able to prepare and forward all the as­
sessment roll sheets simultaneously .  Hence , the sheets concerning 
those taxpayers declaring income in excess of 25 ,000 francs are for­
warded in order of their preparation to the office of the departmental 
Director by April 30. Later sets of sheets are dispatched to the de­
partmental Director' s  office by May 20,  June 20, and July 20. 
13 Some effort is being made , on an experimental basis , to utilize 
a central computing system to handle tax calculation and notification. 
Under this proposed system, the local office would prepare a report 
for each taxpayer which would serve as the basis for preparation of 
perforated cards . However , the bulk of tax calculation is still car­
ried on in the traditional manner. Under the generally prevailing 
method, when the assessment roll sheets arrive at the departmental 
Director' s office ,  the portion of the sheet showing the names and ad­
dresses of the taxpayers is detached. The sheets , now devoid of any 
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for the collection of taxes on the rolls sent to him, then ad­
dresses the notices to the taxpayers, and thereby fixes the 
future date when tax payments will be deemed overdue. 14 
At some point subsequent to the transmittal of the assess­
ment roll sheets to the office of the departmental Director, the 
local office verifies or audits the taxpayers ' declarations, either 
at the local tax office or at the taxpayer's  place of business .  
In the course of this verification or audit, the inspector 
has full authority to make such adjustments as he feels desir­
able, including the correction of errors of fact or law in the 
government 's position. In addition, he may conclude, as to all­
yes-or-all-no questions of law, that it would be preferable to 
reach an accord with the taxpayer rather than pursue the mat­
ter through the higher administrative levels or even the courts . 
Accordingly, and to the end of attempting to reach an agree­
ment, he may propose a settlement based on the relative merits 
of the positions of the two parties . Should the taxpayer agree, 
the settlement will be made and will bind both parties . Such 
a settlement can include either the trading or the splitting of 
issues . The inspector at this early stage-and at all subse­
quent stages-has the full power to reach a binding settlement. 
In complex or important situations, he may discuss the matter 
on an informal basis with his supervisor, but the authority and 
the responsibility are his alone. 
Where the examination is confined to the local office ,  docu­
ments in the taxpayer's file furnish the prime, though not the only, 
informative source against which the declaration is tested. These 
will assist the inspector in verifying the dependents claimed, 15 
(footnote continued) 
identifying data, are sent out to individuals (not full-time employees 
of the tax administration but retired individuals or housewives who 
seek to supplement their incomes) who perform in their homes the 
work of tax calculation, on a piece-work basis . These taxers ,  work­
ing under the supervision of the tax administration ,  use tables which 
permit a ready calculation of the amount of tax with reference to the 
number of dependents , thus reducing the possibility of error . After 
the taxers have completed their calculations , the sheets are returned 
to the departmental Director' s  office where the names of the taxpayers 
are paired up with the sheets showing their income and their total 
ta.x. 
14 Once the assessment roll sheets are signed by the departmental 
Director, they become enforceable. These rolls also are sent out to 
the collectors for each geographic district. 
15 Since the local office has sent the first of these assessment roll 
sheets to the office of the departmental Director by April 30, theo­
retically a tax roll should be established by May 31,  with the tax pay­
able by June 30 .  T o  take account , however , of the fact that delays in 
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the income listed, 16 and the deductions taken. 17 A quick check 
also is made to determine if the total income tends to corre­
spond to the general manner of life led by the taxpayer, 1 8  and 
to his capital investments, transfers, and debts incurred or 
repaid. 19 Data on documents relating to his local taxes is 
scanned to see, for example, if the taxpayer is maintaining a 
secondary residence. 20 
Should the inspector ascertain a discrepancy between the 
income declared and the results of his general audit, he either 
can request an explanation from the taxpayer or arrange for a 
field audit which would be undertaken by personnel at varying 
levels depending upon the nature and size of the business . The 
local inspector himself would handle it if the individual has 
(footnote continued) 
tax calculation do occur , a tax penalty of 10% becomes operative for 
communes with more than 3 ,000 inhabitants only after the fifteenth day 
of the third month following issuance of the notices , that is , at the 
earliest , after September 16-and for other communes the penalty is 
imposed at the earliest after October 31. 
16 The list of dependents claimed is compared with prior declara­
tions. In the event of a discrepancy , the examining official may re­
quest an explanation from the taxpayer or check the local census. 
17 Where income from real estate appear s ,  the listing in the decla­
ration for each piece of property will be compared with the filed docu­
ments described in note 10 supra . With respect to wages and salaries , 
the amounts shown by the taxpayer will be compared with the amount 
reported by his employer or employers ,  which report is due by Janu­
ary 31 of the year following receipt. Should the taxpayer's  declara­
tion include income from industrial and/or commercial profits or prof­
its from professional activity , the detailed explanations which accompany 
the return itself will be examined but the profit reported also will be 
compared with official tables setting out typical profit levels for the 
several types of enterprise. Where income from stocks or bonds is 
listed , the sums will be compared with lists turned over by the banks 
which have acted as transfer agents in paying corporate dividends or 
interest. 
18  For example, where the taxpayer lists deductions for items such 
as alimony , arrear ages of rent ,  interest on indebtednes s ,  the name and 
address of each beneficiary is set out on the return. Should the bene­
ficiary live in another district , a report on the deduction will be sent 
to that district' s local office , and if there is a discrepancy this will 
be reported back. 
19 Particularly in a small community, the inspector will have per­
sonal knowledge of most taxpayers , and can determine readily if their 
general level of living corresponds to the income declared. 
20 Taking due account of declarations made in previous year s ,  and 
of reports filed by third parties relating to purchases of real estate , 
stock subscriptions , payment of high premiums for life insurance , etc . 
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only a small industrial or commercial enterprise .  Medium­
sized enterprises are audited, however, by inspectors who are 
trained for this purpose, work under the authority of a princi­
pal inspector, and have responsibility for a territory covering 
several departments . Because of limited personnel resources, 
small and medium-sized enterprises are only audited when the 
declaration itself or reports derived from third parties sug­
gest that income has been either inadequately documented or 
incorrectly reported. In contrast, large enterprises are audited 
on a more systematic basis . For this purpose, a director of 
verification supervises units, competent for all France, which 
specialize in the different major types of economic activity. 
Should either the office or field audit indicate that the 
declaration was incorrect, the inspector will notify the taxpayer 
in writing of the proposed change and the underlying rationale . 
The taxpayer has thirty days in which to accept the proposal 
or express dissatisfaction, making a counter-proposal. Such 
differences are resolved by an informal, simplified procedure 
in the case of taxpayers whose turnover is below a certain 
minimum 21 and whose good faith is not in question. 22 A more 
rigid procedure is used, however, where the apparent discrep­
ancy involves a larger enterprise which has been audited by a 
specialized verification unit. 
In either case-that is, whether the simplified or more 
rigid procedure is employed-the inspector has full authority 
to attempt to reach a settlement with the taxpayer. As was 
the situation which existed during the original field or office 
audit, this power in the inspector includes that of splitting or 
trading issues of law on a basis responsive to the competing 
strengths and weaknesses of the two parties .  
The verification unit inspectors prepare reports reflecting 
details revealed by the audit and the methods utilized to ascer­
tain these details . To the proposed correction, which is ex­
plained in full, the unit 's  examiner adds his opinion regarding 
21 Taxpayers who possess a residence are subject to a local tax, 
contribution mobiliere . There is a strong incentive to avoid , if possi­
ble , reporting a second residence as this is subject to the same tax. 
However , should a taxpayer establish a second residence within a dis­
trict other than the district where his domicile is located, the district 
of his domicile will be notified of the secondary residence. 
22 The use of the simplified procedure is limited to taxpayers whose 
annual turnover is less than 600,000 francs where derived from a sales 
enterprise and 150 ,000 francs where derived from performance of serv­
ices. 
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the good faith of the taxpayer and the penalties that might be 
applicable . This report is reviewed by the head of the unit 
who may return it to the examiner with a recommendation for 
further investigation of insufficiently explored areas or that 
certain claims be abandoned. 
Once the report is accepted by the unit 's head,23  the tax­
payer is sent a statement of the proposed changes . The tax­
payer, who is entitled to be represented by two counselors of 
his own choice (lawyer, chartered accountant, tax advisor) , has 
a right to request a conference to discuss the proposed changes 
with the head of the unit, 24 and that conference may result in 
an accord. Again that accord may and usually does represent 
a settlement between the two parties or it may lead to the 
withdrawal of an issue by either party. 
If agreement is reached, whether based on the tax admin­
istration's proposals , the taxpayer' s  proposals, or a compro­
mise figure, the verification unit sends to the office of the 
departmental Director the information necessary for the tax 
roll to be completed. 
Should no accord be reached, either the tax administration 
or the taxpayer can request that the dispute be submitted to 
the departmental Commission for its opinion-a procedure to 
be discussed later. 25 
3 . 2b Details of assessment and audit procedure re estimated 
income 
Assessments on three types of income, and also in the 
case of one type of taxpayer, are based on estimates . These 
estimates, as to income from small industrial or commercial 
enterprises or from the liberal professions, are made individ­
ually for each recipient. Income from agriculture, on the other 
hand, is geared to averages based on collective data. How­
ever, in any of these cases, the taxpayer may request that as­
sessment be based upon the income actually received, and the 
23 To use this simplified procedure,  certain conditions must be ful­
filled: (1) The taxpayer's  books must have been verified , (2) this veri­
fication must not have revealed any absence of good faith, (3) the tax­
payer himself must have requested expressly the use of the s implified 
procedure, and (4) the taxpayer must agree to pay within 15 days the 
amount of whatever tax may be held due with the addition of interest , 
computed at the rate of 0.75% per month for the period of the delay. 
24 This conference has no legal basis. However , it is used fre­
quently to facilitate communication between the tax administration and 
taxpayers.  
25 See 3 .4a infra . 
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tax administration will honor the request. In practice such a 
request is made by those taxpayers who may have suffered a 
substantial loss or who have had markedly lower incomes than 
typical for taxpayers comparably situated. Otherwise, it tends 
to be to the advantage of eligible taxpayers to utilize the esti­
mated income procedure .  Finally, taxpayers whose standard 
of living suggests an income in excess of the amount declared 
are subject, individually, to an assessment based upon the ex­
terior signs of wealth. The table on page shows that the 
overwhelming percentage of those taxpayers who are free to 
have their income assessed on the basis of an estimate chose 
to have such an estimated assessment. 
The estimated assessment procedure does not extend to 
income derived frqm companies with capital stock or to partner­
ships.  It is limited to individually-owned commercial and in­
dustrial enterprises whose annual turnover is 400,000 francs or 
less if derived from selling goods or furnishing lodging, or is 
100,000 francs or less if from rendition of services .2 6  
A qualifying taxpayer whose assessment will be  based on 
an estimate, must submit before the close of the year a decla­
ration setting forth certain information as to that year . The 
required information relates not only to business matters-i.e . ,  
amount of purchases, of sales, stock on hand, number of em­
ployees and wages paid, rent paid-but also to his standard of 
living including, for example, any purchases of automobiles .  
The local inspector has access not only to the individual 
taxpayer 's file (of substantial importance in facilitating an ac­
curate appraisal of the taxpayer's  standard of living) ,27 but 
also to certain data supplied by the Director General of Taxes :  
monographs dealing with a variety of occupations 28 and indica­
tions of general economic activity. In addition, a given decla­
ration is compared with those of other taxpayers engaged in 
similar activity. Using all available information, and taking 
particular account of the taxpayer 's level of living, the inspector 
26 Since January 1, 1966 , the figures have been increased to 500 ,000 
and 125 ,000 respectively . 
27 Where the inspector is dealing with a rural of semi-rural area, 
his actual knowledge of the manner of life of its inhabitants will be ex­
tremely helpful. 
2 8 In addition, the offices of the departmental Directors ,  with the 
cooperation of agents charged with inquiry into certain occupations , 
have prepared surveys which indicate for certain retail establishments 
the norms of purchases from wholesale suppliers and the habitual prof­
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will propose an estimated figure, representing the profits that 
"enterprise can normally produce . "  
The taxpayer has twenty days to consider this proposed 
figure .  If he accepts it, either directly or by not answering 
the inspector 's letter, the estimate cannot be challenged by the 
tax administration for the next two years, 29 unless it develops 
that the taxpayer furnished incorrect information. 
The taxpayer, however, is free to protest the assessment. 
Should he protest, the dispute will be forwarded to the depart­
mental Commission, which will fix the estimate. The figure 
so fixed becomes binding upon the tax administration, but the 
taxpayer is again free to protest, this time to the departmental 
Director of Taxes.3° 
While it is recognized that taxpayers who elect to use the 
estimate-based assessment are not bound to maintain full sets 
of regular books, any taxpayer who protests either the inspec­
tor 's or the Commission's estimate should be prepared to 
furnish sufficient data to permit an estimate of the normal in­
come his enterprise produces . 31 
The taxpayer using the estimated assessment procedure 
thus can meet his tax obligation with a minimum of record­
keeping. The tax administration also derives an advantage : It 
need not devote the man-hours otherwise necessary to make 
complete audits . Indeed, estimate-based assessments have 
proved to be higher than assessments based on statements of 
actual income . In the latter case, the administration has ex­
perienced real difficulty in proving profit concealment by petty 
tradesmen or small individually-operated service enterprises . 
Whereas estimated assessments are used with respect to 
income derived from individually owned commercial and indus­
trial enterprises only if annual turnover is below a certain 
level, 32 they are used in the case of individuals deriving income 
from a liberal profession-i.e . ,  doctors, lawyers, chartered 
�9 In practice, once the estimate is fixed , it will be renewed by 
tacit agreement for subsequent biennial periods as long as the turn­
over remains below the upper limit for this type of assessment and 
as long as neither the inspector nor the taxpayer gives notice of 
termination. 
30 See 3.4a infra . 
31 Thus , at the least , such taxpayers should maintain a register of 
purchases supported by the invoices. Where the enterprise performs 
services,  a book of original entries should be maintained, setting out 
the day-by-day receipts. 
32 It should be repeated that use of the estimate-based assessment 
is optional. 
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accountants, architects, etc . ,  without reference to a monetary 
ceiling, though here there is an annual estimate . 
While the procedures in the two cases are otherwise sim­
ilar, 33 there is a significant difference in the degree to which 
the estimates will approach true income . An inspector typical­
ly has a substantial number of small tradesmen and petty serv­
ice enterprises within his area of responsibility; just as typi­
cally he has only a limited number of professional men. Thus 
it is more difficult to prepare estimates by comparing, say, a 
limited number of doctors. Moreover, decentralization of the 
tax administration places many young and inexperienced inspec­
tors in local offices, and they often find it difficult to discuss 
an estimated assessment with an established professional man 
who is a long-time resident of the community. Further, the 
nature of professional activities vary and this leads to marked 
inequities in assessment. Illustratively, a relatively accurate 
estimate can be made in the case of an attorney who derives 
the bulk of his income from fees paid by industrial or commer­
cial concerns, for the latter concerns will have reported the 
payments . By contrast, where an attorney's  practice is pri­
marily with individuals who pay him in cash, it is very diffi­
cult for the inspector to even approach an accurate figure.  34 
This contrast exists also in the case of doctors, though in a 
somewhat different form. Estimates will be fairly accurate in 
the case of physicians paid primarily from social security funds, 
whereas physicians in private practice, who receive their fees 
in cash, can be quite confident their income will be under­
estimated. This fact has caused many doctors to avoid the 
social-security type of practice ,  with the result that social 
security beneficiaries could not obtain adequate care. And in 
consequence, pressure was put on the tax administration to in­
sure a less accurate estimate of the income derived by these 
physicians . 
33 One difference is that in the case of the income from a liberal 
profession, the estimate must be filed by February 1 ,  of each year . 
Also , it should be noted that if a dispute is forwarded to a departmen­
tal Commission, the Commission' s membership will be geared to the 
particular professional activity of the individual taxpayer. 
34 It is probable that in the situation where a lawyer has a medium­
sized practice, the inspector can make a reasonably accurate estimate, 
aided by some appreciation of his general level of living. Where, how­
ever , an outstanding lawyer is able to command high fees from private 
persons , even an estimate based upon exterior signs of wealth is like­
ly to lead to an underestimate of his actual income. 
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The foregoing factors have led to marked differences in 
the accuracy of estimates and, in turn, this has created dis­
satisfaction among professionals who compare their respective 
estimates. Such inequities are tolerated both because of the 
legislature 's unwillingness to require such professional people 
to keep an accurate and full set of books 35 and because of the 
tax administration 's utter inability to audit the accounts of 
every professional man in France .  
Unlike the other types of income subject to an estimated 
assessment, agricultural income is estimated, 36 not on an in­
dividual basis, but rather by reference to averages geared to 
collective data, these averages then being applied to the units 
a given taxpayer has under cultivation. 37 
These averages are calculated by the departmental Com­
mission, on the basis of its knowledge of actual conditions 
and in light of certain information made available by the Di­
rector General of Taxes 38 and the office of the departmental 
Director.39 The averages ,  however, are based on a medium­
sized farm, theoretically typical of the region. Consequently, 
35 Notaries are required to keep a full set of books. Chartered 
accountants , lawyer s ,  architects , doctors , etc . ,  are not. 
36 While the use of the estimate-based assessment is optional for 
those deriving income from agricultural operations , in exceptional 
cases , the administration has the right to deny the use of the esti­
mate and require the use of the actual income as the basis for as­
sessment. 
37 The units under cultivation may be calculated in terms of the 
land itself or in the terms of the use made of the land. Thus , where 
land is used for a specialized purpose-viticulture ,  orchards , apicul­
ture, poultry-raising-assessment will be based on the amount of wine 
or the number of fruit trees , beehives , or laying hens . Where the 
land is used for more general agriculture,  assessment will be based 
on �he hectare, i.e. , 2 .47 acres . 
38 The Office of the Director General of Taxes prepares a general 
study of the agricultural situation at the national level based on the 
different agricultural products .  Taken into account are a number of 
factors including yield , prices in comparison with preceding years.  
This study is transmitted to the offices of  the departmental direc­
tors .  
39  The office of each departmental Director uses a s  a base the data 
forwarded by the office of the Director General of Taxes.  See note 
38  supra . Information peculiar to the region or to the agricultural 
portions of the department is assembled. This is forwarded to the 
departmental Commission, together with some proposals of a medium 
income which will serve to fix the assessable income of all the agri­
cultural enterprises of the department. 
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the more productive agricultural operations are under­
assessed. 40 
Once the formulae for assessment-one for each type of 
agricultural activity-have been computed by the departmental 
Commission, 41 the list of agricultural enterprises, showing the 
acreage of each and the specific type or types of agricultural 
activity engaged in, is posted publicly for fifteen days . During 
that time, a taxpayer who disagrees with the classification of 
his property in terms of the activity carried on, can lodge a 
protest with the departmental Commission, 42 not with the tax ad­
ministration. 43 
Finally, any taxpayer may be assessed on the basis of an 
estimate where the exterior signs of his wealth indicate a 
gross under-declaration. Before making such an assessment, 
the inspector requests the taxpayer to supply on a form certain 
facts relevant to his standard of living. The data relates ,  inter 
alia, to the rental value of his home or homes, the number of 
40 Understandably ,  the owners of the more productive-because larg­
er and efficiently managed-agricultural enterprises are staunch de­
fenders of this system of collective assessment. Moreover , these 
same men tend to be the directors of the agricultural organizations 
which enables them to wield considerable influence. In 1959 , the gov­
ernment proposed a bill which would have changed the method of as­
sessment for agricultural operations , abolishing the existing system 
of the unitary profit per hectare and establishing an individual esti­
mate for the largest farms , about 30 ,000 in number. The agricultural 
organizations were successful in persuading the Parliament to reject 
the government bill. 
41 Where the agricultural land is utilized in some manner not pro­
vided for by the typical categories , thus rendering unusable the uni­
tary profit per hectare computation, the income from the land will be 
assessed by reference to the cadastral income. This determination 
is made by the local inspector with the concurrence of the communal 
commission for direct taxes .  This local group, in addition to its 
responsibility relative to this type of assessment , also assists the 
inspector in the assessment of local taxes (i.e. , occupany tax, assess­
ment of improved or unimproved real estate) and expresses its opin­
ion on the lists of those in the commune liable to pay income tax. 
42 See 3 .4a infra . 
43 Should a particular farmer have sustained loss of anticipated 
harvest by reason of hail, ice ,  flood , etc. ,  he can petition the tax ad­
ministration-accompanied by an attestation from the mayor-to be al­
lowed to deduct the amount of his loss from the estimated profits 
from his agricultural operations. This is the only situation in which 
the owner of an agricultural operation enters into direct communica­
tion with the tax administration. 
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domestics employed, his cars, boats, etc . ,  to each of which 
standard amounts of income are applied by the inspector. 44 
These standard scales are then used, together with other 
available information, to calculate the assessment. The tax­
payer has twenty days in which to protest. A taxpayer might 
counter,  for example, with proof, that a portion of his apparent 
income actually represented capital gains-not includible within 
assessable income, or other tax-exempt income, such as inter­
est on treasury bonds, pensions for war victims, etc . 
In making estimated assessments on the basis of exterior 
signs of wealth, the inspector himself is subject to certain 
limitations . First, this method is not used when upon appli­
cation of the standard scales the estimated income is 1 5,000 
francs or less .  Second, in practice, this method is used only 
when there is substantial discrepancy between the taxpayer 's  
declared income and his general level of living. While not a 
rule of law, this method is used only where an estimate based 
on the level of living equals or exceeds 130 percent of declared 
income . Third, the administration deems the method inappro­
priate in cases where the taxpayer 's  income is composed in 
major part of sums paid by others-i.e. ,  wages and salaries ,  
fees for professional services, etc. In these cases, the admin­
istration focuses directly on the income itself. Also, the fact 
that such a taxpayer 's income tax assessment is otherwise 
based on an estimate will not warrant a reduction by reference 
to a lower estimate geared to his external signs of wealth. 
Section B. Administrative Appeals 
3 . 3  Introductory note 
As indicated in the preceding section, there are two types 
of income tax assessment in France :  one utilizing a declara­
tion of actual income by the taxpayer, the other an estimated 
assessment. In either case, i .e . ,  should the taxpayer disagree 
with the result of a post-declaration audit by a tax agent or 
with an inspector 's  estimate of his income, he may carry the 
dispute first, to the departmental Commission, though this is 
not indispensable to a further appeal. 
The form of the Commission's response will vary, depend­
ing on the type of income tax assessment. If the taxpayer had 
44 The taxpayer cannot contest the figures set out in the scale 
though it is proper for him to show that one of the elements is not 
applicable to him, for example, that he has no domestic servants. 
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filed a declaration of actual income, the Commission will render 
an opinion on the particular issue in dispute, provided it in­
volves only a question of fact. The Commission has no power 
to rule on questions of law. If the taxpayer 's original assess­
ment had been based on an estimate of income derived from a 
sole proprietorship or from a liberal profession, the Commis­
sion will render a decision, fixing the total amount of estimated 
income. Whether a decision or an opinion has been rendered, 
however, a taxpayer is free to appeal further to the depart­
mental Director. 
For reasons later described, a taxpayer whose estimated 
income was derived from agricultural activity may not contest 
his assessment before the Commission. In effect, the previous­
ly described averages employed in making those estimates may 
be tested only by the tax administration or by an organization 
of farmers, but before a forum distinct from the Commission. 
Finally, where the administration believes that a contract 
or other legal act conceals a legal deceit for which a heavy 
fine might be imposed, it may first refer the case to a yet 
different body, the Consultative Committee and if successful 
there, later avoid bearing the burden of proof should actual liti­
gation ensue. 
3 . 4a  Details of administrative appeals to a departmental Com­
mission 
The departmental Commission for each department is pre­
sided over by the Counselor of the Administrative Tribunal, 45 
that is, by a judge, not by an official of the tax administration. 
In addition, there are three tax administration 46 and four tax­
payer representatives, 47 all appointed for renewable terms of 
45 This judge is nominated by the Minister of the Interior , not by 
the tax authorities .  
46 The secretaryship of the Commission is  held by an inspector of 
taxes assigned to the office of the departmental Director. 
47 The general pattern of these departmental commissions (four tax­
payer representatives and four members of the tax administration) has 
remained constant for some time, though recent modifications have re­
duced the weight accorded the views of tax administration members .  
Prior to 1954, the tax administration members were headed by 
the departmental Director of Taxes who held the chairmanship. While 
the views of a majority of the eight members theoretically determined 
the Commiss ion' s decisions , the Director or his delegate, in effect, 
cast an extra vote · in case of a tie, a not infrequently occurring cir­
cumstance. Thus , much to the dissatisfaction of taxpayer organiza­
tions , the tax administration, in practice, always had the last word. 
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one year. While the proceedings must be treated in confidence, 
there are few qualification requirements for membership on 
the commission. A member must be a French national, at 
least twenty-five years of age, possess civil rights, and must 
not have suffered a conviction for tax fraud. In general, a 
taxpayer whose case is to be heard is entitled to have four 
taxpayer representatives : in the case of professional men, 
these are drawn from their own professions ; in the case of 
those engaged in trade (including manufacturing and the service 
occupations) representatives are appointed by the local business 
groups; in the case of handicraft-artisans by their special or­
ganizations . Agricultural groups likewise appoint their own 
representatives . To this end, each major occupational or pro­
fessional group designates a number of such representatives 
to serve, as need be, on the departmental Commission. 48 
Some indication of the annual number of cases laid before 
the departmental Commission can be gained from the following 
figures pertaining to 1964. 
Assessment based on 
Real Estimated 
Source of income income 
Industrial or commercial activity 257 
Agricultural establishments 7 















In 1954, these voting practices were altered. In the event of a 
tie vote,  a deadlock ensued , requiring the matter to be referred to a 
departmental committee of arbitration. This committee was made up 
of five members.  The chairman was a Counselor of the Administra­
tive Tribunal (outside the tax administration) , and of the other four 
members , two were members of the civil service and two represent­
ed taxpayers. 
Another modification in 1959 abolished the committee of arbitra­
tion and instituted the present system. 
48 The following four major occupational groups designate repre­
sentatives to sit on departmental Commissions: 
(1) Departmental chambers of commerce, for cases involving 
industrial or commercial profits;  
(2) Guild chambers of trade, for cases involving artisans; 
(3) Federations of the agricultural syndicates (half drawn from 
rural proprietors and half from farm operators) , for cases 
involving agricultural enterprises; and 
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Where the taxpayer has filed a declaration of actual in­
come, but disagrees with the inspector' s  proposed increase,  
either side may request the Commission's opinion regarding 
questions of fact. In such event, the inspector forwards to the 
Commission the taxpayer 's  complete assessment file, together 
with a report summarizing all relevant information, including 
some indication of the amount the taxpayer previously was dis­
posed to accept and, as to each point in dispute, the respective 
positions of the two parties . At least ten days before the hear­
ing, the taxpayer is reminded that he may present his case 
orally or by written statement. Also, he is advised of the con­
tents of any documents in his in-service file on which the in­
spector relies in sustaining his position and, as to documents 
and data the inspector submits relating to the income of com­
parable third parties, the taxpayer is informed of the names 
of the persons or corporations involved, but not their actual 
incomes . The intention is to enable the taxpayer to "assure 
himself that the points of comparison submitted by the ad min­
istration completely take into account enterprises the activity 
of which is comparable to his own." 
Though the taxpayer does not bear the burden of proof in 
the strict sense, he must provide the Commission with all 
items-accounts, etc . -essential to its proper resolution of the 
dispute. In presenting his case, he may be assisted by two 
persons, a lawyer and an accountant, or qualified agents . 
Even though the Commission is presided over by a judge, 
the proceedings are very informal. If the taxpayer elects to 
make an oral presentation, it is for him to decide whether he 
will or will not present a written brief. After hearing both 
sides, the Commission issues an opinion which is communicated 
to the taxpayer. Neither he nor the inspector is bound, how­
ever, to accept the Commission's findings. The taxpayer may 
file a further appeal with the departmental Director . But 
should either the taxpayer or inspector pursue the matter into 
the actual litigation stage, by appealing to the administrative 
tribunal, the party which did not accept the Commission's find­
ings will bear the burden of proof. 
(footnote continued) 
( 4) Three professional organizations representing, respectively , 
physicians , dentist-surgeons, and lawyers. In the case of 
other liberal professions , if there is no taxpayer representa­
tive engaged in the profession of the taxpayer in question, 
he can demand that one Commission member be replaced by 
a representative of the professional organization to which he 
belongs. 
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If a taxpayer who filed a declaration of actual income is 
accused by the administration of having entered into a contract 
or other transaction to conceal a legal deceit for which a heavy 
fine may be imposed, 49 the administration has the alternative 
of referring the case in the first instance to a yet different 
body, the Consultative Committee, headed by a judge of the 
highest administrative court, the Conseil d 'Etat, assisted by 
three additional members: the Director General of Taxes and 
two members designated by the Minister of Finance, one a 
judge of the highest civil court, Cour de Cassation, the other 
a professor of law, usually the Dean of the Faculty of Law of 
Paris . If the administration exercises this option and prevails 
before the Consultative Committee, its recourse to the Commit­
tee will have served the purpose of shifting the burden of proof 
to the taxpayer if he later appeals to the judiciary. 50 But the 
administration is not bound by the Committee 's  findings ; it too 
can appeal to the judiciary. But in such case, it bears the 
burden of proof to the extent its assessment exceeds that fixed 
by the Committee.  
Consider now those taxpayers whose assessment was based 
originally on an estimate to which they have taken an exception. 
As to them, the regular departmental Commission's procedures 
will vary, depending on the source of the estimated income. 
One set of procedures, applicable to income from small 
sole proprietorships and from the liberal professions, is simi­
lar to that described above . Here, however, the Commission 
will render a decision fixing the total estimated income. Also, 
typically the sole proprietor will attempt to show the amount 
his business normally can produce, whereas a taxpayer associ­
ated with a liberal profession will focus on the income actually 
received for the year in question. Finally, the taxpayer can 
appeal further to the departmental Director, but an inspector 
who takes exception to the Commission's findings must then 
enter the litigation stage, by taking the case to the adminis­
trative tribunal. 
Where the original estimated assessment related to agri­
cultural income, the Commission's role is quite different from 
that described above . This is the same Commission which 
earlier established the collective estimates which fixed the 
49 Should a legal deceit be disclosed at any time, it will give rise 
to a fine equal to double the tax actually due. 
50 Absent resort to this body , the administration would continue to 
carry the burden of proof. 
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average profit for each particular type of agricultural activity. 
And that average was applied automatically by the inspector to 
each taxpayer engaged in agricultural activity, with deviations 
responsive only to the number of units a taxpayer had under 
cultivation. If the Commission's determination of the average 
was unsatisfactory to a particular taxpayer or to an inspector, 
neither can appeal directly. If appeal is taken, it must be by 
the departmental Director of Taxes or by the President of the 
Departmental Federation-an organization of farmers. The ap­
peal goes to the Central Commission, a body with nationwide 
jurisdiction. 
The Central Commission has three justices 51 and four con­
sultants (two senior civil servants from the office of the Direc­
tor-General of Taxes, one senior civil servant from the Ministry 
of Agriculture, and two representatives designated by the Na­
tional Federation-the previously mentioned organization of 
farmers) .  However, the justices alone hand down a binding de­
cision determining the averages to be employed . Their deci­
sion can be appealed only to the Council of State and on only 
one very limited ground, that the action taken was ultra vires. 
3 . 4b Administrative appeals to the departmental Director: Re ­
cours contentieux 
Whether or not a taxpayer has appealed his case to a de­
partmental Commission, he may not carry the dispute (tax 
penalty) to the judiciary (administrative tribunal) until he has 
laid it before the departmental Director unless the tax was as­
sessed by a specialized office ,  in which case it is laid before 
the director of that office .  Not until the taxpayer 's claim has 
been rejected in whole or in part-or not acted upon within the 
six-months ' time limit-may he turn to the judiciary. 
Like the inspector, the departmental Director has full 
authority to reach a settlement on issues of law as well as , 
of course, the authority to correct errors of either fact or law 
in the government's position. This settlement may take place 
as a consequence of an oral conference with the departmental 
Director granted at the taxpayer 's request, which permits a 
further exploration of all outstanding issues . 
Such claims must be presented within a fixed time limit, 
which begins when the tax roll is placed in collection and ends 
51 Of the three justices , one is drawn from each of the following 
categories: a Counselor of state who is the chairman, a Counselor of 
the Court of Cassation, a Master Counselor of the state Audit Court, Cour 
des Comptes . 
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on December 3 1  of the calendar year following such date . Cer­
tain other formal requirements are also imposed. 52 The con­
tested tax must be identified; the assessment notice or copy 
thereof must be attached; the grounds upon which the taxpayer 
relies must be fully explained; and the claim must be signed 
by the taxpayer or by his duly authorized attorney or agent. 53 
Where the taxpayer 's claim raises a question of law, the 
petition should cite the relevant legal provisions and set forth 
the interpretation on which the taxpayer rests his claim. In 
support of that interpretation, the petition may cite not only 
judicial decisions but also ministerial statements or even ad­
ministrative instructions . 
Where the claim relates to a question of fact, the petition 
should set forth all supporting circumstances and offer to pro ­
vide proof of the facts alleged. All types of evidence,  other 
than witnesses , can be used. 
The petition may include also a request that actual pay­
ment of the contested tax be postponed, but unless future pay­
ment is sufficiently guaranteed, the request can be refused. 
This refusal can be contested, however, by means of the refire 
fiscal-an emergency procedure lodging summary jurisdiction 
over urgent tax matters in a single judge of the administrative 
tribunal, as designated by its president. 
Claims received by the departmental Director, if free of 
defects in form, are sent back to the inspector who fixed the 
initial assessment. The inspector, after assuring himself that 
the formal requirements have been met, then examines the 
petition to determine if it correctly states the law and the facts . 
This includes a check of the statutes and regulations , and where 
time permits, the case law. At his discretion, he may contact 
the taxpayer for additional information, and the taxpayer him­
self may request the opportunity to explain his position. 
The inspector then makes whatever adjustments he deems 
warranted, and send his conclusions, together with the taxpayer 's  
file, back to the departmental Director . 
The Director now examines the petition, file, and the in­
spector 's report and may accord a hearing to the taxpayer. If 
52 Where a defect is considered correctable (e.g. , failure to attach 
the required notice of assessment or set out the taxpayer' s  conclu­
sions and supporting arguments) , the taxpayer will be notified and given 
20 days in which to make necessary corrections . If not corrected 
within the time limit , the petition will be rejected. 
53 For a corporation, any salaried employee who has received a 
commission from the hoard can sign such a claim. 
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he finds the inspector 's conclusions inadequately supported or 
believes an inadequate examination was made, he will return 
the file and require additional verification. He may not, how­
ever, require the inspector to alter his conclusions. 
The departmental Director is expected to act within six 
months, but if additional time is necessary, the taxpayer will 
be so informed prior to the expiration of that period, and will 
be advised also regarding the probable additional time re­
quired. This cannot exceed three months . 
Where a claim is rejected in whole or in part, the Direc­
tor explains the reason for his conclusion, though his decision 
on the matter is not final. The dispute may be carried to the 
judiciary (administrative tribunal), the Director 's  action having 
been an indispensable prerequisite . About 365,000 such claims 
reach this office annually, though many involve very simple 
questions, such as dependency deductions for children. 
3 . 4c Administrative appeals to the departmental Director: Re ­
cours gracieux 
In addition to claims for tax reduction on legal grounds, 
taxpayers may petition the tax administration either to reduce 
tax penalties or to forgive or lower properly determined assess­
ments which the petitioner cannot pay because of poverty or 
financial embarrassment. 
The administration itself has complete jurisdiction over 
these recours gracieux petitions; the administrative proceed­
ings are not a preliminary in any sense to a judicial stage . 
No time limit is imposed and the signature of the petitioning 
taxpayer is the prime formal requirement. 
The taxpayer submits his petition to the office of the de­
partmental Director who forwards it to the inspector who origi­
nally made the assessment. The inspector contacts the collec­
tion office to determine the likelihood of collecting the tax due, 
and then attempts to make a general estimate of the total situ­
ation, including an appraisal of the taxpayer 's  sincerity and 
honesty. 
In the case of individuals, he will focus primarily on the 
taxpayer 's actual resources and present financial condition. 54 
In the case of business enterprises, he also will be concerned 
54 I.e . , on the actual acuteness of the taxpayer's  alleged financial 
stringency or poverty, taking due account of his age , profession, fam­
ily situation, burdens , amount of income, exterior signs of wealth, 
etc. 
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with its competitive status, the liquidity of its resources, and 
the attitude of its other creditors .55 After all relevant infor­
mation has been collected, the inspector will draft his report 
and submit his conclusions . 
Decisional jurisdiction for re cours gracieux petitions de­
pends upon the amount of tax involved . Where 50,000 francs 
or less, it rests with the departmental Director of Taxes . Where 
more than 50,000 francs but less than 1 50,000 francs,  jurisdic­
tion lies with the Director General of Taxes subject to concur­
rence by the Council of Administration-a body made up of the 
heads of the several offices. In all other cases, decision rests 
with the Minister of Finance who normally follows the opinion 
of his Committee of Remission and Settlements . 
Where jurisdiction rests in the first instance with the de­
partment Director, appeal can be made to the Director General. 
Should new facts develop, even after the Director General or 
the Minister of Finance has handed down a decision, a petition 
can be laid before the same authorities to obtain a better in­
formed decision. However, no reason need be cited for any 
decision nor can a decision be challenged in the courts . 
Approximately 120,000 recours gracieux petitions are filed 
annually with the departmental Directors . Only a relatively 
small percentage-in 1961,  only 199 cases-is appealed from 
the departmental Director to the Director General. 
Section c. Administrative Processing of 
Refund Claims 
The French tax system does not have a special procedure 
for reimbursement of excessive tax payments . Where such 
payments have been made, the claim and reimbursement are 
handled in connection with the assessment procedures previous­
ly described. If the claim is justified, reimbursement is made 
without any additional formalities .  Further, any administrative 
appeal regarding such a claim actually involves an appeal to 
contest the assessment itself. Such must be undertaken in a 
timely manner in accordance with previously described proce­
dures . 
55 Should the petition be for a reduction in a tax penalty , the inspec­
tor also takes account of the reason for the penalty: whether for late 
filing or late payment , failure to make a declaration, etc. 
CHAPTER XII 
RESOLUTION OF TAX QUESTIONS BY 
INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS 
4 .1  Introduction 
Litigation in France is conducted in two distinct types of 
forums, the judicial and the administrative. The judicial forums 
have jurisdiction over disputes between private persons; the 
administrative over disputes between the government and pri­
vate persons . 
The original jurisdiction of the administrative tribunals­
from which appeal lies to the Council of State-covers three 
types of actions, of which one is the contentieux fiscale , where­
in a claimant asks that his tax obligation be determined.! In 
addition to jurisdiction over actions of this type, the depart­
mental Director may appeal to the administrative tribunal any 
taxpayer claim as to which he believes the tribunal should hand 
down a decision. 
Procedures followed by the administrative tribunals are 
somewhat less formal than those followed by the regular judi­
ciary. For example, the use of an attorney is optional . 
A request, that the taxpayer be permitted to postpone pay­
ment of the tax until the administrative tribunal hands down 
its decision, cannot be made for the first time in a petition 
submitted to it. Such suspension, however, is automatic if the 
taxpayer, on invocation of an earlier administrative appeal to 
the departmental Director, secured his permission to postpone 
payment pending that appeal, the conditions imposed being the 
same in both cases. But this suspension will not carry over 
automatically during a yet further appeal to the Council of 
State . However, if such a taxpayer can show that payment 
prior to the Council's determination would result in serious 
1 A claimant also may bring a recours pour exces de pouvoir, and 
thereby challenge the legality of the administrative act-i.e . ,  ministeri­
al decree ,  decree of a prefecture or of a mayor , etc .-by alleging this 
act has violated a general and widespread rule of law.  In effect, the 
tribunal is requested to nullify the administrative act . To protect 
citizens against arbitrary administrative actions , few formalities are 
involved in bringing a recours pour exces de pouvoir.  A lawyer is 
not necessary . 
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detriment, the Council has discretion, on special petition, to 
grant a yet further delay. 
Section A. Organization and Procedures :  
Trial Leve l 
4 .2  Organization of the tribunals 
There are 24 administrative tribunals for the 90 depart­
ments in metropolitan France . Thus their jurisdiction neces­
sarily extends beyond departmental boundaries, with the ex­
ception of the Paris tribunal, which exercises jurisdiction only 
over the department of the Seine . 
An appeal to the Council of State is not limited to questions 
of law. Questions of fact may be raised as well. Since the 
Council of State functions as an appellate tribunal, it can con­
sider only those questions which previously were presented to an 
administrative tribunal. While the taxpayer is free to present 
new grounds of fact and of law, he cannot enlarge on the conclu­
sions set out in his original claim addressed to the Director. 
Illustratively, a taxpayer who based his petition for the discharge 
of a tax on the ground that the sums taxed constituted capital 
assets may not allege upon appeal a procedural irregularity in 
the assessment itself; such a conclusion would constitute a new 
demand. 
The typical administrative tribunal has a president and 
four members, of which one is vice-president and another is 
the Commissaire du Gouvernement.2 The Paris and Strasbourg 
tribunals,  however, because of their work load, are larger, and 
are divided into sections-Paris has four-with a president for 
each section. 
To hold court, a tribunal must have at least three mem ­
bers present, but it can request that a deputy serve when a 
quorum is absent. 3 
The presidents of the tribunals are drawn from the tri-
2 The third type of action, a recours de pleine jurisdiction rests 
on assertion of an individual claim arising out of some action or non­
action on the part of the government . Illustratively , the claimant may 
allege a right derived from a government contract , with the govern­
ment contesting the amount claimed , the method of payment , or even 
the very existence of the contract . 
2 The commissaire is appointed from among the conseillers for a 
one-year term, with the prospect of reappointment. 
3 The deputies can be drawn from the members of a neighboring 
administrative tribunal or from advocates or solicitors .  If the latter 
category is drawn upon, the oldest advocate available must be utilized. 
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bunal members, the conseillers or justices,4 whose qualifica­
tions are governed by statute to insure their competence and 
independence .  Theoretically, all are supposed to have graduated 
from the National School of Administration. These graduates 
are not necessarily lawyers since they are not required to 
have their degrees in law. Their careers will have begun with 
a training period in that section of the Council of State which 
deals with judicial business . 5 Other officials will be appointed 
also, but these men must have graduated in law before appoint­
ment. They will have been appointed to the tribunals directly 
from either the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Justice, 
never from the tax administration. 6 
4.3 Processing cases through the trial tribunals 
As explained earlier, 7 a taxpayer cannot invoke the juris­
diction of an administrative tribunal until his claim has been 
laid before the departmental Director of Taxes and the Direc­
tor either has rejected it  or allowed six months to elapse from 
the time the claim was filed without communicating with the 
taxpayer. Upon receiving such a rejection, the taxpayer has 
two months, 8 in which to file a petition with the clerk of the 
appropriate administrative tribunal. 
Typically, the taxpayer lays his case before the adminis­
trative tribunal because he has been unable to work out a 
settlement or compromise earlier. He is aware that settle­
ment, as such, henceforward is most unusual. 
4 Ranked in a descending order , the hierarchy of the judges of 
these administrative tribunals is as follows:  president of the adminis­
trative tribunal of Paris , president of a provincial administrative tri­
bunal or conseiller of the administrative tribunal of Paris , conseiller 
of a provincial administrative tribunal . 
5 Thus they receive the same training as the auditeurs of the Coun­
cil of State. See 4.4 infra. Both informal and formal contacts exist 
between the administrative tribunals and the Council of State . The 
tribunal members commenced their training with the Council of State. 
Also , tribunal members sometimes are appointed to the Council of 
State ,. and some members of the Council of State have been appointed 
to the Paris administrative tribunal. Finally , the Council of State in­
spects the tribunals through a three-member commission , not to check 
on case-by-case decisions of the tribunals but rather to appraise and 
bring some uniformity to their general operations . 
6 This practice assures their independence as well as the inde­
pendence of the tax administration. 
7 See Chap. XI , 3 .4b supra . 
8 Upon receipt a petition is registered and marked with the date 
of arrival , to help police this limitation. 
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Formal requirements pertaining to the petition itself are 
similar to those which applied earlier when the claim was sub­
mitted to the Director. A petition, however, must be on stamped 
paper9 and be accompanied by a copy of the Director 's deci­
sion and a transcript on unstamped paper. As was true of the 
earlier claim, the petition should contain a summary of the 
facts, a statement of the arguments, the legal bases thereof, 
and the conclusions which set out the relief requested. The 
taxpayer cannot claim a reduction greater than that previously 
claimed but he is not precluded from asserting a different line 
of reasoning. Should he desire to use expert witnesses or 
present oral arguments, he may request such either in the pe­
tition or at a later date . But a request to the tribunal, seeking 
permission to postpone payment of the heretofore assessed tax, 
would be misdirected. This request must have been made 
earlier to the Director and, if granted, no additional request 
is necessary and the taxpayer may continue to postpone pay:­
ment. 
The administrative tribunal's clerk sends by registered 
mail to the Director a copy of the petition and any amplifying 
memoranda. After a cursory examination for form, the Direc ­
tor sends the petition to the inspector who made the original 
assessment and who examined the same taxpayer 's earlier 
claim addressed to the Director .10 
The inspector examines the petition for form, and tries 
to determine if any matter relevant to substance (factual or 
legal) was overlooked earlier. To this end, he re-examines 
the law (statutes, cases, and instructions) and may request fur­
ther information from the taxpayer or even re-examine his 
books . 
His investigation completed, the inspector prepares a re­
port, analyzing the petition and the problem. After noting any 
defect of form in the claimant 's petition, the report sets out 
the relief requested, the facts as found by the inspector, his 
analysis of each legal argument advanced by the taxpayer, and 
closes with a brief statement of his conclusion, indicating, if 
necessary, the amount of tax due or the reduction or reimburse­
ment believed justified. 
This report is due in the departmental Director's office 
9 For each sheet of paper 21 x 27 em,  there is  a charge of two 
and a half francs . 
lO where the disagreement arises from an assessment established 
by an agent who specializes in the examination of accounts , it is this 
agent who will examine the petition. 
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within three months from the date the inspector receives the 
petition. In light of the report, the Director carefully re­
examines the case and this may result in a request for sup­
plementary information from the inspector.  While this same 
claim was rejected earlier by the Director, the re-examination 
sometimes causes him to revise his decision and to declare 
justified the claim for reduction. Should this occur, the tax­
payer is notified and a summary memorandum prepared, in­
forming the administrative tribunal that the case no longer 
requires consideration. 
More typically, however, the Director prepares a memo­
randum of law, submitting four copies to the administrative 
tribunal-in theory, within six months from his receipt of the 
petition, though an extension may be granted by the president 
of the tribunal. 11 While this memorandum carefully considers 
the statute and case law, it does not cite instructions though 
their rationale may be used to justify his interpretation of the 
statutes and decisions . 
Prior to the time the director prepares the memorandum, 
the taxpayer on occasion will request (a request which will be 
granted) an opportunity to confer with the departmental Direc­
tor.  Occasionally, the departmental Director at his discretion 
will ask the taxpayer to come into his office for an oral dis­
cussion of the matter. Typically, there is no settlement of 
issues at this point as any such adjustment will have taken 
place before invoking the court's  jurisdiction. The one excep­
tion to the general rule that these pretrial negotiations only 
provide opportunities for the correction of errors-in addition, 
of course, to the clarification of issues-lies in the situation 
where a case was docketed to prevent the running of the statute 
of limitations . In such circumstances, discussions can lead to 
the settlement of issues . 
In four circumstances,  however, before submitting such a 
memorandum, indeed, before arriving at his own conclusion, 
the departmental Director will consult the office of the Direc­
tor General. 12 This occurs, in the interest of uniformity, 
11 The president of the tribunal first extends the time limit by an­
other three months .  Should this added three months be insufficient , 
the Director can request another extension , setting out the reasons 
therefor . 
12 The taxpayer is not informed formally of such consultation by 
the departmental Director with the Director General . The depart­
mental Director has no specific obligation to acquaint him with this 
fact. Unofficially , however , the taxpayer may be told but this is a 
matter entirely within the discretion of the departmental Director . 
278 FRANCE:  INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS 
where he believes the petition rested on a sound legal principle 
although such principle was not stated specifically in either 
case law or administrative instructions; where he is uncertain 
as to thB interpretation of an international convention or of the 
constitution and bylaws of an international organization; and 
where the petition cites decisions which are contrary to ad­
ministrative regulations but as yet are unpublished in either 
the compilations or the administration's official bulletin. Con­
sultation also occurs for an obvious reason whenever he ex­
pects the decision would be against a pending petition presented 
in the name of the state by another administrative branch or by 
a division subject to the Minister of Finance 's authority. 
The administrative tribunal, upon receiving the Director 's  
memorandum, forwards a copy to  the taxpayer or his author­
ized agents, setting a time limit for reply. The taxpayer may 
file one or more memoranda in response to the Director's and 
the Director, in turn, may respond with yet another memoran­
dum. Or, in the interim, the Director may have consulted 
with the inspector who made the original assessment and then 
modified his original conclusions . Otherwise, however, these 
memoranda are exchanged until one of the parties either does 
not reply at all to the memorandum of the other or does not 
reply within the time limit specified by the president of the 
tribunal. At that point the case is considered ripe for judg­
ment although, in practice, memoranda can be deposited with 
the clerk of the administrative tribunal until the date set for 
hearing. The aim of this repeated exchange of memoranda is 
to enable the parties to refine the issues and their respective 
arguments . However, if these preliminary exchanges are con­
tinued unnecessarily, the president of the tribunal can terminate 
this stage of the proceeding by deliberately refusing to forward 
memoranda which merely reiterate the grounds or arguments 
presented earlier. 
While memoranda deposited with the administrative tribunal 
otherwise are always forwarded to the opposing party, support­
ing documents submitted by the administration remain on file 
in the clerk's office, but are available to the taxpayer or his 
authorized agent. That file, for example, may include com­
parative data on third-party income or profits, and the tax­
payer can check this material to determine whether the other 
situations or enterprises are truly comparable .13 
1 3  To preserve secrecy regarding the affairs of others , third-party 
information accumulated by the administration should deal only with 
the averages , whether of business turnover or of income. 
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In spite of this free exchange of memoranda and the op­
portunity for oral argument, the tribunal may find that additional 
facts are needed, and request supplementary information. But 
if the taxpayer, in response to this or on his own initiative, 
asserts at the hearing what in effect is a new ground, the tri­
bunal must require him to develop this in a written memoranda, 
which then is forwarded to the tax administration to enable it 
to respond in writing. Also, if the tribunal believes, for veri­
fication purposes, that an inspection of the taxpayer 's site is 
necessary, all, several, or only one of its members, may be 
directed to make the inspection. But in any case, an official 
written report of the inspection will be prepared and made 
available to the parties for their comments . 
The tribunal may also call upon expert witnesses on its 
own initiative or by request of either party, 14 to determine 
doubtful or contested facts relevant to a final resolution of the 
case. 15 Illustratively, such experts may be requested to de­
termine the value of a corporation's inventory at a given date . 16 
Although the normal number of experts utilized is three, 
if the parties agree, one will fulfill all requirements . Where 
three are used, one is appointed by the tribunal and one by 
each party, though their cost will be borne by the losing party. 
While each must be placed under oath, there are no specific 
qualification requirements, except that appointments cannot be 
made from either of two groups : officials subordinate to the 
defending departmental Director of Taxes and authorized agents 
of the taxpayer.  However, the departmental Director may ap­
point an inspector to accompany or observe the work of the 
experts where necessary. The taxpayer can do likewise, using 
either an authorized agent or an attorney. In either event, the 
experts will submit a full written report, individually or joint­
ly . The official report, however, is drafted by the expert ap­
pointed by the tribunal; it describes the way in which they ap­
proached the problem, contents of documents examined by them, 
and their findings of fact. 
14 The request may be made at any time during the proceedings . 
While the tribunal can refuse the request , the refusal should be ac­
companied by a full explanation. 
15 Questions of law or theory do not fall within the competence of 
such experts . 
16 The tribunal has no power to order an inquiry or an interroga­
tion or consultation of persons . It cannot hear witnesses. But it can, 
for example,  have experts determine the authenticity of documents if 
such is put in question. 
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When the case is considered ripe for a hearing, that con­
seiller  of the tribunal who has been appointed rapporteur for 
this case studies the complete file and prepares a report, set­
ting out a resume of the facts' and the legal arguments and 
conclusions reached by each party. The conseiller-rapporteur 
reads his report at the hearing, to point up the issues of fact 
or law to be resolved by the tribunal which consists of at least 
two other conseillers including the president. 17 
The public is barred from hearings relating to taxes on 
income . 18  The administration is represented not by an attor­
ney, but by an inspector who is appointed by the departmental 
Director from among those residing in the city where the tri­
bunal is sitting.19 While the taxpayer 's agent may also attend 
and may present written memoranda during the hearing, he can 
participate in oral argument only if he is an attorney.  
At the final hearing of the case, the commissaire of the 
government presents the factual and legal conclusions he has 
reached independently and, presumably, impartially. To these, 
the parties cannot reply; the tribunal takes them under advise ­
ment and usually will hand down its decision within the fort­
night following. Its written decision should state the reasons, 
legal arguments , and supporting authorities for the conclusion 
reached as to each issue, to facilitate review in the event of 
an appeal. 
The decision may, of course, reduce the amount of the 
assessment as originally established. But the tribunal may 
also increase the tax, as compensation for delay in payment, 
should it find that an earlier petition for postponement was en­
tirely unwarranted. 
Approximately 13,400 judgments a year are handed down 
by these tribunals . In 1960, 4, 578 dealt with direct taxes-i .e . ,  
taxes on income and taxes levied for the state or  the units of 
17 The tribunal should be made up of an unequal number of con­
seillers at every hearing. 
18 Indeed, if deemed desirable , the tribunal may request that it re­
ceive for private inspection in the court chambers , a full presentation 
of all evidence or documents concerning the income of other persons 
or enterprises to which the taxpayer' s alleged income is being com­
pared. 
19 While the administration' s  representative can be heard and should 
answer questions posed by the tribunal, if the taxpayer ' s  representa­
tive alleges new facts or new legal arguments ,  or deposits a written 
memorandum, the administration' s agent is expected not to answer. 
Instead ,  he should request a continuance until he has had an opportun­
ity to respond in writing. 
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local government. Decisions in 3 , 580 or 78 .2  percent upheld 
the decision of the tax administration and 998 or 2 1 . 8  percent 
were in favor of the taxpayer. 
Unless such a judgment contains a new interpretation of 
the statute or administrative regulations, it will not be pub­
lished. In part, this is because it would lack precedent value 
and in part because each such judgment is appealable and many 
feel that case law, as such, should be evolved only by the Coun­
cil of State, not by an administrative tribunal. 
Section B. Organization and Procedure s :  
Appe llate Tribunals 
4.4 Organization of the appellate system 
Decisions of administrative tribunals may be appealed by 
either the taxpayer or the Minister of Finance,  to the Council 
of State, 20 a body which fulfills a dual role . It furnishes the 
government its opinion on a variety of matters: drafts of pro­
posed statutes ,  administrative regulations,21 points of law. 22 
It also is the supreme appellate tribunal for the administrative 
tribunals,  and is the only body with jurisdiction over actions 
which challenge the legality of administrative acts and seek to 
set them aside-les recours pour exces de pouvoir. 23 
The Council of State is made up of the vice-president and 
the presidents of the five sections, 53 conseillers en service 
ordinaire, 69 maitres des requetes,  and 44 auditeurs. 24 
The auditeurs are graduates of the National School of Ad­
ministration who have chosen this branch of government serv­
ice. 25 From their ranks are drawn the mattres des requetes ;  
and from the latter are drawn the conseillers.  The one excep­
tion to this is that the government may appoint up to a third 
20 Created by Napoleon I, the role of the Council of State has 
evolved in response to the current political climate. 
21 The Council of State must be asked for its opinion with respect 
to regulations of the public administration; for all other types of regu­
lations it may be asked for its opinion. 
22 When the government requests the opinion of the Council of State 
upon a point of law, it is comparable to consulting a lawyer for a 
legal opinion. 
23 Les recours pour exces de pouvoir may be utilized with respect 
to decrees or revenues stemming from administrative · acts which have 
an area of application extending beyond the jurisdiction of a single ad­
ministrative tribunal. See note 1 supra . 
24 This diversity in seniority causes a wide age range among the 
members of the Council of State , typically 26 to 7 0 .  
25 The graduates of the National School of Administration who se­
lect the Council of State usually ranked at the top of their clas s .  
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of the conseillers and up to a quarter of the mattres des re ­
quetes from outside the civil service hierarchy. 
The auditeurs and the mattres des requetes prepare ma­
terial for discussion. From these two groups are chosen the 
government commissaires who present to the Council of State 
their own independent and impartial view as to the legal con­
clusions which should be reached in contested cases . The 
questions will be heard and decided by the conseillers . 
The administrative or consultative function of the Council 
of State has been more or less completely separated from its 
judiciaJ function. Four of its five sections are charged with 
administrative matters;26 the fifth handles the judicial function. 
The latter,  the section du contentieux, is divided into eleven 
subsections, three of which specialize in tax litigation. Beyond 
this, the eleven presidents of these subsections (each of whom 
is a Conseille r d 'Etat) 27 together with four conseillers from 
the consultative sections,28  make up the plenary assembly of 
the section du contentieux, which is presided over by the vice­
president of the Council of State . The plenary assembly con­
siders only matters posing new important questions which may 
lead the Council of State to alter its position or take a new 
position as to some legal principle . 
A Conseiller d 'Etat presides over each subsection of the 
section du contentieux. He is assisted by two associate Con­
se illers d 'Etat, and about ten mattres des requetes and audi­
teurs who function as rapporteurs. Chosen from the maitres 
des requetes is the previously mentioned commissaire who 
presents his own conclusions-presumably impartial-as to the 
facts, legal principles, and the decision he deems appropriate 
in each case. 29 His report is of substantial importance to the 
judicial process and the most significant are published in the 
specialized legal periodicals . 
26 The administrative sections-Finances , Public Works, Interior, 
Social-provide opinions in their respective areas of competence.  In 
fulfilling its administrative functions , the Council of State will delib­
erate , sometimes in a s ingle section, sometimes in two or more sec­
tions united for this purpose,  and sometimes in a general assembly. 
In the latter situation, some conseillers from the judicial section will 
be present. 
27 A Conseiller d'Etat is so designated by a decree of the first 
Minister upon recommendation of the Ministry of Justice after his name 
has been presented by the vice-president of the Council of State. 
28 These are elected by their colleagues.  
29 The commissaire is  designated in the same manner as a Con­
seiller d 'Etat .  See note 26 supra . 
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The fact that the section du contentieux has three subsec­
tions which deal with tax matters facilitates reasonably prompt 
decisions. But it does not facilitate uniformity of decisions . 
Nor is this difficulty completely mitigated by the close relation 
existing between the president of the section du contentieux and 
the members of the three subsections . However, three other 
devices , none entirely successful, tend at least to cushion the 
magnitude of the problem. The commissaire rotates among the 
subsections, and questions of prime importance or questions 
upon which the subsections disagree can be-but not too fre ­
quently are-examined by more than one subsection. 30 Also, 
on very rare occasions, where an issue of legality is involved, 
the matter may be put to the entire section du contentieux. 
Finally, any interpretative conflict over the meaning of a stat­
ute or regulatory text, arising between a tax subsection and 
the earlier expressed opinion of the Council of State, must be 
laid before the plenary assembly. 31 
4. 5 Processing a case through the appellate tribunal 
Taxpayer and tax administration alike have two months, 32 
from the date notice is received of the administrative tribunal 's  
decision, within which to  lodge an appeal to  the Council of 
State . 
Any decision by the tax administration to appeal must pass 
through a fairly complicated process . First, the departmental 
Director prepares a report on the administrative tribunal's de­
cision, explaining-in the case of adverse decisions-why he 
believes the decision for the taxpayer was incorrect (i .e . ,  
whether it arose from an erroneous interpretation of applica­
ble statutes or from an incorrect appraisal of the facts) . Or, 
if he believes the adverse decision would be sustained on ap­
peal, perhaps because of an intervening judicial decision, this 
is set forth. 
This report, together with the complete file, is forwarded 
to the office of the Director General where it is carefully ex­
amined by senior civil servants, assisted by inspectors who 
30This will occur on a very few occasions in the course of a single 
year . 
31 The Council of State will have given its opinion as to the inter­
pretation of the statute or regulatory text at an earlier point in time 
when its opinion was requested. 
32 For the Minister of Finance the two-month time limit runs from 
the day the file is received at the office of the Director General of 
Taxes or from the day on which he is notified by the bailiff 's  writ of 
the administrative tribunal' s  judgment. 
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come in from the field, to determine if an appeal should be 
lodged. 33 These officials may decide not to appeal. If they 
favor an appeal, the report from the departmental Director 
may serve as the petition, 34 or another will be prepared if a 
different line of argument or method of presentation seems 
appropriate. The petition is signed by the Director General of 
Taxes or a senior civil servant to whom this power has been 
delegated. 
Petitions filed by taxpayers must comply with certain for­
mal requirements which essentially are the same as those 
imposed by the administrative tribunals . Most are prepared 
by experienced lawyers,35 though the taxpayer may prepare 
his own. In fact, an attorney need not be used at all unless 
the taxpayer wishes to make an oral argument or comments 
during the hearing. 36 In practice, twenty-six percent of all 
income tax petitions are prepared by a particular group-the 
avocats aux conseils . This group of lawyers, limited in num­
ber, are appointed by the state. They are permitted to handle 
private cases and have a monopoly on the right to make oral 
argument before the Council of State and the Court of Cassa­
tion. 
The petition itself, and any supporting documents later sup­
plied, can be filed, either with the secretariat of the section 
du contentieux or with the prefecture of the department where 
the taxpayer is domiciled, but in either case is forwarded to 
the office of the Director General of Taxes which, in turn, 
sends it to the appropriate departmental Director. There the 
petition is examined, both as to formal requirements and the 
merits, and a full report prepared for submission-together 
with a complete record of the administrative tribunal's  proceed­
ings -to the Director General of Taxes . 37 The report will 
33 The examination takes place in the office responsible for litiga­
tion before the Council of State, the service du contentieux. 
34 If the office of the Director General does utilize the departmen­
tal Director' s  report , it is likely to make modifications or observa­
tions in the margin. 
35 I . e . , attorneys ,  tax counselors , members of the legal staffs of 
trust companies . Petitions which are prepared by taxpayers relate 
principally to local taxes and are limited almost entirely to uncompli­
cated matters ,  posing few technical difficulties . 
36 The presentation of oral arguments or statements is an excep­
tion to the typical hearing. 
37 By preparing the petition at two distinct levels , having both levels 
work on the petition, the best possible defense is assured. The depart­
mental service is better situated to deal with issues of fact , and the 
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carefully analyze the facts, legal arguments, and the conclu­
sions which should be drawn. The inspector responsible for 
the original assessment normally will have been contacted only 
if the departmental Director determined either that the case 
has been inadequately examined prior to the administrative 
tribunal's decision or that the taxpayer is now relying on facts 
or legal arguments not heretofore raised. 
Whether the taxpayer or the Director General entered the 
appeal, the parties exchange memoranda, just as they did in the 
tribunal below, until the case is considered ripe for judgment. 
Occasionally the taxpayer 's adviser will request the oppor­
tunity to elaborate orally on the pleadings, but this is the ex­
ception rather than the rule . When such oral elaboration does 
occur, it is limited to developing the contents of the written 
pleadings and, thus, can add little to properly prepared memo­
randa. The government never requests such an opportunity. 38 
Even more rarely, indeed in less than one percent of the cases, 
will expert witnesses be used at this appellate level. Presum­
ably all facts have been established at the lower court level 
and, if necessary, additional documentation from witnesses will 
be submitted during the exchange of pleadings . Hence there is 
no particular need for their use at this level. Moreover, the 
lack of impartiality too often exhibited by the taxpayer 's  ex­
pert witnesses has diminished their value in the eyes of the 
Council of State . 
When the case is considered ready for judgment, it is 
turned over to a rapporteur39 who analyzes it for the purpose 
of preparing two documents . The first is a memorandum which 
states the facts, analyzes the applicable statutes and case law, 
and concludes with a proposed decision. The second (visas of 
final judgment) summarizes the contention advanced by the re­
spective parties , the principal documents , and the applicable 
law and sets forth a proposed final decree . 
These documents , together with the entire file, are sent 
through the office of the president of the subsection to the 
commissaire of the government, who prepares his independent 
(footnote continued) 
office of the Director General is better prepared to handle the legal 
arguments .  In addition, this arrangement reduces the work of the of­
fice of the Director General ,  for usually the report of the departmen­
tal Director contains all pivotal elements for the administration' s  d.e­
fense. 
38 The government takes the position that the submission and inter­
change of pleadings serves to clarify the issues and provide the judi­
ciary with all necessary insights . 
39 Drawn from the ranks of auditeurs or the maitres des requetes. 
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and impartial conclusions . The commissaire views the case 
from a point which goes beyond that of the rapporteur. The 
latter considered only the particular case and file before him. 
The commissaire goes on to consider how this particular case 
fits into the totality of case law, the proposed decision's possi­
ble repercussions, in practice and on the law's future direction, 
and whether it would be wise to abandon the rationale of pre­
vious cases-however abrupt. 
Submission of his written conclusions is followed by the 
hearing before the subsection, from which the public is barred. 
Typically, five members are present: the president, two Con­
seille rs d 'E tat, the rapporteur for this particular case, and a 
mazt'te des requetes .  After the visas, as prepared by the rap­
porteur, are read, the attorneys, if they wish, are permitted to 
make an oral argument. The hearing concludes with the com ­
missaire 's  presentation. 
The deliberation which follows, from which the public and 
parties are barred, is participated in by the commissaire 
though he cannot vote . If either he or the president disagrees 
with the majority's  view, however, either can demand that the 
case be submitted to the combined subsections . 
The decree, which is prepared by the rapporteur and read 
at a public session, typically recites the names of the parties, 
their respective contentions, a summary of principal documents 
presented, and in concise form the legal reasoning which led 
to the decision. While such decrees of the Council of State 
are conclusive, in very limited circumstances involving formal 
defects, a decree can be vacated or modified.40 All of that 
body's  decrees are published in a review; also tax journals 
reprint the more important tax decisions, sometimes together 
with the commissaire ' s conclusions and other comments . In 
addition, the administration's  weekly bulletin prints those de­
crees which reflect important legal principles,  typically with a 
commentary relating the decree to existing case law . 
In general, a decision constitutes a precedent for similar 
situations arising in the future.  Occasionally, however, the 
administration indicates that it will distinguish a particular 
decree from a given line of decisions for reasons not immedi­
ately apparent upon reading the decree. 
In 1960-61,  of the 4,883 judgments handed down by the 
lower administrative tribunals, 3,848 favored the administra­
tion. Nevertheless, the actual number of appeals from the ad-
40 Such formal defects include a judgment rendered by default in 
absentia, a defect in the procedure,  correction of a material error . 
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ministrative tribunals to the Council of State is spread almost 
equally between taxpayers and the government. This results 
from the fact that only about 10 percent of those taxpayers who 
initially suffered an adverse decision do appeal, whereas the 
government appeals between 30 percent and 40 percent of deci­
sions unfavorable to it. 
In 1960-61 the Council of State judged 815  tax cases, 724 
of which were appeals from decisions of administrative tri­
bunals. The tax administration submitted 94 cases .  
Out of the 724 appeals, 608 dealt with direct taxes levied 
for the benefit of the state and of the communes, and of these, 
316 dealt with taxes on income-with the majority ( 211) involv­
ing taxes on industrial and commercial profits . 41 
An analysis of decisions by the Council of State shows that 
in 1960-61  the government was completely sustained in 62 per­
cent of  all taxpayer appeals although almost a fourth of these 
resulted from defects in form. Of the administration's  own 
appeals , 41 percent were decided completely adverse to it, an­
other 41 percent confirmed the contested taxes, and 11 . 5 per ­
cent were abandoned by the administration. 
While the administration was completely successful in only 
41 percent of its own appeals, this is in sharp contrast to tax­
payers who were completely successful in only 9 percent of 
their appeals .42 Several considerations contribute to this dif­
ference . On the one hand, taxpayers are not always knowledge­
able, tend to view their own cases subjectively, can litigate at 
little cost (no attorney being required) , and thus are willing to 
take a chance . On the other hand, the administration usually 
is more knowledgeable, attempts to be objective, employs suc­
cessive levels to weed out errors made by lower echelons, 
tends to abandon the weaker issues in a case-submitting only 
the stronger ones to the tribunal- and, in general, exercises 
considerable restraint regarding the number of cases it will 
appeal. 
41 This is understandable in light of the difficulty in determining 
such profits and the monetary interests involved. 
42 An overall breakdown of Council of state decisions on tax ap-
peals for 1960-1961 shows the following: 
Taxpayer in error to appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 . 0% 
Appeal by taxpayer badly taken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.0 
Taxpayer became discouraged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.0 
Taxpayer right in whole or in part . . . . . . . . . . . .  11 . 5  
Administration in error to appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 .5 
Intermediate position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . 0  
Return t o  administrative tribunal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . 3  






ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
PERSONNEL FRAMEWORKS 
Section A. Administrative Organizational 
Framework 
1 . 1  Introduction 
Under the Constitution, the Federal Republic of Germany 
is composed of states, Laender, each of which, independently 
of the federal government, exercises legislative, administrative, 
and judicial powers.  While fiscal powers are exercised simul­
taneously by the two levels of government, the states and the 
federal government, the Constitution does allocate certain func ­
tions between them by reference to the distinctions between 
(a) the authority to enact laws, (b) the authority to exercise 
administrative jurisdiction, and (c) the authority to dispose of 
the revenue from a given tax. 
Taxes as to which all three powers are vested in the Fed­
eration are called federal taxes . These include especially the 
turnover tax, the transport tax, and the excise taxes, with the 
exception of the beer tax, the revenue from which accrues to 
the States .  
The Federation is also authorized, and exercises authority, 
to legislate on taxes which are administered by, and accrue 
to, the States .  This is true of the capital tax, Ve rmoegensteuer, 
the inheritance and gift tax, Erbschajtsteuer and Schenkungsteuer, 
the motor vehicles tax, Krajtjahrzeugsteuer. And above all, 
this category includes the income and the corporation tax where, 1 
however, part of the revenue accrues to the Federation which, 
to the latter extent, also has the administrative authority. Also 
within this group is the trade tax, Gewerbesteuer, the revenue 
from which accrues to the municipalities. 
Only as to very few taxes do the States have legislative 
power, the most important being the real property transfer tax, 
Grunderwerbsteuer. 
1 While the Federation exercises the legislative function, the states 
indirectly play a part through the Bundesrat, which represents the 
states in the federal legislative procedure. 
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The federal tax structure is headed by the Federal Minis ­
ter of Finance, with comparable state officials at the head of 
the tax structure of each state . These are distinct adminis­
trative offices; the Minister of Finance for a state is not the 
subordinate of the Federal Minister of Finance . 
At the regional level, however, the chief administrative of­
ficial (Chief Finance President, Obe rfinanz-praesident) is simul­
taneously a federal and a state official . The sixteen Regional 
Finance Offices, Oberfinanzdirektionen, comprise both federal 
and state offices , some divisions therein being concerned with 
federal and others with state taxes, and their respective em­
ployees belong either to the state or to the federal government. 2 
This contrasts with the local level where separate federal 
and state offices do exist. However, the federal offices, Zoll­
aemter, are responsible only for customs duties and excise 
taxes, whereas the state offices, Finanzaemter, are responsible 
for the individual and corporate income taxes and also for the 
turnover tax. The fact that all of the turnover tax revenue and 
a portion of that produced by the income tax is turned over to 
the federal government3 does not in practice, diminish the 
authority of the local state offices . They have full, actual re­
sponsibility for local administration of these taxes because, to 
the extent of the Federation's share of such revenue, these 
state offices in effect act as agents of the Federation. In con- -
sequence, duplication of local administration is avoided. 4 
1 . 2  Organizational framework, national office le ve l 
A .  Federal tax administration 
As noted previously, the Federal Minister of Finance is 
the highest ranking officer in the federal tax administration. 
As such, he engages actively in policy determination. In addition, 
2 The Federal Republic of Germany is made up of states ,  Laender. 
The smaller states and the city states , such as Bremen, Hamburg,  and 
West Berlin, have only one regional office. The larger states may 
have two or three . 
3 The revenue from the income tax is divided between the federal 
government and the states. The federal quota is variable and may be 
modified at two-year intervals .  For the fiscal years 1964 and 1965 , 
the federal government received 39% of the total income tax revenue. 
4 In theory, the responsibility of administering the Federation' s 
turnover tax rests with the Regional Offices . But ,  as the law stands , 
the Regional Offices may request the assistance of the state finance 
offices. In practice ,  as a result of this set-up, the state finance of­
fices actually administer the turnover tax. 
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he is responsible for organizational and personnel matters and 
for matters pertaining to the application of federal tax laws . 
In practice, however, the State Secretary of the ministry handles 
the day-by-day business . 
Reporting directly to the Minister of Finance is a bureau 
concerned with fiscal policy and economic matters. Apart from 
that, the Ministry houses the six divisions set out in Chart I, 
each headed by a Ministerial-Director. Only the Third and 
Fourth Divisions are concerned directly with taxes.  The divi­
sions are divided into subdivisions, headed by Ministerial Deputy 
Directors, each of which in turn is broken down into sections, 
headed by senior officials, usually with the rank of Ministerial 
Counselor . These officials act on their own responsibility in 
that they make the first decision on all matters within their 
competence .  
The most important tax division (Division IV) has respon­
sibilities with respect to both turnover and income taxes, but 
these responsibilities are not identical. For taxes collected 
solely for the benefit of the federal government, such as the 
turnover tax, this division drafts laws, issues regulations , and 
hands down decisions in appellate proceedings . For taxes col­
lected only in part for the federal government, such as income 
taxes,  the division exercises less sweeping authority. Its for­
mal direct responsibility is limited to the drafting of legislation. 
It also contributes to uniformity in interpretation, however, by 
having the prime responsibility for the drafting of regulations . 
Further,  it plays a major role in the coordination of, and co­
operation in, administrative measures taken by state tax ad­
ministration. Rulings are not issued by the federal government, 
but by state governments ; however, prior to issuance,  the fed­
eral government in fact prepares and approves them. This, 
again, insures uniformity. Also, meetings of senior state and 
federal tax officials are called by and presided over by the 
Federal Finance Ministry with the end of insuring maximum 
uniformity in the actual application of the tax laws . To that 
same end, and to safeguard its interest in the revenues thus 
produced, the Central Federal Auditing Office within the Fed­
eral Ministry of Finance exercises its right to participate in 
the auditing activity which theoretically is the concern of the 
various states .  For like reasons, acquiescence of the federal 
tax administration is also required with respect to the forgive­
ness of individual and corporate income taxes which exceed a 
certain sum. 
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- Section 2 
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al aspects , Saar territory , 
exports, additional turn­
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form questions, extensions 
of time for payment , abate­
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- Section 4 
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Income tax and supplemen­
tary income tax laws ( ex­
cept agriculture and fores­
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Section 2 
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Tax examinations . 
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B. State tax administration 
As previously noted, none of the eleven State Ministries of 
Finance are subordinate to the Federal Ministry. The former 
are organized, however, along lines similar but not identical 
to those of the federal ministry, the difference being attributed 
to the fact that some functions are performed solely at the 
federal level. Nevertheless, each does have a tax division 
which is subdivided. The State ministry consists of several 
divisions subdivided into groups (which are the equivalent of 
the subdivisions of the Federal Ministry of Finance) ; each group 
comprises a number of sections -depending on the range and 
importance of the tasks assigned to it. As in the case of the 
Federal Ministry of Finance,  these sections constitute the basic 
operational units of the ministry. 
In the area of individual and corporate income taxes the 
Ministry of Finance for a particular state supervises imple­
mentation of the tax laws by lower-level authorities (regional 
finance offices and the local finance offices) . In this process, 
instruction is given concerning assessment, auditing, tax for­
giveness, etc . In some circumstances the state ministry hands 
down a decision in an individual situation. 
However, all questions of common interest to tax adminis­
trations in the other states as well as questions relating to 
future legislation are referred to the federal tax administration 
by the state tax administrations . Moreover, no state ministry 
has any direct concern in the drafting of statutes dealing with 
individ•.1al or corporate income taxes . 
1 . 3  Organizational framework, regional office le ve l 
As previously noted, the Regional Finance Offices serve as 
regional authority for both the state and federal tax administra­
tions . The head, known as Chief Finance President, Oberfinanz ­
praesident, serves under joint nomination by the Federal and 
the appropriate state Ministers of Finance .  
The heads of  the several divisions, the Finance Presidents, 
Finanzpraesident, are subordinate to the Chief Finance Presi­
dent. However, the Customs and Excises Division is staffed 
with federal employees and its head is responSible to the Chief 
Finance President in the latter 's  capacity as a federal official, 
while the Division for Income, Profits, Net Worth, and Transfer 
Taxes is staffed with state employees and its head is responsi­
ble to the same regional Chief Finance President but in his 
capacity as a state official. Further, while the Group Unit for 
federal Turnover and Transport Taxes is attached to the Division 
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for Taxes on Income, Profits, Net Worth, and for Transfer 
Taxes, the former unit actually is independent of the latter 
division's  authority and reports directly to the Chief Finance 
President in his capacity as a federal official. 
The tax division is concerned primarily with supervision 
of the local state tax offices, Finanzaemter, where the actual 
work of ta:x administration is carried on. Within limits set by 
the State Ministry of Finance, the Regional Finance Office in­
structs the local offices on all aspects of income ta:x and trade 
tax administration, with particular attention to assessment, 
auditing, and tax forgiveness procedures. It also usually works 
with the local offices in auditing the more important enterprises 
in the region. 5 Further, under certain circumstances it hands 
down decisions covering particular fact situations which have 
been referred to it. In addition, the officials of this division 
of the Regional Finance Office conduct personal inspections to 
determine if the ta:x law is being enforced properly and if there 
is compliance with Regional Finance Office instructions . Final­
ly, information forwarded by the local offices to the regional 
tax division is analyzed and matters of general interest called 
to the attention of the State Ministry of Finance . 
1 . 4  Organizational framework, local office leve l 
The actual administration of the tax laws falls upon the 
approximately 500 local offices which are severally responsible 
for geographical areas varying sharply in size and number of 
taxpayers.  The number of local offices in a particular state 
depends upon geographic and economic considerations . In the 
City State of Bremen, only 5 local offices are needed, whereas 
45 are established in the State of Hesse, 63 in Lower Saxony, 
101 in North-Rhine Westphalia with its huge industrial centers, 
and 128 in Bavaria with its large rural districts . Also, the 
number of local offices serving under a particular Regional 
Finance Office varies according to the circumstances,  and 
ranges from 5 (Bremen) to 69 (Munich) . 
The geographical areas assigned to the various local of­
fices also vary in size . In a city with a great number of peo­
ple and businesses concentrated in a relatively small area, the 
district of a local tax office is necessarily much more restricted 
5 Among the other functions of the auditing section is the respon­
sibility of fixing, on the basis of criteria and data collected by the 
local authorities , the standard rates for estimating the turnover and 
profits of enterprise. 
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than in rural areas with widely dispersed settlements . The 
number of individual taxpayers-as distinct from residents­
within the jurisdiction of a local office also varies . In the 
federal territory approximately 3 . 2  million individuals are as ­
sessed for income tax. The number accommodated by a particu­
lar local office ranges from four thousand taxpayers to a high 
of twelve thousand or more, with an average in the neighbor­
hood of seven thousand. 6 Throughout the Federal Republic of 
Germany there are approximately 60,000 corporate taxpayers . 
In some of the larger cities, responsibility for the assessment 
of the corporate income tax has been given to special offices 
for corporations 7 but no data is available to indicate the aver­
age number of corporate taxpayers for which a typical office 
is responsible .  
Each local finance office is divided into a number of branch­
es which, in turn, are subdivided into working units , each of 
which is responsible for either a certain residential area or a 
certain category of taxpayers, such as corporations . The num­
ber of branches and of employees in a particular finance office 
depends upon the size of the area and the number of taxpayers . 8 
To some extent these same factors control the services per­
formed by a given local office, as in the case of auditing. Cer­
tain small local offices do not have an auditing staff. Where 
this situation exists, assessment personnel perform office 
audits, but the more complex audits are turned over to the 
auditing staff of a nearby larger local office which customarily 
does have such a staff. Further,  all auditing activity within a 
particular region is coordinated by the auditing section of the 
Regional Finance Office to insure uniformity. 
The head of each local office is subordinate to the head 
of the Regional Finance Office, though his rank depends upon 
the size of the local office .  He supervises the local adminis­
trative personnel, including the heads of the branches who, in 
6 Excluded from these figures are those taxpayers who are re­
quired to file tax returns but for some reason (i. e . ,  income below 
minimum taxable) are not liable for any tax. Also excluded are those 
taxpayers who have had their taxes (i. e . ,  wage tax, capital yields tax) 
withheld at the source. 
7 In these same large cities , other local offices are charged with 
the centralized administration of certain other kinds of taxes , such as 
those on transactions , the inheritance tax, etc.  
8 Offices in larger towns and industrial centers usually have staffs 
of considerable size,  up to 450 , and more branches than smaller of­
fices in rural areas . These latter average about 50 employees to an 
office. 
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turn, supervise the work of the working units . In the larger 
local offices, one or two heads of branches are denominated 
coordinators for taxes of particular importance, such as indi­
vidual and corporate income taxes, turnover taxes, or for a 
group of related taxes, such as capital transfer taxes.  These 
coordinators perform consultative and coordinating activities 
with respect to the particular taxes falling within their respec­
tive competence. 
Each taxpayer falls within the jurisdiction of some particu­
lar local office .  If an individual, jurisdiction is determined by 
his domicile; if a corporation, by the seat of management; if a 
foreign enterprise, by the site of the permanent establishment. 
In fulfilling its role as part of the state tax administration, 
each local office assesses, enforces, and collects individual and 
corporate income taxes from those falling within its jurisdic­
tion. Although the revenues from the turnover tax accrue to 
the federal government, local administration is handled by the 
state 's  local office, acting as agent for the federal government. 
In fact, before preparing a taxpayer 's  income tax assessment, 
the state official in the local office first computes the turnover 
for establishing the turnover tax. After all, the turnover,  
measured by gross receipts, serves as a point of departure in 
computing the taxpayer 's income . 9 Moreover,  in smaller and 
medium-sized tax offices,  when the income tax assessment for ­
a business is being prepared, the assessing official concurrent­
ly handles the work involved in computing the amount of the 
municipal trade tax, income being one of the multiple compo­
nents which constitute the base of that tax. 
Should the taxpayer wish to raise any questions relating to 
his tax, two administrative remedies are available . One, the 
protest, Einspruch, goes to the substance of tax liability; the 
other,  the complaint, Beschwerde , involves discretionary mat­
ters which in practice raise procedural issues, e .g . ,  forgive­
ness of taxes, or delay in filing returns because, illustratively, 
of force majeure or temporary absence from the country .  Under 
both procedures, the protest and the complaint, the local office 
hands down a decision. Should the local office deny the taxpay­
er's protest, the taxpayer has no further level of administrative 
9 If a taxpayer's  business has establishments in two or more mu­
nicipalities , the office apportions the trade tax receipts between the 
concerned municipalities. To facilitate the collection process ,  the 
larger municipalities have their own tax offices which administer not 
only the trade tax but other municipal taxes as well, including the real 
estate tax, levied in much the same manner. 
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appeal but must bring his case before the appropriate fiscal 
court. In the case of a complaint, however, the taxpayer may 
have the denial submitted to the regional office .  Should the 
regional office deny relief, the taxpayer then may proceed be­
fore the fiscal court. 
To summarize the work of the local office with respect to 
the income tax, this office determines the basis of taxation and 
then assesses and collects the amounts due. The same office 
also handles all administrative appeals with respect to sub­
stance and the first of the two levels of administrative appeals 
with respect to procedure . 
Section B. Personnel Framework (Gove rnmental 
and Non-Gove rnmental) 
1 . 5  Governmental professional personnel 
With very few exceptions the tax administrations 10 of the 
Federal Republic and of the several states are staffed by civil 
servants .1 1  These fall into four classes-senior, administra­
tive, clerical, and subclerical. Classification depends to a very 
substantial degree upon the individual's educational level at the 
time of entry. This educational level also determines the par­
ticular in-service training program into which an individual is 
channeled. 
The lowest level of employment for the senior class is as 
head of a branch in one of the local tax offices . However, 
such a position may be one of the top levels for a member of 
the second or administrative class, although officials of this 
class are employed as assistants to the senior class officials 
10 Fiscal administration is subdivided into three branches: taxes , 
customs,  property and construction. This subdivision is particularly 
evident in the structure of the Regional Finance Offices. See 1 .3  
supra . 
1 1  The term civil servant includes those persons whose status as 
such is governed by public law rather than by a private contract of 
employment. While theoretically practically all functions assigned to 
civil servants may be performed by salaried employees , the latter 
play only a minor part in tax administration. Where employed, sala­
ried employees typically perform clerical work but sometimes ,  where 
there is a need and their qualifications are satisfactory , they will be 
utilized in administrative posts. Relatively often such employees with 
particular competence in tax matters and accounting practices will be 
employed in auditing sections . However , the majority of such posts 
are filled by civil servants. 
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at all higher levels , and occasionally will be promoted into the 
senior class .  Clerical and subclerical classes have no admin­
istrative responsibilities,  being employed in subordinate capaci­
ties . 
Since tax administration involves the application of rele­
vant laws and-at the higher levels of the federal hierarchy­
the drafting of appropriate legislation, extensive legal knowledge 
is required of all officials who deal with other than purely ad­
ministrative matters. In consequence, the senior posts within 
the tax administration are filled typically by lawyers , although 
in some instances these positions are filled by university grad­
uates other than lawyers -i.e . ,  from economics, etc . -or by 
officials promoted from the administrative class12 to the so­
called senior class .  
A lawyer applying for a senior class civil servant classi­
fication in the tax administration, like all other lawyers, has 
completed approximately seven years of training in a university 
and in post-university apprenticeships and has passed his First 
and Second Legal State Examinations , and thus qualifies for the 
title of Assessor . 13  If the appropriate State Ministry of Fi­
nance 14 accepts his application, the young Assessor is enrolled 
by a Regional Office as a Finance Assessor and undergoes a 
training period lasting from eighteen months to two years . The 
bulk of this period is utilized in practical training. He spends 
ten to sixteen months at a local office, where stress is placed 
on auditing, four months at the Regional Finance Office, and 
one month at a Finance Court. On the theoretical side, the 
Finance Assessor attends three training courses, each lasting 
about one month, at the Federal Finance College, supervised by 
the Federal Ministry of Finance .15 
12 Officials in the top brackets of the administrative class frequent­
ly have duties comparable to those of senior officials. Therefore ,  they 
may move into the senior class without first qualifying through the ex­
amination process normally required. 
13 This training is made up of two parts. First , there are at least 
seven half-year terms of legal training at a university , concluded by 
the First Legal State Examination, Referendar Examination . This is 
followed by at least three and a half years of apprenticeship training 
in courts , administrative authorities , and law offices , successful com­
pletion of which entitles the student to take the Second Legal State Ex­
amination, Assessor Examination. 
14 The Federal Ministry of Finance handles the employment of at­
torneys to be used in the turnover and transactions tax areas . 
15 In adrlition to the Federal Finance College , there are several 
finance training schools conducted by the several states . 
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The courses at the Federal Finance College are designed 
to supplement the university legal training and give the Finance 
Assessor a broader and more detailed knowledge of the tax law 
as well as information in other areas (i. e . ,  business adminis­
tration with particular stress on industrial management) essen­
tial for tax administration. Special attention is given to ac­
counting and the analysis of balance sheets . In addition, there 
is some discussion of certain aspects of economics,  sociology, 
personnel management, industrial relations, and related subjects . 
Supplementing the formal course work are lectures of a gen­
eral character, covering political, cultural, and scientific topics.  
Upon successful completion of the training program, the 
Finance Assessor is appointed a Government Assessor, Regie ­
rungsassessor. Normally, his first assignment is as head of 
a branch at a small local office, but after two or three years 
he is promoted to Government Counselor, Regie rungs rat ,  which 
is the lowest ordinary rank, according to Table A, of the seven 
ranks in the senior class.  
TABLE A 
Officials of the Senior Class:  
Promotion Sequence 
Government Counselor • . . . . . . . . . . . .  Regierungsrat 
Chief Government Counselor . . . . . . . . . Oberregierungsrat 
Government Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regierungsdirektor 
Chief Government Director}16 {Leitender Regierungsdirektor 
Ministerial Counselor · · · · · · · or Minsterialrat 
Ministerial Deputy Director . . . . . . . . . . Ministerialdirigent 
Ministerial Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ministerialdirektor 
This bottom rank heads branches in the larger local offices. 
In the largest local offices, however, the heads of the more 
important branches are Chief Government Counselors, Ober­
regierungsrat. The rank held by heads of local finance offices 
depends upon the size of the particular offices . Most offices 
are headed by experienced personnel who have progressed 
through two or three, sometimes in the case of larger offices 
even four, ranks . A few very small offices are headed by men 
of the lowest rank. 
16 These two officials occupy an equal rank and enjoy an equal sal­
ary. The difference in title depends upon where the official in ques­
tion works ; the Leitender Regierungsdirektor works in the field , the 
Ministerialrat in either the state or federal Finance Ministry. 
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In the Regional Offices, section chiefs are either Govern­
ment Counselors, Regierungsrat, or Chief Government Coun­
selors, Obe rregierungsrat, while officials in charge of groups 
(made up of sections) are Government Directors , Regierungs ­
direktor. 
Within the State Ministries, the rank of the head of the tax 
division depends upon the size of that division. Usually this 
division is headed by an official who holds the second highest 
rank in the senior class, i.e . ,  a Ministerial Deputy Director, 
Ministe rialdirigent. Groups working on the level below that of 
the division are headed by Ministerial Counselors, Ministerial­
rat, or Government Directors,  Regierungsdirektor, with the 
section chiefs holding the rank of Chief Government Counselor, 
Oberregierungsrat. 
While the educational qualifications for tax officials of the 
second or so-called administrative class are not nearly as de­
manding as the standards applied to those who seek to enter 
the senior class, the wide variety and complexity of the tasks 
performed by the former does require them to have a sound 
basic educational background. Federal and state laws17 set out 
minimum requirements-i.e . ,  completion of training at an inter­
mediate-level school (e .g. ,  commercial school) or qualification 
for the upper years at a high school 18-but in practice the tax 
administration prefers candidates with somewhat greater quali� 
fications-i.e . ,  completion of training at a high school. 
The candidate ,  upon acceptance of his application by the 
Regional Finance Office, commences his apprenticeship train­
ing at a local office ,  the training period lasting at least three 
years . The state-administered training programs are general­
ly similar although they differ in detail. The bulk of the ap­
prenticeship training, geared to familiarize the candidates with 
the work of the local offices, involves actual work in the dif­
ferent branches of these offices. In the course of the training, 
knowledge of administrative class functions is acquired through 
contact with experienced officials . Simultaneously, the candi­
date is introduced gradually to progressively more difficult 
cases . 
17 The Federal Law on Civil Servants , which fixes the general re­
quirements , is binding on the several states .  In addition, each state 
has its own particular laws. 
18 In the school system in effect throughout Germany , the subjects 
taught in the upper year�.> at high school correspond at least in part 
to the subjects taught in the first two years in a college in the United 
States . 
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In addition to this practical training, a minimum of nine 
months is spent in theoretical studies .  To this end, six states 
maintain special training schools ; 1 9  in the other states,  Re­
gional Finance Offices are responsible for administration of 
the training programs . 
Typically, the first introductory course,  usually lasting 
three but sometimes as long as ten months, begins after the 
candidate has had a short period of practical experience in a 
local office.  This brief course, concluding by a preliminary 
examination, provides the theoretical knowledge necessary for 
successful continuation in the training program. A second 
course follows a substantial period of practical training and is 
concluded by written and oral examinations covering the im­
portant subjects a candidate will employ in his future work. 
These include: government and administration, accounting, 
balance-sheet analysis ,  auditing, individual income tax, corpo­
rate income tax, turnover tax, general tax law, capital tax, 
criminal law pertaining to fiscal offenses, enforcement meas­
ures, budgetary administration, etc . 
Candidates successfully passing this second examination 
are classed as civil servants on probation and are hired as 
supernumerary Tax Inspectors . After satisfactory service dur­
ing the probation period (normally two years) , they are ap­
pointed to the lowest bracket of the administrative class,  Tax 
Inspectors, and assigned a specific post within a local tax of­
fice. 
Typically the working unit of a local office is headed by 
a Tax Inspector or Chief Tax Inspector. Such an official, with 
the aid of one or two assistants, handles the assessment work. 
Inspectors also bear the prime responsibility for field audits . 
The two highest ranks of the administrative class,  Tax Superi­
ors and Tax Counselors , are to be found for the most part as 
heads of branches in Regional Finance Offices .  However, all 
four ranks of the administrative class also occupy posts at re­
gional, state, and federal levels as assistants to senior class 
officials . 
Normally, throughout the tax administration, the careers of 
all persons in the senior and administrative classes commence 
in a local tax office .  From the staffs of these offices, appoint­
ments are made to the regional offices . The state ministries 
of finance draw their personnel both from the regional and the 
local offices . The Federal Ministry of Finance draws its staff 
19 A s  of 1964 there were nine such training schools. 
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from the tax administrations of all states, the several state 
governments consenting to the transfer. 
When an official is transferred from a lower to a higher 
office, i.e . ,  from the regional office to the state or the federal 
ministry, he will not be expected to secure further education 
or on-the-job training. Such an official is already a member 
of a particular class and he will continue, albeit on a higher 
level, to perform the duties of that class .  Hence, such a pro­
motion merely presumes superior qualifications, such as a 
high degree of specialized knowledge, administrative or execu­
tive capacities, creative imagination, and initiative . These are 
the essentials for appointment to the state and federal minis­
tries ; no consideration is given to proportional representation 
of lower level authorities or any particular class of personnel. 
1 . 6  Private tax practitioners 
With the heavy post-war tax burden, the services of tax 
advisors have become increasingly important. These advisors 
fall into two main groups -Tax Consultants, Steuerbe rater, and 
Agents in Tax Matters, Steuerbe vollmachtigter-and presently 
number respectively 4,000 and 20,000. To insure suitable edu­
cational background and necessary professional qualifications, 
the 1961 Law on Tax Advisors , applicable to all the states, set 
up certain requirements for admission to the respective pro­
fessional examinations . 
To sit for the Tax Consultant examination, an individual 
must have completed a full course of university study in law 
or economics and subsequently must have been employed for 
at least three years by an individual or company admitted to 
tax practice .  There are somewhat less stringent requirements 
for the Agent in Tax Matters examination. Admission to this 
examination is granted on the basis of a high school or ac­
credited school-of-commerce education followed by an appren­
ticeship with a tax or business advisor or a trader and four 
years practical experience in the giving of tax advice while 
employed by a Tax Consultant or Agent in Tax Matters . 
In cooperation with the respective professional associations, 
the State Ministries of Finance conduct the examinations for 
Tax Consultants, the Regional Finance Offices for Agents in 
Tax Matters.  Because of the high level of competence demand­
ed, between 20 and 2 5  percent of the applicants fail to pass .  
Both types of examinations cover tax law, relevant criminal 
law and procedure, accounting with particular emphasis on bal­
ance sheet analysis, civil law, and professional law. The Tax 
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Consultant examination, in addition to requiring a more exten­
sive and sophisticated knowledge of these subjects, includes 
commercial and company law, public finance, and economics .  
Candidates for the examinations may not attend the federal 
or state in-service training programs . Instead they attend 
private courses conducted by experienced teachers including 
Tax Consultants ,  Certified Public Accountants,  and senior or 
administrative class tax officials . In addition textbooks and 
correspondence courses are available . 
The typical candidate for the rank of Tax Consultant has 
completed his university training before taking the qualifying 
examination. However, the examination may be taken by two 
groups who lack university training: Agents in Tax Matters 
who have had ten years of full time service considered satis­
factory by the head of the local finance office most familiar 
with their capabilities, and former tax administration officials 
(in practice members of the non-senior class) who in the ten 
years prior to their retirement had worked for five years as 
head of a branch. If such a former non-senior class tax ad­
ministration official had headed a section or working unit under 
the same conditions, he may sit for the Agent for Tax Matters 
examination. 
No qualifying examination for Tax Consultant is required 
of two groups : former judges of fiscal courts and senior class 
tax officials who for five of the ten years directly preceding 
retirement have headed a branch in a local office or occupied 
an equivalent position. Their technical knowledge is considered 
sufficient to warrant this special arrangement. 
These two groups of tax advisors-Tax Consultants and 
Agents in Tax Matters-perform essentially the same functions, 
including closing taxpayers ' books, establishing balance sheets, 
preparing tax returns, representing taxpayers in dealings with 
the tax administration or before the fiscal courts. However, 
Agents in Tax Matters handle primarily tax affairs of small­
and medium-sized firms with less complex financial dealings , 
while Tax Consultants are retained by larger firms with more 
complicated tax problems . Only Tax Consultants may be the 
members of the boards of managers of the hundred-odd cor­
porations or limited liability companies organized to  engage in 
tax practice.  
Both Tax Consultants and Agents in Tax Matters may rep­
resent taxpayers in administrative proceedings and in the tax 
courts . Two other groups of professional tax advisors have 
the same privilege: a very small and steadily decreasing group 
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of Certified Auditors, vereidigter Buchpriijer; and the much 
more important group of Certified Public Accountants, number­
ing about 1 50, who have completed university training in eco­
nomics and related fields, have had six years of professional 
accounting experience, and have passed a difficult qualifying 
examination. 
Because a taxpayer can use members of any of these four 
groups as tax advisers and as representatives in tax litigation, 
it is not necessary to have a lawyer represent him. Yet rep­
resentation in tax litigation is the only tax area where lawyers 
are at all active, for the giving of tax advice is almost entire­
ly handled by members of other professional groups . 
CHAPTER XIV 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS 
Section A. Characte r  of the Underlying Statute 
2 . 1  The precision of the statute itself 
The basic principles of German income tax law are the 
same for individuals and for corporations . While there are 
two separate statutes -individuals are subject to the Income 
Tax Law and corporate bodies to the Corporation Income Tax 
Law-the corporation tax statute refers to and is based on the 
individual tax statute . 
Both the Income Tax Law and the Corporation Income Tax 
Law are relatively short. The Income Tax Law fills 80 print­
ed pages with approximately 300 words to the page . It has 73 
sections . 1 About two-thirds of these contain substantive provi­
sions concerning the determination of income, tax rates ,  etc . 
The remaining one-third contains procedural rules, such as the 
authority to issue regulatory ordinances having the force of 
law. 2 Most, but not all, of the individual sections of the law 
are relatively short. The most extensive sections are those 
which, in addition to a general principle, set forth rules grant­
ing special relief as to which the law seeks to be as precise 
as possible . 
The Corporation Income Tax Law is shorter than the In­
come Tax Law, with 24 sections on 1 5  pages of approximately 
300 words each. This brevity is possible because the Corpora­
tion Income Tax is essentially based on the Income Tax Law. 
Illustratively, it refers back to the Income Tax Law when deal­
ing with income determination and tax assessment, restricting 
itself to special provisions governing the taxation of corporate 
bodies,  i .e . ,  intercompany holdings, tax rates,  etc . 
1 The numbered sections run only to 54,  but several sections marked 
with letters have been added, bringing the actual number of sections to 
73.  
2 During the post-World War II period of reconstruction, special 
economic considerations led to incorporation of a number of rules ex­
pected to have a short life. Their number is decreasing as the ob­
jectives of their enactment are being achieved. 
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A factor contributing to the relative shortness of both stat­
utes is the fact that there is a separate code of procedure 
covering all taxes, the Fiscal Code, Reichsabgabenordnung. This 
code deals with assessment, conditions permitting modification 
of assessment notices, collection of deficiencies , tax refunds , 
statutes of limitations, and penalties. Although extensive, com­
prising 488 sections, relatively few provisions directly affect 
the taxation of income . However, in addition to the two basic 
statutes, certain other comparatively brief laws do deal with 
isolated specialized sectors of individual and corporate income 
taxation, such as contributions to industrial pension funds, in­
vestment funds, and corporate reorganizations . 
Another prime factor contributing to the brevity of the 
basic income tax statutes are the complementary regulatory 
ordinances, Rechtsverordnungen, discussed in 2 . 4  infra. 
Most important, however, is the fact that the two laws are 
based on abstract concepts and state abstract rules .  The statu­
tory provisions do not enumerate concrete cases which may be 
encountered in practice. In solving any such problem, the ab­
straction is applied to the factual situation, with specific rules 
then being derived from the guiding principle. 
This approach of the statute is based on the premise that, 
since the law must cover a wide range of factual situations, it 
must leave room for flexible interpretation. An enumeration 
of concrete cases might be helpful to the layman, but would 
tend to make the law rigid and inflexible, unable to adjust to 
changing conditions . 3 Moreover,  it is unlikely that inclusion 
of a large number of subordinate rules to govern diverse types 
of individual cases would reduce the volume of interpretative 
controversies, for no list could cover all possibilities . And in 
practice, it then would be difficult to classify factual situations 
under the competing rules however great their number.  While 
Germany avoids this by using general provisions , and thus 
achieves far greater brevity than does the United States in its 
code, delimitations are not lacking; but they are confined to 
basic essentials and thus not nearly so numerous as those 
found in the United States code . 
This greater reliance on abstract legal principles also in­
sures greater uniformity in application of the law to economic 
3 A rigid statute, out of tune with current conditions , might grant 
unanticipated benefits or result in unforeseen hardships. Such inequity 
might lead to new demands by taxpayers ,  further detailed specifications 
in the statute with increased ramifications , and even an aggravation of 
existing rigidity. 
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gain. Under the German law, income from trade or business 
comprises all income derived by a businessman from his busi­
ness . It is immaterial whether the income arises from inter­
est payments , capital gains, or profit from the sale of goods; 
income is treated as a single unit. The structure of the law 
itself tends to resist the insertion of complicated special rules 
according special or preferential treatment to isolated items. 
Illustratively, the Income Tax Law, Section 2, paragraph 1 ,  
states that income tax is calculated on the basis o f  net income 
received in any one calendar year. Paragraph 2 provides, by 
way of deduction from the principle expressed in paragraph 1 ,  
that net · income is the total amount of income derived from 
each of the listed sources of income, less losses and expenses 
incurred in respect of those sources. 
The sources of income listed in the statute are as follows : 
(1 )  Income from agriculture and forestry; 
(2) Income from trade or business; 
( 3) Income from independent personal services ; 
( 4) Employment income; 
( 5) Income from the investment of capital; 
( 6) Rentals and royalties ;  and 
(7) Other income defined and circumscribed likewise in abstract 
terms including 
(a) Recurring payments such as pensions ; 
(b) Income from speculative transactions, i .e . ,  sales of pri­
vate property, if, in the case of real property, not more 
than two years , and in the case of other property not 
more than two months , have elapsed between the acqui­
sition and the sale; and 
(c) Income from any other payments or benefits received 
and not included in one of the sources of income listed 
as, for instance, income from the occasional leasing of 
movable property. 
Under each of the sources of income are listed the types 
of income . Thus income from trade or business is said to 
comprise the profits derived by a partner from a partnership, 
including payment for his services to the partnership, payment 
for assets made available to the partnership, or interest on a 
loan granted by him. Employment income includes non-cash 
benefits and pensions, while income from the investment of 
capital includes dividends , interest, etc . 
In the case of corporations, however, their entire income 
is deemed to be income from trade or business. 
310 GERMANY: RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS 
The statute defines the terms surplus and profits. These 
concepts are of prime importance because for the first three 
sources of income listed above, income is understood to be the 
profit from the activity while for the other four it is the sur­
plus of receipts over income-connected expenses . 
Under the statute, profit is computed by comparing net 
worth at the end of one business year with that at the end of 
the preceding business year . This is an abstract approach, 
preceding from general terms to particular elements, starting 
with the balance sheet not the profit and loss account. Fur­
ther, the balance sheet must be prepared to accord with com­
mercial law principles, while at the same time taking into ac­
count special provisions in the tax law governing withdrawals 
and investments, valuation, physical depreciation, business  ex­
penses, etc. This reference to commercial law simplifies the 
tax law 's structure , but in practice it requires the preparation 
of two balance sheets, one for commercial, the other for tax 
purposes. 
Since income is determined by comparing two balance 
sheets, no capital loss deduction provision is needed: this be­
comes a matter of asset valuation in the balance sheet. De­
ductible expenses, however, are specified, with those not deducti­
ble regarded as withdrawals to be added to the profits . 
By specifying certain types of receipts as subject to in• 
come tax, those not so identified are excluded, such as lottery 
gains ; this stems from the structure of the law, that is , an 
item is excludable because it is not specifically included. Thus, 
while the statute does not list every kind of payment excluda­
ble from income tax, it does list approximately sixty items 
which, absent such identification, could be included under a 
source of income . 
When determining an individual 's net income, certain per­
sonal expenses are deductible. These include interest, life 
insurance premiums, church tax, etc .  Further the taxpayer 
may deduct various allowances for dependent children or ad ­
vanced age, and also certain extraordinary burdens such as 
unusual medical costs . Thus the net income figure is reached, 
a sum to which the income tax rate table is applied. 
A statute stating abstract concepts inevitably creates inter­
pretative problems in the course of applying the abstractions 
to individual cases .  The following example relating to income 
from trade or business illustrates this process .  
In determining whether items constitute receipts or  ex­
penditures, the statute establishes certain criteria. With respect 
CHARACTER OF UNDERLYING STATUTE 311 
to receipts, the only issue is whether the income was derived 
from the trade or business; the nature of the individual item 
is immaterial. With respect to expenditures, the statute pro­
vides : "Business expenses shall be understood to mean expendi­
tures occasioned by the operation of a business . "4 Under this 
provision, expenditures for private purposes are not deductible . 
If the latter are shown as business expenses, an adjustment 
will be made, adding them back to profit . While the treatment 
of business expenditures is clear, disputes do arise as to the 
meaning of the standards ,  "occasioned by the operation of a 
business" or "incurred for private purposes ."  The statute at­
tempts to clarify the abstract standards by providing that non­
deductible expenses include expenditures to maintain a standard 
of living commensurate with the taxpayer 's  economic or social 
position, irrespective of whether such expenditure promotes the 
taxpayer 's professional or business activities .5 However, be­
cause the terms used in these standards ("economic or social 
position" and "promoting the taxpayer 's  professional or business 
activities") do not readily provide a clear answer to each of 
the wide range of factual circumstances to which they must be 
applied, courts do encounter a large number of controversies 
in this area. 
Where deductibility depends upon the expenditure's  having 
been occasioned by the operation of the business ,  the principle 
of causality becomes the criterion. Should a businessman incur 
excessively large expenditures for customer entertainment, the 
abstract language of the statute, standing alone, might seem to 
warrant their deduction. To prevent this possible construction, 
the statute sets out concrete criteria and classifies as non­
deductible the following expenditures : 
1. Expenditures for presents made to persons who are not em­
ployees of the taxpayer and do not have continuous business 
relations with him under either a commercial agency con­
tract or a contract for work and services , except presents 
with an aggregate value during the taxpayer ' s  business year 
not exceeding DM 100 for each individual recipient; 
2 .  Expenditures for guest houses maintained by the taxpayer 
outside the city or town where the business is located, to 
the extent these facilities are used for accommodating and 
entertaining persons other than employees; and 
3.  Expenditures connected with the acquisition or exercise of 
hunting or fishing privileges or the maintenance of yachts 
or similar facilities ,  and the entertainment of guests through 
use of such facilities. 
4 Income Tax Law, § 4 , para. 4. 
5 Income Tax Law , § 12.  
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Finally, the following catchall provision provides a general 
safeguard against excessive expenses : 
Expenditure affecting the standard of living of the taxpayer 
or another person shall not be taken into account when deter­
mining the profits,  to the extent that such expenditure is deemed 
to be excessive by generally accepted standards. 6 
Since this less precise standard must be applied to each indi­
vidual set of facts, here too courts encounter many controver­
sies requiring construction of the phrase "deemed to be exces ­
sive by generally accepted standards ."  "Constructive dividends" 
is another phrase creating interpretative problems . The Cor­
poration Income Tax Law does not define the phrase, simply 
stating: 
The question as to which receipts are income and the 
method of computing such income shall be governed by the 
provisions of the Income Tax Law. In this connection, con­
structive dividends shall also be taken into account. 
The relevant regulatory ordinance, Ordinance Regulating the 
Corporation Income Tax Law,7 gives ten examples but no defi­
nition. 8 Consequently the courts must define and interpret the 
statutory expression. 
The fact that the courts are available to resolve these in­
terpretative disputes means, on the one hand, that the statute ' s  
reliance on abstract principles does not j eopardize the stability 
of the legal system. In borderline cases, on the other hand, 
the taxpayer cannot be certain in advance as to the tax conse­
quence of his actions, for each decision covers only the case 
at issue . 
Finally, it should also be observed that the German statute 
does include some provisions which contain precise definitions 
with scant room for interpretation, such as those dealing with 
the extraordinary depreciation allowances on private housing 
6 Income Tax Law , § 4, para. 5.  
7 For details concerning the status of regulatory ordinances ,  see 
2 . 4  infra . 
8 Typically an ordinance does not contain illustrative examples. 
They are to be found in administrative regulations . The first two ex­
amples of constructive dividends set out in Ordinance Regulating the 
Corporation Income Tax Law , § 19 , read as follows: 
"1.  A shareholder is paid an excessive salary for his services 
as an officer of the company. 
" 2 .  A shareholder is paid, in addition to an adequate salary, 
extra compensation based on the turnover of the business." 
CHARACTER OF UNDERLYING STATUTE 313 
(including owner-occupied dwellings) and with charitable contri­
butions . Thus German tax law employs deliberately a variety 
of drafting techniques, the overriding motive being to keep the 
law as flexible as possible . 9 
The annual number of income tax controversies which in­
volve interpretative issues is not known. While some are re ­
solved at the judicial level, administrative procedures handle 
far more . It is not even known how many reach, or how many 
are resolved by, either the lower echelon fiscal courts or the 
Federal Fiscal Court.10 Only the latter tribunal publishes de­
ClSlOns . And while, in 1963 for example, it published 164 in­
come tax and 17 corporation tax decisions, the total number 
handed down was substantially higher, for even that court does 
not publish all its decisions. 
2 .2  Legislative pre -enactment aids to interpre tation 
Legislative pre-enactment aids to income tax law interpre­
tation include : 
( 1) Minutes of the Budestag or Bundesrat Fiscal Commit­
tee or of any other technical committees dealing with 
income tax matters; 11 
( 2) Reports submitted to the Bundestag or Bundesrat by the 
Fiscal Committee concerning the results of its discus­
sion; and 
(3) Minutes of the plenary session debates of the Bundestag 
or Bundesrat. 
Of these three, the Bundestag Fiscal Committee 's minutes 
contain the greatest amount of information regarding the sense 
and purpose of a provision. The Fiscal Committee may and 
typically does invite the Federal Minister of Finance, senior 
officials of the Finance Ministry, experts from industry, etc . ,  
to participate in these clarifying discussions . However, the 
hearings are closed and the minutes ,  summary rather than ver­
batim reports of the discussion, generally are not available to 
the public . 
9 One advantage: Taxpayers ,  rather than attempt to exploit the 
marginal areas hoping to find loopholes in the law, may seek sound 
footings , not otherwise being sure of a court' s  reaction. 
10 The Federal F iscal Court , the supreme court for German tax 
matters , deals only with questions of law. See Chap. XVI, 4.4 infra . 
11 The grass-roots work on a given provision-apart from the pre­
paratory work done by the Federal Ministry of Finance-generally is 
left to the several committees. 
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The public, however, does have access to the reports which 
the Committee submits to the legislature and to legislative 
minutes . The utility of the former is limited because they re­
flect only a summary of the committee 's views . And typically, 
the legislative minutes furnish no details regarding the inter­
pretation of a given provision. The processing of one new pro­
vision in 1964 (section 6(b) of the Income Tax Law) illustrates 
the relative informative quality of these three sources. The 
portion of that provision of interest here reads as follows : 
Profit from the disposal of certain fixed assets 
(1) Taxpayers who dispose of real property , fixtures attached 
to real property including the appurtenant lands . . . or live­
stock of agricultural and forestry enterprises in connection 
with a plant reorganization, may , in the business year in 
which the assets are disposed of, deduct from the cost of ac­
quiring or producing the [especially defined . . .  similar] assets 
purchased or produced in the said business year an amount 
not exceeding the profit derived from such disposal. . . . 
Two questions arise .  What are "fixtures attached to real prop­
erty" within the meaning of the provision? What is a "plant 
reorganization" ? , 
The Fiscal Committee minutes,  though not available to the 
public, provide some clarification. They state that the expres­
sion, "fixtures attached to real property," is more or less re­
stricted to irrigation and drainage facilities used for agricul­
tural or forestry purposes . "Plant reorganization"-a term 
hitherto unused by German tax law-is said to cover not only 
the fundamental reorganization of a business but also situations 
where, for instance, a cattle farm is converted into a duck farm. 
The minutes go on to state that the ultimate definition of "plant 
reorganization" must rest with the courts . 
The Fiscal Committee 's  published report to the Bundestag 
does not refer at all to "fixtures attached to real property. "  
"Plant reorganization" is explained only by an illustration, 
"e.g. ,  when changing from bovine cattle farming to small cattle 
farming."  
The Bundestag minutes of  the debate on the 1964 Tax 
Amendment Law mentions neither of the previously quoted 
statutory phrases. The plenary session did not concern itself 
with these details; it explored only the economic, political, and 
fiscal effects of provisions granting tax reliefs . 
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2 . 3  Standards of construction followed by the judiciary in inter­
pre ting the statute 
A German court, construing a statute, takes as a point of 
departure the premise that the language of a law determines 
its construction, for the language reflects the legislature's  in­
tention. Therefore, any construction must accord with the 
language used in the law, unless a literal application were to 
lead to an obviously unreasonable result. 
The extent of judicial interpretation depends, of course, on 
the way a provision was drafted. When a statute is phrased 
in abstract form, there is much scope for judicial interpreta­
tion. When a statute is expressed in precise terms, there is 
little judicial interpretation. Since each provision reflects its 
own character, the courts try to ascertain from the statute 
itself the proper degree of interpretative freedom. For exam­
ple, a sweeping term such as constructive dividends obviously 
gives wide latitude.  
That interpretations will be realistic and responsive to new 
situations is insured by the fact that certain principles of con­
struction, not set out in any statute, ride piggy-back on the 
text of the law itself. Among those to which the judiciary ad­
heres, the most important is the so-called economic approach, 
wirschaftliche Be trachtungsweise . This approach stresses the 
economic aspects of a transaction, its substance rather than 
the niceties of its legalistic form. The interpretation accorded 
"concealed capital stock" illustrates the use of this overriding 
economic approach. Should an interest-bearing loan be granted 
to a limited liability company by a shareholder, the loan will 
be scrutinized in the light of all facts pertaining to the com­
pany to determine whether it constitutes additional capital rather 
than a liability . If it is determined to be additional capital, 
interest payments are deemed distributions rather than recog­
nized deductible business expenses . 
This realistic approach also enables the courts to keep the 
law in tune with current economic developments . For example, 
changes in agricultural practices with greater use of farm 
machinery, fertilizer, etc . ,  led courts to recognize that part­
nership agreements between farm parents and children should 
no longer be regarded as tax avoidance devices reflecting mere 
family ties, but as genuine contractual relationships . 
This approach to interpretation also has enabled the ju­
diciary to assure that cases of like economic substance re­
ceive identical tax treatment even in the instance where a 
literal interpretation of the law would produce different results . 
316 GERMANY: RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS 
Illustratively, the statute literally accords different treatment 
to businessmen and to individual investors in depreciating capi­
tal improvements to realty. Should a businessman shift from 
coke to oil heat, the rules concerning the determination of 
profits from trade or business would apply with the conse­
quence that his depreciation would be geared to the useful life 
of the new system. The private investor, however, is governed 
by the provisions relating to rental income, and literally would 
be forced to gear his depreciation to the longer useful life of 
the building. This obviously discriminatory treatment caused 
the courts to rule that the private investor, at the point when 
the new oil furnace became unserviceable, could write off as 
income-connected expenses the then remaining undepreciated 
basis of the furnace.  
Finally, where the courts are uncertain as to the legisla­
tive intent, consideration is given to the historical background 
of a provision, though this may not be used to justify an in­
terpretation incompatible with the thrust of the provision itself. 
The background includes the pre-enactment documents men­
tioned previously 12 though, in general, these do not rank high 
among the guides to interpretation. 
Section B. The Regulations Program 
2 . 4  Types and force of regulations 
As noted in 2 . 1  supra, German tax statutes are supple­
mented by regulatory ordinances, Rechtsverordnunger. These 
are issued by the Federal Government with the consent of the 
Federal Council, Bundesrat, pursuant to authority contained in 
the individual laws which lay down the scope, limits, and pur­
pose of  the authority. These ordinances then serve only to 
implement the law, providing specifics in accordance with the 
general legislative intent reflected by the statute itself. 
Regulatory ordinances cannot change or modify the law's  
provisions nor can they create new obligations and privileges . 
Unless they fail to conform to the language and purpose of the 
law, they are regarded as binding legislation susceptible to in­
terpretation. Thus they are far more than mere administrative 
instructions . They bind both the administrative authorities and 
the courts except where the courts hold either that a regula­
tory provision exceeds the delegated authority, or that the 
12 See 2.2 infra . 
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delegation itself was invalid because insufficiently defined in 
the statute . 
Despite these limitations, regulatory ordinances can be 
used effectively to supply details not incorporated in the law 
itself or to permit adaption to changing conditions without fur­
ther resort to the more time-consuming legislative process. 
Illustratively, the statute authorizes the issuance of regulatory 
ordinances granting special depreciation allowances for such 
items as sewage plants, mining, air purification, and research 
equipment, and to provide special deductions for certain cate­
gories of goods, including imported goods the prices of which 
have declined sharply on the world's market and other goods 
of particular importance to the German economy. Other regu­
latory ordinances are authorized to permit increased accumu­
lation of reserves when prices rise or to allow special de­
preciation allowances during a recession. Again, authority is 
delegated to issue ordinances according tax relief to inventions 
by employees, independent inventors, etc . 
The Income Tax Law confers both specific and general 
authority to issue regulatory ordinances. Specific authority is 
conferred in certain selected areas,l3 such as those previously 
mentioned . In order to insure equality of all taxpayers before 
the law, to provide relief in hardship cases, or to simplify tax 
procedures , general authority is granted to facilitate implemen­
tation of the Income Tax Law with respect to the delimitation 
of tax liability, determination of income, assessments, applica­
tion of tax rate provisions , and payment of taxes . 
The most important ordinance issued under the Income Tax 
Law is the General Ordinance regulating the Income Tax Law. 
It contains 9 1  sections and comprises about 60 pages of ap­
proximately 300 words each, and thus is somewhat smaller in 
size than the Income Tax Law itself. Also relevant to this 
comparison of size is the fact that this ordinance-like all regu­
latory ordinances-for more complete understanding frequently 
repeats the text of the various parts of the law with which it 
deals . However, not every section of the statute is supple­
mented by a corresponding portion of the regulatory ordinance . 
Only portions are so complemented, selected usually because 
13 The identification of these specified areas is primarily a matter 
of drafting technique. At the end of the Income Tax Law ,  the text re­
flects both the general authority to issue regulatory ordinances , as 
well as specific authority in selected areas to make certain that the 
Federal Government is authorized to issue the latter ordinances with 
the approval of the Bundesrat.  
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the statute is not exhaustive enough on a given point. Subject 
to the overriding requirement that a regulatory ordinance con­
form to the law itself, the government in exercising its author­
ity to issue regulatory ordinances has full administrative dis ­
cretion in determining what it will include within a particular 
regulation. In addition to the General Ordinance,  there are 
approximately ten major regulatory ordinances covering im­
portant special income tax areas . The most voluminous of 
these is the Wage Tax Ordinance,  which comprises 58 selec­
tions dealing in large part with the technical aspects of the 
wage tax. Other ordinances bear on the withholding tax on 
income from capital, taxation of independent inventors, tax 
treatment of inventions by employees, and on the calculation 
of the rental value of owner-occupied homes . Together, these 
ordinances add slightly less than a hundred sections . 
These regulatory ordinances fulfill the purpose of making 
precise whatever may have been left open or unclear in the 
statute. They do not interpret the statute. Rather they set 
out supplementary rules omitted by the legislature. Further, 
they do not include summaries of Supreme Court decisions. 
The Ordinance regulating the Corporation Income Tax Law, 
issued under the authority contained in the statute itself, has 
only 38 sections, for it deals only with the special problems 
peculiar to corporate taxation. 
Whereas the regulatory ordinances establish legally bind­
ing rules,  the quite separate administrative regulations dis ­
cussed below serve only to reflect the government's  interpre­
tative position. 
2 . 5  Precise purpose of inte rpre tative regulations 
The introductions to the Income Tax Regulations, Corpora­
tion Income Tax Regulations, and Wage Tax Regulations state 
their purpose as follows : 
The regulations deal with questions of doubt and interpre­
tative questions of general importance with a view to insuring 
uniformity in the application of the income tax law [corporation 
income tax law ,  wage tax law] by the tax authorities . In addi­
tion, they give instructions to the local finance offices on how 
to proceed in certain cases in order to prevent undue hardship 
and to simplify administrative procedures. 14 
14 under German tax law (Fiscal Code, § 131) , taxes may be for­
given or refunded in whole or in part where,  in the circumstances of 
the individual case, taxation would result in undue hardship. It also 
is permissible to reduce the base of income on which the tax rates 
are applied. Although this provision refers to hardship in relation to 
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These administrative regulations describe and interpret 
both the law and the regulatory ordinances . They do not sup­
plement the law, i .e . ,  fill gaps left open by the legislature . 
This is left to the regulatory ordinances. 
The authority to issue these administrative regulations is 
derived by the Federal government from the Basic Law, 15 not 
from specific delegations in the tax statutes . However, because 
of the power held by the several states in income tax matters, 
the administrative regulations covering this area can be issued 
only after receiving the approval of the Bundesrat (comprised 
of representatives of the states) . 
Administrative regulations, unlike statutes or regulatory 
ordinances, do not bind the courts. A regulation may be taken 
into account, however, either because it is deemed to repre­
sent a well thought out administrative view or because it is a 
source of information regarding methods which have been ap­
plied in practice. Even so, in the end a court renders its de­
cision on the basis of its own interpretation of the law. 
Nevertheless, the abstract language of the German statutes 
makes centralized administrative interpretation a prerequisite 
to uniform application of the law by all administrative officials, 
and is peculiarly important as to matters having wide applica­
tion. Since the focus on interpretative problems is only to 
assure uniform application by fiscal authorities, rather than to 
guide the lay public, lay language is not used. Nor are exam­
ples provided where the law itself provides a clear answer. In 
general, the aim is to strive to interpret the law to conform 
with objective criteria, i.e . ,  as the courts would be expected 
to interpret it. 
Two illustrations will indicate the type of interpretative 
assistance these administrative regulations provide. The first 
relates to Sections 2 and 2 1  of the Income Tax Law which re­
quire inclusion of rental income from real property. Income 
means receipts less income-connected expenses . The latter 
are defined in Section 9 precisely, to mean those incurred in 
obtaining, conserving, and maintaining receipts . In practice ,  
however, it is difficult to distinguish between expenditures con­
stituting income-connected expenses and expenditures requiring 
capitalization. The administrative regulations seek to clarify 
the distinction, as follows : 
(footnote continued) 
the circumstances of individual cases,  it expressly allows similar ar­
rangements to be provided for certain groups of analogous cases. 
15 Basic Law ,  art. 108,  para. 6 .  
320 GERMANY: RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS 
There is no fixed borderline between maintenance-connect­
ed expenditure and capital expenditure. Maintenance-connected 
expenditure invariably includes expenditure 
1. Which does not change the nature of the real property 
and 
2 .  Which is incurred with a view to maintaining the prop­
erty in proper operating condition and 
3. Which recurs regularly in about the same amounts. 
Even if not all of these conditions are fulfilled , expenses in­
curred may, under certain conditions , constitute maintenance­
connected expenditure (cf. Federal Fiscal Court Decisions , 
July 9 ,  1953 and March 1 ,  1960-BStBl (Bundessteuerblatt) III , 
245 and BStBl III, 198) . In particular , maintenance-connected 
expenditure includes expenditure on current maintenance and on 
repair (backlog of maintenance work) . . .  ,16  
This effort to be as precise as circumstances permit is 
illustrated by the regulation dealing with Section 9a of the In­
come Tax Law. The latter allows, in lieu of a deduction for 
actual income-connected expenses, a standard deduction in the 
following amounts : 
( 1) DM 564 deductible from employment income; 
(2) DM 1 50 deductible from the income from capital assets . 
From this emerge several questions . Is a taxpayer with more 
than one employer allowed to claim more than one standard 
deduction? If a taxpayer receives both employment income 
and income from capital, can he claim both standard deduc­
tions ? If he ceases to be liable for tax during part of a given 
year, must the standard amounts be reduced proportionately? 
The Income Tax Regulations respond as follows: 
The standard deduction for income-connected expenses 
shall be allowed only once in respect from the same source [17 ]  
o f  income ( cf. Federal Fiscal Court Decision, April 3 ,  1959-
BStBl III, 220) . In the case of income from two or more 
sources , the standard deduction shall be allowed in respect of 
each source of income up to the amount of the income involved. 
The standard amounts shall not be reduced if the taxpayer's 
liability to tax during a given year failed to extend over the 
full year. 
Observe that both of the above examples from the regula­
tions cite decisions of the Federal Fiscal Court, the highest 
16 Income Tax Regulations, p:j.ra. 157, 
17 E .g., employment income irrespective of the number of employ­
ers.  
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German court in tax matters. Thus the regulations not only 
clarify but serve also to indicate the issues which the tax ad­
ministration regards as now settled but which at some point 
were doubtful enough to have reached the highest judicial tri­
bunal. 
Finally, it should be noted that administrative regulations 
do not try to cover exhaustively all interpretative questions . 
Coverage depends on foreseeable or actual needs . Consequent­
ly, initial regulations must be supplemented with amendments 
and, in practice, almost every year amended versions of the 
Income Tax and Wage Tax Regulations are issued.18 The bulk 
of the provisions remain unchanged, but for identification pur­
poses the particular year is added to the title, i .e. ,  Income 
Tax Regulations for the Calendar Year 1963. 
Administrative regulations are subdivided into paragraphs, 
unlike the laws and the regulatory ordinances which are sub­
divided into sections . The Income Tax Regulations contain 224 
paragraphs covering 2 1 5  pages with approximately 300 words 
to each page. While procedural rules are of secondary impor­
tance in the case of the Income Tax Regulations , they are more 
important for the Wage Tax Regulations . Wage Tax Regulations 
spread 94 paragraphs across 120 pages, and the Corporation 
Income Tax Regulations include 69 paragraphs which run about 
100 pages . 
2 . 6  Manner of processing regulations 
A division of the Federal Ministry of Finance, responsible 
for taxes on income, capital, and transactions, prepares all 
statutes , regulatory ordinances , and administrative regulations 
relating to the taxation of income. 
Section heads within this division, 19 assisted by senior of­
ficials and officials of the administrative class,  20 handle the 
actual preparatory work. The section heads and senior offi­
cials are lawyers . Their prime guidance comes from the de­
bates on the statute .  Consequently the basic thrust is fixed by 
the time of enactment. But actual drafting takes place later,  
after all interested parties-i.e . ,  the State Finance Ministries,  
18 The regulations constitute definite instructions for local finance 
offices for the calendar year of issuance. Consequently , amendments 
are introduced only once a year. 
19 See Chap. XIII, 1.2 supra . 
20 See Chap. XIU, 1. 5 supra, for a discussion of officials of the 
administrative class. 
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other Federal Ministries, 21 and private organizations (particu­
larly the leading professional and industrial groups)-have ex­
pressed their opinions and made recommendations . Public 
hearings are not held though regulations are normally prepared 
after discussing matters with all interested groups-who may 
in fact have made the initial suggestion for the proposed regu­
lation. 
Typically a few months elapse between the enactment of 
the statute and the issuance of the regulatory ordinances . The 
administrative regulations, on the other hand, are published 
annually. 22 
Section C .  The Rulings Program 
2 .  7 Formal advance private written rulings to taxpayers 
The German tax administratiqn is not required to supply 
taxpayers with rulings concerning the tax consequences of pro­
posed transactions . There is only one exception: it is possible 
to obtain a ruling on whether and to what extent wage tax pro­
visions must be applied. This exception is justified because 
the employer is liable for the proper deduction of this tax, 
even in the absence of fault. Information as to this liability 
may be obtained without formality, even over the telephone . 
While the administration is not legally bound by its answer, 
should it prove to be erroneous, in practice the administration 
legally stands by the position taken if the applicant relied 
thereon in good faith. 
Though not legally bound to do so, the administration often 
does issue advance written rulings to accommodate taxpayers 
who plan to conclude important contracts or to commence large­
scale transactions . But this is a discretionary matter·. No 
rules define the questions which will or will not be answered. 
And in exercising discretion as to whether or not a ruling 
should be issued, the administration is guided by the principle 
that a taxpayer deserves the protection of a ruling only in cases 
involving doubtful questions of law which impose an undue bur­
den on a taxpayer unable by himself to clarify the problem.  
Further,  rulings are never issued in two types of  situations . 
21 Most important of these ministries is the Ministry of E conomics . 
Others likely to be invited, depending upon the nature of the questions 
involved , are the ministries of Labor, Transport , Food and Agricul­
ture. 
22 See 2.5  supra . 
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Requests involving an issue of fact are rejected; this type of 
problem can be resolved only during a tax audit. Also reject­
ed are requests for rulings with respect to transactions possi­
bly inspired by tax avoidance possibilities . 
Since no office is formally designated as a rulings office ,  
requests may be addressed to, and rulings issued by, the local 
finance offices, Regional Finance Offices , State Finance Minis­
tries, or the Federal Ministry of Finance .  Each level may 
answer a request submitted to it. But Regional Finance Offices 
and State Finance Ministries will usually decide to refer the 
matter to the local finance office which is responsible for the 
applicant's  assessment and hence familiar with his circum­
stances . In consequence, the local finance offices issue the 
bulk of all income tax rulings . This means that most rulings 
are prepared by officials who did not participate in any of the 
preparatory work on the statute, the regulatory ordinances, or 
the administrative regulations . However, if the question is of 
fundamental importance or involves large sums, the final rul­
ing will usually come from the Regional Finance Office or the 
State Finance Ministry. The Federal Ministry of Finance avoids 
becoming involved in ruling on specific cases, and tends to 
rule only on abstract questions usually involving matters of 
fairly wide significance .  Should a State Finance Ministry re­
ceive a question of this caliber, it forwards it to the federal 
level, 23 because the officials there have participated in the 
preliminary work on the statutes, regulatory ordinances,  and 
administrative regulations . 
In theory, an advance ruling is only an expert opinion of 
the tax authorities . In preparing them, the officials strive to 
formulate and adhere to the line of reasoning which would be 
valid for the final decision on an assessment. 
In the abstract, an expert opinion does not legally bind the 
tax administration. However, when a taxpayer obtains a ruling 
on a particular set of facts, the ruling is treated as a decision 
taken in anticipation of a subsequent assessment upon which the 
taxpayer may rely. In other words , even if the administration 
later concludes, on balance, that a different legal conclusion 
should have been drawn, it will adhere to the position taken in 
its ruling, regarding it as the equivalent of a promise .  This 
is based on the well-established principle of fair dealing, origi­
nally developed under that part of the civil law which governs 
23 This is in consequence of the constitutional status of the federal 
states.  See Chap. XIII, 1 . 1 ,  1 .2 supra . 
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taxpayer-government relations . However, if the ruling was 
clearly erroneous, the principle of fair dealing is not deemed 
to override the competing principle, that no tax claim can be 
subjected to arbitrary manipulation. Thus the administration 
does not consider itself bound by clearly erroneous rulings it 
had no power to issue . 
The absence of legal provisions covering the status of rul­
ings is causing increased dissatisfaction. Disputes between tax 
authorities and taxpayers arise continuously over the degree 
of reliance a taxpayer is entitled to place upon a ruling in a 
given case. There is a widespread belief that a matter of 
such great importance should be governed by statute, and the 
Federal Government is planning to amend the Fiscal Code by 
adding provisions to permit local finance offices to issue bind­
ing advance rulings . The ruling will provide the basis of sub­
sequent assessment provided there has been no change in the 
facts as presented. To secure such a ruling, the taxpayer will 
have to file a written application, describe the contemplated 
transaction, and analyze the tax question. Oral conferences 
with the issuing officials would be permitted, but in these the 
taxpayer may not alter the facts as originally presented. Nor 
need the local finance office audit the facts, though in suitaple 
cases it may invite the applicant to supplement his presenta;.. 
tion of the facts . In any event, the ruling would be binding 
only if all relevant facts were exposed and the transaction is 
carried out as presented. 
The ruling itself will include an analytical explanation. The 
taxpayer will be informed also that the ruling may be appealed 
to the appropriate fiscal court, from whence appeal lies to the 
Federal Fiscal Court. 
It is not contemplated that the procedure under the pro­
posed statute would supersede the present practice. Moreover, 
there is no plan to limit the areas in which binding rulings 
would be issued. Because of the continuance of the present 
practice and because it is proposed to charge for a ruling with 
the added requirement that the request analyze the tax ques­
tions presented, a flood of requests is not anticipated. 
At present, since most rulings are issued at the local level, 
statistics are not available showing the number requested. 
2 . 8  Informal technical advice to taxpayers on proposed trans ­
actions 
Authorities at all echelons typically are willing to discuss 
informally any problem with a taxpayer. The importance of 
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the question determines the level at which the discussions will 
take place, however .  If the case is  relatively unimportant, 
higher-echelon authorities will refer the taxpayer to his local 
finance office .  Taxpayers, however, try to get their advice 
from the higher echelons because of their fear that the local 
office's view may not accord with that of the Regional Finance 
Office and State Finance Ministry whose hierarchical status 
entitles them to send instructions to the local offices. More­
over, local offices tend to be far more reluctant to render 
definitive, albeit oral informal opinions, than the higher-eche­
lon authorities with more extensive powers . 
2 .9  Technical advice to fie ld offices 
The local finance offices have full autonomy to render de­
cisions on their own responsibility. They receive, however, 
binding administrative instructions from the competent Regional 
Finance Office ,  24 which usually acts under directions given by 
the State Finance Ministry, not on its own initiative . 
State Finance Ministries are the highest level entitled to 
give instructions to the local finance office .  To insure uni­
formity through the Federal Republic, heads of divisions (i .e . ,  
income tax, wage tax, corporation income tax) of the several 
State Finance Ministries frequently meet in the Federal Minis­
try of Finance to discuss interpretative questions under the 
chairmanship of one of that Ministry's competent top officials . 
Conclusions reached at such discussions are set out in minutes 
which are not published, but are used by the State Finance 
Ministries as the basis for instructions issued to the lower 
level authorities on interpretative problems . 
The more important instructions, however, are published 
as general rulings, Erlasse, in the Federal Tax Gazette, Bundes ­
steuerblatt, the official publication of the Federal Ministry of 
Finance which is available to the public . While published in 
this manner, the instructions are not actually issued by the 
Federal Ministry. Rather each State Finance Ministry has ex­
clusive power to issue its own instructions in its jurisdictional 
area. However, publication is usually discussed and decided 
upon in the meetings held under federal auspices and the texts 
of each state's  instructions ordinarily are drafted by the fed­
eral officials and are more or less identical. Consequently 
24 For practical reasons , the more important instructions are ar­
ranged in card files which are supplemented regularly and kept up to 
date. Thus officials of local finance offices can draw on a convenient 
collection of important instructions to guide them in their work. 
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these general rules are termed Coordinated Laender Rulings, 
and appear as such in the Federal Tax Gazette . 
It not infrequently happens that when the annual volume of 
administrative regulations is issued, an important interpreta­
tive question has not been clarified sufficiently. Rather than 
wait until the next annual set of regulations is published, a 
Coordinated Laender Ruling can be issued in the interim. 
While senior officials at the local finance office normally 
have ultimate responsibility for any decision, upon encounter­
ing a complicated question of tax law, it is under instructions 
to refer the question to the Regional Finance Office which then 
assumes responsibility for the decision. The referral is ac ­
complished by submission of a detailed statement of the facts 
and a legal analysis of the issues involved. The Regional Of­
fice either will decide the question itself or, if it is a matter 
of prime importance, refer it to the State Finance Ministry. 
Should the State Finance Ministry consider the issue to be of 
interest to the tax administrations of all the states or one 
which should be the subject of future legislation, it will for­
ward the question to the Federal Ministry of Finance .  
Since the typical case referred to the Regional Finance 
Office presents a difficult question of law which the local of­
fice has explored extensively with the taxpayer, the taxpayer 
customarily is informed that the matter has been sent to a 
hi8'her-level authority. The taxpayer then is free to contact 
and discuss his problem with the appropriate higher office, 
whether it be the Regional Office, the State Finance Ministry, 
or the Federal Ministry of Finance . 
No information is available as to the number of cases sent 
to the Regional Office by the local offices . In general, local 
offices usually try to solve their own problems and secure high­
er level decisions only in exceptional cases . 
2 . 10 Publication of te chnical advice given taxpayers and local 
offices 
The Federal Tax Gazette publishes as rulings the instruc­
tions State Finance Ministries send to all local finance offices,  
instructions which normally stem out of concrete cases decid­
ed by the same Ministries . When an instruction is derived 
from a concrete case, the taxpayer' s  name is omitted and the 
solution shaped in terms of general application. Such an in­
struction sets out only one or two specific points decided, to­
gether with a rough indication of the legal issues involved. 
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The State Finance Ministries and the Federal Ministry of 
Finance also issue information circulars, the more significant 
of which are published in the Federal Tax Gazette .  
Other information is made available to the public in vari­
ous ways . For example, the tax administration annually pub­
lishes standard profit margins for the most important types of 
trade and commerce, as well as tables of normally recognized 
depreciation rates .  Less sophisticated information on topical 
tax matters is provided through press conferences and news­
paper articles . Television and radio also are used. Whatever 
the method of publication employed, effort is made to provide 
not only the decision or conclusion but also the underlying ra­
tionale. 
CHAPTER XV 
ASSESSMENT, REFUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL PROCEDURES 
Section A. Assessment and Audit Procedures 
3 . 1  Introductory note 
The assessment procedure begins with the filing of the tax 
return by the taxpayer, and concludes when the local office is­
sues the formal notice of assessment which establishes the tax 
due. In computing the amount, credit is given for the quarter­
ly installment payments made by taxpayers during the assess­
ment year . In addition to  stating the tax due, the assessment 
notice sets out the factors making up the tax base, such as 
profits from business,  income from other sources, personal 
deductions , etc . The notice states where, when, and how the 
tax is to be paid. Further, it specifies the points where the 
assessment differs from the information return filed by th,e 
taxpayer . 
Since the tax depends upon the tax base, a taxpayer can­
not challenge one and not the other.1 Should a taxpayer dis­
pute the assessed tax, he must protest the assessment notice 
as a whole . 
1 There is one exception to the general rule, i.e. , that the assess­
ment notice constitutes the final determination of the tax on income 
and that any challenge to either the tax base or the amount of tax 
must be made to the entire assessment notice. This exception arises 
when two or more persons jointly , most usually in the setting of a 
partnership or jointly owned property, carry on a business or are en­
gaged in any other income-producing activity. It is unlikely that such 
individuals will have identical income from other sources or identical 
personal deductions. Moreover , their shares of the jointly derived in­
come may differ . Under such circumstances , a preliminary notice 
dealing with such jointly derived income is sent to each of the partici­
pants, settmg out the amount of tax each one owes on this particular 
income. As the law requires , such tax base and such amount are es­
tablished " separately and uniformly." This notice may be contested 
separately by each taxpayer. It must be contested if the taxpayer 
does not want the amounts set out in the notice to be incorporated 
into the subsequent assessment notice determining his total income 
tax base and total tax liability. Moreover , if not contested on the 
basis of the preliminary notice, it may not be contested when the final 
assessment notice is received. 
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If a taxpayer does disagree with the assessment, he must 
make known his disagreement within a month. Failure to act 
within that month renders the assessment incontestable unless 
the taxpayer qualifies for a so-called correctin� assessment 
because new facts or new evidence is discovered. Generally, 
even this type of correction is not possible after the period of 
limitations (normally five years) has elapsed. Prior to the 
expiration of the five-year period, if the Regional Office should 
discover on examination -which in practice may be stimulated 
by a request from the taxpayer himself-that the taxpayer re­
ceived a higher assessment than was justified, the error will 
be corrected. However, if upon such an examination an error 
is discovered showing the taxpayer should have received a high­
er assessment, no correction can be made. 
The same assessment procedure is used for individuals 
and juridical persons, such as corporations . 3 However, where 
wages are withheld at the source, a simplified procedure is 
used. 4 
Tax assessments are signed by the head of the appropriate 
branch at the local office, but the tax assessors within that of­
fice do all the assessment work. Since the head is kept fully 
informed, the final signature represents not mere acquiescence 
but participating responsibility. 
To insure maximum uniformity in assessment and audit 
procedures ,  within a local district and through the several units 
2 Certain safeguards have been thrown up around the use of the 
correcting assessment device. Absent the discovery of new facts or 
new evidence ,  a correcting assessment exceeding the original one is 
unenforceable unless accepted by the taxpayer-most unlikely circum­
stance. Moreover , the local office cannot claim facts or evidence 
were newly discovered if they were in its own files but their rele­
vance went unrecognized. Should new facts or evidence in favor of 
the government develop, the local office may reconsider the entire 
assessment but the tax may not be decreased below the original 
amount, Comparably , a decreased assessment is possible if new facts 
or evidence in favor of the taxpayer are discovered in the course of 
an audit or if mistakes are discovered in the course of a review by 
the local office's supervising authority. Thus, where an audit reveals 
facts or evidence , partly in favor of the taxpayer and partly in favor 
of the government-the situation which in point of fact is the most 
usual one-the legal aspects of the entire assessment are reconsidered, 
with the result that there is a redetermination of the tax base and the 
amount of the tax, irrespective of the previous assessment. However , 
should the matter have been appealed, decisions rendered in the course 
of such appeal procedures must be reckoned with. 
3 See 3.2a infra . 
4 see 3 .2b infra . 
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of government, there is continuing supervision at several lev­
els . Over and above the assessing officials is the head of the 
local office .  In cases of particular complexity, he handles the 
assessment personally, thus insuring maximum uniformity with­
in his jurisdiction. The entire assessment procedure is super­
vised by the head of the office, who himself participates in the 
discussion of complex questions with the taxpayer, and both in­
structs and coordinates the work of his subordinates .  The Re­
gional Finance Office, in the course of its supervision of local 
office activity, examines individual cases . State and Federal 
audit authorities ,  technically separate but actually working to­
gether with a high degree of cooperation, review the work of 
local offices. 
3 . 2a Details of assessment and audit procedures :  In general 
The formal assessment procedure, sketched in the preced­
ing paragraphs, makes no provision for taxpayer self-assess­
ment. 5 The taxpayer merely files an information return. The 
local office determines whether the taxpayer is liable for tax 
and, if liable, the amount of tax due .  In making such a deter­
mination, assessing authorities investigate all relevant factual 
and legal aspects, taking account of all factors whether favor-
able to the government or to the taxpayer . 
' 
Return forms are sent by local offices to known taxpayers, 
and others are reminded through public notices of their obliga­
tion to file .6 Failure to file a return renders a taxpayer liable 
to a fine up to a maximum of DM 5,000.7 Also, in the event 
5 Consideration has been given to the introduction of self-assess­
ment procedures in the Federal Republic of Germany. On an experi­
mental basis , certain localities temporarily introduced the system. 
Reactions varied. Tax consultants , on the whole, were unenthusiastic. 
Local tax administration offices reported favorable comments,  if only 
for the reason that self-assessment released qualified staff members 
from assessment work to auditing. However, there were more un­
favorable than favorable comments. The complexity of the tax law 
argued against computation by taxpayers of their own tax liabilities. 
Moreover , it was pointed out that with the introduction of automatic 
data processing, self-assessment would be obsolete. If electronic 
computers could compute the majority of the liabilities for an tax­
payers ,  there was no need for taxpayers to compute their own taxes. 
6 The Ordinance Regulating the Income Tax Law lists all cases 
where income tax liability appears likely , and adds a requirement that 
returns be filed by all such individuals . This list, however , is not of 
major practical significance ,  as every individual requested to file a 
tax return by the tax administration must do so. 
7 Theoretically , failure to file is subject also to a prison term. 
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of a definite refusal to file, the appropriate local office is 
authorized to make an assessment based on an estimate. 
The official form which a taxpayer must use,  if properly 
completed, should contain sufficient information to enable the 
local office to determine the correct tax liability. 8 That of­
fice is free, however, to seek additional data and, if it pro­
poses to rely thereon, the taxpayer must be informed and given 
opportunity to present his arguments . 
Where a taxpayer derives profit from a business or in­
come from rental properties, a supplementary return is re­
quired, listing receipts, expenditures, deductions for deprecia­
tion, etc.9 Also a balance sheet, 10 prepared from business 
records, must accompany the return where-as in the case of 
business,  agricultural or forestry pursuits, or service enter­
prises-net worth comparisons are used to  determine income. 
Where a commercial balance-sheet is submitted by the taxpayer, 
the figures shown on it, though acceptable from an accounting 
point of view and correct from the standpoint of commercial 
law, do not always conform to tax law requirements . Addition­
al data and annotations must be supplied to adapt these figures 
for tax purposes .  Alternatively-and in practice, customarily­
the taxpayer may submit a separate balance sheet prepared in 
accordance with tax law requirements . In any event, if the 
records are based on double entry bookkeeping, a profit and 
loss account must accompany the balance sheet. Finally, if 
deemed necessary, the local office may require the taxpayer 
to submit a principal account statement, Hauptabschlu Bilber­
sicht-i .e . ,  a horizontal breakdown of all accounts . 1 1  In theory, 
any available business reports, including reports prepared by 
certified public accountants , must accompany the return though, 
in practice ,  only larger firms, particularly corporations, com­
ply with the requirement-not waiting for a special request from 
the office. 
Swhere the taxpayer submits only estimates , necessary supporting 
information must be supplied. 
9 Taxpayers themselves often add clarifying data relative to cer­
tain balance sheet items:  for example, depreciation tables for indi­
vidual assets , detailed breakdown of transitory balance sheet items, 
lists of new receivables and net payables , calculations concerning the 
revaluation of assets and reserves , and explanatory notes. 
10 This balance sheet may not be abbreviated, that is , the individ­
ual items must be shown separately and may not be grouped together 
or set off against each other. 
11 It shows for each account the initial balances , accruals , and with­
drawals , as well as the effect of each account on the profit and loss 
account. 
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Where a taxpayer used a licensed professional tax consult­
ant to prepare the return or the attached information, the re­
turn must state the consultant 's name and address . While the 
local office generally can rely on the accuracy of the figures 
reflected in such a return, and can assume the return con­
forms to clearly established legal principles, it also recognizes 
that sophisticated advisors will have resolved in favor of the 
client any interpretative tax questions the answer to which may 
not be wholly clear. Hence, returns prepared with professional 
assistance are examined as thoroughly and carefully as any 
other returns and inquiries are made whenever considered nee ­
essary. 
In examining a filed return, 12 a local office makes use 
not only of the required supplementary data but also of the 
permanent file it keeps on each taxpayer. These files are ex­
tremely important, for they contain his prior years'  returns,  13 
the results of earlier audits, and the so-called cross-check 
memoranda, Kontrollmitteilunger. Some cross-check memo­
randa are obtained, on request, directly from firms which make 
extensive fee payments to other taxpayers, e .g . ,  from broad­
casting companies . The bulk of such memoranda, however, 
come from the government' s  own tax audit of enterprises which 
transacted business with such other taxpayer. Illustratively, 
the books of a business may show intermittent payments to a 
payee who could indulge in tax avoidance through failure to re­
port. An auditor, on noting such intermittent payments, pre­
pares cross-check memoranda to place in the files of the 
taxpayer-payees, thereby enabling the latters ' local offices, as 
a matter of routine, to check to be sure such payments were 
included in income . 
Should questions arise concerning the accuracy of state­
ments made in the return, the local office ,  in seeking additional 
information from the taxpayer, 14 usually requests an oral 
12 Very rarely ,  the local office decides before the return is filed 
to take emergency measures designed to insure proper collection of 
the tax, i .e . ,  it may order that the inventories be checked during the 
first few weeks of each year. 
13 Thus the assessing official has before him the full tax history 
of this particular taxpayer. 
14 Circumstances creating such requests for additional data can in­
clude situations where the basis for valuation of balance sheet items 
is not clear or where the profit rate varies from the typical rate for 
the particular trade or business. Such differences are apparent to the 
assessor upon referring to the tables of standard profit rates published 
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conference rather than a written explanatory statement. The 
former is preferred, experience having shown that written re­
plies are often so vague and incomplete as to be almost use­
less, and the oral conference enables tax officials to  gain an 
understanding of the actual facts as well as some impression 
of the taxpayer 's  reliability. 
However, the local office may not request information or 
records other than those the taxpayer can reasonably be ex­
pected to furnish. Further, where it is necessary to look into 
extensive business records and documents, this normally will 
be accomplished on the taxpayer's  premises unless he himself 
desires otherwise .  
Since the taxpayer must declare in his return that the in­
formation therein is correct and complete to the best of his 
knowledge and belief, assessing officials commence their own 
work on the assumption that the return itself and accompanying 
documents are correct. Though the assessment process itself 
involves at least some examination of the taxpayer 's  return, 
accompanying documents, and permanent file, and oral discus­
sions with the taxpayer if necessary, the assessing official is 
confronted with the necessity of completing his share of the 
total assessments of a district within a given time . Hence, 
other than in exceptional cases, the assessing official himself 
does not have time to examine the books and accounts of those 
taxpayers who submitted what appeared to be proper returns 
and adequate supplementary statements . Nor in such cases 
would he request third persons to supply information. In con­
sequence of these practices, however, much of the assessment 
work in the local office is supplemented by later audits , i . e . ,  
extensive examinations of books and records, conducted on the 
taxpayer 's business premises, by other tax officials . Where 
such a later tax audit is customary because of the size of the 
business or where the assessing official dee ms such an audit 
to be necessary, 15 the assessor-if certain questions remain 
open-will make a provisional assessment, postponing final de­
cision until completion of the audit. Modification of such pro­
visional assessments is not subject to the restrictions applicable 
to final assessments . 
(footnote continued) 
annually for a number of trades and occupations. These tables indi­
cate the typical mark-up and the rates of gross and net profits com­
puted on the basis of turnover. 
15 In rare instances , he alternatively may ask the so-called tax 
committee , discussed in 3.3 infra, to handle the matter, rather than 
the regular audit officials. 
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The larger local offices maintain special audit sections 
which audit both the large industrial enterprises in their dis­
tricts and comparable enterprises situated in nearby districts 
if the local office there does not have similar specialized per­
sonnel. Other specialists in these same larger local offices 
audit agriculture and forestry operations . 
Medium and small enterprises16 are audited by the regular 
audit section, Betriebsprujung, in the typical local office, and 
this staff audits similar enterprises in districts where the local 
office does not maintain an audit section. Such an audit sec­
tion, subordinate to the head of the local office, is staffed with 
men of a rank equivalent to those performing assessment func ­
tions, the personnel of both sections being interchangeable .17 
As a general matter, audits cover only taxpayers who by 
law are required to keep books and records (though such audits 
may extend to such taxpayer 's employees-wage and salary 
earners-past or present, particularly if there is some question 
concerning proper withholding of the wage tax) .1 8  In practice ,  
this means that the audits are restricted to industrial or com­
mercial enterprises, independent professional offices, and the 
larger agricultural and forestry establishments . In all other 
cases, examination of returns is considered completed after 
the investigation by the assessing official and his superior, the 
head of the branch who signs all assessments which exceed 
DM 500. 
Every large enterprise according to the law should be 
audited at three-year intervals . In practice, however, because 
of the shortage of personnel, these audits actually are conduct­
ed at about four-year intervals, but the fact that each such 
audit commences where the prior one ended, means that all 
transactions of each large enterprise are subjected to audit on 
a continuing basis. By way of contrast, audits of medium and 
s mall firms usually cover only the preceding three years, and 
are made only after considerably longer intervals, the law not 
16 Classification of enterprises as "small," "medium-sized ," and 
"large" is governed by specific criteria. Any business which falls 
short of the standards required of a "small" business is classed as 
a "very small" business. 
17 Under an experimental program, designed to increase the scope 
of audit coverage, assessors in some districts not only made the as­
sessment, but also audited small enterprises. The results were gen­
erally unsatisfactory, primarily because of the heavy burden of the 
assessment work itself. 
18 In addition, the wage tax staff of the local offke conducts wage 
tax field audits. 
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specifying any particular period. Medium-sized firms, again 
taking the actual practice, are audited about every six and a 
half years and small firms about every seventeen years . Con­
sequently, at least 50 percent of the returns filed by medium­
sized businesses and at least 80 percent of those filed by small 
businesses are not audited. Note the following data for 1962:  
Total Number Number audited as a 
Type of enterprise number audited percent of total 
Large Enterprises 48,441 11 ,911 24.59% 
Medium-Sized 
Enterprises 314,360 51 ,166 16.28% 
Small Enterprises 737 ,576 42 ,814 5 . 81% 
Though tax audits normally follow a regular schedule, audits 
also are made out of turn, especially when the period of limi­
tations is about to expire, though even here account will be 
taken of the probable amount of tax involved. Sometimes they 
take place where the assessor, on examining a particular re­
turn, questions a taxpayer 's  statements, with verification re­
quiring thorough examinations of the books and records and, 
perhaps, inspection of the business premises . 
The auditor 's functions are strictly limited. He only in­
vestigates the taxpayer 's books and records. It is the assessor 
who draws the final conclusions from such an investigation, by 
deciding all questions of law and fact in order to determine the 
proper tax liability. The very nature of the task-i.e . ,  deciding 
whether or not certain facts are to be regarded as having been 
proved sufficiently or deciding between competing legal argu­
ments as applied to a given set of facts-clearly makes it im­
perative that the assessor exercise his own judgment in fulfill­
ing his responsibilities . Since the assessor has the ultimate 
responsibility for the assessment, he usually is present at the 
final discussion which concludes the audit, where the taxpayer 
(and, perhaps, his consultant) confers with the auditing official 
and his superior. If the case is an important one, the assessor 
is accompanied by his superior or even by the head of the local 
office .  If a particularly difficult question is involved, the audit 
officials from the Regional Finance Office may participate . 
This meeting is designed to explain to the taxpayer the 
result of the audit, not to work out a compromise .  The as­
sessor has absolutely no power to settle in the sense of split­
ting or trading of issues; the judgment of the assessor includes 
only the power to determine what is or is not taxable . It does 
not include the power to compromise.  The assessor, however, 
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may see fit to state his views during the meeting so that the 
taxpayer will know what changes the local office will make in 
his assessment (a correcting assessment) and the rationale in 
support of the change . 
3 . 2b Details of assessment and audit procedures where taxes 
withheld at source 
While taxes on several types of income are withheld at the 
source, wage and salary earners constitute the largest single 
group of individuals subject to such withholding.19 Their tax 
payments are deducted by their employers on the basis of wage 
tax cards issued by the municipal authorities .  The cards carry 
all relevant personal data needed to compute the withholding 
tax, being amended where circumstances change .20 Each em­
ployer must forward the proper amount to the local office at 
proper intervals . 21 While the wage or salary earner is the 
actual taxpayer, he can be held liable only if proper deductions 
were not made or if he is aware of his employer's failure to 
forward the correct amounts to the appropriate office .  
Should the tax withheld exceed the amount due, 22 the ex­
cess is refunded to the wage or salary earner under a special 
19 Other types of income subject to withholding include dividertds 
and directors.• fees. Also withholding is applied to royalties and inter­
est paid nonresidents,  the amount withheld being the final tax thereby 
rendering a formal assessment unnecessary. The same is true of 
wages earned and, by a recent amendment, interest received by a non­
resident. E arnings of foreign entities or of noncitizens , are subject 
to unlimited tax liability if they are residents of Germany , and tax is 
withheld on their earnings. If the earnings are attributable to a per­
manent establishment situated in the Federal Republic, a tormal as­
sessment will take account of the amounts withheld. 
20 where an individual expects his deductible expenses to exceed 
the standard deduction, he may apply for an amendment of his wage 
tax card reflecting the additional expenses. Should the circumstances 
causing these additional expenses change , the taxpayer must have the 
entries amended. Should he neglect to do this , any resulting under­
payment subsequently discovered is claimed by way of a special notice. 
This notice ,  however , has no relationship to the assessment notice is­
sued after a regular assessment. 
21 To insure proper computation and retention, wage tax audits in 
the field are carried out at regular intervals. Under the withholding 
procedure the tax is computed and retained in respect to the actual 
pay period-month, week, day-with special wage tax tables having been 
drawn up on the basis of the income tax table. 
22 This can occur for a number of reasons. For example, the wage 
or salary earner may become entitled to higher allowances in the 
course of the year because of changes in his family status . His wage 
or salary may not be constant for all pay periods throughout the year. 
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wage tax adjustment procedure, Lohnsteuer-Jahresausgleich. If 
the wage tax cards supply all necessary information, the local 
office then credits the employers. Millions of refunds are 
handled in this way. 
Where wage tax cards do not supply all the necessary data, 
wage and salary earners entitled to refunds must make appli­
cations for such to the appropriate local office .  In 1963, of 
the 23 .8  million wage earners subjected to this withholding tax, 
10 million or 42 percent obtained some refund from their local 
offices on the basis of such applications . 
The fact that tax is withheld from an individual's wage 
does not always neutralize the need to make a formal assess­
ment. Sometimes this is required simply because the salary 
exceeds a certain amount, or because the taxpayer had more 
than a de minimus amount of income from other sources . Under 
other circumstances, taxpayers themselves may request assess­
ment, e .g . ,  where they have suffered net losses from other 
sources of income . Should assessment be made under either 
type of circumstance, the amount withheld is credited against 
the amount declared due in the formal assessment notice . In 
1961,  out of the 3 .277 million persons assessed for income tax, 
43 percent were wage or salary earners, having been subject 
to withholding at the source by their employers . 
Section B .  Administrative Appeals 
3 . 3  Introductory note 
German tax law provides two distinct types of administra­
tive appeal for all income taxpayers, whether individual or 
corporate. The protest, Einspruch, is used for substantive 
issues,  the complaint, Beschwerde , for discretionary matters 
which in practice raise procedural issues . The taxpayer does 
not choose between the remedies ;  the type of issue determines 
the appeal to be employed. 
Once a taxpayer has exhausted the protest unsuccessfully 
at the local office level, he must turn to the courts for relief. 
Where he must utilize the complaint, however, should the local 
office deny relief, the taxpayer may have the whole matter re­
ferred to the Regional Finance Office for a decision. Should 
he be dissatisfied with that office's decision, he then must pro­
ceed through the courts . 
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3 . 4a Protest 
The prime use of the protest is to challenge an assessment, 
that is, to question whether tax liability exists at all or to 
raise specific questions involving the tax base or the amount 
of the tax. Its timely use prevents an assessment notice from 
becoming final or, where there is jointly earned income as in 
the case of a partnership, prevents the preliminary determina­
tion notice from being incorporated in an unchallengeable as­
sessment notice .  
Wage tax questions also may be  raised through the protest. 
For example, a taxpayer may conclude he is entitled to a re­
fund exceeding that fixed by the local office, believing that of­
fice erred in refusing to enter certain deductible amounts on 
his wage tax card. Or he may feel that office was wrong in 
contending that a deduction was entered incorrectly on the wage 
tax card and consequently was wrong in asserting a tax defi­
ciency. 
Every effort has been made to simplify administrative pro­
cedures, keeping them as flexible and uncomplicated as possi­
ble, with formalities at a minimum. The one undeviating re­
quirement is that the protest be filed within one month, but the 
filing may be effected in a variety of ways . Though it may not 
be telephoned, it may be written, in the form of a telegram, 
or lodged orally with a local office official. 
The law requires only that the protest state that the tax­
payer disagrees with the local office 's  assessment. As a prac­
tical matter, however, the taxpayer should state the facts and 
supporting evidence he proposes to use ;  otherwise the local 
office will not know the basis for his objection. In preparing 
this protest, the taxpayer may use a consultant, who may have 
assisted him earlier in the preparation of his return. How­
ever, very frequently a tax consultant is  called in only after 
the taxpayer has decided to file a protest. 
Once filed, the protests are handled at the local office .  
Prior to January 1 ,  1966, taxpayers could choose to have the 
protest laid before the tax committee, attached to the local 
finance office .  23 However, only one percent utilized this 
(footnote continued) 
The taxpayer' s  deductible expenses in excess of his standard deduc­
tion may not have been fully entered on his wage tax card. 
23 One or more of these tax committees is attached to each local 
office , with the head of the local office or his authorized agent acting 
as chairman. otherwise, the membership consists of private citizens. 
E ach of the communities located in the district of the finance office 
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procedure, and this limited use caused the procedure itself to 
be abolished. 24 
While in some local offices it has been felt convenient to 
establish special staffs to handle administrative appeals, the 
great majority of protests are handled by the same officials 
who prepared the original assessments, with a detailed review 
by the same superior who bears the ultimate responsibility. It 
is true that this superior approved the original assessment, but 
his scrutiny of the assessor's  report on the protest goes far 
beyond his somewhat routine check of the normal assessment 
work. 
The obvious question is how the taxpayer can hope to bene­
fit from a protest if the decision on that protest and the re­
view are made by the same officials who reached the original 
(footnote continued) 
is represented by one member nominated for a six-year term by the 
elected governing body of his community. These members participate 
in deliberations and decisions of the committee with reference to tax­
payers who have their residence or their business in the particular 
community. In addition, the committee comprises two to four mem­
bers who must be familiar with the specific conditions of the region 
and experienced in business matters. They , too, are nominated for a 
term of six years by the elected body of the self-governing political 
subdivision representative of the communities located in the district 
of the local office concerned. The head of the local office also is en­
titled to name suitable persons after considering candidates proposed 
by industrial, commercial , professional, or vocational associations , 
trade unions , farmers' unions , and the like. 
The composition of the tax committee was one of the prime de­
terrents to its use for the protest. Most taxpayers were reluctant to 
let the tax committee know the details of their personal and financial 
transactions because of the nonofficial character of its members. 
To constitute, for the purpose of the protest, a quorum of the 
tax committee, at least two members in addition to the chairman must 
have been present. Decisions were taken by majority vote, with the 
chairman entitled to vote. In the event of a tie, he cast the deciding 
vote. Decisions were not subject to instructions by the local office , 
but higher authorities-i.e. , the Regional Finance Office and the state 
Finance Ministry-were entitled to be informed of cases before the tax 
committee and to be heard in an advisory capacity. A taxpayer dis­
satisfied with the committee's decision could then appeal to the courts .  
In arriving at its conclusions , the tax committee had the same 
authority and was subject to the same limitations as the local finance 
office dealing with a protest. 
24Although the tax committee has lost the power to decide on a 
protest , it remains in existence because of the remaining function-to 
give advice in some rare instances of minor importance where the 
local office should take advantage of the members' practical experi­
ence. 
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decision now being protested. The explanation lies in part in 
the fact that the taxpayer knows that pressures of time and 
shortages of personnel may have caused assessments to be 
prepared on the basis of a relatively routine examination. 
Moreover, the original assessment notice gave only the brief­
est explanation of the local office 's  refusal to accept the tax­
payer's statements . By protesting the conclusions of this notice, 
the taxpayer, when the matter comes up for discussion, can 
give the local office a detailed explanation of the facts, set out 
the supporting evidence, and explore legal considerations . Both 
parties are fully aware of how the original assessment is han­
dled and the device of the protest provides an opportunity for 
a full discussion of every possible relevant matter.  Further,  
when the local office renders its decision on the protest, it 
evaluates all the taxpayer 's objections, whether relating to law 
or to fact . Thus the taxpayer obtains a very detailed explana­
tion of the considerations which led the local office to reach 
its conclusions . Should he decide to contest the decision fur­
ther-which only occurs in about four percent of the cases pro­
tested, he can anticipate the arguments which the government 
will advance in court. 
Once the protest has been filed, the local office has full 
jurisdiction, irrespective of whether the taxpayer has raised 'a 
question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law 
and fact. It is not required to clear its decision with the Re­
gional Finance Office.  Merely because the taxpayer protests 
one part of the assessment notice does not restrict the local 
office to a consideration of that point alone . The local office 
may raise other issues not previously considered, or revise 
its own former conclusions-giving the taxpayer more relief 
than he requested or, contrariwise, asserting a higher tax than 
that reflected in the original assessment. 
The finance office is required to decide the case in con­
formity with the law . It is not authorized to render a decision 
which would depart from what it thinks is appropriate both 
from the factual and the legal points of view, merely because 
it is in doubt as to the outcome of litigation. Thus, as to the 
type of issue which a court necessarily would decide entirely 
for one side or the other, the local office may not split the 
issue on the basis of mutual concessions responsive to the 
litigation hazards . Furthermore, it must render its decision 
in conformity with its own convictions even if it fears that the 
courts may hold different views on the subject matter,  thus un­
favorably prejudicing later cases where the facts are perhaps 
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more in the government's  favor. But in practice there are 
many questions of fact which by their nature cannot be pre­
cisely answered, or where complete substantiation is unavail­
able, leaving room for the assessor to reach a decision which 
he believes most closely approximates the actual facts of the 
case and which at the same time will secure the consent of 
the taxpayer who himself recognizes that he is unable to give 
a more precise or more complete substantiation. 
The annual number of all protests filed in the local offices 
of the Federal Republic total between 450,000 and 500,000 and 
about 40 percent of this total relate to individual and corporate 
tax matters, 25 though the way in which the 40 percent breaks 
down as between those two types of taxpayers is not known. 
3 . 4b Complaint 
Taxpayers must utilize another remedy, the complaint as 
distinct from the protest, when the matter challenged involves 
procedural rather than substantive questions . 
Typical of the situations giving rise to the filing of a com­
plaint is the case where a local office imposed a penalty (which 
may be as high as ten percent of the tax) on the ground the 
tax return was not filed within the prescribed period, and the 
taxpayer argues the delay was excusable. Again, the complaint 
would be used to contest a penalty imposed for late payment 
of the tax (one percent for every month or fraction thereof} ; 
or where a taxpayer and the local office disagree as to the 
sufficiency of the installment payments an individual or cor­
poration makes -the taxpayer's  income estimate for the current 
year being somewhat less than the amount of income he re­
ceived from such sources during the preceding year. 
Like the protest, a complaint must be filed with the ap­
propriate office within a one-month period. The absence of 
formality with regard to the method of filing, the uncomplicated 
and loose standards bearing on statements supporting the com­
plaint, the freedom to use tax consultants, which characterize 
the use of the protest, also characterize the use of the com­
plaint. Also, upon the filing of complaint, it again is the local 
office which sits as the reviewing agency. However, contrary 
to the situation regarding protests, the issues covered by the 
complaint procedure allow a certain discretion, for example, as 
to the matter of penalties -the area where the most important 
25 The remaining 60% relate to such other taxes as the capital tax, 
trade tax, turnover tax, inheritance tax, real estate tax, etc. 
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complaints originate . Should the local office deny the complaint, 
another distinctive feature is that the whole case-with the local 
office 's  comments thereon-is sent up to the Regional Finance 
Office for a decision. Should the Regional Finance Office deny 
the complaint in whole or in part, its formal decision may be 
appealed by the taxpayer to the Fiscal Court. The number of 
complaints filed annually, relating to income taxes ,  is not known. 
Section c .  Extent Administrative Processing of 
Refund Claims Departs from Administrative 
Processing of Assessments 
3 . 5  Introductory note 
In the United States,  a taxpayer himself may initiate a re­
evaluation of a finally assessed tax of an earlier year, provided 
only he files a claim for refund within a three-year period. No 
such procedure exists in Germany. German income tax law is 
based exclusively on the assessment procedure .  The amount 
of tax payable is formally stated in an assessment notice, after 
having been computed on the basis of the local finance office 's  
investigations which took account of  evidence and arguments 
both favorable and unfavorable to the taxpayer . Normally, once 
the assessment notice has become final (within one month, ab­
sent an administrative appeal), the tax is definitively fixed even 
if an actual error was committed. Only in three instances 
does Germany have a procedure which bears any resemblance 
to the much more sweeping refund procedures available in the 
United States . These are described below. 
3 . 6  Details regarding refund procedures 
The first exception to the rule that, once an assessment 
notice becomes final, corrections cannot be made, relates to 
mere mechanical errors . For example, errors attributable to 
typographical or arithmetical mistakes must be corrected by 
the authorities automatically upon detection. However, the gov­
ernment is subject to the five-year statute of limitations even 
if the arithmetical error is to the government's detriment. 
Second, an assessment notice which has become final can 
be modified by a so-called correcting assessment. But this 
means only that a change favoring the taxpayer is made if a 
tax audit (initiated by the government) reveals new facts or 
evidence in that taxpayer 's favor . 26 Most audits are conducted 
26 See note 2 supra . 
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in accordance with the overall audit program of the tax admin­
istration or the local offi ce. Occasionally, a taxpayer himself 
will request that an audit be made-a request which the tax ad­
ministration or local office may or may not honor-but this 
does not mean that the taxpayer himself can initiate a re­
evaluation of the case by filing a refund claim. 
The third situation involves the procedure,  discussed in 
3 . 2b supra, relating to refunds owed wage and salary earners 
who have been subjected to withholding at the source. For ex­
ample, a given taxpayer may not have requested that the de­
ductions shown on his wage card be adjusted in accordance 
with the facts or he may have made such a request and the 
request been erroneously denied. Under either set of circum­
stances , at the end of the year, under this procedure, the tax­
payer may file a claim requesting a refund. The local tax 
office is in no way bound by its earlier decision, which in fact 
only established the probable pattern of deductions and which 
both parties recognized was subject to subsequent change . 
Should the wage or salary earner be entitled to a refund, he 
receives one. Thus, in one sense, the annual wage tax refund 
permits a second independent review of decisions reached ear­
lier-albeit by the same local office-with the possibility of a 
change in its conclusion. 
Since the annual wage tax refund procedure involves only 
tax refunds and not collection of unpaid taxes, it might appear 
to resemble the sweeping refund procedure followed in the 
United States .  However there is only a superficial similarity. 
The wage tax refund procedure is actually deemed to be just a 
part of a simplified method of colle cting taxes from a restrict­
ed group-wage and salary earners . Whereas the standard 
assessment process results in the taxpayer's  being informed 
of the amount he owes, this wage tax refund procedure simply 
informs him that he paid, through withholding, more than what 
is finally due . And, as pointed out earlier,  once a taxpayer 
receives the assessment, he has only one month to request 
administrative reconsideration. Should he fail to file either a 
timely protest or a complaint either as an end in itself or as 
a prelude to court action, the amount of the tax-absent later 
correcting assessment-is considered fixed. No administrative 
appeal is possible simply by filing a claim for refund. 
Finally, should a taxpayer secure a readjustment of his tax 
liability through timely invocation of the administrative or judi­
cial process, no formal application for a refund is necessary; 
repayment of any sum owing is automatic. 
CHAPTER XVI 
RESOLUTION OF INTERPRETATIVE INCOME TAX 
QUESTIONS BY INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS 
4 .1  Introduction 
Jurisdiction over tax cases is conferred only on special 
courts designed for that sole purpose: 1 Fiscal Courts Finanz­
ge richte of the several states,  Laenders, which deal with both 
questions of fact and law, and the Federal Fiscal Court, Bundes­
jinanznoj, which deals only with questions of law. 
An act of October 6, 1965, effective January 1 ,  1966, made 
substantial changes in the procedures employed in the Fiscal 
Courts, changes so dramatic that they have been said to insti­
tute a new era in tax litigation. The statute provided that every 
taxpayer may have any decision of the tax administration-in­
cluding the ministries-reviewed by an independent tribunal. 2 
Judicial procedures in tax cases also were conformed to those 
utilized in other types of litigation. 3 Further to emphasize the 
judicial character of its proceedings , the governing statutory 
provisions were removed from the Fiscal Code and placed in 
a separate statute . In consequence,  no longer -as a mere in­
cident to resolution of a dispute-may a Fiscal Court usurp the 
administrator 's function on a de novo basis . More specifically, 
taxpayers who institute proceedings against either the local or 
regional Finance Office, through a remedy termed a revision, 
do not now run the risk that a judgment favoring the govern­
ment might be entered for an amount exceeding that in dispute.4 
The taxpayer is free to sue the tax authorities for any 
benefit to which he believes himself legally entitled, the only 
requirement being that he set out facts which at least suggest 
1 Including refund cases. 
2 The Basic Law (Constitution) provides that any person who be­
lieves that a public authority has infringed his rights can seek redress 
from an independent tribunal. 
3 See note 4 infra . 
4 Previously , the Fiscal Courts were not limited to the adjudica­
tive function of an independent tribunal. In cases coming before them, 
they could operate as if they were finance offices. No earlier finding 
of a finance office was binding; a Fiscal Court could substitute its own 




detrimental impairment of his rights by application of law. 
The suit is based upon the act or, very rarely, the refusal to 
act of the tax authorities .  Typically the taxpayer directs his 
claim against the assessment as it stands after the decision 
on his protest, either seeking cancellation of the assessment 
as a whole or requesting a mere reduction in his assessment. 
Occasionally, a taxpayer institutes proceedings to obtain from 
the local finance office a decision which that office either 
refused or failed to render. A taxpayer also may seek a 
declaratory judgment that a certain act of the tax authorities 
is a nullity and void. 
Except in small cases, with respect to which certain addi­
tional restrictions are imposed, either the taxpayer or the 
local finance office has one month in which to appeal the deci­
sion of the Fiscal Court. Appeal lies to the Federal Fiscal 
Court, normally by revision. However, complaint is the proper 
remedy to secure review of a Fiscal Court decision on pro­
cedural questions-such as the admission of parties to a pro­
ceeding, wherever such decisions can be contested separately . 
Ordinary tax litigation cannot be carried beyond the Fed­
eral Fiscal Court. However, a constitutional complaint can be 
taken within one month to the Federal Constitutional Court . 
This remedy is available when a taxpayer believes that his 
basic rights, as laid down in the Constitution, have been im­
paired by statute, administrative act, or a decision of the Fis­
cal Courts (e .g. ,  on the ground that there has been a violation 
of the principle of equality before the law) . A procedural re­
quirement is to the effect that a taxpayer must exhaust his 
remedies in both the Fiscal Court and the Federal Fiscal 
Courts before lodging a constitutional complaint with the Fed­
eral Constitutional Court; it is waived only where an established 
practice in the Fiscal Courts precludes any likelihood of a de­
cision favorable to the taxpayer. 
A decision by the Federal Constitutional Court, holding a 
statute, or decisions of the tax administration or of the Fiscal 
Courts, incompatible with the Basic Law, renders the offending 
statute or decision void. Within recent years, this Court has 
declared unconstitutional a number of tax provisions, some of 
a fundamental nature-such as one which treated husband and 
wife as a unit for income tax purposes.  In consequence, its 
decisions have become of increasing significance to the daily 
work of the tax authorities. 
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Section A. Organization and Procedure s :  
Trial Le vel  
4 .2  Organization of the trial tribunals 
The fifteen Fiscal Courts are completely independent state 
tribunals, empowered to decide questions both of fact and law, 
with appeal on questions of law alone lying to a federal tri­
bunal, the Federal Fiscal Court. 
Prior to the act of October 6, 1965, there was consider ­
able variation from state to state in the organization of the 
Fiscal Courts . The new law, however, sets out uniform provi­
sions , in force throughout the Federal Republic . It also up­
graded the Fiscal Courts : they have been raised to the higher 
of the two echelons of state courts and are the equal of the 
Regional Appeal Courts which handle ordinary non-tax litiga­
tion. 
Each Fiscal Court is divided into so-called Senates ,  from 
two to eight for each court, depending upon local requirements . 5 
The jurisdiction of each Senate may be fixed by reference to any 
one of several criteria: ( 1) geographical boundaries, (2) cate­
gories of taxable objects, such as real property or business 
enterprises, or (3) types of taxes, that is, the individual in­
come tax, the corporate income tax, etc . In each Senate, five 
members form a quorum, three members of which must be 
professional judges.  The other two are honorary associate lay 
judges .6 
Each Fiscal Court is headed by a professional judge-the 
President of that particular court, who is appointed for life by 
the state finance ministry. As President, he bears the admin­
istrative responsibility for the overall functioning of the court. 
In his capacity as a judge, he acts as presiding judge of one 
or more Senates .  His deputy is that President of a Senate who 
has the highest seniority among the court members . 
5 Prior to the upgrading of the F iscal Courts ,  these several intra­
court divisions were termed chambers. 
6By increasing the professional judges from two to three, and re­
ducing the lay judges from three to two, the preponderance of laymen 
sitting on the Fiscal Courts has been eliminated. The earlier require­
ment, that there be three lay judges, was designed to counterbalance 
the tendency of F iscal Courts to side with the finance offices. The 
change was made to more closely conform these courts to comparable 
courts in other areas of law and in the belief that other structural 
changes would preclude finance offices from exercising undue influ­
ence, 
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Senates not headed by the President of the Court are head­
ed by professional judges with the rank of "President of Senate ." 
They, like the associate judges of the several senates ,  are ap­
pointed for life7 by the state finance minister .  The Senate as­
sociate judges possessing legal training8 and carrying the title 
of Fiscal Court Counselor, 9 are drawn from the tax adminis­
tration. However, once a senior tax official is appointed pro­
fessional judge on a Fiscal Court, his connection with the tax 
administration is completely severed. His new role requires 
that he be completely independent of the tax administration. 
But neither this, nor the fact that judges of the Fiscal Court 
are drawn from the senior tax officials, means that service as 
a judge is considered superior to that of the senior officials. 
The two are deemed equal in importance and are under the 
same salary pattern. 
As stated previously, the new statute requires that a Senate 
quorum be composed of three professional and two lay judges . 
Each Fiscal Court has a committee which elects the lay judges 
for four-year terms . This nine-member selection committee ,  
whose chairman is  the President of  the Senate, includes one 
official from the state tax administration and seven citizens 
"of confidence" selected by the legislative body of that state. 
The lay judges are chosen by the committee from a list 
of candidates proposed by the President of the Court after con­
sultation with professional and trade organizations . The number 
7 According to the federal statutes , a judge may be appointed "on 
probation." 
8 Senior tax officials who are appointed to the lowest rank of the 
tax judiciary typically will have passed the government' s senior level 
legal examination which made them eligible at least to serve in legal 
capacities or as senior civil servants. While individuals who have 
passed qualifying examinations in areas other than law-specifically , 
economics-are appointed to senior administrative posts , and theoreti­
cally become eligible for appointment to the judiciary , such appoint­
ments are very rare. 
9 It is not yet clear what the Laender will do in supplementing 
the new federal statute. Until the revision of the federal law ,  the fol­
lowing state of affairs existed. Fiscal Court Counselor was the lowest 
rank in the judicial hierarchy.  An associate judge might be promoted 
from that rank to that of Senior Fiscal Court Counselor without any 
change in duties. The next higher rank was that of a Fiscal Court 
Director with the highest rank that of Fiscal Court President. Typi­
cally , the senior posts were filled through promotion of judges,  al­
though in the early years of the Fiscal Court , senior tax officials were 
appointed directly to the higher ranks if they occupied comparable 
posts in the tax administration. 
348 GERMANY: INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS 
of names on the proposed list is expected to be three times 
the number of persons to be appointed, and the number appoint­
ed is sufficiently large that no one will have to sit .on the Fis­
cal Court more than twelve days in any one year. 
4.3 Processing cases through the trial tribunal 
Every attempt is made to dispose of disputes at the admin­
istrative level and it now resolves 96 percent of the total. In 
keeping with this principle, a taxpayer-to invoke the jurisdic­
tion of a Fiscal Court-must show that he has exhausted the 
administrative remedy. The one exception permitting the ad­
ministrative procedures 10 to be bypassed, requires agreement 
of the local finance office and this usually occurs only when 
both parties recognize that administrative re-examination of 
the case would be futile . Such a conclusion might be reached, 
for example, where pre-assessment examination of the facts 
was so thorough that it is unrealistic to expect new factual de­
velopments , leaving for resolution only questions of law as to 
which neither party is prepared to yield. Direct appeal to the 
Fiscal Court in such cases saves administrative time11 and 
also accelerates the point of time when a yet further appeal 
can be made, if desired, to the Federal Fiscal Court. , 
Once the administrative process has ended, the taxpayer 
has a month in which he may bring an action challenging the 
assessment as it stands after the decision rendered on his pro­
test. But even where this is done, in theory the disputed tax 
must be paid on the due date stated in the assessment notice ,  
for the latter retains its vitality until altered or set aside . 
However, under the new law the local finance office may post­
pone payment by suspending implementation of the assessment 
notice. Moreover, that office is required to grant the taxpay­
er's application for postponement whenever serious doubt exists 
as to the assessment's correctness or where payment would 
have an unnecessarily harsh effect on the taxpayer. The Fiscal 
Court, even before an action is brought, also may order a 
postponement under these circumstances. 
While a case, once brought, will be defended by the local 
finance office unless convinced its own position is untenable, 
10 The new law refers to the administrative procedure as a "pre­
cursory procedure," i.e . ,  precursory to the court proceedings proper. 
11 Since the head of the finance office has the power to refuse or 
to consent to such a direct appeal, he determines whether or not ad:.. 
ditional effort will be made to settle at the administrative level. 
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invocation of the Fiscal Court 's jurisdiction does not prevent 
either party or both from changing its position. 12 However, 
this in no way alters the obligation of the tax administration 
to resolve the issue in that manner which under the law seems 
to be the right solution. Consequently, should the taxpayer 
offer to concede more than appears justified to the administra­
tion, such a concession could not be accepted . Obviously, then, 
the taxpayer cannot hope to secure as a concession from the 
tax administration any treatment to which, from the adminis ­
tration's  point of view, he is not entitled under the law . Fur­
ther, on the basis of its own re-examination, the finance office 
may modify or replace the old assessment notice .  In such 
event, the taxpayer may proceed with his action in the Fiscal 
Court under the new notice without having to re-process the 
case through the administrative procedures. The taxpayer also 
may withdraw his action at any time before the Fiscal Court 's 
decision becomes final but, once the oral hearing has been 
held, only if the finance office agrees. 
The higher levels within the tax administration are not 
routinely informed of all cases moving from local finance of­
fices to the Fiscal Courts . Only if a case has substantial sig­
nificance are the higher echelons alerted. They also keep 
abreast of important Fiscal Court decisions ; these are published 
by legal journals . Thus such officials are in a position to 
make general suggestions to finance offices regarding the way 
in which similar cases should be handled in the future . 
In hearings before the Fiscal Courts, the tax administra­
tion is represented by the local finance office, customarily by 
its head or by his nominee who usually is a so-called senior 
class official with legal training. 
The taxpayer usually is represented at the hearing though 
rarely by a lawyer. Typically, his representative is the tax 
consultant or agent in tax matters who either assisted the tax­
payer in preparing his return or first represented him at the 
point discussions were held with the finance office .  While tax­
payers are entirely free to represent themselves before the 
Fiscal Court, should the court conclude a given taxpayer is in­
capable of protecting his own interests, the new law permits it 
to require him to secure counsel. 
Proceedings are as informal and flexible as possible, to 
insure maximum expedition consistent with full protection of 
the party's  rights . However, strict adherence is required with 
12 Under the old law ,  once a case had been carried to the Fiscal 
Court , the Fiscal Court assumed control and direction of the case. 
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respect to the one requirement that actions be brought within 
one month from receipt of the protest (or if the protest pro­
cedure is waived, the assessment notice) which must advise the 
taxpayer of ( 1) his right to bring an action, <f) the competent 
court, and ( 3) the time limit to be observed . 1 
As long as the one-month time limit is met, considerable 
latitude is allowed with respect to the written statement which 
the taxpayer must file with the Fiscal Court, regarding both 
its form and the agency with which it is filed. Illustratively, 
the requirement has been deemed fulfilled by (1 )  a telegram 
sent to the Fiscal Court, (2) a statement of claim filed with 
the local finance office, or (3) an oral statement made by a 
taxpayer to a competent official, either of the Fiscal Court or 
the local finance office, who will make a formal record of the 
taxpayer 's statement and see that it is properly filed. 
Whatever the initial form of the statement, it must include 
the names of the plaintiff and defendant, the administrative 
notice which he disputes, and the subject at issue. The tax­
payer, though not required to do so at this earlier stage, will 
also expedite matters if he identifies the specific relief sought 
and sets forth the facts and evidence supporting his claim, to 
the end of making it obvious that his rights were in fact im­
paired. In turn, the local finance office has no option but to 
submit all available records, even those received after com­
mencement of the suit. Failure to do so is ground for re­
versal of revision. In practice, the documents submitted by 
both the finance office and the taxpayer are equivalent to briefs . 
Apart from the foregoing, the new law itself permits, but 
does not require, other pleadings or statements prior to the 
oral hearing which that law made an integral part of Fiscal 
Court proceedings ,l4 though such can be waived by agreement 
of the parties .  It also is possible for the court to issue a pre­
liminary determination before an oral hearing if it also informs 
the taxpayer that (a) he may request such a hearing, and (b) that 
if he fails to do so the decision set out in the preliminary 
13 Should the taxpayer decide to sue the finance office for failure 
to issue such a notice, he must wait six months after he has filed a 
protest. 
14 under the old law, the Fiscal Court had full discretion whether 
to grant a taxpayer's  request for an oral hearing, although in prac­
tice the .request was granted. Under the new law, to prevent oral 
hearings from becoming an undue burden on the parties and the tri­
bunal , the latter seeks to dispose in advance of all preliminaries so 
that one hearing is sufficient. 
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notice will become final. Should an oral hearing then be ap­
plied for within the prescribed time limit, the decision set out 
in the preliminary notice becomes inoperative . At the hearing, 
and prior to the final decision, the parties themselves are free 
to introduce-and the court must take into account-new facts or 
evidence now considered relevant though previously not brought 
out during the administrative process-whether from ignorance, 
accident, or a mistaken belief in their irrelevance .15 Witness ­
e s  may be used at the option of the parties or under the direc­
tion of the court. Neither party bears the burden of proof as 
the prime concern of the court is to ascertain the true situation. 
Whether or not the parties introduce new facts or evidence, 
or waive an oral hearing, the court itself, in fulfilling its re­
sponsibility to examine all relevant factual and legal aspects of 
the case,  must make its own inquiry, and in so doing is not 
limited to matters of record. Indeed, it is expected to conduct 
such an inquiry even if the parties agree as to the facts . In 
consequence, the parties are not allowed to file formal stipula­
tions of fact. To illustrate the practice: if the taxpayer, on 
instituting the proceeding, filed only an abbreviated statement 
regarding his claim, the court, through the presiding judge, may 
request, for example, that he furnish additional explanation to 
clarify apparent vagueness or to supplement the insufficient 
factual data, to facilitate either determination of the facts or 
appreciation of their significance. The court also may ask 
either side to prepare a statement in response to matters stat­
ed by the other side. 
The court may base its judgment only on facts or evidence 
presented in the course of the hearing. Thus, in those rare 
instances where, to avoid delay, evidence is taken by a member 
of the court prior to the hearing, such evidence must be laid 
before the court during the hearing itself. 
The particular relief which the taxpayer requests limits the 
relief the Fiscal Court may grant. 16 Thus, without further ado, 
15 F acts or evidence not introduced by the time the court hands 
down its decision cannot later be relied upon to justify a correction 
in the assessment. 
16 Under the old statute , the Fiscal Court and the finance office 
approached the case in the same manner: each reached its decision 
on its appraisal of the taxpayer's  entire situation, ignoring his par­
ticular claim for relief. Thus before J anuary 1 , 1966 , the Fiscal 
Court was authorized to hand down a decision granting more than he 
had requested or it could change the decision of the finance office and 
place the taxpayer in a worse position than he was before bringing his 
case to the Fiscal Court. 
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it may not accord more favorable treatment than he requested. 
But if the court believes the taxpayer actually is entitled to 
additional relief, he must be so advised and at that point may 
modify his petition. On the other hand, the court may not in­
crease the contested tax beyond the total amount originally set 
by the finance office .  In other words, at worst his action will 
be dismissed and the assessment of the finance office upheld. 
Then if the finance office concludes it treated the taxpayer too 
liberally, it may issue a new assessment notice which the tax­
payer then may contest. Finally, it is possible for the court 
to conclude that, as to the question at issue, there are sound 
reasons for reducing the tax as originally determined but that 
other circumstances involving this taxpayer do justify a larger 
amount. In such circumstances, the court confirms the origi­
nal amount. 
Every effort is made to minimize the time lag between the 
date of the oral hearing and the date of judgment. The bare 
decision itself may be read in court at the end of the hearing 
or delivered in writing to the parties at a later date, usually 
within a two-week period. In any event, within two weeks after 
that bare decision is rendered, a complete written judgment 
must be forwarded to the parties .  This judgment, in addition 
to the decision, sets forth the facts as determined by the court, 
an analysis of the legal rationale on which the decision is based, 
and information regarding further remedies available to the 
parties . The statement regarding the facts includes also an 
explanation of the weight attached to the several matters put in 
evidence .  The legal analysis also explains why the court re­
j ected any given arguments advanced by the parties.  In short, 
the parties receive an exhaustive analysis of the facts and rele­
vant law. To minimize the burden on the court, however, a 
statement of facts need not be included in the judgment where 
the amount in controversy is less than DM 100. It need only 
identify the points as to which the court differs from the re­
sult reached in the administrative procedures . 
Approximately 20,000 appeals are decided annually by the 
fifteen Fiscal Courts in the Federal Republic . Between six and 
eight thousand such appeals involve individual or corporate in­
come tax cases. 
Not all Fiscal Court decisions are published. The several 
courts themselves select for publication in the Collection of 
Fiscal Court Decisions the particular decisions they consider 
of prime importance .  
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In theory, a Fiscal Court decision has no precedent value 
whatsoever, either as to the court which decided it or any 
other court . However, as a practical matter, attention is given 
to previous decisions, by both the court of decision and other 
courts . Indeed, the judgments of the Fiscal Courts increasing­
ly tend to discover prior decisions in developing the rationale 
in support of the judgment. 
Since the courts themselves independently select the deci­
sions to be included in the Collection of Fiscal Court Decisions, 
the mere fact of inclusion indicates that the court of decision 
believes this particular case is likely to influence future inter­
pretations of the law. Understandably, these decisions are 
widely studied, further facilitating their use as precedents . 
The tax administration itself provides no published clue as 
to its reaction to an adverse decision. Though it may decide 
not to appeal a particular judgment, it does not publish any in­
dication of whether, in the future, it will follow the thrust of 
that decision or continue to press for its original position. 
Since a decision of a Fiscal Court, in theory at least, has 
no precedent value in subsequent judicial proceedings, the de­
fending local finance office ,  on encountering a substantially 
similar case, is wholly free to ignore the Fiscal Court deci­
sion and proceed as if it were dealing with a case of first 
impression. In practice, however, the local finance office tends, 
when faced with a doubtful issue covered by an earlier deci­
sion, to follow the court 's  reasoning and adopt a similar posi­
tion. 
Section B. Organization and Procedure s :  
Appe llate Tribunals 
4.4 Organization of the appellate court system 
The highest court for tax matters is the Federal Fiscal 
Court, located in Munich. Normally, its decisions are final; 
they can be reversed only by the Federal Constitutional Court 
if a taxpayer establishes that his constitutionally guaranteed 
basic rights have been violated. The most usual case involves 
a claim by the taxpayers of an impingement on his right to 
equal treatment before the law. 
The Federal Fiscal Court consists of a President, Vice­
President, five presiding judges of the Senates ,  and about thirty­
five judges .  Members of the court must be at least thirty-five 
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years of age . In practice, almost every member is qualified 
to hold a judicial post. 17 
Persons appointed are thoroughly familiar with tax law and 
business economics,  having had substantial practical experience 
in tax matters. They will have served in the federal or state 
tax administrations,18 on lower Fiscal Courts, or as tax con­
sultants or tax lawyers. Occasionally, however, judges from 
other branches of the judiciary are appointed to the Federal 
Fiscal Court, thus enriching it with their knowledge of other 
legal areas . 
All Federal Fiscal Court judges are appointed for life by 
the Federal President after election by a special committee .  
The Federal Minister of Finance appoints the other officials of 
the court: clerks, registrars, and about ten junior legal offi­
cers. Appointments as President, Vice-President, or presiding 
judge of a Senate are made from judges previously appointed. 
The committee which elects the judges of the Federal Fis ­
cal Court consists of twenty-three members : the Federal Min­
ister of Finance, the eleven State Finance Ministers, and eleven 
others appointed by the Bundestag, Parliament. These latter 
eleven are recommended by the political parties represented in 
the Bundestag. The Committee's election of judges takes place 
in secret and is presided over by the Federal Ministe:r: of 
Finance .  Although he does not vote, he does exercise a veto 
power.  
The Federal Fiscal Court, for operating purposes,  is di­
vided into Senates ,  the number at any one time depending upon 
current requirements as determined by the Federal Minister 
of Finance .  At present there are seven Senates ,  in addition to 
the so-called Great Senate. Six members of the latter are 
chosen by the court's  governing board which is made up of the 
President of the Court, the presiding judges of the several 
Senates ,  and the two judges with the highest seniority. Deci­
sions are reached by majority vote, with the President casting 
the deciding vote in case of a tie . 
17 The relatively rare judicial appointee who does not possess the 
requisite formal qualification will have the qualification necessary for 
a senior administrative post or will have been for at least three years 
a professional judge of a Fiscal Court. 
1 8 once appointed to the bench, a judge may not serve the tax ad­
ministration in any capacity. In an earlier period, it was feared that 
judges with a tax administration background might be prejudiced against 
taxpayers. This fear has proved groundless. 
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The court's governing board also designates the members 
and their deputies of the other several Senates, though on occa­
sion one judge may be a member of several Senates. Further, 
a year in advance each Senate is assigned responsibility for a 
particular group of taxes -though this assignment tends to con­
tinue y ear after year-and the scope of the responsibility is not 
changed during the year except where necessary to equalize 
the work load among the several Senates or to accommodate a 
particular Senate, the work of which has been adversely affect­
ed by illness, etc .,  of one or more judges.  
Before each year begins, the President of the Court s e ­
lects the Senate over which he intends to presid e .  The Presi­
dent and the presiding judges determine by maj ority vote which 
judges will preside over which Senates.  Within each Senate, 
the pres iding judge allocates all business before the year be­
gins . As in the case of the inter-Senate allocations, no change 
is permitted except where required by work pressures or per ­
sonnel changes.  
The statute requires that five judges sit in every case . 19 
Three j udges decide on those questions which raise preliminary 
or peripheral questions, normally of a procedural nature. 
The seven-member Great Senate, 20 made up of the Presi­
dent of the Senate and the six judges elected by the court's 
governing board, must render the decision whenever one Senate 
does not wish to follow any decision of another Senate . 21 More ­
over, any Senate may refer to the Great Senate a case involv­
ing an important question of law, considered s ignificant to the 
development of either a legal principle or consistency in judi­
cial decisions . Where a Senate does refer a case to the Great 
Senate, which happens about five times a year, one of its own 
members sits with the latter, participates in the discussion, 
and votes on the disposition of that particular cas e .  Should a 
tie develop, the President of the Court casts the deciding vote . 
4.5 Processing a case through the appellate tribunal 
An appeal-termed a revision-to the Federal Fiscal Court 
may be entered by either the taxpayer or the local finance 
19 The law formerly in force required that a minimum of five judges 
sit in each case. 
20 Under the old law, the number of members of the Great Senate 
depended upon the number of Senates. Now the number is fixed per­
manently . 
21 The old law required only that the Great Senate decide all cases 
where a Senate did not wish to follow a published decision of another 
Senate. 
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office ,  but only with respect to questions of law. The Federal 
Court must accept the facts as determined by the lower tri­
bunal; new facts or new evidence cannot be introduced. The 
court is bound by the facts as found by the lower court unless 
the error of fact is so dreadful and enormous that in the find­
ing of the facts, the law itself was violated. Thus, it is possi­
ble to support a revision on the ground that the trial tribunal 
did not comply with the law when it determined the facts of 
the case .  Illustratively, a taxpayer may request a revision, 
alleging that the lower Fiscal Court violated the law in not in­
vestigating the facts for itself as required. 
The Federal Fiscal Court is not restricted to those issues 
of law specifically pleaded by the taxpayer. It is free to con­
sider, at its discretion, any issues of law it believes emerge 
from the facts . Procedural defects, however, must be specifi­
cally pleaded. 
A taxpayer may bring an action of revision if the amount 
in controversy exceeds DM 1 ,000 or if the trial tribunal grant­
ed permission to apply for a revision. And that tribunal is to 
grant such permission if: 
( 1) The legal issue raised is of fundamental importance ;  
(2) The judgment does not follow a previous decision hand­
ed down by the Federal Fiscal Court, or 
(3) It is alleged that the judgment was bottomed on a pro­
cedural defect. 22 
If the trial tribunal concludes that a taxpayer 's application 
for a revision, which in practice contains a careful analysis of 
the rationale underlying his claim, does not fall in any one of 
these three categories and denies his request, the taxpayer is 
entitled to have the Federal Fiscal Court review that procedural 
determination. The Federal Fiscal Court, in then deciding 
whether or not to grant the request for a revision, need not 
explain its decision, even if adverse to the taxpayer, so long 
as ( 1) all participatil'g judges agree and (2) the taxpayer had 
an opportunity to state his views as to why he should be per­
mitted to file a revision. 
22 The new statute reduced the discretion of the Fiscal Court. Pre­
viously , the Fiscal Court was supposed to grant permission to file an 
application if the matter was considered to be of fundamental impor­
tance. This single but relatively demanding standard was imposed in 
an effort to reduce the volume of work handled by the Federal Fiscal 
Court in the belief that minor cases lacking any legal significance 
were dealt with satisfactorily by the lower-level Fiscal Courts. 
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The Federal Fiscal Court can decide a case brought be­
fore it on revision only if it concludes that all of the essential 
facts were determined by the court below. Should it conclude 
further fact finding is necessary, the case must be sent back 
to the lower Fiscal Court for a new trial and decision, 23 for 
the Federal Fiscal Court may decide only questions of law . 
Also, should it disagree with the rationale on which a lower 
court rested but conclude that the decision itself was sound for 
other reasons, it must refer the matter back to the lower 
court. This requirement is designed to safeguard the taxpay­
er 's interests,  by assuring him of an opportunity to discuss 
before a trial court all aspects relevant24 to the different rea­
sons which influenced the Federal Fiscal Court. 
Except for the foregoing, the procedural rules which gov­
erned the lower Fiscal Courts apply also to the Federal Fiscal 
Court. For example, though taxpayers typically use lawyers 
expert in tax matters to represent them in revision proceed­
ings, in theory every taxpayer is free to appear and represent 
himself. Here too, however, the court may order the taxpayer 
to employ a representative if it believes he is unable to de ­
fend properly his own interests . 25 
On the government's side, the question of whether to ap­
peal an adverse lower court decision rests with the head of 
the local finance office which originally issued the contested 
assessment notice . Typically, the individual who makes such 
a decision is a senior class tax official with legal training. 
Occasionally, those who supervise a local finance office may 
instruct it to seek a revision, but this is unusual. Even less 
frequently will the state finance ministry or the Federal Finance 
Ministry join the proceedings on their own initiative . If they 
do join, they are in the same position as the local finance of­
fice and the taxpayer : they are separate parties to the pro­
ceedings . In some instances, the Federal Fiscal Court itself 
23 Under the old law , the Federal Fiscal Court had the power in 
theory to conduct its own fact-finding investigation. In practice, how­
ever, this power was rarely utilized. 
24 It is no longer possible , as it was in the past , to refer the case 
back to the finance office. 
25 Prior to January 1 ,  1966 , a taxpayer's  freedom to appear pro se 
was unlimited. The modification incorporated into the new statute 
was a compromise following extensive debates in the Bundestag. Some 
argued that taxpayers should be required to have representatives be­
fore this tribunal, and that such representation be restricted to cer­
tain groups of experts . These arguments were rejected. 
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may seek the views of either ministry by inviting either or 
both to join the proceedings . Such an invitation usually is ex­
tended when the court is faced with a question of far-reaching 
or fundamental importance to the development of the tax law.  
Rather frequently, the state finance ministers decline to join 
such proceedings . The Federal Finance Ministry is much more 
likely to accept the invitation, particularly if it appears that 
the final decision may affect future legislation or administra­
tive regulations . 
Should either ministry join the revision proceedings, the 
head of the appropriate section represents it. However, he 
will not interfere with the presentation of the case by the local 
finance office;  but he will focus primarily on the ministry's 
estimate regarding the overall importance of the issues . 
The local finance office usually is represented either by 
its head or by an official designated by him. Typically, this 
is the same person who handled the matter before the trial 
court and who continues to handle the case for the finance of­
fice until a final decision has been reached. 
The parties have one month, from the date they received 
notice of the trial court's  final judgment, within which to file 
a request for revision with the Federal Fiscal Court. They 
then have another month in which to file supporting state­
ments . 26 
The request for revision must identify the specific relief 
sought, the statutory provision or legal rule which the party 
believes to have been infringed, and procedural defects, if any, 
on which he relies.  Noncompliance with these rules will cause 
the court to reject the revision. 
Provisions regarding oral hearings before the lower Fiscal 
Courts apply also to the Federal Fiscal Court. Thus there 
must be such a hearing, unless the parties agree to waive it . 
But, like the lower court, the Federal Fiscal Court retains the 
power to issue a preliminary notice without an oral hearing, 
provided the taxpayer is given one month before the notice be­
comes final within which to request an oral hearing. 
In 1964 the Federal Fiscal Court dealt with almost 2 ,000 
legal complaints, of which 39 percent (780) dealt with individ­
ual and corporate income tax questions . Of the 2 ,000, approxi­
mately 8 percent ( 160) were quashed because the amount in 
controversy was too small, 50 percent ( 1 ,000) were dismissed 
26 Upon application, the presiding judge of the Senate may extend 
these time limits. 
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for being unfounded, that is dismissed on the merits,27 2 5  per­
cent ( 500} were referred back to the lower courts, and final 
decisions were rendered in 17 percent (340} . 
Theoretically, decisions handed down by one Senate do not 
constitute precedents even for future cases which may come 
before it. However, the court itself classifies certain deci­
sions as having fundamental importance .  This includes any 
Senate's decision believed to be important and so well founded 
that it may be considered as a guide in pending or future 
cases . In practice, other Senates must respect these prece­
dents . One Senate cannot deviate from such a decision coming 
from another Senate unless consent is given by the deciding 
Senate . Should consent be refused, the Senate seeking to over­
rule the earlier decision must refer the question of law, together 
with its own legal opinions, to the Great Senate. The Great 
Senate decides the matter, and its decision binds all the Senates .  
The Federal Fiscal Court publishes two groups of deci­
sions : ( 1} the previously mentioned decisions of fundamental 
importance, and (2} other decisions believed to be of general 
interest. However, it will postpone publication of a decision 
of fundamental importance if it expects in the near future 
(1 }  that other Senates will deal with comparable cases or ( 2} that 
authoritative discussions of the problem by legal writers will 
appear. Delay of publication in these circumstances makes it 
easier for the particular decision-making Senate later to change 
its position if such a change seems to be warranted.  
Published decisions appear in a special section of the Fed­
e ral Tax Gazette ,  Bundessteue rblatt. This is issued as the 
need arises-three or four times a month-and is available to 
the public . Decisions of fundamental importance are marked, 
and to facilitate reference, all published decisions appear under 
subject matter headings . 
In practice, all lower courts, whatever their formal obliga­
tion to rely upon and follow their own legal opinions almost 
invariably are guided by the published decisions of the Federal 
Fiscal Court, absent circumstances which suggest that the 
27 The question may be raised as to why taxpayers-when approxi­
mately 50% of all complaints brought to the Federal Fiscal Court were 
dismissed on the merits-take the trouble to process a complaint. 
B asically , taxpayers feel it is worth the chance.  The court costs are 
low. The Federal Fiscal Court is accessible. Attorneys' costs on 
the whole are low and depend entirely on the complexity of the case. 
Moreover , taxpayers tend to feel that taxes should be contested wher­
ever there is any reason for so doing. 
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Federal Fiscal Court will overrule its earlier decision. Obvi­
ously, this will not be anticipated where an earlier position has 
been reaffirmed recently by the Federal Fiscal Court, particu­
larly if such reaffirmation occurs when either the earlier de ­
cision or the trend of thought it reflects has been attacked by 
legal writers . 
In theory, the tax authorities, like the courts, are free to 
ignore the decisions of the Federal Fiscal Court but in prac ­
tice tend to follow them. Understandably, again like the courts , 
greater weight is accorded published decisions, especially those 
considered to be of fundamental importance. 
Interpretations the tax administration sets out in ad minis ­
trative instructions and regulations pertaining to individual or 
corporate income taxes (or to the wage tax) are frequently fol­
lowed by the phrase, "subject to contrary appellate opinion." 
This is intended only to remind tax officials that they are ex­
pected to take into account any subsequent contrary decision 
handed down by the Federal Fiscal Court. Indeed, the regula­
tions themselves are based in large part on Federal Fiscal 
Court decisions. By incorporating the principles of selected 
decisions, the tax administration indirectly indicates which judi­
cial pronouncements the tax administration believes should 
henceforth control points heretofore in dispute . Otherwise,  
however, the tax administration does not publish its view re­
garding any court decision. On occasion, however , the admin­
istration does decide to relitigate an adverse Federal Fiscal 
Court decision in a similar fact situation. In such event, local 
finance offices are told to act on the basis of administrative 




James Arthur Johnstone 
CHAPTER XVII 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
PERSONNEL FRAMEWORKS 
Section A. Administrative Organizational 
Framework 
1 . 1  Introduction 
In the United Kingdom the income tax is placed, by statute, 
under the care and management of the Board of Inland Revenue, 
that is, all the processes leading to the ascertainment and en­
forcement of taxpayers ' liabilities are initiated and controlled 
by officials of the Inland Revenue Department over which the 
Board preside . The staff of the Department consists wholly of 
civil servants, recruited by the same general procedures as 
the officials of other departments of the central government. 
The members of the Board themselves are civil servants and 
not political appointees;  and the political responsibility to Par­
liament for the work of the Department rests with the Chan­
cellor of the Exchequer (the title given in the United Kingdom 
to the member of the Cabinet in charge of Treasury problems) .  
As will be seen in Chapter XX infra, certain independent 
authorities play a part in determining the legal liability in par­
ticular cases where the taxpayer disputes the calculation of 
the amount of tax for which the Inland Revenue Department 
proposes to hold him responsible. But the intervention of those 
authorities must be regarded as the exercise of a judicial func­
tion, and to that extent those authorities stand apart from the 
Inland Revenue Department, considered as an executive agency .  
The organizational framework of those authorities, therefore,  
is  outside the scope of  the present Chapter.  Further, in  keep­
ing with the dominant purpose of this volume only those organs 
of the Department are described which contribute in some way 
to the resolution of substantive interpretative tax questions . 
This principle of selection requires that reference first be 
made to agencies in the field which undertake the bulk of the 
work of assessing income tax liabilities, namely, the local Tax 
Offices.  The broad principle of organization followed is to as­
sign responsibility to a Tax Office operating in the geographi­
cal area where the source of income in question is found. 
363 
364 GREAT BRITAIN: ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL 
The business profits of a shopkeeper, for instance,  are as ­
sessed by the Tax Office for the area where his shop is located, 
and so on. 
However, when the total income of an individual taxpayer 
from all sources exceeds a specified limit, the locally assessed 
income tax is not the end of his liability. He is liable, in ad­
dition, to a further charge, arrived at by applying a graduated 
scale of complementary tax rates to his total income less 
authorized deductions . In the cases affected, this complemen­
tary charge-known as surtax-is in reality a deferred install­
ment of income tax. The work of assessing this surtax has 
been assigned, not to the local Tax Offices, but to a distinct 
branch at headquarters, covering the whole country and called 
the Surtax Office . 1 
Because of the function just described, the Surtax Office 
must handle, in relation to surtax, substantive interpretative 
tax questions closely analogous to those arising for decision in 
local Tax Offices . Consequently its organizational framework 
does fall within the scope of the present Chapter. 2 
Surtax, being a graduated complementary tax only on indi­
viduals with a sufficiently large income, does not affect the 
liability of corporate bodies . 3 But corporate bodies (and nota­
bly limited liability companies) which carry on a trade or busi­
ness are liable to a profits tax on their income, in addition to 
the income tax they suffer in common with natural persons . 4 
1 It was called formerly the Office of the Special Commissioners 
because, before the recent legislation clarifying the division of assess­
ing and appellate functions , the formal responsibility for final approval 
of the estimates of liability prepared by Inland Revenue officials em­
ployed there rested with the Special Commissioners ,  the appellate body 
described in Chap. XX, 4.2b infra . 
2 A ccount will be taken also in Chaps. XVIII-XX of procedures in­
volving the Surtax Office to the extent that they diverge in principle 
from the procedures affecting local Tax Offices. 
3 See, however , Chap. XX, 4.2c infra, for a reference to legisla­
tion under which surtax assessed on shareholders in certain companies 
may be collected from the companies. 
4 The system of taxing companies was altered considerably by the 
Finance A ct of 1965. The income of companies was made subject to 
a new corporation tax (instead of income tax and profits tax) , but in­
come tax-with surtax-remained the tax on the income of individuals. 
From April 1966 onward, companies were made accountable for in­
come tax withheld on the payment of dividends. The Act of 1965 also 
introduced a capital gains tax. Despite these changes ,  the procedure 
described in the text as existing before the 1965 legislation remains 
generally applicable, 
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This complementary tax on corporate bodies is not, however, 
handled by any separate office of the Inland Revenue Depart­
ment for computation of such a body 's liability to profits tax 
is in the hands of the same local Tax Office which bears re­
sponsibility for assessment of the income tax. 
In summary, the organizational framework of the Inland 
Revenue Department, relevant as essential background to any 
study of the processes by which interpretative tax questions 
are resolved, would include the following: first, the network of 
local Tax Offices ,  together with the higher echelons by which 
the activities of those Offices are directed, supervised, and co­
ordinated: secondly, the Surtax Office; and thirdly, the organi­
zation through which the Board discharge their responsibility 
of undertaking the care and management of the taxes involved. 
1 . 2  Organizational framework, national office leve l 
The whole organization of the Department centers round 
the Board. The head of the entire Department is the Chair­
man of the Board; he is assisted by two Deputy C hairmen and 
by four other Board members . 
The Board exercise their function of management through 
their secretariat (known as the Secretaries ' Office) at head­
quarters .  Parts of this latter office are concerned with areas 
not relevant here, such as personnel management, but one divi­
sian which is significant here is known as the Stamps and 
Taxes Division. It is to this Division that the Board look pri­
marily for advice and recommendations regarding the general 
administrative management of the Department. This same Di­
vision also handles the day-to-day correspondence sent to the 
Board and deals with important questions raised by the public 
or by the various branches and offices of the Department. 
On specifically legal questions the Board are advised by 
their Solicitors ' Offices (one in London, and another in Edin­
burgh, required because of differences in the legal system of 
Scotland and that of the rest of the United Kingdom) . The staff 
of the Solicitors ' Offices are available to conduct litigation on 
behalf of the Department. 
The higher direction of the work of the local Tax Offices 
is entrusted to the Office of the Chief Inspector of Taxes . The 
Chief Inspector is the official head of the service in the field, 
that is, the corps of Inspectors of Taxes and their supporting 
staffs who man the local Tax Offices ;  in his headquarters of­
fice in London he is assisted by two Deputy Chief Inspectors 
and by a number of other officials, drawn from the field service 
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but posted to headquarters for various specialist functions . In 
the main, these specialists have the task of furnishing guidance 
about the application of tax legislation to particular situations 
or particular classes of taxpayers thought to deserve separate 
study, whether because of inherent complexity or for any other 
reason. Illustratively, one small section of the Office contains 
the expert adviser on the grant of double taxation relief by way 
of credit when income derived by a United Kingdom taxpayer 
from an overseas country has already suffered tax in that 
country under the local tax legislation. Another example of a 
class of taxpayers requiring such expertise are companies 
which engage in life assurance business .  But apart from those 
readily understood cases of specialization, two sections of the 
Chief Inspector 's  Office deserve particular mention here:  
( 1) The Organization Group is concerned with all matters 
of general organization, including the control of work 
processes, in local Tax Offices, and contains the unit 
which prepares periodic amendments to the code of de­
partmental instructions supplied to those Offices and 
mimeographed circulars supplying guidance on new 
problems, including those arising from new legislation 
or court decisions interpreting existing legislation. , 
(2) The Inspectors of Taxes serving in the Special Appeals 
Section are available to present the Department's  case 
in certain appeal proceedings before the Special Com­
missioners when it seems useful to call them in. For 
example, the appeal may relate to the income tax lia­
bility of a taxpayer in a provincial town: had the appeal 
hearing taken place locally the District Inspector in 
charge of the taxpayer's  local Tax Office might have 
been expected to present the Department's case,  but if 
the taxpayer has asked for the hearing to take place in 
London (because, for example, he has engaged a lawyer 
practicing in London to present his own side of the 
case), it may be more convenient to entrust the repre­
sentation of the Department to the London-based Special 
Appeals Section. 
One group of specialists at headquarters has long been 
concerned with the part of the tax code relating to superannua­
tion funds and other arrangements for the payment of retire­
ment pensions . Until recently, these specialists operated as 
part of the Chief Inspector's Office, but for a variety of reasons 
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it has now been thought more convenient to reorganize the 
group as a s eparate unit immediately responsible to the Board 
through their secretariat. This change in formal responsibility 
does not, however, imply any change in the work of the unit. 
To conclude this survey of organization at national office 
level, it must be recalled that (as previously pointed out) the 
assessment of surtax is· in the hands of a single central office 
for the whole country, the Surtax Office . That Office comprises 
a number of executive sections which examine the returns of 
income made by individual taxpayers . The work of officials in 
the executive sections is under the supervision of a hierarchy 
of officials of senior rank; and the office also includes the 
following: 
( 1) An Organization Section which advises on office pro­
cedures and the design of forms, and 
(2) An Intelligence Division which keeps a record of im­
portant decisions of general application and assists the 
top management with advice on the technical content of 
the instructions to be issued to the staff of the execu­
tive s ections . 
1 . 3  Organizational framework, regional office leve l 
A noteworthy characteristic of the organizational frame­
work of the Inland Revenue Department, so  far as the adminis­
tration of income tax and profits tax is concerned, is the 
absence of any formally constituted regional offices standing 
between the national headquarters and the various local Tax 
Offices . The creation of any such regional offices would be 
contrary to the deliberate policy of delegating the maximum 
degree of responsibility to District Inspectors in charge of 
local Tax Offices.  There is no room for any larger degree of 
delegation to an intermediate authority. The District Inspector 
is responsible to the Department for the efficient running of 
his Tax Office ,  and although he has to conform to the general 
instructions issued from headquarters,  his independence is a 
real one . 
It is , nevertheless ,  recognized that some aspects of the 
work of local Tax Offices make desirable a link between those 
offices and the Chief Inspector at headquarters.  This is pro­
vided by the appointment of Inspecting Officers, each having 
the oversight of a particular group of local Tax Offices . Through 
the Inspecting Officers, the Chief Inspector can keep himself 
informed of the general progress of work in the local Tax 
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Offices . To provide this information, the Inspecting Officer 
makes regular inspection visits to the Offices in his group and 
keeps in close touch with the District Inspectors .  He  also 
plays an important part in the machinery of promotion by means 
of reports on the staff in his area. But he does not displace 
the headquarters specialists as the source to which the District 
Inspector would normally look for technical guidance in resolv­
ing substantive interpretative tax questions (though he might 
well be brought into consultation if the resolution of such a 
question gave rise to problems in ensuring that a common poli­
cy was adopted on a matter affecting several Tax Offices in 
the same locality) . 
It has already been noted that the separate legal system in 
Scotland accounts for the existence of a separate Solicitor' s  
Office in Edinburgh which handles any legal problems requir­
ing familiarity with the laws of that country . Side by side 
with this separate Solicitor's  Office there exists the Office of 
the Comptroller of Stamps and Taxes.  This latter Office has 
a variety of duties (e .g . ,  in connection with receiving and ac­
counting for tax payments) which are outside the scope of this 
study, but for the purpose of the current discussion the feature 
to be noted is that the Office undertakes, in Scotland, much of 
the work that for the rest of the United Kingdom is undertaken 
by the Stamps and Taxes Division of the Secretaries '  Office .  
It would, however, be misleading to categorize the Office of 
the Comptroller as corresponding in any sense to a regional 
office of the kind found in other government departments . The 
Comptroller reports directly to the Board, and his office can 
perhaps best be regarded as comprising a geographically de­
tached part of the Board 's central secretariat which, for con­
venience,  is placed in close proximity both to the Solicitor 's 
Office for Scotland and to the Edinburgh headquarters of the 
diverse organizations catering to Scottish needs . 
1 . 4  Organizational framework, local office leve l 
In round figures there are 700 local Tax Offices . This 
means that the average number of taxpayers whose affairs are 
handled by any one Tax Office is in the neighborhood of 30,000 
and that the average area covered by a Tax Office is about 130 
square miles . But in a country like the United Kingdom where 
the population density varies from less than one inhabitant per 
square mile (in parts of Wales and Scotland) to well over 20,000 
inhabitants per square mile (in the London area), these national 
averages can conceal a considerable range of variation. 
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Each Tax Office is headed by a District Inspector, who is 
supported by one or more assisting Inspectors, together with 
an executive and clerical staff which usually numbers between 
40 and 50. 
The bulk of this staff will normally be concerned with the 
administration of the � 'Pay as you Earn" scheme under which 
income tax is deducted currently from the wages and salaries 
of persons in employment. Others will be engaged on work 
connected with the determination of liability in respect of rents 
derived from the letting of property or with repayment claims 
lodged by taxpayers who have paid more tax, by deduction at 
s ource from dividends or other investment income, than the 
amount of their final liability (having regard to the reliefs 
granted in respect of dependents and so on) . 
The management of those blocks of work will be planned 
by the supervisors after any appropriate consultation with mem­
bers of the Inspectorate . But apart from such consultation 
about the general running of the Tax Office, the prime duty of 
an Inspector who has undergone full technical training is the 
examination of accounts of business concerns in order to com­
pute the assessable profit and thus the amount of liability to 
income tax and profits tax. 
Section B. Personnel Framework (Go ve rnmental 
and Non-Governmental) 
1 .  5 Governmental professional personnel 
To facilitate the reader's appraisal of the procedures dis ­
cussed in Chapters XVIII-XX, it will be useful to supplement 
the previously described organizational framework of the Inland 
Revenue Department with a description of the prior education 
and in-service training of the Departmental officials who play 
a leading part in the determination of tax liabilities .  For this 
purpose, a superficial survey of the education and training of 
the staff in all the various grades employed in the Department 
probably would be less helpful than an account dealing more 
specifically with those officials performing technical and pro­
fessional functions, and attention will therefore be concentrated 
on the following groups : 
( 1) The professional staffs of the two Solicitors '  Offices;  
(2) The examination staff of the Surtax Office; and 
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(3) The members of the Inspectorate employed in local Tax 
Offices and, at headquarters, in the Office of the Chief 
Inspector of Taxes . 
Recruitment of professional staff for the Solicitors '  Offices 
is on the same lines as the recruitment for legal posts in other 
government departments, that is, candidates must already pos­
sess a recognized legal qualification and have had some ex­
perience in the practice of their profession. In other words, 
at the point of recruitment, entrants to the Solicitors '  Offices 
will have undergone the normal professional education of a 
member of one or other of the two branches of the legal pro­
fession (as described in 1 . 6  infra) .  
On entry into one of the Solicitors ' Offices, a recruit 
acquires familiarity with the work of his Office by actually tak­
ing part in it, under the guidance of a more senior member 
of the professional staff . He is not regarded as a trainee; the 
responsibility allocated to him recognizes that he brings with 
him professional qualifications and experience acquired outside 
the service.  
In contrast to the system of recruitment to legal posts, 
which takes place after acquisition of a professional quali�ica­
tion and some outside experience, the recruitment of the In­
spectors of Taxes and of the executive staff employed on 
examination work in the Surtax Office takes place through com­
petitions which do not require or assume any previous study of 
the technical matters which will be involved in the candidates '  
future work. The respective competitions are adapted to test 
the attainments and capabilities of candidates who have com­
pleted some particular step on the ladder provided by the coun­
try 's educational system. Thus the competitions through which 
recruitment to the Surtax Office 's  examining staff takes place 
are framed for young people leaving school after a full second­
ary education. The competitions through which Inspectors of 
Taxes are recruited cater to rather older candidates who have 
undertaken higher studies (up to first degree standard) at a 
university or similar institution. 
New entrants to the Surtax Office are trained in the work 
of surtax examination in a special training section attached to 
the Office. Training consists of lectures, discussions, and 
practical work with revision courses and exercises,  and in­
cludes organized visits to a local Tax Office and to a meeting 
of Appeal Commissioners. The basic training course normally 
lasts six months and falls into two three-month periods . In 
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the first period, lectures are interspersed with a certain amount 
of practical work, . in the second period, the emphasis falls 
mainly on practical work,, though some advanced lectures are 
also included. At the beginning of the second three-month peri­
od, the trainees move into a unit which is intended to form a 
bridge between the lecture room and the normal working sec­
tions of the Office .  Here, still under the close supervision of 
the tutorial staff, they undertake the actual duties of surtax ex­
amination, though the volume of work allotted to two trainees 
will correspond to the allocation handled by a single fully­
experienced surtax examiner. The object of the scheme is to 
provide trainees with a regular, but limited, flow of case work 
in an atmosphere which is a close copy of that obtaining in the 
main part of the Office to which they shortly will be trans­
ferred. The transition itself takes place in the last month of 
the second three-month period; leaving the training section the 
new examiner moves into the main part of the Office where he 
completes his training under the guidance of experienced mem­
bers of the staff of the unit to which he has been transferred. 
New inspectors are attached immediately to a local Tax 
Office, but time for study is allowed. They in fact undertake 
a long and systematic training for their future duties , their 
progress being tested by two Departmental examinations in 
which problems of accountancy and tax law figure prominently. 
As a general introduction to the Department, they pay a special 
initial visit to one of the eight training centers throughout the 
country. Thereafter, along with some members of the execu­
tive staff of Tax Offices who have been selected for full tech­
nical training and promotion into the Inspectorate, the cadet 
Inspectors undergo a fifteen-month Preliminary Course during 
which they attend a training center for two full-time periods 
amounting to 10 days and for 40 half-day tutorials . The Pre­
liminary Examination follows. Inspectors who are successful 
in this examination then undergo the Final Course which lasts 
1 6  months and again involves attendance at a training center 
both for short full-time periods and for numerous half-day 
tutorials . The course is followed by the Final Examination. 
An Inspector who is successful in the Final Examination 
has completed his basic training and may anticipate transfer 
to an Office where, instead of being a trainee ,  he will be ex­
pected to take an active part (under the guidance of the District 
Inspector) in controlling the work of the Office. He is still, of 
course, broadening his experience and will have some additional 
formal training. During the succeeding year he will attend two 
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post-graduate courses, each of a week's duration, at a residen­
tial center. This further training is designed in part to assist 
him to fit himself for the management of a staff when he even­
tually takes over an independent command, but the course cov­
ers also some of the more involved technical problems en­
countered by members of the Inspectorate in their individual 
case work. 
There is no separate channel of recruitment for the Inspec­
tors on specialist work in the Chief Inspector 's  Office at head­
quarters . These officers are selected from the Inspectorate 
at large on the basis of apparent aptitude for the duties to be 
undertaken. 
1 . 6  Private tax practitioners 
A taxpayer who wishes to receive advice about the extent 
of his tax liability or the steps which he ought to take in order 
to establish a claim for a particular tax relief is free to obtain 
such advice from any source that offers it. Thus many of the 
companies carrying on branch banking have established depart­
ments which, for a fee, will assist the banks ' customers in the 
preparation of their returns of income and will conduct corre­
spondence on their behalf with the Inland Revenue Department. 
However, by far the greatest part of the work of advising tax­
payers and representing them in their dealings with the Depart­
ment falls to members of the legal and accounting professions . 
In fact the only professional representatives who have general 
statutory right to be heard on behalf of a client when the cli­
ent 's  tax appeal comes before the General or Special Commis­
sioners for adjudication are ( 1) lawyers and ( 2) members of 
one of the incorporated societies of accountants . To comple­
ment the foregoing description of the education and training of 
professional and technical staff in the Inland Revenue Depart­
ment a brief account should therefore be given of education and 
training for the legal and accounting professions . 
At the outset, however, it must be explained that in each 
of the component parts of the United Kingdom the legal profes ­
sion is organized in two distinct branches .  
( 1) The first branch consists of those known as barristers 
(in Scotland, advocates),  who have the exclusive right 
of representing litigants in the higher courts and other­
wise confine themselves to giving specialized advice on 
legal questions laid before them, on behalf of clients, 
by members of the second branch. 
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(2) The second branch consists of solicitors ,  to whom mem­
bers of the public go for all kinds of legal advice .  When 
litigation is necessary, a solicitor may represent his 
client in the lower courts . Where the presentation of 
a client's case in any court is to be entrusted to a 
barrister (or advocate) ,  the solicitor will make the 
necessary arrangements for this and, in particular, will 
supply a brief analyzing the legal issues at stake . 
Admission as a barrister or advocate is in the hands of 
the ancient Inns of Court in London or of the corresponding 
body in Edinburgh or Belfast. The regulations are not entirely 
uniform throughout the United Kingdom, but in general a candi­
date must show that he has reached a prescribed standard in 
his general education and must also pass one or more exami­
nations in legal subjects . The prescribed examination subjects 
do not necessarily include tax law. 
Before admission as a solicitor a form of apprenticeship 
with a practicing solicitor for a prescribed period is normally 
required under arrangements approved by the Law Society (for 
England and Wales) or the corresponding Society in Scotland or 
Northern Ireland. A candidate must show that he has reached 
a prescribed standard in his general education, must pursue a 
suitable course of study in legal subjects, and must obtain a 
pass in all the subjects required for the qualifying examination. 
Tax law will usually be one of the subjects studied. 
Almost all solicitors in private practice undertake a cer­
tain amount of tax work (if only because the settlement of out­
standing tax questions is an inevitable part of the business of 
administering the estates of decedents) . Specialization in tax 
matters, however, is not common among solicitors . Among 
barristers, on the contrary, specialization is quite common, 
especially at the English Bar . Any barrister possessing repu­
tation as a tax specialist undoubtedly will acquire so much 
business in that one area that he will have no need to go be­
yond it. 
Without discussing those bodies concerned solely with par­
ticular fields -e.g. ,  the financial affairs of municipal corpora­
tions-there are four professional groups whose members all 
are fully qualified accountants : i .e . ,  the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales,  the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland, the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Ireland, and the Association of Certified and Corporate Ac ­
countants . Nevertheless, the membership requirements for 
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these four groups are not entirely uniform. Normally, a candi­
date first must have served an apprenticeship with an actively 
practicing member of the body concerned, but in certain cir­
cumstances the Association of Certified and Corporate Account­
ants accepts "as an alternative . . .  practical experience in the 
finance or accounting department of a commercial or industrial 
company, in a nationalized industry or in local government . . . . "5 
Candidates must also show that they have reached a certain 
standard in their general education and must pass a series of 
examinations in professional subjects . Taxation law and prac ­
tice will always be one of the subjects in which candidates are 
tested. 
The range of work undertaken by a firm of practicing ac­
countants will vary to some extent with the size and connections 
of the firm. But an important part of the work of the majority 
of practicing accountants is the preparation and audit of the 
accounts of business concerns of all kinds . This work natural­
ly leads on to the discussion with local Tax Offices of the 
clients' tax liabilities in respect of the profits shown by those 
accounts . Thus almost all practicing accountants undertake 
some tax work. Within a large firm there is a possibility that 
some of the partners and the supporting staff will specialize 
in tax questions, leaving their colleagues to handle other branch­
es of the firm's business. 
5 H.M.S.O. , Choice of Careers: The Accountant 14 (3d ed. 1963) .  
CHAPTER XVIII 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE -MAKING PROGRAMS 
Section A. Character of the Underlying Statute 
2 . 1  The precision of the statute itse lf 
Controversies arising from time to time about the precise 
amount of the tax liability in particular cases, certainly are 
not due to any paucity of legislative provisions indicating the 
rules by which Parliament intended to govern the matter. There 
is, indeed, a massive volume of guidance available . 
The whole statutory code of income tax provisions was 
consolidated last in 1952 .  The result was the longest single 
Act of Parliament ever put on the statute book. This act con­
tained 532 separate sections, together with 25 schedules . In 
the legislative practice of the United Kingdom the term sched­
ule normally is used to denote an appendix to an Act of Parlia­
ment, supplementing the sections in the main body of the act 
by setting out subordinate and ancillary provisions . The stand­
ard edition of the statutes issued by the Queen's Printer has 
511  octavo pages with upwards of 400 words to a page . 
Since the consolidating Act of 1952 embodied virtually the 
whole of the code of income tax legislation then in force, it 
necessarily contained some materials other than the statutory 
provisions directly defining the amount of a taxpayer 's liability. 
Nearly 30 percent of its sections related to administration in 
the broadest sense, covering a wide range of matters such as 
the obligation to make returns of income, penalties for non­
compliance or fraud, appeal procedures, and the enforcement 
of collection. Only the remaining 70 percent related to sub­
stantive questions of liability, specifying how taxable income 
should be measured or what relief from tax should be available 
and in what circumstances . The basic code of general appli­
cation, after the 1952 consolidation, numbered about 2 50 differ­
ent sections, comprising roughly about two-thirds of this part 
of the statute . The remaining one-third of this portion of sub­
stantive provisions dealt with departures from the normal tax 
pattern. These departures do not-with two exceptions-cut 
across wide groups of taxpayers . Instead they apply only to 
special classes of taxpayers, such as estates in the course of 
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administration, banks , insurance companies, charitable bodies, 
or nonresidents . The two exceptions to the general principle 
of the English statute -that deviations of the type used in the 
United States requiring itemization of deductions shall be avoid­
ed in favor of round-sum allowances-are the deductions for 
interest, available to all taxpayers whether businesses or indi­
viduals, and for life insurance premiums, available to individ­
uals under certain specific restrictions . 
Since that consolidating act was passed, Parliament has 
continued to occupy itself with income tax matters . In all, by 
1964, fifteen subsequent statutes had been enacted, containing 
over three hundred additional sections and schedules .  In part, 
this activity represents a process of reform in which new legis­
lation entirely displaces the corresponding provisions of the 
old, thus enabling the superseded provisions to be repealed. On 
balance,  however, the result has been a considerable net in­
crease in the size of the income tax code. 
The corpus of legislation just described covers the surtax 
as well as the income tax. Moreover, many of the basic prin­
ciples which it sets out are applicable also to the computation 
of a company 's income for the purpose of determining its prof­
its tax. There is, however, a considerable number of supple­
mentary substantive and procedural enactments not included in 
the foregoing enumeration that do bear upon the ascertainment 
of liability for the profits tax. 
Information reflecting the volume of the applicable statutory 
material does not, of course, afford any complete index of the 
degree to which interpretative difficulties may be expected to 
arise when the statute is applied to practical situations . This 
will be affected, as well, by the character of the language used 
by the legislature, and, in particular, by the extent to which it 
sought to draw fine distinctions between one case and another 
in a search for greater equity. On this aspect of the legisla­
tive process, it is worth quoting from the Final Report in 1955  
of the Radcliffe Commission on the Taxation of Profits and In­
come: 
1085. The social and industrial structure of the United Kingdom 
is intricate. It comprehends a great variety of forms. A 
master tax, such as income tax has come to be,  which has to 
be applied with fairness to all the variety of forms , must re­
flect to a large extent the intricacy and complication of the 
underlying structure. Even if the social pattern is itself be­
coming less complicated-an assumption which we do not make­
the general extension of the range of the tax to new circles of 
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taxpayers involves a complementary increase of detailed provi­
sions. 
1086. Secondly , the high rate of tax brings certain consequences. 
On the one hand, there is pressure for allowances , alleviations 
and qualifications wherever a special case can be asserted or a 
distinction claimed. Indeed, with a high rate of tax, a distinc­
tion acquires a potential value which it would not possess in 
other circumstances.  Moreover , the methods and process of 
Parliamentary legislation, particularly , perhaps , as applied to 
the annual Finance Act ,  themselves assist in the multiplication 
of special provisions. On the other hand, a tax which has so 
heavy a bearing on the lives and prospects of its citizens is 
sure to meet with avoidance on a large scale: and the statute 
book becomes encumbered with elaborate provisions against 
avoidance ,  some of which rank among the least intelligible por­
tions of English prose. . . . 
1088. In considering whether we can make any useful recom­
mendation for the improvement of the present situation we must 
distinguish between the two other major criticisms of the tax 
code. First, as to the complications of its conceptions and 
structure. These can never be simple, as we have said. C an 
they be simpler than they are today ? Such answers as we can 
give to this are to be found in the other Chapters of our Re­
ports. We were at one in starting our inquiry with an ardent 
desire to leave the structure and the conceptions of the tax 
simpler than we found them. If we have had only small suc­
cess in the result , we have at least explained in most instances 
why we have failed, and what were the reasons that have led 
us on occasions to reject a seemingly attractive simplification. 
Perhaps the most formidable single obstacle is the fact that 
hitherto the tendency both of Parliament and of the Inland 
Revenue Department has been in the opposite direction. Scru­
pulous regard has been paid to even small differences in in­
dividual situation: and, while it is comparatively easy to ad­
vance from a simple system to a more refined one by intro­
ducing qualifications and differentials , it is very much more 
difficult to retire from a refined system to a simpler one and, 
by so doing, to ignore distinctions which hitherto have been 
recognized and allowed for. 
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Here, then, is expert testimony to a significant tendency in the 
country's tax legislation: for some time it has been customary 
to accord differential treatment on the basis of rather small 
distinctions between one case and another .  This process seems 
likely to continue. It certainly must be conceded that the broad 
and sweeping language of the earliest acts relating to income 
tax gradually has become overlaid by refinements involving 
elaborate definitions quite foreign to the original conception of 
the code. 
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It is almost inevitable that this modern elaboration should 
prove a fruitful source of interpretative controversy. In prac ­
tice, while no statistics are available, the accounts submitted 
by almost every business enterprise give rise to one or more 
interpretative controversies . On the other hand, it is unlikely 
that such controversies will arise frequently in the returns of 
wage or salary earners. 
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that evidence 
is lacking by which to judge whether the old style of drafting 
tax legislation would have been any more successful in avoid­
ing such controversies had Parliament been constrained to con­
tinue its use .  Here it is possible to quote contrasting exam­
ples of the old style and the new, leaving the reader to draw 
his own conclusion on the matter .  But first it may be  helpful 
to quote another comment from the Final Report of the Rad­
cliffe Commission bearing on what, after all, is one of the 
central problems any legislature encounters on adopting an in­
come tax law, namely, the problem of indicating the distinctions 
separating taxable from nontaxable receipts. The report calls 
attention to the strains that may well arise when a form of 
definition that served well enough in former times must be ap­
plied to more modern conditions : 
28. The tax code contains no general definition of income. It 
is often said that it is impracticable or undesirable that it 
should. We do not feel it necessary to subscribe to either of 
those epithets. The codes of other countries have achieved the 
work of definition without any known ill-effects. What seems 
to us more important is that no real advantage could possibly 
result from the introduction of a general definition that had to 
cover so multifarious a subj ect as taxable income. If it were 
expressed in very general terms the work of deciding how to 
apply to particular instances would have to be done by deduc­
tions drawn from other parts of the code' s framework or with 
the help of general principles imported from without. To a 
large extent the United Kingdom system itself has proceeded 
by this method of interpretation. On the other hand, the more 
particular the definition the more it tends to become a mere 
list of different classes of receipt , and the anxiety not to ex­
clude some class by inadvertence or omission leads to the 
addition of a comprehensive " sweeping up" clause at the end 
which, in effect, raises over again the problem of interpret­
ing the general phrase in the light of a particular instance. 
The United Kingdom code has in fact established the limits 
of what it will regard as taxable income by formulating a list 
of different classes of income , grouped under five Schedules: 
and the interpretation of the wording and significance of these 
lists has been the subject of copious decisions of the Courts 
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of law during the course of some three generations . Their in­
terpretation has been governed by the principle , in itself un­
exceptionable , that income tax is a tax on income . . . .  
30. Since the tax code identifies income by a process of classi­
fication, a receipt , to constitute taxable income, must be capa­
ble of being referred to one of those classes. The classifica­
tion itself takes two forms: either it specifies a kind of receipt 
which is regarded as being inherently of an income nature,  e.g. , 
interest, annuity , public revenue dividends , or , more often, it 
specifies a kind of source which is regarded as being inher­
ently productive of income, e.g. , land, trade, profession, securi­
ties , employment , and charges the income from that source. 
The identification of a receipt of the first kind presents little 
difficulty , once the material facts are ascertained. But very 
great difficulty arises from time to time in deciding whether 
a particular receipt is or is not to be regarded as income of 
the second kind. For it has to be determined, first ,  whether 
the recipient owns one of the specific sources to which the 
receipt can be related, and, secondly , whether the relation of 
the receipt to that source is such that it can be said to grow 
out of it by way of annual increment. The difficulties are 
added to by the fact that in most
' 
cases the income to be taxed 
is not receipts themselves but profits representing the balance 
between receipts and deductible expenses. 
31. We have here one of the basic conceptions of the tax coae, 
that referability to a defined source is essential to permit of 
a receipt being categorized as income,  unless it falls within 
the limited class of receipts that are identified as income by 
their own nature. The source provides the capital substance 
from which income can emerge. Since the division of classi­
fiable income into five Schedules dates back to the Income Tax 
A ct of 1803 , the adaptation of increasingly complex forms of 
income to the general structure of the tax code has not pro­
ceeded without strain. For instance ,  though offices and em­
ployments appeared in the original list of 1803 as a catego­
rized source of income, it is not always easy to recognize 
that it is the office or employment itself that constitutes the 
source of income, not the services rendered or the contraqt 
that secures the payment. While the fundamental structure re­
mains signally unaltered, additions and alterations have, of 
course,  been made from time to time either by changing or 
enlarging the list of sources or by ad hoc provisions to the 
effect that a particular kind of receipt is to rank as taxable 
income. 
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The need asserted above, to discern a classifiable source, 
such as a trade, for the purpose of identifying particular re­
ceipts as taxable,  emphasizes the importance of the statutory 
definition of trade. The manner in which the statute approach­
es that term serves as our first illustration of the older style 
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of definition (dating back to the Income Tax Act of 1805} which 
in this instance survives almost intact today. The present 
definition reads : " 'trade' includes every trade, manufacture, 
adventure or concern in the nature of trade . "  1 
While this is a sweeping description, the language still 
leaves room for differences of opinion over the question wheth­
er the purchase and profitable resale of property in any given 
case does or does not amount to the carrying on of a trade. 
Is the answer to be influenced, for example, by the precise 
character of the property involved ? What is the significance 
of the period that elapses between purchase and resale, wheth­
er long or short? Can a single transaction of this sort amount 
to an "adventure . . .  in the nature of trade" or is it a requisite 
that there be recurring transactions ? Does it tend to negative 
the existence of a trade if the property is in no way altered 
before it is sold?  Is there an opposite tendency if the proper ­
ty is improved only to make it more marketable ? Does the 
definition postulate that the surrounding circumstances show 
that the person originally acquired the property for the pur­
pose of making a profit, and would a case be excluded where 
some different motive led to the acquisition? All of these 
questions have had to be considered in litigation over many 
years, to fix the proper interpretation of the definition itself. 
The meaning of residence provides another illustration of 
the older style of drafting. From the very earliest period, 
Parliament has acted on the principle that income from sources 
within the country should be taxed irrespective of the national­
ity or place of abode of the recipient and that, in addition, 
persons residing in the country should be taxed also in respect 
of income which they received from foreign sources . Thus the 
concept of a person's residence long has been of crucial im­
portance in determining the basis of liability. Nevertheless,  
Parliament did not specify any general definition of residence.  
Instead, the word residing apparently was to be viewed accord­
ing to its everyday popular meaning, with such additional as­
sistance as might be derived from two particular rules (origi­
nally enacted in 1799 and 1803 respectively} directed to specific 
situations . In their current form those rules read: 
368, British subjects, etc .. , temporarily abroad. Every Brit­
ish subject or citizen of the Republic of Ireland shall, if his 
ordinary residence has been in the United Kingdom, be as­
sessed and charged to tax notwithstanding that at the time the 
1 Income Tax Act of 1952,  § 526.  
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assessment or charge is made he may have left the United 
Kingdom,  if he has so left the United Kingdom for the purpose 
only of occasional residence abroad, and shall be charged as a 
person actually residing in the United Kingdom upon the whole 
amount of his profits or gains , whether they arise from prop­
erty in the United Kingdom or elsewhere ,  or from any allow­
ance, annuity or stipend (save as herein is excepted) , or from 
any trade, profession, employment or vocation in the United 
Kingdom or elsewhere. 
375 .  Position under Schedule D of temporary residents . A per­
son shall not be charged to tax under Schedule D as a person 
residing in the United Kingdom , in respect of profits or gains 
received in respect of possessions or securities out of the 
United Kingdom,  who is in the United Kingdom for some tem­
porary purpose only and not with any view or intent of estab­
lishing his residence therein, and who has not actually resided 
in the United Kingdom at one time or several times for a peri­
od equal in the whole to six months in any year of assessment, 
but if any such person resides in the United Kingdom for the 
aforesaid period he shall be so chargeable for that year . 
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It will be observed that these two rules have one thing in 
common; each deals with a situation constituting something of 
an exception to a person's normal way of life . Since the gen­
eral concept of residence is fairly well understood where an 
individual is concerned, it could be said that Parliament has 
given fairly clear guidance as to its intention to use the term 
residing in that ordinary sense for normal cases, while taking 
care to spell out a definite rule for the exceptional cases where 
doubt might otherwise arise.  But the income tax must be ap­
plied to corporations as well as individuals . Since the relevant 
statutory provisions say nothing about a corporation's  residence, 
the courts had to decide whether analogies could be developed 
which would give some coherent meaning to the concept in the 
case of a legal entity so materially different from a natural 
person. 
The contrast between the older statutory approach to defi­
nitional problems as illustrated above, and the more modern 
approach can be observed in one example taken from the con­
siderable volume of modern legislation directed against the 
avoidance of tax by the ostensible transfer of income from one 
person to another .  In 1936, Parliament provided that a settle­
ment by a parent who transferred income to a minor child 
would not be effective for tax purposes (subj ect to certain con­
ditions) unless the settlement had been made before the new 
statutory amendment was first proposed and was then irrevoca­
ble . Parliament in the same act set forth an elaborate definition 
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of the term "irrevocable," the current form of which as amend­
ed in 1952 follows : 
399. For the purposes of this Chapter , a settlement shall not 
be deemed to be irrevocable if the terms thereof provide-
(a) for the payment to the settlor or , during the life of 
the settlor , to the wife or husband of the settlor for 
his or her benefit, or for the application for the ben­
efit of the settlor or , during the life of the settlor , 
of the wife or husband of the settlor , of any income 
or assets in any circumstances whatsoever during the 
life of any child of the settlor to or for the benefit 
of whom any income, or assets representing it , is or 
are or may be payable or applicable by virtue or in 
consequence of the settlement; or 
(b) for the determination of the settlement by the act or 
on the default of any person; or 
(c) for the payment of any penalty by the settlor in the 
event of his failing to comply with the provisions of 
the settlement: 
Provided that a settlement shall not be deemed to be re­
vocable by reason only-
(i) that it contains a provision under which any income 
or assets will or may become payable to or applica­
ble for the benefit of the settlor , or the wife or hus­
band of the settlor , on the bankruptcy of any such 
child as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of this section 
or in the event of any assignment of or charge - on 
that income or those assets being executed by such a 
child; or 
( ii) that it provides for the determination of the settle­
ment as aforesaid in such a manner that the deter­
mination will not , during the lifetime of any such child 
as aforesaid, benefit any person other than such a 
child , or the wife , husband, or issue of such a child; 
( iii) in the case of a settlement to which section thirty­
three of the Trustee Act ,  1925,  applies , that it di­
rects income to be held for the benefit of such a 
child as aforesaid on protective trusts , unless the 
trust period is a period less than the life of the 
child or the settlement specifies some event on the 
happening of which the child would , if the income 
were payable during the trust period to him abso­
lutely during that period, be deprived of the right 
to receive the income or part thereof. 
At first glance, it might be supposed that a definition so 
comprehensive would leave no room for argument about its ap­
plication. A determined inquirer, however, would find room 
for arguments as to whether particular cases are covered. In 
connection with paragraph {a), for example, can a settlement be 
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justly said to "provide for" a payment to the settlor if a trust 
does permit such a payment to be made but only at the discre ­
tion of the trustees,  there being no certainty that any such pay­
ment will be made ? Again, does a settlement provide for pay­
ments to the settlor "during the life of" his child if the enabling 
words are such that the payments, if made would not necessari­
ly continue during the whole life of the child? Or, turning to 
paragraph (b) , is there provision for the "determination" of a 
settlement if it permits or requires the trust fund to be in­
vested in shares of a company which the settlor so dominates 
(e .g . ,  through his holding of shares with special voting and 
liquidation rights) that he could neutralize the settlement by 
winding up the company and thereby legally take possession for 
himself of the entire assets ? 
2 . 2  Legislative pre -enactment aids to interpre tation 
When an Inland Revenue official or a private tax practi­
tioner encounters a proble,m of interpretation arising out of a 
statutory provision, he may well seek to enlarge his knowledge 
of its background by studying the relevant passages in the pub­
lished reports of the different Royal Commissions and commit­
tees of enquiry which have from time to time reviewed the 
country's tax system. He knows that, as a matter of history, 
many amendments of the tax law owe their origin to the recom­
mendations of such bodies . In addition, he may decide to check 
his tentative conclusions against statements made on behalf of 
the Government when the proposal to enact the amending sec­
tion was debated in the House of Commons (though, as noted 
under 2 . 3  infra, arguments based on such a statement could 
never be decisive) . To this end, he can turn to the bulky vol­
umes of the Official Report of Parliamentary Debates for the 
year concerned. This is a substantially verbatim report, pub­
lished since 1909 under the authority of the House itself. Not 
every provision of a finance bill attracts notice in the debates 
on the second and third readings of the bill; the tendency at 
that point is to concentrate on major issues of policy. But the 
bill is also considered clause by clause in Committee of the 
whole House; and at this stage, it is usually for the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer or another member of the government to ex­
plain the object of each provision of the bill as it comes up 
for discussion. There are further opportunities for debate on 
points of detail when the bill as amended in committee is re­
ported back to the House . 
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It will thus be to those two different stages of debate in 
the House of Commons that the inquirer will turn, for there is 
no debate on points of detail in the House of Lords (which is 
constitutionally precluded from amending a bill relating to tax­
ation) . Nor are there any committee hearings, such as occur 
under the legislative procedures of some countries, at which 
evidence bearing on the provisions of the bill would be given 
by officials or representatives of interested taxpayers . 
Any interpretative guidance derived from a study of these 
legislative pre-enactment aids is a complete byproduct. An at­
torney examines them to facilitate his own understanding of the 
meaning of the statute ; they have no de jure weight in court. 
The status of such aids is not peculiar to tax legislation; it is 
common to all United Kingdom legislation. 
2 . 3  Standards of construction followed by the judiciary in inter­
pre ting the s tatute 
While the reports of Parliamentary debates may afford a 
valuable indication of the government's intentions at the time 
the statute was enacted, the courts have regularly refused to 
turn to Ministers ' statements in either House of Parliament in 
order to explain its meaning. The courts proceed from_a com­
mon premise,  that the language of a statute must be regarded 
as the language of the whole legislature and, in consequence,  
that the meaning attached to  it by an individual member of 
either House cannot govern the interpretation. Indeed, it has 
been stated that if there is a difference between the language 
of a statute and the declared intention of its framers, the prop­
er inference is that this difference was not accidental but in­
tentional. 
In interpreting tax statutes ,  courts are accustomed to apply 
the recognized rules of construction applied to statute law gen­
erally. If, for example, a statute uses plain and unambiguous 
language, the court will give effect to it; the court 's  duty in 
such case is not to make the law reasonable but to apply it by 
reference to the usual sense of the words . Words will not be 
read into a statute by implication unless it is necessary to do 
so to give the language sense and meaning in its context. If, 
on the other hand, some apparent contradiction arises between 
two passages in the same statute or in two related statutes 
dealing with the same subject matter, the court will interpret 
the actual words of the section under review in a manner which 
best harmonizes with the subject and with the scheme of the 
statute or statutes taken as a whole . 
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In addition, courts tend to hold that tax statutes should be 
construed strictly. This approach rests on the view that when 
the legislature imposes a monetary obligation which, in some 
sense, encroaches on the property of a citizen, it is reasonable 
to expect it to manifest its intention in clear words, rather 
than leave the matter to mere inference.  This approach was 
reflected in one judgment as follows : 
In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. 
There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity 
about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is 
to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look 
fairly at the language used. 2 
Section B. The Regulations Program 
2 . 4  Types and force of regulations 
The United Kingdom tax code contains no general enabling 
provision authorizing issuance of so-called interpretative regu­
lations. Hence, a regulations program of the type administered 
by the United States Treasury Department under the general 
authority of section 7805 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 
could not be and is not, carried out by the Board of Inland 
Revenue . 
However, in the tax code, as in many other United King­
dom statutes, Parliament sometimes does delegate legislative 
power. That is, it does provide that some specified authority 
shall have power to prescribe rules ,  having the force of law, 
which amplify and otherwise carry into effect some particular 
provision or group of provisions in the parent statute . These 
rules take on different forms and go under various names (for 
example, the instrument by which, after Parliamentary approval, 
effect is given to a double taxation convention with another 
country is an Order-in-Council) , but it is convenient to refer 
to them comprehensively as statutory regulations . 
Some statutory regulations may be primarily or indeed 
wholly concerned with matters of machinery. For example, 
they might specify the form of notification to be given to the 
Inland Revenue Department by a taxpayer who wishes to claim 
the benefit of a relief provision in the parent statute, and they 
2 cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ,  37 
Times L.R. 33 (1920) , [1921 ]  1 K.R. 64, 71 , per Rowlatt, J . ,  aff'd on 
different grounds, 37 Times L.R. 402, [1921] 2 K.B. 403 (Aff'd Cas.) . 
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might also go on to outline the procedure to be followed in re­
solving a dispute between the taxpayer and the Department 
concerning the applicability of such relief in a particular case .  
But regulations also may deal with questions of substantive 
liability . Such regulations sometimes define more specifically 
than the parent statute the qualifying conditions giving rise to 
a claim for relief, or prescribe the actual method of calculat­
ing a result intended by the parent statute . 
In 1945, for example, Parliament enacted a new code pro­
viding a system of capital allowances for amortization of ex­
penditures incurred after a given date on various types of 
depreciable assets . The application of this new code to some 
types of assets in existence at the initial date was fully worked 
out in the statute. In the case of construction works connected 
with mining operations, however, the statute merely set forth 
certain general principles for determining the extent to which 
any relevant expenditure incurred before the initial date would 
qualify for amortization after that date, and then authorized 
the Board of Inland Revenue to make regulations indicating how 
those general principles would be applied in actual cases . 3 
Again, in 19 56 the system of investment allowances (an in­
centive device to encourage capital investment in certain busi­
ness assets) temporarily was withdrawn. Parliament c:lecided, 
however, to make an exception in favor of investments under­
taken in connection with the conservation of fuel.  Since a very 
wide range of industrial equipment was involved, the statute 
did not attempt to catalogue the fuel-saving devices which would 
continue to be eligible for an allowance. Instead the Treasury 
was authorized to make regulations prescribing the types of 
equipment which would qualify. After obtaining technical ad­
vice, the Treasury promulgated a list of qualifying equipment. 
These two examples are typical of the degree to which 
statutory regulations are used to complement a substantive 
statutory tax provision. The general objective was stated 
clearly by Parliament; but, the subject matter being one of 
some complexity, it was deemed advisable to delegate author­
ity to develop the subsidiary specifications regarding applica­
tion of the basic principles . Another typical feature is that 
the power to make statutory regulations is granted on each oc ­
casion for some more or less specific purpose; in the tax area, 
3 The regulations made by the Board of Inland Revenue are print­
ed and issued by H.M. stationery Office. They are available to the 
public. 
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Parliament would be most unlikely to grant a regulation-making 
power which extended to a wide range of different matters . 
Where a question of substantive liability turns on a provi­
sian contained in statutory regulations, a court before which 
that question arises will determine whether the body which pro­
mulgated the regulation. exceeded the limits of the authority 
delegated to it by Parliament in the parent statute .  If, upon 
review of the scheme of the parent statute and the actual lan­
guage by which the power to issue regulations was granted, the 
court should conclude that some part of the regulation goes 
beyond the presumed intention of Parliament, a decision would 
no doubt follow that, to this extent, the regulation was ultra 
vires and therefore invalid. This is not, of course, a feature 
peculiar to statutory regulations on tax matters; it reflects the 
control which the courts exercise over all forms of delegated 
legislation. For example, the "Pay as you Earn" system, under 
which employers withhold income tax when paying employees '  
wages and salaries, was put into force by virtue of regulations 
authorized by legislation reading in part as follows : 
The Commissioners [i.e . , Board] of Inland Revenue shall make 
regulations with respect to the assessment, charge, collection 
and recovery of income tax in respect of emoluments to which 
this Act applies . . .  and those regulations may , in particular, 
include provision-
(a) for requiring any person making any payment of, or ac­
count of, any such emoluments , when he makes the pay­
ment, to make a deduction or a repayment of tax calcu­
lated by reference to tax tables prepared by the Com­
missioners of Inland Revenue and for rendering persons 
who are required to make any such deduction or repay­
ment accountable to , or , as the case may be, entitled to 
repayment from, those Commissioners ;  
* * * 
and any such regulations shall have effect notwithstanding any-
thing in the Income Tax Acts . . . . 4 
For many years,  the Bankruptcy Acts had provided that, in the 
administration of a bankrupt's property, there should be paid 
in priority to his other debts certain preferential claims, in­
cluding one year's  taxes and outstanding wages due to his 
servants and workmen. An analogous provision appeared in 
legislation relating to insolvent companies .  Accordingly, the 
statutory regulations for "Pay as you Earn" were drafted so as 
to apply the same rules to the tax which an insolvent employer 
4 Income Tax Act of 1952. § 157 . 
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had deducted but not yet paid over. In relation to bankruptcy 
for example, the relevant regulation read: 
There shall be included among the debts which under section 
33 of the Bankruptcy Act ,  1914, are to be paid in priority to 
all other debts in the distribution of the property of a bank­
rupt or person dying insolvent , so much as is unpaid of the 
employer' s  liability for the period of twelve months next be­
fore the date of the receiving order or of the death, as the 
case may be. 
Later,  in the course of a dispute, the Law Officers of the 
Crown indicated their opinion that this part of the regulation 
was ultra vires.  While the language of the parent statute clear ­
ly indicated that the authorized statutory regulations would be 
deemed to override any inconsistent provision in the Income 
Tax Acts themselves ,  it did not indicate that the regulatory 
power could alter the separate bankruptcy legislation dealing 
with preferential claims in bankruptcy. After the Law Officers ' 
opm10n was handed down, the Board of Inland Revenue rescind­
ed this part of the regulation. 5 
2 .  5 Precise purpose of statutory regulations 
The Parliamentary practice of delegating legislative !'1-uthor­
ity may indirectly contribute to  greater clarity in  the affected 
area. When the subject matter is especially technical and com­
plex, statutory regulations issued under the specific authority 
of a parent statute are likely to deal with the application of a 
new measure in a more detailed fashion than Parliament would 
have been willing to undertake if the entire matter had to be 
compressed within the narrower bounds of the statute itself. 
This consideration apart, however, statutory regulations do not 
afford a means of resolving the interpretative problems which 
emerge from all tax legislation. For, as has just been seen, 
the ultra vires  test means that, in the United Kingdom, these 
regulations are subordinate to, and controlled by, the parent 
statute .  Since the power to make regulations is granted only 
for a specific and limited purpose, study of their language will 
not throw much light on wider questions arising even out of the 
parent statute itself. 
5 In 1952 , however , Parliament itself enacted amending legislation 
which directed that the priority rules in the Bankruptcy Act and other 
analogous legislation should extend thenceforward to " Pay as you E arn" 
tax not accounted for by an employer at the date of the receiving order 
or other relevant date. 
THE REGULATIONS PROGRAM 389 
As these regulations are not designed to interpret doubts 
generated by the statutory language-recall that their purpose 
is to complete the gaps left deliberately by Parliament-there 
is no part in them designed to interpret the parent statute . 
However, as the Inland Revenue fills in the gaps, the statutory 
regulations indirectly come to serve an interpretative function 
for they are more detailed than Parliament itself would have 
provided in a statute. Although the process is a legislative 
one, the completion of details, it must be emphasized again 
that the regulations must not go beyond or vary the clear 
meaning of the statute . 
From time to time, even without a new Parliamentary en­
actment, statutory regulations will be amended by whatever 
agency to which Parliament originally delegated the legislative 
authority. 6 Illustratively, an incentive allowance encourages 
the installation of fuel economy devices . There is no general 
language which permits such an allowance for any and all de­
vices insuring an economical use of fuel. Instead, the regula­
tion lists specific devices with very precise engineering de­
tails . If a new device were to be invented, it would be added 
to the list, with great preciseness as to its engineering fea­
tures . 
2 . 6  Manner of processing regulations 
In other countries where the primary tax legislation is 
supplemented by a comprehensive system of interpretative regu­
lations, a regular procedure doubtless will be developed for 
drafting original regulations, as well as amendments should the 
primary legislation itself undergo amendment. But, as has been 
seen, statutory regulations, as used in the United Kingdom, have 
a much more limited scope . Each such regulation has some­
thing approaching an ad hoc character ;  in consequence,  the 
process of bringing them into existence has not been formal­
ized . 
Generally speaking, however, the Board's  secretariat takes 
the initiative in preparing any given set of regulations. To 
provide continuity, members of that office who are familiar 
with the underlying problem, having looked after the Depart­
ment's  interests when the enabling statute was originally pro­
posed to Parliament, normally continue to handle the matter at 
the later point when the related regulations are to be prepared. 
The staff of the secretariat are administrators, not trained 
6 see 2.4 supra . 
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lawyers. However, they may seek the advice and assistance of 
the legally qualified staff of the Solicitor 's  Office .  They also 
usually keep in touch with the relevant technical branch of the 
Department (e .g . ,  with the specialist Inspectors in the Chief 
Inspector's Office) as the draft of the regulations takes shape . 
Whether interests outside the Department will be consulted 
while the regulations are still in draft form and, if so, the ar­
rangements to that end, will depend largely on the particular 
subject matter . The secretariat 's  timetable, within which regu­
lations must be processed, is also variable and depends on the 
circumstances . 
Section c .  The Rulings Program 
2 .  7 Formal advance written rulings to taxpayers 
It is only in a few very special cases that the tax code 
gives the taxpayer the right to obtain a formal written ruling 
regarding the probable tax consequences of a transaction which 
he proposes to carry out in the future. Parliament has been 
extremely sparing in creating such a right. In each case where 
it has done so, it was enacting unusually sweeping provisions 
designed to counter avoidance of tax liability by artificial trans­
actions; and there was some risk that its broad language would 
become a deterrent to normal business transactions unless the 
affected persons could obtain a clearance beforehand. 
The first example dates from 1951 .  In that year there was 
a steep rise in profits tax rates, and antiavoidance legislation 
,vas deemed necessary. It was designed to cover any transac­
tion where the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, was 
avoidance of or reduction of liability to profits tax. In such 
cases, the Board of Inland Revenue was authorized to adjust 
the liability in a manner which counteracted the avoidance or 
reduction. Further, the legislation provided that avoidance or 
reduction would be presumed to have been the main or one of 
the main, purposes in certain types of transactions (e .g . , on 
the transfer or acquisition of shares in a company) if the main 
benefit which might have been expected to accrue in the im­
mediately succeeding years was avoidance or reduction of lia­
bility for the tax. It was provided, however, that a company 
could send to the Board full particulars of a projected trans­
action; and the Board, if satisfied that the transaction was being 
entered into "for bona fide commercial reasons" and ought not 
to be brought under the section, then must notify the company 
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of its finding. In such event, the Board could not thereafter 
invoke the statutory provision in respect of the transaction de­
scribed to them (though such a clearance does not prevent fur ­
ther action under the section if the particulars supplied did not 
amount to a full and accurate disclosure of the material facts) .  
Since this device of an advance clearance under these par­
ticular circumstances is considered as an exceptional departure ,  
one to  give swift comfort to a business man, an oral confer­
ence is  not available .  However, a refusal of advance clearance 
does not preclude recourse to the courts should the transaction 
be held by the Inland Revenue to fall within the thrust of the 
statute. 
In 1960, provision for advance clearances was again insert­
ed in antiavoidance legislation -this time in the income tax and 
surtax fields. For present purposes, it is enough to summarize 
the two groups of avoidance devices to which this legislation 
was directed: 
( 1) The first group is illustrated by cases where the dis­
posal of a company's  stock-in-trade (inventory) was ef­
fected indirectly by arranging for the intended purchaser 
to buy, not the stock-in-trade itself, but the whole share 
capital of the company holding it (so that the result was 
a capital gain for the former shareholders instead of a 
taxable profit for the company itself) . 
(2) The second group involved the manipulation of holdings 
of securities , so as to bring about a tax advantage anal­
ogous to that sought to be gained by the operations 
known as "bond-washing" and "dividend-stripping." 
For the first group, the legislative remedy was, broadly, 
to make the vendors of the shares liable for income tax (and, 
if applicable, surtax) on an appropriate proportion of the tax­
able profit which would have been realized by the company had 
the disposition been carried out in a straightforward fashion. 
But it was also provided that prospective vendors and purchas­
ers otherwise within the scope of the section might apply joint­
ly to the Board of Inland Revenue for an advance clearance .  
T o  obtain such, they are required in effect to show that the 
company itself will eventually dispose of its stock-in-trade in 
a manner which produces a realized profit to the company. If 
the projected sale is carried out within six months of the clear­
ance date, such a clearance again prevents the Inland Revenue 
from invoking the statutory provision. 
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For the second group of avoidance devices,  the remedy (as 
in the 195 1  precedent) was to authorize the Board of Inland 
Revenue to require adjustments of liability sufficient to counter ­
act the tax advantage sought to be obtained. The section did 
not apply, however, to transactions carried out "for bona fide 
commercial reasons ,"  obtaining of tax advantages not being a 
main object. Here too, persons who intended to undertake one 
or more such transactions were authorized to seek binding ad­
vance clearances, by sending full particulars to the Board which 
then had the duty to respond one way or the other .  
No formal procedure has been prescribed with respect to 
applications for a clearance under the three sections just de­
scribed. A letter giving all relevant information is sufficient. 
Before the Board will rule, the application is examined by the 
secretariat in consultation, where appropriate, with the Office 
of the Chief Inspector or the Surtax Office. The Board's  ruling 
takes the form of a simple notification, that a clearance is 
granted or, as the case may be, withheld. The sole purpose 
of the clearance system, as previously stated, is to prevent 
the legislation from acting as a deterrent to normal business 
transactions. Thus, if a clearance is withheld, there is no 
reason why the applicant should be permitted to make elaborate 
legal arguments regarding the precise technical application of 
the legislation. Such argument would be more appropriately 
held over to a later stage should the applicant, notwithstanding 
denial of advance clearance ,  carry out his proposal and should 
the Inland Revenue then take countervailing action under the 
statutory provision. 
While statistics regarding the number who apply for clear­
ances are not available, in the case of mergers or reorganiza­
tions involving issuance of shares to the public, it is not un­
common for the published prospectus to state that clearances 
have been obtained. 
2 . 8  Informal technical advice to taxpayers on proposed transac­
tions 
The relatively restricted compass of the area within which 
the United Kingdom tax code has given taxpayers the right to 
obtain a formal advance ruling on the tax consequences of a 
proposed transaction is matched by the absence of any general 
custom of providing informal or oral technical advice on such 
transactions . However, as to one or two areas of tax law, the 
practice of the Inland Revenue Department does permit such 
advice to be given, and this practice might be looked upon as 
a partial rulings program. 
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An outstanding example of this is afforded by the advice 
which the Department is willing to give when a business con­
cern decides to establish a superannuation fund -or to institute 
some comparable scheme-for the payment of retirement pen­
sions to its employees . The purpose is to give advice as to 
whether a given plan will qualify for tax purposes if carried 
out in accordance with the proposal submitted. The specialist 
unit at headquarters is able at a preliminary stage to call the 
employer's  attention to any features of the proposal which 
make it difficult for the plan to achieve recognition for tax 
purposes and advises on the changes which would eliminate 
points of difficulty. The matter can be handled by correspond­
ence, or by a combination of correspondence and oral discus­
sion. 
Since the advance informal advice is given by the echelon 
of the Department which renders technical advice to the Board's  
secretariat on recognition of pension arrangements when formal­
ly constituted, as a practical matter employers can place great 
confidence in the rulings they receive. It would be very un­
usual for an employer 's  representatives to omit the precaution 
of informal consultation before the proposed pension arrange ­
ments become legally binding on the employer. 
It should be observed that this exception to the normal no­
rulings practice of the department involves a circumstance in 
which the official who is consulted can obtain a complete pic­
ture of the proposed transaction. He can be supplied with com­
plete copies of the proposed trust deeds and other legal docu­
ments which establish the funds and regulate the rights and 
obligations of employer and employees . The same is true in 
the other principal area in which informal technical advice is 
regularly given, namely, to charitable organizations . The tax 
code exempts from income tax, subject to conditions, "a body 
of persons or trust established for charitable purposes only." 
The Chief Inspector's specialists who give technical advice to 
the Board's  secretariat on the recognition of charitable organi­
zations customarily give informal advance rulings on the tax 
effect of a proposed constitution (corporate charter and bylaws), 
or change of constitution, in much the same way as the staff 
of the unit which handles questions about pension arrangements . 
2 .9  Technical advice to fie ld offices 
It is evident that the arrangements just described for g1vmg 
formal advance rulings or informal technical advice on the tax 
aspects of proposed transactions cover only a small proportion 
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of interpretative tax questions which arise.  It follows that, in 
general, the key role in resolving such questions falls to the 
local Tax Offices which must apply the abstract language of the 
tax code to completed transactions in the course of making 
yearly assessments . Consequently, the very greatest impor­
tance attaches to the system adopted within the Inland Revenue 
Department for giving them technical guidance in the interests 
of uniformity and certainty. 
The primary source of guidance upon which the local Tax 
Office relies in performing its task is that afforded by the de­
partmental instruction manuals and by the circulars (mimeo­
graphed or printed) sent out from headquarters . These can be 
considered as a single medium because the instruction manuals 
represent a consolidated version of those previous circulars 
having permanent value, and also because the circulars use the 
instruction manuals as the point of departure in explaining new 
problems . Indeed, a circular may well take the form of a 
textual amendment of the pertinent passage in one of the man­
uals . It is convenient, therefore, to refer comprehensively to 
the circulars and manuals under the single name of instruc­
tions . 
As a result of long experience, the conclusion has been 
reached that the local Tax Offices will be best served, if edi­
torial responsibility for instructions is placed on a single unit 
in the Office of the Chief Inspector. Inter alia, such consoli­
dation helps to ensure use of uniform terminology and adequate 
cross-references to other instructions dealing with cognate 
problems. Because instructions often prescribe procedures as 
well as give substantive technical advice, the Instruction Sec­
tion was made a part o f  the Organization Group in the Office 
of the Chief Inspector . 7 
Though editorial responsibility for a new instruction rests 
with the Instructions Section, that section necessarily consults 
with the specialist or specialists interested in its subject mat­
ter when preparing the text. To the extent the instruction at­
tempts to resolve interpretative questions , the specialist pro­
vides necessary guidance regarding the departmentally accepted 
view of the law. In its final form, the instruction is sent out 
under the authority of the Chief Inspector; but where the in­
struction deals with a matter of substance (as distinct from a 
purely procedural matter) , the text first will be submitted to 
the Board's  secretariat to insure that the stated interpretation 
carried their approval. 
7 See Chap. XVII, 1 . 2  supra . 
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The circumstances which trigger new instructions vary 
from one occasion to another. In one case, for instance, Par­
liament may have amended the law, and the practice of the 
Department must be altered to conform to the amended legis­
lation. Or a particular statutory provision may have been in­
terpreted by a court decision. While local Tax Offices regu­
larly receive the reports of tax litigation, a new instruction 
may be needed to point out the extent to which the new court 
decision appears to govern application of the code to situations 
analogous to, but not identical with, the actual situation sub­
j ected to litigation. Again, examination of some problem at 
headquarters (for whatever reason) may have clarified views 
hitherto held on a debatable question of interpretation, and it 
may be thought desirable to communicate the result to local 
Tax Offices .  As a last example, headquarters may find that a 
question previously deemed to have only academic interest has 
begun to assume practical significance in a number of actual 
cases, and thus merits specific guidance in an instruction. 
Instructions, however, are only part of the story. It pre ­
viously has been stressed that (subject to compliance with de ­
partmental instructions) the District Inspector in charge of a 
local Tax Office has an independent command in a very real 
sense.  Indeed, he has discretion to arrive at a reasonable 
settlement of controversies arising with taxpayers in his area. 
Nevertheless, from time to time he may want technical guid­
ance on some specific point not adequately covered by the in­
structions . He is entitled to submit his problem to the relevant 
specialist at headquarters, though he will not do so lightly. In 
making such a submission, which normally is in writing, he is 
expected to provide, not only an adequate summary of the facts 
of the actual case giving rise to his request, but also citations 
to the statutory provisions and to any court decisions that ap­
pear relevant, together with an indication of his own view as 
to the correct solution. The object at this stage does not go 
beyond providing the District Inspector with an expert opinion 
on the interpretative question. In consequence it is not cus­
tomary for the headquarter's specialist to meet with the tax­
payer whose affairs are covered by the submission. Should the 
specialist think it desirable, before reaching a decision, to have 
a more complete understanding regarding the taxpayer 's  view 
of his own affairs, he probably will leave it to the District In­
spector to make the necessary contact. 
Although the Surtax Office is not a field office in the ordi­
nary sense of the term, since it assesses surtax centrally for 
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the whole of the United Kingdom, it nevertheless resembles the 
local Tax Offices in that it has direct contact (if only by cor­
respondence) with the taxpayers whose liabilities it handles .  
When the amount of a taxpayer's income from a given source 
has been finally determined for ordinary income tax purposes,  
that amount is  conclusive in calculating that particular source 's  
contribution to  the taxpayer's  total income for the purpose of 
determining his surtax for that same year. This often means 
that interpretative questions affecting the assessable amount of 
an item of income, if not resolved between the taxpayer and 
his local Tax Office prior to the point the Surtax Office con­
siders the surtax matter, continue to be the primary responsi­
bility of the local Tax Office. Nevertheless , interpretative 
questions can arise for the first time in the context of the sur­
tax computation for a case where no ordinary income tax as­
sessment was required. A simple example might relate to the 
precise amount of an income item which was subject to deduc­
tion of tax at source and for which, accordingly, no income tax 
assessment was required. In this circumstance, the Surtax Of­
fice bears the responsibility of upholding the departmental con­
struction of the tax code 's  provisions . Since the Surtax Office 
is a centralized branch of the headquarters organization, it is 
not as dependent on instruction manuals and circulars as the 
local offices,  in trying to achieve uniform administration. Never­
theless, even at this higher level, the use of branch instructions 
has been found advantageous . The details of this separate sys­
tem of branch instructions need not be discussed here, however; 
the procedures followed correspond generally to those associ­
ated with the Chief Inspector 's instructions to local Tax Offices.  
For example, the Board's secretariat will be informed in ad­
vance regarding important newly proposed interpretations . 
2 . 10 Publication of te chnical advice given taxpayers and local 
offices 
The question of whether the Department should or should 
not publish what are sometimes termed Practice Notes in order 
to alert the public to interpretations officially placed on tax 
statutes was the subject of earlier debate . Some of the rele ­
vant arguments were indicated in the Final Report of the Rad­
cliffe Commission: 
982.  The preparation of Notes of this sort is not free from pit­
falls. In the first place the style and content of the Notes must 
be adapted to the needs and understanding of the prospective 
reader; and these must be supposed to differ from one case to 
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another according to the branch of the tax code to which the 
Notes relate. Again, an official publication may well prove 
embarrassing if it does not state the whole law in complete 
detail. If minor qualifications of the main principles of the 
code are omitted in the interests of simplicity , there is a risk 
of misleading those taxpayers to whose affairs some such quali­
fication is in fact relevant: on the other hand, if detailed treat­
ment is resorted to , the Notes may be of little value except to 
the skilled lawyer and accountant-whose training already fits 
them to derive the same information at first hand from the 
code itself and the reports of decided cases. A further prob­
lem arises when the legal provisions to be dealt with have not 
been the subject of any Court decision. Unless the Notes are 
to give some account of the supposed construction of those 
provisions they may be seriously incomplete; but if they do 
enter upon the matter it can be objected that they lack author­
ity. When in the past the Board have volunteered a public 
statement as to the basis of liability which they themselves 
suppose to be applicable in a given set of circumstances their 
action has sometimes been criticised as a usurpation of the 
proper functions of the appeal Commissioners and the Courts 
and they have on occasion been accused of an attempt to over­
awe taxpayers .  We think that criticism of this sort is mis­
conceived. The Inland Revenue Department must do what it 
can to secure that the law is uniformly administered; there 
must be therefore some view, officially received, as to the 
right interpretation of each enactment that bears upon the com­
putation of liabilities.  This view may have to be a provisional 
one in cases where the language of the statute has not been 
judicially construed, but that is no good reason for not letting 
interested taxpayers know what it is if it is regularly acted 
upon by the Department in its executive work of computing 
tax liability. 
983. We ascertained from the Board that they were in favor of 
adding to the existing series of pamphlets and that a certain 
amount of preparatory work had already been undertaken for 
that purpose. In spite of the difficulties to which we have re­
ferred in the previous paragraph we think that the project ought 
to be encouraged, and we recommend that it should be perse­
vered with. The kind of publication we have in mind is one 
which would describe , preferably with illustrative examples , the 
effect that a particular branch of the tax code is understood to 
have; the presentation in summary form of the facts of indivi­
dual cases considered at headquarters and of the decisions ar­
rived at was also suggested by some witnesses , but we do not 
think that a disconnected series of "rulings" of this sort would 
have any real value. 
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The pamphlets in existence at the time of that report consisted 
chiefly of a series explaining the postwar system of capital al­
lowances for expenditures on different types of depreciable 
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assets . Following the above recommendation, the Board have 
repeatedly added to their number . The subjects bear on such 
matters as the arrangements for double taxation relief, main­
tenance claims for relief in respect of expenses connected with 
the ownership of real property, and the tax consequences when 
company directors and executives receive benefits in kind or 
expense allowances from their companies .  
I n  particular, the program has made a sustained effort to 
issue pamphlets which provide technical guidance on major leg­
islative changes .  For example , pamphlets have been issued 
explaining respectively ( 1) the 1957 tax reliefs for Overseas 
Trade Corporations, (2) the 1962 extension of the income tax 
to certain short-term gains, and (3) the 1963 comprehensive 
reform of provisions governing tax liability in respect of rents, 
etc . ,  from real property. 
A typical pamphlet conforms to the general specification 
suggested by the Radcliffe Commission, that is, as to some 
distinct branch of the tax code, it seeks to cover, in outline at 
least, the effect of the legal provisions on the whole range of 
normal situations to which those provisions are directed. When 
possible, definitions in general terms are illustrated by citing 
concrete instances which would (or would not) be cove!"ed; and 
simple numerical examples are added where this would help to 
illustrate the mathematical aspects of particular provisions . 
The emphasis throughout is upon final results deemed to follow 
from the terms of the statute, rather than upon the legal rea­
soning which could be advanced in support of the interpretation 
adopted. 
It is through this publication program, and not through any 
system of published rulings on specific cases submitted for that 
sole purpose, that the Inland Revenue Department seeks to pro­
vide taxpayers with a starting point from which they may begin 
the study of interpretative questions arising in connection with 
their own tax affairs . 
CHAPTER XIX 
ASSESSMENT, RE FUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL PROCEDURES 
Section A. Assessment and Audit Procedures 
3 . 1  Introductory note 
The assessment procedure adopted by the Inland Revenue 
Department follows a common pattern, whether the tax involved 
is income tax, surtax, or profits tax. The taxpayer is re­
quired by statute to furnish a return showing the sources of 
his income and the amount of income derived from each 
source. The local Tax Office or the Surtax Office then scruti­
nizes the information supplied, calls for any further information 
or explanation that appears necessary, and makes arrangements 
for a formal assessment in the amount that appears to be war­
ranted by the facts . 
This common pattern extends beyond cases in which the 
definitive action to be taken is an assessment. In a country 
such as the United Kingdom, which applies tax deduction at 
source-i .e . , withholding-to a wide variety of income sources, 
cases in considerable numbers are bound to arise where the 
aggregate tax deducted exceeds the amount of the recipient 's 
true liability . 
For example, consider an individual whose income is de ­
rived primarily from investments, the income of which is sub­
ject to withholding at the source. This same individual may be 
entitled to various personal allowances and reliefs with respect 
to his dependents, or his business activities may have resulted 
in a net loss which he is entitled to set off against income 
from other sources . In such a case, this individual is entitled 
to a refund and will not receive an assessment. The procedural 
steps , however,  are much the same as in the assessment situa­
tion. Such a taxpayer presents the necessary information on a 
return, and the initial examination is conducted in the same 
way and, generally speaking, by the same Tax Office which 
would have handled the matter if an assessment were required. 
However, in the case where taxpayers derive their income 
from wages and salaries, both subject to withholding at the 
source, the making of a formal assessment on such salaries 
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or wages is a prerequisite in the process of establishing what­
ever adjustment may be necessary, whether the amount of such 
an adjustment represents a refund or an assessment.1 
In view of the foregoing, it seems proper to regard the 
making of assessments and the payment of refunds as alterna­
tive aspects of a single process . This conclusion is reinforced 
by the fact that the remedies open to the taxpayer when he dis ­
putes the amount of the refund offered to him are fundamentally 
similar to the remedies which a taxpayer can pursue when he 
disputes the amount of an assessment. In either type of case, 
he can make an oral argument before appeal Commissioners 
having jurisdiction in the matter, and can then appeal, if need 
be, to the courts on a point of law-as discussed in Chapter XX 
infra. 
The tax administration of some countries use the so-called 
self-assessment system, that is , the field office automatically 
records as the assessment the tax liability calculated by the 
taxpayer himself on the return he files . This initial taxpayer­
determined assessment is then checked, but only in a selected 
proportion of the cases, by a subsequent examination-described 
as an audit-designed to verify the adequacy of the return. The 
United Kingdom does not use the self-assessment syste!ll; some 
degree of scrutiny is regularly applied to each return before 
final assessment. Therefore, the audit process is not distinct 
from the process of assessment. 
Every taxpayer' s  return is processed to establish the cor­
rectness of the information stated thereon. For wage earners, 
who have no other source of income, this is a matter of de­
termining whether or not, in comparison with past years, the 
taxpayer has reported his dependents correctly and whether the 
employer has withheld the proper amount under "Pay as you 
Earn. " The same type of verification is applied where a return 
shows, in addition to earnings, income from another source, 
i . e . ,  investments . An actual check of the mathematical accura­
cy to ascertain the totals (other than for incomes subject to 
surtax) is not necessary because the withholding system will 
have insured that a taxpayer will have been taxed correctly for 
each source of income . 
1 The tax withheld by an employer is calculated on a basis which 
takes account of the employee' s personal allowances and reliefs,  to 
the end, hopefully , of collecting the correct final liability . The sys­
tem in fact achieves this in the great bulk of cases; and when it does 
so , the law permits a formal assessment to be dispensed with unless 
the employee requests one. 
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Even incomes subject to surtax are given the same 
processing at the local office . When the case reaches the 
Surtax Office for processing at that level, the Surtax Office 
then concerns itself with the exact amount of any income sub­
ject to withholding. 2 
3 . 2  De tails of the assessment and audit procedures 
Ordinarily, the assessment procedure takes as a point of 
departure the taxpayer 's own return of his income. A taxpay­
er's written claim for a refund (including where appropriate 
his statement of income) performs a similar role in the re­
fund procedure.  Even the "Pay as you Earn" system does not 
depart completely from this principle. Under that system, a 
return received from the employee in an earlier year, supple­
mented by any later information he may have supplied during 
the current year, is used by the Tax Office to determine the 
code number to be furnished the employer so the latter can de­
termine from official tax tables how much tax should be deduct­
ed from any given wage payment. Thus even if the withholding 
process is deemed equivalent to a species of provisional as ­
sessment, it still is based upon a return by the employee .  
When the employer, after the end of the year, reports the total 
amount of tax deducted, the Tax Office 's provisional assump­
tions about the employee ' s  circumstances can be checked against 
the employee 's  return for that year . Normally only if the two 
differ (due, e .g. , to a midyear change of circumstances not 
previously known to the Tax Office and not reflected therefore 
in the code number whic h governed the employer 's action) will 
it be necessary to make an assessment. Although the taxpayer 's  
return of income is tremendously important to  the Department's  
procedures, a taxpayer is not allowed to defer his liability by 
neglecting to make a return. Where he fails to submit his re­
turn or submits one which is incomplete or unsatisfactory, the 
assessing authority is authorized by statute to make an assess­
ment according to its best judgment. 
Where surtax or profits tax is also involved, a separate 
return will not necessarily be obtained. When individuals have 
incomes sufficiently large to render them liable to surtax, there 
is a regular procedure by which photocopies of the income tax 
returns they have delivered to the local Tax Office are passed 
2 It will be recalled that a determination by the local office set­
ting out an assessment of tax on any income not subject to withhold­
ing is conclusive. See Chap. XVIII, 2.9  supra and 3. 2 infra . 
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on to the Surtax Office . Again, a company 's profits tax liabil­
ity is handled by the inspector who handles its income tax lia­
bility; the information supplied to him serves for both taxes.  
The typical income tax return form provides space for the 
taxpayer to list all his different sources of income and the 
actual amount of income derived therefrom in a stated twelve 
months ' period. Space is also provided to enter claims for the 
various personal allowances and reliefs . In other words, re­
turns are designed to give the Inland Revenue Department as 
comprehensive a view as possible of a taxpayer 's situation. 
Indeed, if the information requested was supplied with complete 
reliability year by year, the local Tax Office or the Surtax Of­
fice often could compute the proper tax solely by reference to 
the information in the series of annual returns . To make the 
computations for any given year may require examination of 
more than one return in the series .  While each return would 
show the actual income of the tax year just completed, the as ­
sessment for certain types of income is measured by the amount 
received in a different year . 
In making out his return, a taxpayer is not expected to re­
solve interpretative questions . Rather he is expected to pre­
sent the raw materials which the Inspector will use in the 
decision-making process.  Thus the taxpayer is to record the 
actual receipt of all kinds of gross income for a given period. 
Where expenses incurred or other amounts are claimed as a 
deduction from any one type of the several types of gross in­
come from which the total gross income is derived, the tax­
payer must show each class of deduction by a separate entry, 
to enable the assessing officer to determine whether in fact 
they are legally deductible . Similarly, in connection with the 
allowances and reliefs for dependents, etc . ,  the return form 
asks that the facts be stated, so that the assessing officer can 
decide for himself whether those facts do confer a legal right 
to the allowance or the relief. 
This approach, however, would hardly be practical with re ­
gard to business profits . Theoretically, only the net profit, 
which is the only chargeable income, needs to be shown in the 
taxpayer's  return. As a practical matter, however, such a 
taxpayer almost invariably will supplement his return by sup­
plying the local Tax Office with his accounts . In the case of a 
business of any magnitude, these will consist of a profit and 
loss statement and balance sheet, both vouched for by a pro­
fessional accountant. Detailed depreciation schedules will also 
be included if the nature and scope of enterprise 's equipment 
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suggests this may be essential to a proper assessment. Such 
business accounts are freely supplied, although the Inspector 
handling the case has no express statutory power to demand 
them. One reason for such cooperation is that, if the Inspec­
tor believes the information given to him is inadequate, he 
does have the power to assess the profits on the basis of an 
estimate . Further, the taxpayer then would be obliged to con­
test the matter at an oral hearing before the appeal Commis ­
sioners . Where the Commissioners hear an appeal as to the 
chargeable amount of business profits, they do have statutory 
power to require, under penalty, submission of business ac­
counts . 
In examining taxpayers ' returns (and any supporting ac ­
counts) , Tax Offices make methodical use of information returns 
obtained from third parties . The degree to which an office 
audits a return naturally varies with the types of income it 
records . If, for example, a taxpayer earns interest from bank 
deposits, there can be little room for debate about its effect 
on his chargeable income . Again, if he is employed, there can 
be little question about the amount of gross income he derives 
from this source; correspondence may follow, however, regard­
ing the merits of the taxpayer 's  claimed personal expenses 
against the gross remuneration. The type of income which gen­
erates most debatable questions is that arising from business 
profits . In consequence, the Department follows the practice 
of entrusting examination of business accounts to the senior 
members of the local Tax Office, i . e . ,  to Inspectors who have 
completed the technical training program. 
An Inspector engaged in the examination of business ac­
counts takes due note of the professional standing of the per­
sons responsible for their preparation. Should a trader submit 
home -made accounts in support of his return, the Inspector 
may invite him in for a conference, to obtain an oral explana­
tion of the basis on which they were prepared. On the other 
hand, he would no doubt place much greater reliance on ac­
counts verified by a qualified professional accountant. Never ­
theless, business accounts , however satisfactory, do not resolve 
all tax questions . They reflect only a profit figure determined 
according to accepted conventions of commercial accounting. 
Rules for calculating profits for income tax purposes diverge 
on some counts from those commercially accepted conventions . 
For example, a sound but conservative commercial approach 
may justify deduction of a particular expenditure deemed to be 
of doubtful value to the business, though for tax purposes the 
GREAT BRITAIN: 
404 ASSESSMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE A PPEA LS 
expenditure may be properly classified as a nondeductible capi­
tal outlay. In examining accounts, therefore, an Inspector re­
views the possible areas of divergence. With one or more of 
these in mind, he may ask the accountant to itemize particular 
entries in the accounts to assist in arriving at a profit figure 
adjusted to conform to tax rules .  In some cases, responsibil­
ity for valuation of inventory rests with the proprietor of the 
business rather than with his accountant. In such cases, the 
Inspector often requests a certificate from the proprietor speci­
fying the exact basis of valuation-i.e . ,  cost or  market-em­
ployed. Professional accountants,  on the other hand, can antici­
pate the points likely to  be  of interest to an Inspector, and 
many try to shorten the question-and-answer process by sub­
mitting suitable supplementary statements beforehand, when 
the return is filed. 
At any stage during an Inspector 's  examination of accounts 
the taxpayer or his accountant may indicate an unwillingness to 
accept the Inspector 's view of the law, either as it relates to 
inclusion of particular receipts or deduction of an expenditure. 
The Inspector is most willing to outline the reasons supporting 
his contention and to take into consideration the taxpayer' s  
counter-arguments . In other words, an examination _involves 
more than elicitation of information. The Inspector seeks to 
arrive at a figure to which the taxpayer will agree if they can 
reach an accord as to the manner in which the tax code-in the 
light of the established view of the Inland Revenue -can be ap­
plied to any interpretative issue of law arising from the tax­
payer's case . To avoid misunderstanding, it may be well to 
say that the Inspector 's very full authority to reach a solution 
locally of interpretative problems does not extend to giving up 
or making a compromise settlement with regard to any issue 
on which he believes , after weighing the competing strengths of 
the two positions, that the law provides an answer in favor of 
the Inland Revenue . 
The processes described above also are normally applied 
to income and supplementary statements supplied to a local Tax 
Office in support of refund claims . When the assessment or 
refund procedure reaches the point where a final figure is ac ­
cepted by the taxpayer, the actual assessment or repayment is 
handled without further formality. There is no comprehensive 
system of review by officials superior in rank to the official 
who made the actual decisions on behalf of the Department . In 
dividing up the workload, the Department seeks to minimize the 
need for any such review by allocating the work initially to a 
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senior or junior officer according to its presumed degree of 
difficulty. Settled cases are scrutinized on a sampling basis 
by the Inspecting Officer during his inspection visits to a local 
Tax Office .  His purpose in such a case is to appraise both 
the efficiency with which a particular staff member performed 
his present duties and his prospective fitness for promotion. 
The scrutiny is not intended as a countercheck of current work. 
However, should there be a situation (whether arising from an 
error in mathematics or interpretation) which is considered to 
justify an assessment requiring the payment of an additional 
tax, as long as the six-year statute of limitations has not run, 
it is possible for such an assessment to be made. Under such 
circumstances, the Inspecting Officer would call the matter to 
the attention of the Inspector who then would make the addi­
tional assessment-just as he would if he himself had noticed 
the situation in question. 
Much of what has just been said about the procedures 
adopted in local Tax Offices applies also to the Surtax Office ' s  
assessment and repayment procedures . As previously noted, 
the Surtax Office is supplied with photocopies of returns sub­
mitted to local Tax Offices though, if it seems desirable, the 
office is legally authorized to ask the taxpayer for further de ­
tails . Attention has also been drawn 3 to a rule which makes 
the final determination of an income tax assessment conclusive 
also for surtax purposes to the extent the taxpayer is subject 
to both taxes . This rule extends also to certain deductions 
from total income-for example, to the deduction allowed when 
a net loss from business is set off against income from other 
sources . Certain of the personal allowances and reliefs for 
income tax purposes also have counterparts in the surtax 
sphere-for example, the allowances for children and other de ­
pendents . In consequence, it is standard operating procedure 
for the local Tax Offices to notify the Surtax Office of all de­
cisions made locally which are relevant in calculating surtax 
liabilities . With all such information as the starting point, 
examination of the returns for surtax purposes is conducted in 
a manner corresponding to that used by local Tax Offices in 
their assessment and repayment work. For example, if need 
be, the Surtax Office will discuss with the taxpayer or his ad­
visers any problems of interpretation which arise in applying 
the tax code to the particular case, and every effort will be 
made to arrive at a legally and mutually acceptable result. 
3 See Chap. XVIII, 2. 9 supra . 
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Section B. Administrative Appeals 
3 .3  Introductory note 
For the efficient operation of any tax system, there must 
be some ready means by which a dispute between a taxpayer 
and an assessing officer can be resolved by a third party. Liti­
gation in a country's regular courts , however, may not provide 
a sufficiently convenient method in the first instance, particu­
larly with respect to the many small disputes which can arise 
where tax liability extends to a large fraction of the total com­
munity. In consequence, some countries have deemed it ad­
visable to introduce an initial appeal, less formal in character 
than regular litigation, and typically before an agency within 
the tax administration itself, hence the characterization admin­
istrative appeal. 
In the United Kingdom, however, the existence of the Gen­
eral Commissioners and the Special Commissioners4 has af­
forded, from the earliest days of the income tax, a convenient 
and relatively informal procedure for submitting disputes to in­
dependent tribunals . Given the existence of these facilities, a 
felt need for a system of administrative appeals has not evolved. 
The law which governs appeals to the Commissioners makes it 
clear that the taxpayer 's  decision to file a notice of appeal­
such notice constituting the commencement of the appeal-does 
not mean that such an appeal must be carried forward to an 
actual hearing. It is quite possible for the taxpayer and the 
representative of the Inland Revenue to reach an agreed settle­
ment after the taxpayer filed his notice and up until the time 
the matter comes to an actual hearing. The law provides that 
the same consequences shall follow as if the Commissioners 
had decided the appeal on the same basis as that reflected in 
the agreement. This clearly implies that there is still room 
for administrative negotiation even after the Inland Revenue has 
made a formal assessment, to which the taxpayer objected (or, 
in a refund case, after repayment has been offered of a lesser 
amount than the taxpayer considers to be due him) . According­
ly, although the United Kingdom has no formal system of ad­
ministrative appeals , and though the belated negotiations de­
scribed above are carried out by the assessing office itself, 
the arrangement-as described in the succeeding subtopic-has 
some of the earmarks of the more formalized administrative 
appeal procedures in other countries .  
4 See Chap. XX infra . 
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3 . 4  Details of procedures analogous to administrative appeals 
At that point where a taxpayer gives formal notice of ap­
peal from the assessing officer's decision regarding his assess ­
ment or repayment claim, another official, senior in rank to 
the first, may be led to intervene in either of two ways . 
First, the initial decision-making official may think it ap­
propriate to consult higher authority before making arrange­
ments for the hearing on appeal. For example, a member of 
the local Tax Office 's  staff may consult the District Inspector 
in charge in order to seek confirmation of the position he has 
hitherto taken. A staff member of the Surtax Office likewise 
can consult his own superiors . Also on occasion, the District 
Inspector in charge of a local Tax Office may seek advice at 
this stage from headquarters;  and if an important point of in­
terpretation is at stake, it is possible for the Surtax Office to 
consult the Board through their secretariat. In any of the fore ­
going cases, if the higher authority which was consulted advises 
the lower decision-making official that his position was too ex­
treme, the latter is authorized to make a further attempt to 
settle the appeal, before a hearing, by direct negotiation with 
the taxpayer. 
Action along the above lines perhaps should be regarded 
as an extension of the basic assessment procedure ;  it bears no 
very close resemblance to administrative appeals available to 
the taxpayer himself in other countries. There is, however, a 
rather clearer parallel when it is the taxpayer who takes the 
initiative after giving formal notice of appeal. Such a taxpayer 
may think it worth while to write to the headquarters of the 
Inland Revenue Department, setting out his arguments and en­
quiring whether in the face of those arguments, the position 
previously adopted by his District Inspector is supported by 
headquarters . In this quite informal manner,  higher authority 
within the Department can be asked to express a view of an 
interpretative question about which the taxpayer and the local 
decision-making official have hitherto disagreed. 
Again this does not mean that the higher authority ever 
urges the decision-making official to compromise an issue. 
However, should the senior official, drawing on his years of 
service and experience, consider that the lower -level official 
has taken such an extreme position that, considering the facts 
of the particular case,  it is unlikely that the Inland Revenue 
would prevail in court, he will suggest to the younger man that 
it would be reasonable under these circumstances to yield to 
the taxpayer. 
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Again, the taxpayer may send his letter to his representa­
tive in Parliament, asking the latter to approach the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer (or one of the other Treasury Ministers as­
sisting him) in support of the taxpayer 's  view of the disputed 
interpretative question. Often, of course, correspondence ad­
dressed to this level goes beyond the mere matter of interpre­
tation. The taxpayer 's dominant purpose may be to urge that, 
if the meaning of the tax law is indeed the one for which local 
officials have been contending, the government ought to propose 
an amendment to the law. This wider aspect of such corre­
spondence is obviously beyond the scope of the present study. 
But to the extent that the correspondent also indicates his dis ­
agreement with the departmental interpretation of existing law, 
the report submitted by the Board of Inland Revenue to the 
Treasury Minister, to enable him to reply to the member of 
Parliament, will incorporate any necessary defense of that in­
terpretation. The Minister will not necessarily discuss the 
technical aspects of the matter in his own reply. He may 
prefer to take the line that neither he nor his officials have 
the last word on interpretative questions . By noting that tax­
payers have a statutory right to a hearing before the appeal 
Commissioners and that the correspondent had invoked that 
right, he may excuse himself from consideration of the legal 
arguments . Nevertheless ,  the very fact that a responsible 
echelon within the tax administration' s  headquarters was put 
on notice that a departmental interpretation is disputed will 
lead appropriate officials to re-examine the question before 
reporting back to the Minister for the purpose of facilitating 
his reply. This total process may turn out in any given case 
to be the informal equivalent of an administrative appeal. 
However, the analogy of this and the preceding illustration 
to administrative appeals in other countries should not be 
pressed too far. There is no identifiable group of appeals of­
ficers . The correspondence is handled simply as part of the 
general correspondence reaching headquarters on the particular 
topic concerned. Any disputed question is investigated on be­
half of the headquarters office as such, and the departmental 
reply is likewise sent in the name of the office .  Since this 
type of correspondence is not formally segregated from all 
other correspondence handled at headquarters, no statistical 
analysis of the process is possible . Moreover,  there is no set 
procedure; it suffices that the taxpayer or his representative 
should raise the disputed question in correspondence . His analy­
sis, no doubt, will cover the ground as extensively as he thinks 
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advisable for the purpose of explaining his case .  On occasion 
a memorandum prepared by the taxpayer' s  legal advisers may 
be included, but there is no obligation to do so. When the 
taxpayer writes to seek intervention by headquarters, he may 
ask for an oral conference there for the purpose of enlarging 
on his arguments. In such case, if the disputed interpretation 
is one which previously has been fully explored in the case of 
other taxpayers, the headquarters office may indicate to him, 
in his own interest, that it appears doubtful to the Department 
that such an interview would serve any useful purpose .  If, 
however, he persists in his request, an interview normally 
would be accorded . It is left to the initiative of taxpayers to 
decide whether to bring their own expert advisers to assist in 
developing the cases they wish to present. 
In essence, these correspondents ask headquarters to in­
tervene, by overruling the initial interpretative position taken 
by the local decision-making official. In the nature of things, 
the headquarters of the Department does possess the necessary 
authority. But the staff members at headquarters, no less 
than the other officials of the Department, are bound by the 
tax codes .  C onsequently, they have no special power t o  com­
promise a case for the sake of avoiding litigation. 
Every official handling a case is bound equally by the 
same tax code . Hence no power at any level exists to split 
or trade issues in an effort to reach a settlement. 
The foregoing relates to disputed assessments and repay­
ments claims generally. Mention should be made, however, of 
two classes of repayment claims which are subject to a pro­
cedural review which has some similarity to the administrative 
appeal procedures of other countries . 
The two classes of claimants include (1) persons who are 
not resident in the United Kingdom or whose justification for 
relief depends in some way on the claimant's  residence or 
domicile, and (2) entities or trusts claiming charitable exemp­
tion. Although their claims can be given final approval by the 
local decision-making officer, the final rejection of any such 
claim, by statute, must be made by the secretariat at head­
quarters acting on behalf of the Board. This latter require­
ment automatically ensures re-examination at headquarters of 
any claim initially rejected by the local decision-making offi­
cer. 
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Section c .  Extent Administrative Processing of 
Refund Claims Departs from Administrative 
Processing of Assessments 
3 . 5  Introductory note 
It previously has been indicated that normal repayment 
claims, where based on overpayments made during the taxable 
years -usually through withholding-are subject to the same 
procedure as that applied to assessments. Part One, relating to 
the United States ,  indicated that there the refund procedure can 
be used as an alternative method of contesting a controversial 
question which arises in the setting of a proposed assessment. 
In particular, it was noted that a taxpayer, after the close of 
the taxable year in question, may actually acquiesce in an as­
sessment with which he disagrees and pay the tax so assessed 
thus laying the foundation for a refund claim which he can then 
litigate in a different judicial forum than that which he would 
have used in contesting the proposed assessment itself. An 
exact parallel to this does not exist in the United Kingdom. 
The treatment accorded one class of repayment claims, how­
ever, might be fairly compared to the situation which prevails 
in the United States, but only in the sense that the procedures 
governing this one class of refund claims are slightly� though 
only slightly, different from those applicable to normal claims. 
This class consists of claims asserted on the ground, as 
the statute puts it, that "error or mistake" was made . The 
typical situation which the statute seeks to accommodate is one 
where, after an assessment has become final and it is no long­
er possible to invoke an ordinary appeal, the taxpayer discovers 
that, by inadvertence,  he overstated the amount of assessable 
income in the return he submitted to the Inland Revenue De­
partment, by failing, for example, to claim some expense which 
legitimately could have been deducted. Where he can show 
because of his own "error or mistake" an excessive assess­
ment has been made, he  is  permitted to  apply for an appropri­
ate adjustment of his liability for the year concerned. 
3 . 6  "Error or mistake " claims: Refund procedures prior to an 
administrative appeal 
Subject to a right of appeal to the Special Commissioners 
(and, on certain questions of law, to the courts) ,  final decision 
on an "error or mistake" claim lies with the Board, at head­
quarters . But to facilitate a preliminary examination, the tax­
payer is required to submit his claim to the office which handled 
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the assessment in the first instance-the local Tax Office if 
the claim relates to an income tax or profits tax assessment, 
and the Surtax Office if it relates to a surtax assessment. 
The preliminary investigation is not ordinarily a burden­
some one . The very existence of the claim implies that the 
original assessment was based on a return made by the tax­
payer or some supporting statement. Attention, therefore, can 
be concentrated on the particular point on which the return or 
statement is now said to have been erroneous . The extent of 
the examination necessarily varies with the character of the 
alleged mistake . A simple arithmetical slip, on the one hand, 
may be more or less self-explanatory. On the other hand, a 
claim alleging that a deductible expense was overlooked in cal­
culating the profits of a business can give rise to a question 
regarding the legality of any deduction for that expenditure-just 
as such a question might arise during the procedure which 
leads to an original assessment on such profits.  
The official who considers the claim must concern himself, 
however, with certain additional matters which need not be con­
sidered when an original assessment is in question. In the 
first place,  the legislation authorizing submission of "error or 
mistake" claims excludes cases where the return or statement, 
though now seen to have been erroneous, was in fact in con­
formity with the practice generally prevailing at the time when 
it was made. This limitation is designed to prevent the De ­
partment from having to undertake a wholesale reopening of 
closed assessments when, for example, a court decision belat­
edly holds that some type of receipt, hitherto accepted on all 
sides as taxable, is actually nontaxable . To illustrate a second 
restriction on "error or mistake" claims, assume that the tax­
payer mistakenly reflected an item of income in his return for 
1963, but that the item should have been included in his return 
for the earlier year 1962. Assume further that the assess­
ments for both years were made in conformity with the return 
as submitted. It would be inequitable to permit the taxpayer 
to profit from his mistake by allowing him to reopen the as­
sessment for the later year 1963 if, because of the lapse of 
time, the assessment for the earlier year 1962 could not be re­
opened. To prevent that type of inequity, the "error or mistake" 
legislation permits the Inland Revenue to take due account of 
income tax liabilities for years other than the single year to 
which the claim relates. 
If the official who undertakes the preliminary examination 
of an "error or mistake" claim is satisfied that it is well 
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founded and outside the limitations described above, he is em­
powered to approve it and arrange for the consequent repay­
ment. 
3 . 7  ''Error or mistake " claims: Procedure equivalent to ad­
ministrative appeal 
It may be, however, that the relief offered by the initial 
decision-making officer falls short of the amount claimed or 
that, for one reason or another, he rejected the entire claim. 
If the claimant desires to contest that decision, the claim is 
forwarded to the Board's secretariat for a formal determina­
tion by the Board. This decision will be transmitted to the 
claimant in writing. The Board must formally act on the mat­
ter before the claimant, if the Board's decision is adverse, 
can invoke a yet further appeal to the Special Commissioners . 
Since the secretariat re-examines these disputed claims before 
seeking the Board 's authority to refuse or restrict the claimed 
refund, the procedure has some points of similarity to the sys­
tem of administrative appeals found in other countries, for 
there is a reconsideration by a higher echelon of a dispute be­
tween the claimant and the decision-making official in the local 
Tax Office or the Surtax Office . This is not, of course,, pecul­
iar to "error or mistake" claims . As previously noted, cer­
tain other claim procedures likewise involve a formal deter­
mination by the Board, as the final step before a disputed case 
can be referred to the independent appeal tribunal. 
CHAPTER XX 
RESOLUTION OF INTERPRETATIVE INCOME TAX 
QUESTIONS BY INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS 
4. 1 Introduction 
Prime responsibility for resolving disputes over income, 
surtax, and profits tax has been divided between a group called 
General Commissioners and another known as Special Commis ­
sioners . 
The Special Commissioners are a central body of full-time 
tax specialists, with jurisdiction over the whole country. In 
contrast, the General Commissioners are locally oriented. 
Each of the nearly 700 divisions, the areas into which Great 
Britain is divided for purposes of tax appeals, 1 has its own 
body of part-time General Commissioners . 2 
Responsibility is divided between the General and Special 
Commissioners as follows: 
( 1) The General Commissioners have jurisdiction over al­
most all income tax questions . On some matters-e.g. ,  
claims for personal allowances and reliefs for family 
circumstances -they have exclusive jurisdiction. 
(2) The Special Commissioners have exclusive jurisdiction 
of a few income tax questions, notably relief claims by 
charitable bodies or by persons seeking exemption on 
the ground of nonresidence as well as claims for dou­
ble taxation relief by way of credit for taxes paid over­
seas .  (Presumably Parliament allocated these areas 
to the Special Commissioners because of the difficulty 
of the legal questions which emerge and the desirabil­
ity of securing uniform interpretations . )  
1 In the main, these divisions correspond to the ancient areas of 
local administration. 
2 There are no General Commissioners in Northern Ireland. The 
Special Commissioners have jurisdiction to hear any appeal arising 
there which, if it arose elsewhere,  could be heard by the appropriate 
General Commissioners.  However , a Northern Ireland taxpayer may 
elect to have any such appeal heard by the local county court instead 
of by the Special Commissioners.  
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( 3) The two bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over a wide 
range of income tax questions, with the taxpayer being 
free to choose between the two bodies.  Illustratively, 
the right of choice exists with respect to appeals against 
assessments on wages, salaries ,  business profits , inter­
est, and income from overseas . 
( 4} They also have concurrent jurisdiction with respect to 
appeals against assessments for the profits tax. 
( 5) The Special Commissioners have exclusive jurisdiction 
over appeals relating to surtax. 
Because of the many areas over which the General and 
Special Commissioners have concurrent jurisdiction, it is con­
venient to describe them collectively as appeal Commissioners . 
However complicated the distribution of responsibilities may 
appear, the appeal Commissioners do, nevertheless,  provide full 
coverage for all income, profits, and surtax disputes . 
While the appeal Commissioners constitute the main device 
for resolving tax disputes, some questions arising out of anti­
avoidance legislation can go to two other tribunals : the Board 
of Referees (in existence for many years) and the special tri­
bunal established for the purpose of the 1960 Act (see -Chapter 
XVIII, 2. 7 supra) . Like the appeal Commissioners, neither of 
these specialized tribunals has any function outside the tax 
area. 
The appeal Commissioners and the two specialized tribu­
nals make their own independent findings of fact and draw con­
clusions as to the applicable legal principles .  Their decisions 
on questions of law may be appealed to the ordinary superior 
courts of the country possessing a general jurisdiction. 
Section A. Organization and Procedures: 
Trial Le ve l  
4.2a Organization of the General Commissioners 
Each of the nearly 700 bodies of General Commissioners 
holds sessions in a convenient town located in or near its rela­
tively small geographical division. In consequence ,  the tax­
payer-appellant normally can expect the hearing to take place 
within easy traveling distance of his home or place of busi­
ness . 
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There is no formal limit on the number of Commissioners 
to be appointed for any division.3 Two Commissioners are a 
necessary quorum to hear an appeal, but typically more than 
the minimum attend the sessions .  
In England and Wales the Commissioners are appointed by 
the Lord Chancellor, 4 in Scotland by the appropriate city or 
county council. The Commissioners are unpaid, but the clerk 
they appoint to assist them is remunerated from public funds . 
This clerk often holds a legal qualification although the Com­
missioners themselves are not expected to be legally qualified 
or possess special expertise in tax matters . 5 The Radcliffe 
Commission stated the principles which should govern their 
selection: 
In our view the qualities to be looked for are,  in essence , 
that he or she should be an honest and fair-minded person, 
able to display some understanding of figures and of legal dis­
tinctions , and ready to treat his work as an important form of 
public service. It is desirable too , that the Commissioners in 
a division should not all come from one section of the taxpay­
ing community and that they should therefore include in their 
number persons with incomes mainly dependent on personal 
earnings as well as persons whose incomes are derived from 
property. 
4.2b Organization of the Special Commissioners 
The Special Commissioners, with their jurisdiction cover­
ing the entire United Kingdom, are based in London. Many 
hearings take place there, but to accommodate appellants they 
also operate a circuit system visiting a number of the chief 
towns in the country. 6 
The eight Special Commissioners are appointed by the 
Treasury.  They receive remuneration and give their full time 
to their duties .  A quorum of two Commissioners is required 
to hear an appeal. The statute provides no particular qualifi­
cations for appointment, but in practice they are drawn in 
3 Formerly, there was a limit of seven on the number of General 
Commissioners with provision for an increase if the work load re­
quired it. 
4 Under the E nglish legal system , the Lord Chancellor combines 
the functions of a Minister of Justice and the head of the judiciary. 
5 The role of the General Commissioners in the tax area is com­
parable to that of lay justices of the peace in applying the general 
law of the land. 
6 Since the Special Commissioners act in place of General Com­
missioners in Northern Ireland, their circuit coverage of those coun­
ties is particularly thorough. 
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roughly equal proportions from barristers and senior members 
of the Inland Revenue staff . After appointment, members from 
Inland Revenue have no further connection with their former 
Department. 
4. 2c Organization of the Board of Referees 
The Board of Referees was created to deal with certain 
questions arising out of the temporary excess profits tax im­
posed during World War I. In theory, under certain circum­
stances it can be asked to determine the depreciation rate for 
any class of machinery, but in practice it only hears appeals 
growing out of legislation relating to the surtax avoidance which 
results when closely held companies fail to distribute their 
profits. 
This complicated legislation is applicable in cases where 
the controlled company has retained more of its profits than is 
required to meet the reasonable needs of its business .  Since 
this unreasonable accumulation deprives the Exchequer of the 
surtax otherwise payable by individual stockholder on dividends , 
Parliament provided in such cases for the surtax to be as­
sessed as though a dividend had been in fact declared in an 
amount equal to the total amount of the undistributeq income, 
not just to the amount considered to constitute an excessive 
accumulation. Failing payments by the stockholders, the sur­
tax so assessed may be recovered from the company. Accord­
ingly, the company has the right to appeal the determination on 
the ground inter alia, that amount of the accumulation was not 
unreasonable. 
Since such an appeal concerns surtax, it lies within the 
jurisdiction of the Special Commissioners . There are in addi­
tion two ways which enable the company to lay the case before 
the Board of Referees : 
( 1) When the Inland Revenue threatens such a determina­
tion, the company 's directors may, in effect, challenge 
the action of the Inland Revenue on the ground that 
there is no prima facie case for action. The directors '  
written statement and a written counter-statement on 
behalf of the Inland Revenue are considered by the 
Board of Referees which can either uphold the direc ­
tors '  contention o r  rule that a prima facie case exists , 
in which latter event the company 's ordinary right of 
appeal still remains open to it. 
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(2) Where the Special Commissioners have heard and de­
cided an appeal against a surtax direction concerning 
the undistributed income of a controlled company, either 
the Revenue or the company may require the appeal to 
be reheard de novo by the Board of Referees . 
In any such proceedings, it may be a crucial question as 
to whether the company's  actual distributions were reasonable, 
taking account of its business requirements, including those 
necessary or advisable for maintenance and development. The 
Board of Referees has the function of bringing to bear on prob­
lems of this character a wider practical knowledge of business 
conditions than the Special Commissioners possess .  
For this reason there are eighty-odd members of the 
Board of Referees, appointed by the Treasury from persons 
experienced in industrial and commercial affairs .  The Board, 
located in London, has jurisdiction over the entire United King­
dom. The members act without remuneration but there are 
three salaried positions: a part-time chairman, appointed by 
the Lord Chancellor from the ranks of senior barristers, a 
deputy chairman for Scotland, and a salaried registrar. Each 
case is considered by a small panel presided over by the chair­
man. The members of a given panel are selected by the chair­
man, account being taken of special expertise they may possess 
regarding the particular industry with which the given company 
is associated. 
4.2d Organization of the 1960 Act tribunal 
As discussed in Chapter XVIII, 2 .  7 supra, legislation passed 
in 1960 empowered the Board of Inland Revenue to counter 
certain avoidance devices designed, through manipulation of 
securities held, to secure a tax advantage analogous to that 
sought through bond-washing and dividend-stripping operations . 
There was , however, no intention to penalize a transaction 
where it could be shown that it was carried out "for bona fide 
commercial reasons," the obtaining of tax advantages not being 
a main object. Parliament tried to avoid impeding normal 
business transactions by setting up an arrangement which en­
abled taxpayers to seek prior clearance for prospective trans­
actions, and by creating special rights of appeal to a new body­
the so-called 1960 Act tribunal. 
The functions given this tribunal, with respect to avoidance 
through manipulation of securities, resemble closely those of 
the Board of Referees in the surtax area: 
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( 1) When a taxpayer is notified that the Inland Revenue is 
contemplating counter-action under the relevant section 
of the 1960 Act, he may submit to the tribunal a writ­
ten statement seeking a summary ruling that there is 
no prima facie case for counter -action. If the tribunal 
so rules on the basis of both the taxpayer 's statement 
and any written counter -statement by the Revenue, the 
Revenue cannot then proceed any further in the matter .  
If, however, the tribunal does not so rule, the taxpayer 
still retains his normal right of appeal against the 
counter-action proposed by the Revenue . 
(2) The exercise of that right of appeal will result in a 
hearing by the Special Commissioners . When such an 
appeal has been decided by the Special Commissioners, 
however, either the Revenue or the taxpayer may re­
quire the appeal to be reheard de novo by the new 
tribunal. 
The 1960 Act tribunal has a further function. As discussed 
in Chapter XVIII, 2 .  7 supra, an earlier act of 19 51 ,  designed 
to prevent profits tax avoidance,  gave the Inland Revenue a 
right to counter-action. The same act gave the taxpayer a 
right to appeal such counter-action to the Special Commission­
ers . When the 1960 Act tribunal was created, the opportunity 
was taken to provide an additional right of appeal under the 
19 51 statute . On demand of either the Inland Revenue or the 
taxpayer, the new tribunal must undertake a rehearing de novo 
of any future appeals . 
The 1960 Act tribunal is a single authority for the entire 
United Kingdom. Its ex officio chairman is the chairman of 
the Board of Referees : he is assisted by two or more members 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor on the basis of their "special 
knowledge of and experience in financial or commercial mat­
ters ." 
4.3a Processing appeals : The General Commissioners 
In Chapter XIX, 3 . 3  supra, the point was made that the 
taxpayer's easy access to convenient appeal tribunals independ­
ent of the Inland Revenue Department had removed any need 
for a formal system of administrative appeals within the De ­
partment itself. The access is very easy indeed. No special 
formalities precede an appeal to the General Commissioners . 
The taxpayer notifies the Inland Revenue that he intends to ap­
peal and indicates, in a general way at least, the grounds of 
his appeal. 
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Payment of the tax in dispute is not a precondition of the 
taxpayer's right to a hearing. Indeed, if an appeal against an 
assessment is pending, collection of the contested tax is sus­
pended until after the appeal is determined. 7 
The Commissioners who hear an appeal against an assess­
ment (income tax, profits tax, or surtax) have authority to in­
crease or reduce it, depending on the evidence. In keeping with 
this principle, once an appellant invokes their jurisdiction, he 
cannot withdraw his appeal without the consent of the Inland 
Revenue . Because of this ability to withdraw-subject to con­
sent from Inland Revenue -not every appeal of which notice has 
been given goes forward to an actual hearing. In addition, the 
law specifically provides that if the appellant and a representa­
tive of Inland Revenue can agree as to the proper resolution of 
the dispute between them, 8 effect may be given to that agree­
ment as if it were a formal determination by the appeal Com­
missioners . Statistics are not available to show precisely what 
proportion of all appeals are disposed of ultimately by agree­
ment rather than by decision, but there can be no doubt that 
the great majority are resolved by such agreement. In fact 
this is the normal result in certain types of cases, such as 
those where an Inspector relied on an estimated assessment of 
trading profits because the business accounts were not available 
7 Of course, the portion of the assessment not disputed must be 
paid. 
8 The Income Tax A ct ,  § 510 (1) , provides as follows: " Subject to 
the provision of this section, where a person gives notice of appeal 
to the General Commissioners ,  the Special Commissioners or the 
Board of Referees against an assessment, or a decision of any kind 
with respect to income tax other than surtax or surtax , and , before 
the appeal is determined by the Commissioners or Board , the sur­
veyor or other proper officer of the Crown and the appellant come 
to an agreement , whether in writing or otherwise, that the assess­
ment or decision should be treated as upheld without variation, or as 
varied in a particular manner or as discharged or cancelled, the like 
consequences shall ensue for all purposes as would have ensued if,  
at the time when the agreement was come to , the Commissioners or 
Board had determined the appeal and had upheld the assessment or 
decision, without variation, had varied it in that manner or had dis­
charged or cancelled it , as the case may be." However , it must be 
stressed that the phrase "varied in a particular manner" does not 
carry the connotation of settlement in the sense of adjustment or com­
promise.  It means , for example, that where both parties come to an 
agreement that the assessment or decision was in error-as deter­
mined by a closer scrutiny of the point or points in issue-in one or 
more aspects , an alteration will be made to take account of such an 
error . 
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to him at the time when the assessment had to be made. Where 
there is undue delay in producing the accounts, the Inspector 
may ask the Commissioners to arrange an interlocutory hear­
ing so the taxpayer can be questioned regarding the reason for 
delay and warned that the Commissioners, at a later hearing, 
may confirm the estimated assessment if the accounts are not 
produced within some reasonable time limit which they specify. 
Such a warning is often sufficient to get a delay case moving 
again. 
In the small minority of cases where, following notice of 
appeal, issues of fact or law emerge which cannot be settled 
by negotiation, the District Inspector in charge of the local Tax 
Office has full authority to decide when to terminate the nego­
tiations and allow the appeal to go forward for hearing. He 
has no obligation to notify headquarters of appeals that are 
going forward, though he might do so in a particular case, for 
example, where he previously had sought advice from a head­
quarters specialist. 
In nearly all appeals heard by General Commissioners, the 
Inland Revenue 's  case is presented by the District Inspector or 
one of the other Inspectors assisting him in the local Tax Of­
fice .  9 In appeals of special significance,  however, a member 
of the London or Edinburgh Solicitor' s  Office may represent 
the Department.l0 
Taxpayers are entitled to present their appeals in person 
and many do so. It is quite usual, however, for taxpayers to 
be represented by a professional adviser-an accountant or 
solicitor or, more rarely, a barrister.  
There are no written rules of procedure governing the 
hearings, which tend to be informal, especially if the taxpayer 
is appearing without the assistance of a professional adviser . 
The degree of informality varies from one division to another ,  
however, depending on the particular views of the local Com­
missioners . The parties are not required to file formal peti­
tions or other documents, but it is not uncommon for the two 
s ides to draw up an agreed statement of facts to reduce the 
ground to be covered in the oral evidence at the hearing. 
In a typical appeal, the hearing is opened on behalf of the 
appellant, who may submit oral evidence himself and call 
9 The representation of the Department of Inland Revenue at ap­
peals hearings is one of the matters covered in the training course 
for members of the Inspectorate. See Chap. XVII , 1 .5 supra .  
10 Members of the Solicitors' Offices in both London and Edinburgh 
are trained lawyers. 
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witnesses. To the extent appropriate, he and his witnesses 
are cross-examined by the representative of the Inland Revenue 
and then re-examined . The Inland Revenue 's case follows : if 
any witnesses are called on behalf of the Inland Revenue, they 
too are subject to examination. The appellant 's  reply follows . 
There is no simple answer to the question, which party 
must shoulder the burden of proof. With respect to construc­
tion of the statutory provision applicable to a particular case ,  
as distinct from ascertainment of the actual facts to  which the 
law must be applied, the general rule is that the Inland Reve­
nue must show that the item it claims to be taxable does come 
within the scope of the words imposing liability . On the other 
hand, once it has been demonstrated that an item comes within 
a charging provision, a taxpayer who claims the benefit of a 
relief provision must show that the latter provision does em­
brace his case .  As to questions of fact, normal rules associ­
ated with other litigation apply, absent special circumstances . 
The Commissioners usually announce their decision im­
mediately after the hearing, though not infrequently they take 
time for consideration and later communicate their decision to 
the parties in writing. The content of their decision, i . e . ,  
whether it includes the reasoning they employed in reaching the 
result or simply notes that the assessment is confirmed, dis ­
charged, or modified (or that the claim to relief is allowed or 
refused), depends on the discretion of the Commissioners and 
varies with the circumstances of the case.  
Excluding the delay cases previously described, the 700 
sets of General Commissioners decide about seven or eight 
thousand appeals each year. The hearings are private; also, 
the proceedings and decisions are not reported. Hence, these 
decisions have no precedent value . Further, in theory, the de­
cision the Commissioners reach on an appeal for a given year 
is not res judicata should the same taxpayer appeal to the same 
set of Commissioners on a similar question as to a later year. 
As a practical matter, however, a local Tax Office no doubt 
will attribute some significance to a General Commissioners ' 
decision when a later appeal on a similar point arises in the 
same division. 
4 .3b Processing appeals : The Special Commissioners 
In hearing appeals falling within their jurisdiction, the Spe­
cial Commissioners exercise virtually the same powers and 
functions as General Commissioners. The description just 
given regarding procedures before the General Commissioners 
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is equally applicable to the processing of appeals before the 
Special Commissioners, with certain qualifications . 
A surtax appeal may be settled by negotiation as readily 
as an appeal relating to income tax or the profits tax. While 
the taxpayer's  adversary is the Surtax Office, not a local In­
spector of Taxes, the prime difference lies in the matter of 
representation. The Surtax Office staff does not present the 
Inland Revenue 's  case at the oral hearing should one prove 
necessary. On a surtax appeal, the London or Edinburgh Solici­
tor's  Office represents the Inland Revenue . But on income or 
profits tax appeals to the Special Commissioners, typically 
either an Inspector from the appropriate local Tax Office or a 
member of one of the Solicitors '  Offices will represent the 
government-as was true in the case of appeals to the General 
Commissioners . There is, however, one further alternative 
here; sometimes the Special Appeals Section of the Chief In­
spector 's Office presents the Department's case. 11  Further, 
taxpayers themselves are much more likely to be represented 
by professional advisers, including barristers, before the Spe ­
cial Commissioners than before the General Commissioners. 
For that reason the proceedings tend to be somewhat more 
formal. The number of cases in which the Special Commis­
sioners reserve judgment at the close of a hearing and later 
give a reasoned determination in writing also is proportionately 
greater. 
Excluding cases in Northern Ireland where Special Com­
missioners also take the place of General Commissioners, be ­
tween two and three thousand appeals are dealt with annually 
by Special Commissioners . This figure, however, includes a 
considerable number of delay cases where the hearing is little 
more than a formality. The number of appeals in other than 
delay cases probably cW! be put at less than one thousand. 
4.3c Processing appeals : The Board of Referees 
Attention previously has been drawn to the privilege ac­
corded a closely-held company threatened with action under the 
legislation dealing with unreasonable retention of profits . The 
company can ask the Board of Referees for a summary ruling 
that no prima facie case for such action exists .  Oral hearings 
are not held. The company' s  directors simply submit a writ­
ten statement setting forth the facts and circumstances on which 
they rely in requesting the ruling. The Inland Revenue has a 
ll see Chap. XVII, 1 . 2 supra . 
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limited period to transmit this statement to the Board of Ref­
erees , together with a written counter-statement setting forth 
its competing view. The Board of Referees then circulates the 
documents among the chairman (in Scottish cases, the deputy 
chairman) and the panel of five members chosen because of 
their relevant experience in industry. The members send their 
respective written opinions to the chairman (or deputy chair­
man) . Usually, on the basis of the written opinions, he is able, 
without a formal meeting of the members, to announce the 
Board's  determination. 
The Board of Referees has a second function under the 
same legislation: to rehear de novo certain surtax appeals 
arising when either party thereto is dissatisfied with the Spe­
cial Commissioners ' decision. The dissatisfied party must 
submit within a limited period a concise statement of the facts 
and the grounds on which this further appeal is based. The 
respondent party then submits a counter -statement. If any ques­
tion of fact is in dispute the chairman, at a meeting with the 
parties ,  provides directions as to proof and procedure and fixes 
a time by which the copies of documents intended to be used 
at the rehearing must be in the hands of the Board's registrar. 
By statute, the Board of Referees has the same authority at 
the rehearing as the Special Commissioners had at the original 
hearing, though otherwise the tax code does not prescribe the 
procedures to be followed. In practice, the rehearing is heard 
by the chairman (in Scotland, the deputy chairman) and four 
members chosen from the panel. And the procedures generally 
are similar to those followed at the original hearing before the 
Special Commissioners . For example, as in other surtax ap­
peals, a member of the London or Edinburgh Solicitor's  Office 
presents the Inland Revenue case .  
In recent years from ten to  twenty cases are handled an­
nually under the summary procedure described in the second 
preceding paragraph. Rehearings have been much more infre­
quent. Over one recent four-year period for which statistics 
are available, only one rehearing took place.  
4 .3d Processing appeals: The 1960 Act tribunal 
Like the Board of Referees (with which it shares a chair­
man) , the 1960 Act tribunal has a double role : it handles writ­
ten applications for summary rulings where the Inland Revenue 
has threatened counter-action under the legislation dealing with 
securities ' manipulation, and it rehears appeals originally deter­
mined by the Special Commissioners where the Inland Revenue 
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has taken counter-action. During its first three years, no re ­
hearings took place.  The tribunal, however,  had dealt with fif­
teen cases under the summary procedure, some involving appli­
cations by more than one taxpayer . Since that procedure is 
very similar mutatis mutandis to the corresponding procedure 
adopted under the surtax legislation, it will not be described 
further here.  
Section B. Organization and Procedures: 
Appellate Tribunals 
4 .4  Organization of the appe llate court system 
The United Kingdom tax code provides that the decisions 
of any of the independent bodies described in the previous Sec­
tion are subj ect to review, but only as to questions of law, be­
fore the regular superior courts of the country. Thus, either 
party has a right of appeal to a court from appeal decisions of 
the General or Special Commissioners and also from decisions 
rendered by the specialized tribunals after rehearing cases 
originally heard by Special Commissioners . 12  
It is otherwise,  however, in  the case of the summary pro­
cedure by which the Board of Referees and the 1960 Act tri­
bunal can be asked in the first instance for a ruling to termi­
nate Inland Revenue 's  threatened action under the relevant 
special legislation. This summary procedure was designed to 
enable companies (or other taxpayers affected) to test quickly 
and before an expert independent tribunal their asserted grounds 
for believing that the special legislation should not be applied. 
As already indicated, a summary ruling in the taxpayer 's  favor 
is conclusive against further action by the Inland Revenue . In­
deed, in keeping with the limited purpose for which the proced­
ure was designed, such rulings are not subject to any form of 
appeal. 
The particular court which exercises appellate jurisdiction 
varies from one part of the United Kingdom to another: 
( 1) In England and Wales, jurisdiction rests with the Chan­
cery Division of the High Court of Judicature, sitting 
in London. Proceedings take place before a single 
judge of that Division; his decision may be appealed, 
l2 This right of appeal to a higher court extends also to cases where 
a Northern Ireland taxpayer has elected to have his appeal heard by 
the local county court instead of by the Special Commissioners.  
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however, to the Court of Appeal, in which event normal­
ly three judges sit. 
(2) In Scottish cases, jurisdiction rests with the Court of 
Session, sitting in Edinburgh, and is exercised by one 
of the Divisions of the Inner House, usually with three 
or four judges hearing the case .  
(3 )  In Northern Ireland, jurisdiction rests with the Court 
of Appeal of Northern Ireland, normally with three 
judges sitting together .  
Throughout the United Kingdom, there is  a final appeal 
(assuming leave is obtained, if necessary) to the House of Lords 
sitting in its judicial capacity as the supreme court of appeal 
in civil matters for the entire United Kingdom. Up to five 
members of the House commonly sit together on tax appeals . 
These regular courts treat tax litigation as one part of all the 
varied business which comes before them. Because they are 
courts of general jurisdiction, their judges do not specialize in 
tax matters .13 
4. 5 Processing cases through the courts 
The right of appeal to a court is limited by statute to 
questions of law, the decision of the trial tribunal being final 
as to questions of fact. In addition to questions of fact where 
the prime issue is one of substantiation, questions such as 
whether a given course of activity involved carrying on a trade 
or whether,  given the periods and circumstances of an individ­
ual 's  presence in the United Kingdom, he became a resident, 
are deemed essentially to be questions of fact. On the other 
hand, it is a question of law whether the evidence before the 
trial body justified it in drawing the inferences of fact upon 
which it relied in reaching its final decision. If a court con­
cludes there was insufficient evidence on which the tribunal 
reasonably could reach the conclusion it did, the reviewing 
court would feel free to reverse.  
While the taxpayer 's right of appeal to the courts is not 
conditioned formally on his prior payment of the tax outstand­
ing, the tax code does provide that the tax is payable on the 
basis determined by the trial tribunal notwithstanding any ap­
peal to a court. Therefore, the Inland Revenue can enforce 
13 n is possible, of course, that a particular judge, did specialize 
in tax matters as a barrister , before his elevation to the bench. 
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collection while an appeal is pending. Tax paid while an appeal 
is pending would be refunded, however, to the extent appropri­
ate, should the court modify the trial tribunal 's determination. 
The taxpayer may, and occasionally does, choose to appear in 
person to argue his own case; but if he is represented by an 
adviser, he must employ the type of lawyer who has the right 
to appear before the court in question-that is , a barrister in 
England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, and advocate in Scot­
land. 14 
When General or Special Commissioners or one of the spe­
cialized bodies decides an appeal against the Inland Revenue, 
should the officer who represented the Department at the appeal 
hearing believe further appeal to a court is advisable, he could 
refer the matter to the Board 's secretariat. To enable the 
Board to decide whether to authorize resort to the courts,  the 
secretariat consults the Chief Inspector 's Office in income tax 
and profits tax cases or the Surtax Office in surtax cases . The 
secretariat wants to learn whether these offices feel that the 
decision in question is completely unacceptable or whether they 
dislike the decision but do not consider it worth contesting, il­
lustratively because of the unlikelihood that a similar fact situ­
ation will reoccur or whether they feel they can live with the 
decision. Sometimes, of course, these offices will urge that 
the decision be appealed, even though an adverse decision on 
appeal is anticipated, as the resulting clarification of the law 
will permit the introduction of remedial legislation. In short, 
the secretariat consults these offices to discover the adminis­
trative reaction. For purely legal questions, the secretariat 
has recourse to the Solicitors ' Offices, though time pressures 
involved in the secretariat's decision whether or not to appeal 
may well prevent such consultation at this early stage . 
Where appeal to a court is authorized, the Board and secre-: 
tariat keep in touch with subsequent progress of the case .  In­
land Revenue 's actual representative in court will be a barrister 
or advocate, but the secretariat represent the Department in a 
lay capacity, communicating with the barrister or advocate 
through the appropriate Solicitor's Office .  The latter office ,  
however, prepares the brief for the barrister o r  advocate who 
represents the Department in court. And if a particular mem­
ber of the Solicitor's Office handled a given case before the 
trial tribunal, he typically handles the brief on appeal. 
14 Advocates also may appear before the House of Lords on appeals 
from the Scottish Court of Session. 
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But the key document in appealing to a court is the so­
called stated Case prepared by the trial body itself. On giving 
due notice and paying the prescribed fee, either the taxpayer 
or the Inland Revenue can obtain from the trial tribunal this 
written statement setting out the facts of the case and the tri­
bunal's decision thereon. Documents produced in evidence can 
be annexed to the stated Case as exhibits . The Case normally 
is drafted in the first instance by members of the trial tribunal 
(or, in the case of General Commissioners, by their clerk) . It 
usually is sent in draft form to the parties for their comments 
and suggestions, but the trial tribunal which states the Case 
bears the ultimate responsibility. 
The actual court proceedings center around the stated Case .  
During the oral argument-an integral part of all court pro­
ceedings in tax controversies-the appellant's representative 
advances oral arguments in opposition to the conclusions reached 
by the trial tribunal. The respondent's representative, also 
orally, supports it. The court commonly delivers an oral opin­
ion. In simple cases heard by a single judge, the decision is 
delivered at the end of the trial. In more complicated cases, 
especially those heard by the full panel of three judges , there 
may be a delay of several days . In either case, a full trans­
cript is made available . The judgment by the court sets out 
fully the legal reasoning in support of its decision. 
The number of tax appeals-income, profits, or surtax­
brought before all United Kingdom courts varies from year to 
year, but twenty-five is an average annual figure . All the de­
cisions, together with the stated Cases, are published official­
ly. 
The precedent effect of court decisions can be summarized 
as follows : 
( 1) The House of Lords is bound only by its own decisions . 
Its decision binds all lower courts . 
(2) The Court of Appeal (England and Wales), the Court of 
Session, and the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland 
are bound by their own respective decisions . Each of 
these three courts treats the decisions of one of the 
others with great respect . While not strictly bound to 
follow them, divergency comes with considerable re­
luctance . 
(3) A judge of the Chancery Division is bound to follow a 
decision by the House of Lords or the Court of Appeal 
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(England and Wales) . He is not strictly bound by a de ­
cision of the Court of Session or the Court of Appeal 
of Northern Ireland, but in practice almost certainly 
would follow it, especially where the earlier decision 
was unanimous . 
Any member of the accounting and legal professions con­
cerned with tax matters will pay close attention to all court 
decisions . If a given appeal is decided adversely to the Inland 
Revenue in a court of first instance and no further appeal is 
taken to a higher court, this generally is taken to mean that, 
in the absence of a statutory amendment, the Department will 
follow the principle of the adverse decision. However, a single 
decision may not always establish the precise limits of that 
principle 's  applicability. Thus, a decision not to appeal does 
not exclude the possibility of further litigation involving a some­
what similar but not identical situation. The Inland Revenue, 
however, does not follow the practice of publishing statements 
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CHAPTER XXI 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONAL AND 
PERSONNEL FRAMEWORKS 
Section A. Administrative Organizational 
Framework 
1 . 1  Introduction 
The Dutch administrative organization charged with the 
levying and collection of taxes has three levels : national, re­
gional, and local. 
Prime responsibility for the assessment of taxes lies in 
the local offices, i .e . ,  with the 103 inspectorates ,  authorized 
by statute to make assessments and whose decisions cannot be 
overruled by superior officials . Administrative appeal by a 
taxpayer from assessments made by personnel working in those 
inspectorates is to that same local inspector. There is no ap­
peal to a higher administrative level. Differences of opinion 
which cannot be settled locally must be taken to the courts . 
Otherwise,  however, the eight regional offices, headed by 
district directors, do operate as administrative superiors of 
the inspectors ,  inspecteur der be lastingen. In turn, these re­
gional offices are supervised by the National Office Directorate 
of Direct Taxes, one of the seven directors responsible to the 
Director-General of Taxes who, with his counterpart, the 
Director-General of Tax Affairs, reports directly to the Under 
Secretary of Finance,  the actual head of the administrative 
structure.1 
The subdivision of the national office, called the Directorate 
of Direct Taxes, has five subdivisions . Two deal with the in­
dividual income tax, the corporation income tax, and the wage 
tax; three deal with collection and administration. The subdi­
visions dealing with income taxes handle requests for informa­
tion from local offices relating to interpretative matters or to 
situations where an assessment was excessive but the time for 
administrative appeal within the local inspectorate has expired. 
This same division handles taxpayer requests for information 
on the tax consequences of proposed transactions . 
1 The Minister of Finance is the titular head. 
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1 . 2  Organizational framework, national office le ve l 
Chart I, opposite, sets out the arrangement of the na­
tional office.  The portion of the national office responsible 
for the levying and collection of all taxes is headed by the 
Under Secretary of Finance .  Reporting directly to him are 
the two directors-general: the Director-General of Tax Affairs 
and the Director-General of Taxes .2 
The staff of each of these two directorates is made up of 
inspectors or chief-inspectors of taxes (who have served vary­
ing lengths of time in local or district offices) supported by 
lower level personnel.  
The Director-General of Tax Affairs handles tax policy, 
tax legislation, and international tax affairs . Reporting to him 
are four directors . None of these directors is directly respon­
sible for the resolution of interpretative problems in individual 
cases, although the Director of Legislation for direct taxes is 
indirectly concerned with such matters . His office drafts pro­
posed legislation and prepares legislative regulations and di­
rectives .  Thus, whenever groups of affected taxpayers-i. e . ,  
insurance companies, banks, shipping-unions, chambers of com­
merce, trade-unions, agricultural societies -are dissatisfied 
with a statute or with its interpretation and desire a change in 
legislation, they contact this office .  
Responsibility for the levying and collection of all taxes 
rests with the Director-General of Taxes who has seven direc ­
tors reporting to him. Two deal with administrative matters,  
one with general and legal affairs, and the remaining four with 
the several kinds of taxes : direct, customs and excise, death, 
registration and stamp duties, cadastral, and mortgage . The 
Director of Direct Taxes is the one concerned with income and 
wage taxes ,  and as to these, his office performs varied func ­
tions . Occasionally it informs the local inspectorates of deci­
sions reached in certain tax cases with which they should be 
familiar . It responds to requests from local offices for advice 
regarding litigation policy positions . It also determines future 
governmental policy regarding tax decisions reached by final 
judicial authority . Finally, it handles so-called hardship cases, 3 
2 Prior to 1950 the functions of the two present directors-general 
were performed by a single Director-General. The increasing impor­
tance of preparing tax legislation and the emergence of pressing in­
ternational fiscal problems led to the division of the office .  
3 In nearly every tax statute , authority i s  conferred o n  the Minis­
ter of Finance to grant relief in situations where applications of the 
statute , even with a flexible interpretation would constitute a case of 
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presented to it by inspectorates through the regional directors, 
although the Under Secretary of Finance actually announces the 
official decisions . 4 
1 . 3  Organizational framework, regional office 
The eight regional directors ' offices are concerned primar­
ily with administrative matters . Each directorate contains a 
number of organizational units as set out in Chart II, opposite. 
A regional director heads a staff ordinarily composed of 
four inspectors of academic level and of between thirty to fifty 
lower-level technical and administrative personnel. 
The prime responsibility of a regional director is admin­
istrative supervision, to insure the smooth functioning of sev­
eral local level offices .  He personally does not perform any 
technical function with respect to the work of the local inspec­
torates which carry out audit, assessment, and collection func­
tions and also handle their own administrative appeals . 
In addition to his administrative responsibilities, the re­
gional director has certain collateral functions .  He remits tax 
payments in the case of insolvent taxpayers, and transmits so­
called hardship cases to the national office, Directorate of Di­
rect Taxes . Infrequently, a local inspector requests his advice 
in the handling of a particular case which poses interpretative 
difficulties or tactical questions . The regional director ordi­
narily responds to those exceptional situations, by forwarding 
the inspector 's report, together with his own opinion, to the 
national office ,  Directorate of Direct Taxes . This same pro­
cedure is followed where a local inspectorate proposes to ap­
peal a lower court decision to the Supreme Court, with ultimate 
approval regarding the appeal then resting with the national 
office . 
On occasion a taxpayer may complain to the regional di­
rector with respect to an inspector 's conduct while handling a 
(footnote continued) 
hardship , that is , a case where a tax, although in conformity with the 
statute , would be contrary to the intention of the statute. No statute 
can provide a concrete solution for every factual situation which may 
occur and interpretation will not always result in a reasonable con­
clusion. Thus in such cases the Ministry can provide relief through 
remission or reduction of the tax. Taxpayers , however , cannot claim 
such relief; it is wholly discretionary. 
4 On some occasions , the national office , Directorate of Direct 
Taxes , delegates subsequent decisions in like situations to the region­
al or to the local offices . 
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particular audit or assessment. Should the director conclude 
that the audit or assessment was incorrect, a theoretically pos ­
sible but most improbable result, the director can recommend 
a change. The inspector, however, is free to disregard the 
recommendation; by statute he alone is empowered to change 
an assessment, though as a matter of prudence he may decide 
to shift his position. Should the inspector disregard the direc­
tor 's recommendation and the taxpayer decide to contest the 
assessment, the taxpayer can, of course, address the national 
office for hierarchic measures toward the disobedient inspec­
tor, though procedurally, he must lodge an administrative ap­
peal with the same inspector . If the appeal is rejected, the 
taxpayer then can turn to the courts . 
1 . 4  Organizational framework, local office le ve l 
As Chart II, supra, indicates,  regional directors perform 
administrative functions with respect to eight different types of 
offices. Of these, however, only two deal with the income tax: 
the tax-audit or tax-accountant offices,  and the inspectorates 
for direct taxes, inspecties der belastingen, who bear ultimate 
responsibility for all assessments . 
There is wide variation in the size of the geographical 
area serviced by an inspectorate. Some cover as many as 800 
square kilometers ( 480 square miles) some as few as 80 5 ( 48 
square miles) . There are about one hundred inspectorates for 
direct taxes . Eighty deal only with individual income taxes and 
wage taxes . The remaining twenty deal with corporate income 
5 The area of the Nether lands is about 32 ,500 square kilometers ,  
with 1 square kilometer equalling two-fifth of 1 square miles . There 
is a population of 12 million inhabitants , with an average population 
density of 370 per square kilometer.  The provinces of Noord- and 
Zuid-Holland , which make up the western part of the Netherlands , have 
an area of about 5 ,200 square kilometers.  The population of that 
western part equals 5 million inhabitants with a population density of 
960 per square kilometer. By way of comparison, note the following: 












*Square kilometers .  **Per square kilometers.  
Population 
Population Density ** 
0.9 million 280 
0 .6  million 25 
7 .0  million 47 
0.9 million 500 
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taxes ,  as well as individual income and wage taxes .6 There 
are also approximately twenty tax audit offices . Their prime 
function is to audit the more complex income tax returns , usu­
ally those of corporations . Returns involving simpler, less 
complex issues are audited within the inspectorates by their 
own audit divisions . The twenty tax audit offices are staffed 
by chartered accountants who are considered equal to those of 
a university level, since they have passed several examinations 
in accounting, financial arithmetic, etc . 
Inspectorates vary in size, from large, to medium, to 
small. The three large ones are located in Amsterdam, Rot­
terdam, and The Hague . 
There are between forty and fifty inspectorates ,  respec­
tively, in the medium and small categories . 
Despite variations in size, all inspectorates have the same 
basic structural organization, headed by chiefs who have identi­
cal legal authority but whose titles and salaries vary depending 
on the importance of the inspectorate . Such persons are ulti­
mately responsible, apart from supervision of subordinates, for 
assessments, hearing administrative appeals , and representing 
the inspectorate in litigation arising out of assessments it has 
made . To these ends, each inspectorate has either four or 
five divisions, the two most relevant here being the assessment 
and audit divisions . Except in small inspectorates,  an assess ­
ment division will include several inspectors with a university 
background, and a number of less well educated controleurs 
and commiezen. In contrast, controleurs head up the staff of 
the audit divisions , and, in the case of small inspectorates, 
also the assessment divisions . 
The assessment division performs the most important 
duties, concentrating on the income tax though also responsible 
for assessment of the tax on capital. Essentially, the other 
divisions are auxiliary to the assessment division; their func­
tion is to promote an optimal accomplishment of the entire as ­
sessment process (i .e . ,  ordinary assessmenta, deficiency as­
sessment, handling of administrative appeals) . For example, the 
audit division has no power to review an assessment made by 
the assessment division. It simply collects information outside 
6 As of 1967 , there were about 100 inspectorates for direct tax­
es , dealing only with individual income taxes . E ight inspectorates 
deal with corporate income taxes . No inspectorates deal with both 
individual and corporate income taxes . 
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the office and makes routine audits, both inside and outside the 
office, primarily of uncomplicated income tax cases . 7 
The following table shows that the number of assessments 
typically completed by an inspectorate varies depending on its 
size :  




Number of Assessments 
6 ,000- 20 ,000 
20 ,000- 50 ,000 
150 ,000-200,000 
While inspectors ,  with a university background, handle the 
more complex cases, the table below from one recent year in­
dicates that lower level personnel handle the greatest number : 
Levels of personnel 
performing assessments 
Inspectors (with educa­
tional background at the 
university level) 
(H oofd) controleurs 
Commiezen 
Number of Assessments 8 
Income Tax Corporation Tax 
Average 
number 




200 ,000 (8%) 
600 ,000 (24%) 
1 '700 ,000 ( 68o/o) 
36 ,000 
Other data of that same year show within the inspectorates the 
annual number of administrative appeals . 
Type of Tax 
Corporation Income Tax 
Individual Income Tax 
Wage Tax 





7 A separate administrative division also performs a variety of 
supporting functions , such as maintaining up-to-date files for each 
taxpayer. On the basis of the income established by the audit divi­
sion, the administrative division computes the tax or , more accurate­
ly as of the present , forwards the data to the national computer cen­
ter . This division also oversees the payment of the wage tax withheld 
by employers .  A yet separate external services division, sometimes 
known as the active service because of its non-sedentary activities , 
accumulates other data pertaining to the assessment process . 
8 The entire income tax of a majority of taxpayers ( in 1963 , about 
2 ,900 ,000) is withheld from their wage payments . In consequence, 
there is no assessment in the case of this majority. 
PERSONNE L  FRAMEWORK 
Section B. Pe rsonne l Framework (Go ve rnmental 
and Non-Go vernmental) 
1 . 5  Gove rnmental professional personnel 
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The Dutch Internal Revenue Service recruits its personnel 
from two distinct educational levels : those who have completed 
the course of study at a school of secondary instruction which 
prepares for admission to the university9 and those who have 
completed or attended the later years of a school of extended 
primary education.1° From the first group are drawn the fu­
ture inspectors and their superiors, from the second the per­
sonnel at lower levels . 
Graduates of the schools of secondary instruction apply to 
the Ministry of Finance for admission to a competitive exami­
nation covering general ability and character.  If they pass this, 
they enter the training program. Prior to 1964 this took place 
at the State Academy of Instruction and Education for the In­
ternal Revenue Service, Rijksbelastingacademie ,  11 which was 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance . 12 The insti­
tution granted no degrees but a number of students secured 
master's degrees in law or economics from a university while 
enrolled in the Academy. 
The Rijksbelastingacademie had a five-year course .  The 
first half concentrated on public and private law and commer­
cial economics ;  the second on taxation law and theory, with 
9 After attending a primary school for six or seven year s ,  a child 
can enter one of the two main types of schools of secondary instruc­
tion: one with a five-year course stressing mathematics , modern 
languages , and/or economics and a six-year course which adds Latin 
and Greek. 
10 After attending a primary school for six or seven years , a child 
can enter a school of extended primary education which gives four 
years of study in general courses , mathematics , and French, German, 
and English. 
11 The Rijksbelastingacademie was created by the Ministry of Fi­
nance in 1939 . It was designed to supersede the then-existing prac­
tice of preparing in private institutions for admission after examina­
tion to the higher echelons of the Internal Revenue Service. E ither 
these admission examinations or similar screening devices had been 
in existence for a considerable number of years .  The administration 
dealing with death duties had introduced them in 1822 ,  the Internal 
Revenue Service in 1910. 
12Almost no inspectors between 1939 and 1964 entered the Internal 
]{evenue Service other than through the Rijksbelastingacademie . The 
exceptions arose from a shortage in qualified personnel because of 
insufficient applicants . 
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particular emphasis on the income tax, both individual and cor­
porate . In addition a few months were spent at an inspectorate, 
concentrating either on income taxes or on turnover, customs, 
and excise taxes . Practically all students finished this course 
of study and all who completed it entered the Service.  The 
esprit de corps. based on corps traditions dating from the early 
nineteenth century, was an enormously cohesive factor and one 
of the major elements which prior to 1945 held all but a very 
few Rijksbelastingacademie graduates in the service.  The post­
war period, however, saw a marked change, in part because of 
the more attractive salaries and opportunities available in non­
governmental service .  
The difficulty in retaining trained personnel as well as in 
securing qualified applicants (partly because training did not 
tak.e place within a university) led the Ministry of Finance to 
alter the training program for future inspectors . Since 1964 
applicants who qualify for the training program have enrolled 
with the Law Faculty at one of the state universities .  While 
the course of study is substantially similar to that provided by 
the Rijksbelastingacademie, on completion students now receive 
a master's degree in tax law and theory. This is followed by 
a short period of practical experience.  A student enrolling in 
the program receives a government subsidy during his training 
period, but commits himself to remain with the Service for a 
certain number of years. Otherwise, the subsidy must be re­
turned. 
The corps of Dutch inspectors which is formed by the 
training program is not outstanding in terms of learning or in­
tellectual qualities . Rather they are trustworthy and honest 
men, stolid and reliable in the performance of their duties .  
In contrast to the extended academic preparation required 
of and provided for personnel who hope to become inspectors, 
most employees are hired at 17 or 18 years of age, directly 
after completion of all or part of the curriculum of a school 
of extended primary education and commence their duties im­
mediately. 
Such a young man enters a local office 13 where he is 
taught how to do the simplest work in the administrative divi­
sion. Later more difficult but still elementary work is assigned , 
to him. Within two or three years, he is eligible to commence 
13 Theoretically , there is no distinction in the recruitment pattern 
for this type of employee for whatever level of office; in practice,  
personnel in the district, and more particularly the national, office 
have served previously in one or more local offices . 
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a three-to-four year in-service training program, primarily 
involving study at home of various texts, the tax statute, and 
regulations . During some of this time, he also has oral in­
struction for about three hours a month. No complex subjects , 
such as corporate accounting, are studied. Upon completion of 
the course and passing of the final examination-which frequent­
ly is not accomplished upon the first attempt-these persons 
are promoted to adjunct commies, some six to seven years 
after entering the local office. 14 
Two lines of promotion are available to an adjunct com­
mies.  He may prefer to remain in the administrative division 
or in the lower levels of the assessment or audit division of 
his local office .  In such a case, after service in one of  these 
divisions for some time, he is eligible for promotion, upon 
recommendation, I5 to the rank of commies, later to be fol­
lowed by promotion to hoojdcommies .  Under no circum­
stances, however, will he perform important work comparable 
to that of a controleur. 16 
If an adjunct commies believes he is capable of perform­
ing more demanding work than that performed by a commies 
or hoofdcommies, after two to seven years of competent serv­
ice as an adjunct commies and at about age thirty, he may 
apply for admission to the group of candidate controleurs . A 
selection commission tests these applicants on their general 
ability, education, intelligence, and character. If chosen-and 
the chances of selection depend primarily upon the estimated 
anticipated demand for controleurs in relation to the supply of 
applicants-the candidate controleur attends a two-year in­
service training school conducted by inspectors and located in 
the town of Arnheim. 
The course offers two tracks of instruction, enrollment de­
pending in part upon the candidate 's wishes and in part on the 
Service ' s  needs . One combines direct taxes and death duties ,  
the other direct taxes and the turnover tax.17 
While in attendance, each student weekly receives a day 
and a half of oral instruction, spends two days in a local office 
14within this time , such an individual will have fulfilled his mili­
tary service. 
15 Selection is made by a Commission, made up of inspectors under 
the head of a district director . 
16 A special in-service training program for the level of commies 
has been instituted since 1964. It has about 26 meetings a year . 
17 In the second of the two tracks , varying proportions of the two­
year period are devoted to the subjects which follow: 
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for practical training, and studies for the balance of his time . 
Upon completion of this course, the candidate controleur is 
eligible for promotion to the rank of contro leur and subsequent­
ly to that of hoojdcontroleur. In most cases, he spends his 
life in the assessment or audit division of a local office, but 
in some cases he is transferred to a regional or to the nation­
al office .  However, such an individual can never reach the 
rank of inspecteur, and hence can never head an inspectorate.  
He will be, rather, a right hand of the inspectors . 
1 .6 Private tax practitioners 
There are no restrictions in the Netherlands upon the giv­
ing of tax advice.l8 In consequence, the types of tax advisers 
range from a little bookkeeper to the tax expert, properly so­
called, with a large number of individuals falling in the middle . 
Legally trained men are found only among the relatively few 
true tax experts . 19 
An individual, seeking assistance in filling out a simple in­
come tax return or calculating the profit of a small sole pro­
prietorship, typically utilizes the little bookkeeper type of tax 
adviser . The more competent advisers in this group also han­
dle less difficult controversies with local inspectorates but 
rarely, if ever, appear in the courts . 
Somewhat above the little bookkeeper type of tax adviser 




Percentage of Total 
Time Allocated 
Bookkeeping and accounting 23 .0% 
C ivil law 23 .0 
General approach to tax law 4.0 
Income tax 19 .0 
Wage tax, etc. 9 . 0  
Corporation tax 7 .5 
Tax collection 1 . 5  
C apital tax 5 .5 
Turnover tax 4.0 
Real estate tax 3 .5  
18 Excluded from any consideration of  tax practitioners are the 
notaries , notarissen, who handle practically all death and gift tax 
problems . There are jurists , with specialized knowledge of these 
taxes , appointed by the Queen. 
19 While the middle range of tax consultants are known as be lasting 
des kund, tax experts , their expertise is decidedly more limited than 
their name suggests. 
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training. 20 Its members deal not only with local offices but 
also frequently represent taxpayers in judicial proceedings 
though they are not lawyers . Indeedi the associations into 
which they have organized themselves2 require for member­
ship only completion of an extended primary education. These 
associations have joined into a federation which has set up 
part-time training courses for the members .22 While the ex­
aminations are kept at a fairly high level, successful comple­
tion is no guarantee of professional expertise .  At a minimum, 
a member of such an association, upon completing the course 
of study at a federation training school, would require several 
years of practice before attaining the level of knowledge and 
competence necessary to give reliable advice on relatively un­
complicated tax matters. 
In truth, the Netherlands possesses very few true tax ex­
perts . Among these are former inspectors who will have grad­
uated from the Rijksbe lastingacademie . Others are lawyers 
who specialized in taxation. Frequently an office which con­
cerns itself primarily with tax matters has a chartered ac ­
countant, a lawyer, and a tax expert, all working in close co­
operation. 
20 A 1958 report by a Commission, instituted by the Under Secre­
tary of Finance ,  advised the government to create a state examination 
to insure more uniformity among this middle group of tax advisers .  
To date , the government has taken no concrete action. 
21 Some of these organizations have joined with others of compara­
ble status in an effort to insure some degree of uniformity . To in­
crease a sense of professional status , the members may , after passing 
examinations , identify themselves as Members of the Institute of Tax 
Advisers or whatever is the name of the particular organization. A 
1967 act makes it possible for a qualified individual to be registered 
as a Registered A ccountant . 
22 The courses offered by the federation provide some general in­
struction in law ,  economics,  and bookkeeping, followed by a special 
program in tax law which stresses individual and corporate income tax 
law. Generally theory , public finance ,  and related subjects are given 
little if any attention. 
CHAPTER XXII 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE-MAKING PROGRAMS 
Section A. Characte r of the Unde rlying Statute 
2 . 1  The precision of the statute itse lf 
The Netherlands does not have a tax code . Instead there 
are several tax statutes,  each dealing with a specific tax. 
These statutes set out broad rules,  generally applicable, with 
almost no deviations . The term income tax statute refers col­
lectively to three major laws : 
a. The Income Tax Law, inkomstenbelasting, covering the 
tax on the total net income of natural persons; 
b. The Wage Tax Law, loonbelasting, covering the tax on 
wages ; and 
c .  The Corporation Tax Law, vennootschapsbelasting, cav ­
ing the t ax  on the profits of corporations . 1 
There is a fourth and less important statute dealing with the 
tax on dividends . 2 
A revision of Netherlands tax legislation, effective in 1966, 
is designed to clarify rather than alter provisions . 3 Important 
to this clarification process is the use of a Basic Statute ,  
1 The corporation tax statute has a few paragraphs dealing with 
specific institutions-i.e. , banks , insurance companies-but these con­
stitute very minor deviations from the normal pattern. 
2 The wage tax and the dividend tax both are withheld at the source 
and afterwards credited against the income tax. If income consists 
exclusively or almost exclusively of wages and does not exceed a cer­
tain annual amount (currently fixed at about f. 10 ,000) , the wage tax 
covers all taxable income and precludes any additional assessment for 
income tax. 
3 It was not felt there was a need for many substantive altera­
tions in the legislation itself. However , it was felt that there was a 
lack of organization and clarity , a consequence of the patchwork al­
terations made during and after World War II. In 1964 , three statutes 
were enacted: Wet op de inkomstenbelasting, income tax; Wet op de 
vermogensbelasting, capital tax; Wet op de loonbelasting, wage tax. No 
new corporation tax statute was enacted. While the examples in the 
text are drawn from the pre-1964 legislation, both they and the com­
ments about the Netherlands' statutory practices remain valid today. 
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Algemene wet, containing general principles relating to taxes 
levied by the Netherlands , Rijksbelastingen. 4 Since this statute 
sets out general statements dealing with subjects relevant to 
all or to certain categories of taxes, comparable statements in 
each of the several tax statutes may be deleted, thereby in­
creasing intelligibility and producing greater uniformity. The 
Basic Statute deals with such general subjects as domicile, 5 
returns,6 the levying of taxes by means of assessment 7 and 
through withholding, 8 administrative and judicial appeal,9 repre -
sentation, secrecy, 10 and fines.  11  
It is also important to remember that, in the Netherlands, 
only the central government imposes income, wage, and cor­
poration taxes .  12 Further, these statutes omit much detail, but 
do delegate legislative power to fill in the gaps . The delega­
tion is accomplished by specific statutory provisions authoriz­
ing issuance of complementary rules and regulations . These 
regulations have the force of law when officially published in 
the Staatsblad or the Staatscourant. In consequence, hereafter 
the expression, substantive tax provisions, should be understood 
to include these published regulations but not other administra­
tive directives without force of law . 13 
4 The Basic Statute was not changed in 1964. See note 2, supra . 
5 Basic Statute, Chap. I. 
6 Id. Chap. II. 
7 Id. Chap. III. 
8 Id. Chap. IV .  
9 Id. Chap. V.  
10 Id. Chap. VIII . 
11 Id. Chap. IX. 
12 In fact the lower administrative units (eleven provinces with 
some thousand odd communities) possess only a very limited power 
to levy taxes of any kind. 
13 It should be noted that the limits on delegation of tax law-which 
limits are reflected in the particular statute to which the delegation 
relates-have been repeatedly the subject of substantial differences of 
opinion, both in Parliament and among authors .  Paragraph 188 of the 
Dutch Constitution-" Taxation in behalf of the Kingdom can be effected 
only by virtue of a law" -would be infringed upon if such delegation 
were carried to excessive limits. To date , however , both the legis­
lative and executive branches of the government have followed a rea­
sonable middle-of-the-road course.  
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The statutory enactments themselves,  covering just sub­
stantive income tax, include only 1 53 paragraphs and cover only 
57 pages of about 400 words each.14 
A general description of how the net tax basis is estab­
lished will illustrate the Dutch statutory approach. The income 
tax is levied on net income which, broadly speaking, includes 
only the total amount derived from several sources of income 
likely to have some degree of permanence-e.g. ,  rental on a 
house, dividends from stocks, interest on bonds, wages and 
salaries from employment, and profits from commercial or in­
dustrial activities .  Net proceeds from all sources of income 
are added together to constitute the aggregate gross income, 
from which are deducted items not directly related to any one 
component of gross income (i.e . ,  interest on debts, premiums 
on life insurance) . Operating losses resulting in a negative 
gross income in any of the six previous years also are de­
ductible .l5 After computing the net income, allowance is made 
for expenses from illness or other adversity16 and for a lim­
ited amount of charitable contributions . 
A few relatively brief paragraphs set out the foregoing ex­
planation of income, but many more paragraphs supply specific 
details . Illustratively, gross income is defined as the total of 
the net proceeds from three sources-(1) the taxpayer's  activi­
ties in commerce, the liberal professions , or employment, 
( 2) capital, and ( 3) certain life annuities .  Each of these com­
ponent parts of gross income is defined more specifically in 



















Basic departures from 
general tax pattern 
( rough estimate of 




15 Included in this prov1s10n is  a deviation from the prevailing pat­
tern, which permits the permanent carrying-forward of losses where 
such are incurred during the first six years of a newly founded trade 
or industry . 
16 This is limited to those occurring in the taxpayer ' s  immediate 
family . 
17 Trade and liberal professions require about fourteen paragraphs , 
employment seven. Proceeds of capital are defined in terms of mova­
ble and immovable capital, requiring two and three paragraphs respec­
tively . 
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the statute, there are relevant paragraphs in the legislative 
regulations .  
The Wage Tax Statute analyzes in detail the several aspects 
of the terms employment and wages.  The Corporation Tax 
Statute, in defining the term profit, refers extensively to perti­
nent paragraphs of the Income Tax Statute (which defines profit 
resulting from a natural person's  enterprise),  and then takes 
account of variations required for holding companies, manage­
ment trusts , insurance companies ,  etc. 
On the whole, the statutory definitions of the net tax base 
are not overly detailed. It is difficult to determine whether 
this statutory approach tends to increase or reduce interpreta­
tive difficulties, when compared to other more detailed statu­
tory descriptions which inevitably include more variations from 
a basic norm, with these additional variations creating the pos­
sibility of yet more interpretative difficulties . Be that as it 
may, for other reasons the legislature which accomplished the 
most recent statutory revision was probably wise in refraining 
from any attempt to supply all details in a possibly vain ef­
fort to reduce the number of interpretative difficulties . 18 While 
general language in any law does create uncertainty, excessive 
detail makes the statute needlessly complex and impractical, as 
well as rigid and inflexible, and not easy to adapt to social and 
economic changes ,  including changes in business expectations . 
The meaning of general language, on the other hand, can be 
evolved, through judicial science,  to meet those changing cir­
cumstances . Two illustrations will suffice to indicate the tend­
ency of more recent legislatures to retrench from detailed 
prescriptions . 
The first involves the provisions which, from 1941 through 
1950, set out quite detailed rules for computing profit, whether 
derived by an enterprise or from the exercise of a liberal pro­
fession. For example, it provided for the calculation of profits 
on stock, etc . ,  by comparison of the capital at the end and at 
the beginning of the taxable year, as well as on the basis of 
the turnover, after deduction of expenses, and so on. In 1950 
the legislature redefined profit and annual profit in the follow­
ing general terms: 
Profit is the aggregate of gains achieved, under whatever 
name or form , from enterprise or liberal profession. 
18 Such detailed paragraphs might operate as case law, involving 
arguments a contrario when interpretation become necessary ,  to say 
nothing of the obvious lack of flexibility under changing social condi­
tions . 
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Annual profit is calculated in accordance with good mer­
chant 's  usage , with observance of a consistent line of conduct 
(policy) irrespective of envisaged results , and which can be 
altered only when justified by special circumstances .l9 
Observe that this definition does not address itself to details 
relating, e .g . ,  to the evaluation of stocks and merchandise,  to 
the effect on profit of an increase in the value of stocks aris­
ing from monetary depreciation or of an increase in reserves 
because of such depreciation, to the point of time at which 
profit is made (i .e . ,  when the goods are delivered or services 
rendered, or when payment is received) , or to the circum­
stances under which a merchant may change his method of 
computing annual profits . Many of these matters have been 
dealt with, however, by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 
Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, in decisions which supplement 
the written law, but which in hard cases need not lag behind 
changing circumstances . While judicial decisions fill in the 
gaps, the Dutch legal system accords no official precedent value 
to any judicial decision. 20 
A second illustration involves the costs deductible from 
the proceeds of the several sources of income before totalling 
these proceeds . 21 Whereas the old 1941 statute , after stating 
a general rule, went on to list examples falling in six differ­
ent categories ,  the new bill repeated the general rule but omit­
ted most of the earlier stated examples . The former approach 
had produced innumerable problems during the rapid post-World 
War TI changes . For example, in the face of the long list of 
examples, what treatment should have been accorded commuting 
expenses ? Should the crucial point be the business interests 
of the commuter, the housing shortage, or his personal prefer­
ence for living in the country?  Ultimately the Supreme Court 
19 Besluit op de inkomstenbelasting (1941) n 6 and 7 (superseded 
by Wet op de inkomstenbelasting (1964) n 7 ,  9) . The few additional 
paragraphs (true also before 1950) defining depreciation and reserves 
which may be taken into account in calculating profits are not rele­
vant here. 
20 A case may arise later involving the same issue and the Supreme 
Court is free to overrule its earlier opinion, though in practice this< 
occurs almost never . See Chap. XXIV , 4.4 infra . Many times in sub­
sequent decisions dealing with the same issue, the Court will refine or 
sharpen its position. 
21 These costs are referred to in the statute as costs incurred for 
the acquisition, cashing, and retaining (verwerving, inning et behoud) 
of the proceeds , and the charges attributable to those proceeds. 
CHARACTER OF UNDERLYING STATUTE 449 
was able to develop standards from which emerged a workable 
overall concept of the system to be followed, despite the hin­
drance to logical interpretative development provided by so 
many statutory details . 
It is impossible to determine the annual number of inter­
pretative controversies, especially those regarding questions of 
law or mixed questions of law and fact . Many such :Eroblems 
are resolved by the tax inspector and the taxpayer . 2 Also, 
often an issue originally thought to involve a mixed question of 
law and fact eventually proves to be entirely a question of fact, 
and thus loses entirely its interpretative character. Finally the 
decisions of the Chambers for Tax Procedures are published 
only when considered to be of real significance to taxpayers 
and tax experts . Hence the number of the published decisions 
bears no relation to the number of all decisions involving in­
terpretative issues . Nevertheless ,  it is undoubtedly true that 
pure questions of law arise much less frequently than questions 
of fact or question::; of a mixed character. 
2 . 2  Legislative pre -enactment aids to interpretation 
Once a government-sponsored bill has been drafted, 23 the 
Queen requests advice from the Council of State .24 Assuming 
the Council approves, the Queen submits the bill to the Second 
Chamber of the States General, 25 accompanied by an explana­
tory note signed by the appropriate Minister (in tax matters, 
the Under Secretary of Finance) .  
The Second Chamber refers the draft of the tax bill to 
its Committee on Finance, the members of which have expertise 
in tax matters . After thorough examination, the committee pre­
pares a Preliminary Report which sets out the members ' com­
ments, criticisms, and suggestions,  as well as questions . This 
22 The number of such adjustments is unavailable. 
23 Constitutionally , a bill may be presented by a member of the 
Second Chamber on his own initiative. This right , however , is almost 
never exercised. 
The Second and First Chamber form the States General (Staaten­
Generaal), a name which dates from 1464 although the institution it­
self has been changed over the centuries .  The Second Chamber con­
sists of 150 members , elected for four-year terms directly by the 
people in general elections . The First Chamber consists of 75 mem­
bers elected by the Provincial states , which are elected directly by 
the people. 
24 The Council of state is a nonpolitical body of "wise men" whose 
deliberations are not published. 
25 See note 21 , supra. 
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report is referred back to the Under Secretary of Finance who 
reconsiders his draft bill and returns it with a written Note of 
Answer, signed by the Minister of Finance,  typically accom­
panied by a Note of Alterations proposing modifications in line 
with the recommendations embodied in the Preliminary Report. 
At this point, an oral exchange of views frequently occurs be­
tween the Minister or Under Secretary and the Committee on 
Finance . 26 This oral exchange is incorporated in a report, in 
most cases with a second Note of Alterations . Frequently the 
government prepares additional Notes of Alterations . Whatever 
their number, the totality of these written documents are pub­
lished officially without delay. They constitute a full record of 
all proceedings prior to oral debate on the bill by the Second 
Chamber itself. 
During that debate, the bill is subjecte<;l to criticism by 
representatives of the several political parties, the defense 
being led by the Under Secretary of Finance. Circumstances 
may lead the government to withdraw the bill. Or members of 
the Second Chamber may only urge alterations in the bill as 
presented, in some instances requesting that the government 
reconsider certain points , in others proposing their own amend­
ments. Members proposing such amendments on their own 
initiative will have already secured informal technical assistance 
on the wording from the tax administration's Directorate (Leg­
islation: Direct Taxes) . If the Minister of Finance or Under 
Secretary approves the proposed amendments , the text as pre­
pared by the tax administration will be  incorporated in the gov­
ernment's own draft. 27 Alternatively, the amendments may be 
placed before the Second Chamber for enactment or rejection. 
26 It is possible that the Second Chamber will close the preliminary 
work on the draft without an oral exchange. Such omission, however , 
is unusual in the case of a new statute or an important change in ex­
isting law. It is usual where there is only a small change in an exist­
ing statute. Sometimes where the change is very minimal , the Minis­
ter makes only a Voorlopig Verslag and does not produce a Memorie 
van Antwoord. 
27 It is possible that a proposed amendment would make such a 
structural or financial change in the original draft of the bill as to 
render it unacceptable to the Minister of Finance and the Under Sec­
retary. Their conclusion, that a given amendment would make the < 
bill unacceptable , may lead them to consider resignation should the 
Second Chamber pass the amendment. In instances of major impor­
tance , the entire Cabinet might consider resignation. However , it is 
more likely that their bare statement , that the amendment is unac­
ceptable , would lead to its withdrawal. 
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Not infrequently, a bill is altered substantially in the course of 
legislative discussion. 
A bill which passes the Second Chamber has survived its 
prime challenge . The First Chamber cannot amend; it must 
accept or reject any bill in its entirety. Very rarely does the 
First Chamber fail to pass a bill enacted by the Second Cham­
ber. However, the First Chamber subjects the bill to a process 
roughly equivalent to that of the Second Chamber.  
After enactment by the First Chamber and royal assent, 
the new law is published in the Staatsblad, and typically takes 
effect within twenty days after publication unless the law itself 
specifies another period. 
All documents referred to above are published, as is also 
a verbatim account of the treatment accorded the bill by both 
chambers in the States General. Taken together,  this legisla­
tive history is most useful in interpreting the statute . This 
utility, however, especially where interpretative issues are con­
cerned, is a byproduct; the States General do not have a policy 
here. On the other hand, traces in the sand frequently are left 
very deliberately. The Minister may give some examples to 
make clear his intentions about the law. If subsequent debates 
show definitely that the legislature approves his interpretation, 
the courts would be highly reluctant to disregard it . 
The precise role of this legislative history is discussed in 
the next subsection, but that role, it should be observed, is not 
static . The law tends to establish a life of its own, for it 
must deal with circumstances unforeseen or ignored by the 
legislature .  As time passes, both writers and the courts tend 
to place less emphasis on the intention of the lawmaker and 
more on the intention of the law, in the belief this is a more 
objective criteria.28 
2.3 Standards of construction followed by the judiciary in inter­
preting the statute 
Theoretically, the standards of interpretation used with 
respect to tax statutes do not differ from those applied in the 
28 This is a sound development. To look for the intention of the 
lawmaker seems next to impossible , in view of all that is written and 
(especially) said during the legislative processing by various people , 
not one of whom can be identified with the lawmaker , i .e. , the govern­
ment and the people' s representatives , the States General. To consi.d­
er as constant , the lawmaker' s  intention throughout the constantly 
changing life to which the law must be applied, is to misunderstand 
the function of a statute. Admittedly , wise interpretation of particu­
lar paragraphs of a statute may be assisted by examining what was 
written or said about the intention of the government , the Chambers ,  
etc . 
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case of other nonpenal statutes .  In fact, however, until after 
World War I, the consensus of Netherlands opinion was that 
tax statutes should be construed strictly to establish, if not a 
literal interpretation, at least a barrier against loose interpre­
tation and a fortiori application of the law by analogy. This 
conception now has been abandoned. 29 Concurrently with this 
more recent trend in the direction of a more flexible interpre­
tation, there is a growing tendency to consider tax law as au­
tonomous in at least one limited sense . A particular construc­
tion followed by the civil law is not deemed conclusive in 
interpreting a word, expression, or concept also used in the 
tax statute (e .g . ,  immovable property, alienation, sustenance,  
nullities in  jiscalibus) . Instead various other factors are taken 
into account to determine the tax meaning of the word, expres­
sion, or concept.30 It is now believed that this approach is 
not actually to be distinguished from the approach followed in 
construing the civil law itself. Indeed the Supreme Court has 
said that the tax law is to be approached "not in conformity 
with some special method of interpretation, but in the same 
way as in civil law, "31 and thus "no literal construction, but 
a construction on the basis, inter alia, of the ratio legis . "  32 
Thus, a reasonable application of the particular provision under 
consideration is the cornerstone of its interpretation and deci­
sion. 
To this end, the courts now avail themselves of every pos ­
sible device (historical, textual, teleological, etc . ) .  The word 
rechtsvinding, finding the law, perhaps best indicates the ob­
j ective of this open system of interpretation, to get at the pur­
port of any given provision. Thus, no longer does it follow, 
a priori, that questions bearing on the ineluctability of an item 
in gross income should be approached in one manner while a 
different approach is used in deciding whether a given expense 
is deductible . 
There is no official ranking of the weight the courts are 
to accord various sources . Consequently, the courts may accord 
29 This concept perhaps was buttressed by what is now generally 
conceded to have been a misinterpretation of paragraph 188 of the 
Nether lands Constitution. 
30 In this respect , the Dutch approach is less narrow and dogmatic -
than those employed in France or Belgium. 
31 Decision of the Hoge Raad, February 27 , 1935 , B5801 , WPNR 
3417 . 
32 Decision of the floge Raad, June 1 5 ,  1921 , N.J . 1921 , 983 ,  PW 
11561.  
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consideration to whatever factors they consider most important. 
Illustratively, at the beginning of a statute 's  life, the pre­
enactment materials will receive greater attention than will 
later be true . 
Section B. The Regulations Program 
2 . 4  Types and force of regulations 
As noted previously, the Netherlands delegates legislative 
authority in matters of minor importance .  Under the authority 
so delegated, legislative regulations are issued either by the 
Crown or by the Minister of Finance and, when officially pub­
lished, have the status of legislation. 33 
The tax administration also issues many kinds of other 
directives . In these, the tax administration reflects its inter­
pretation of  given statutory paragraphs . 3 4  Since these inter­
pretations were carefully considered by the Finance Minister 
and his staff, Tax Inspectors-as members of the hierarchy­
are bound, hierarchically not legally, to follow the directives . 
However, these do not bind taxpayers or judges,  though the lat­
ter, knowing the directives were carefully considered by the 
administration, do not discount them completely. Not infre­
quently, however, the Supreme Court or  a court of appeal will 
take a position contrary to the interpretation issued in a direc­
tive addressed to tax officials . Should this occur in a Supreme 
Court decision, the Minister of Finance usually alters the tax 
directive in question, and so informs personnel within the tax 
administration. 
2 . 5  Precise purpose of interpretative regulations 
Apart from legislative regulations which a given statute 
authorizes to fill in statutory gaps, so-called interpretative 
regulations , having the stature and coverage of those used in 
the United States, are not to be found in the Netherlands . The 
33 Unlike the situation in the United States , neither the tax admin­
istration nor the Under Secretary of Finance has either general or 
specific authority to provide by regulation ordinary interpretations of 
the statute . The inspectors are bound hierarchically to interpret the 
statute in accordance with the instructions from the tax administration, 
but these instructions have no other binding force . 
34 In preparing directives of this type-most usually when a new 
statute has been enacted or an old one amended-the tax administration 
uses every method of interpretation in trying to reach a proper inter­
pretation. 
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closest analogy is in the Dutch administrative directives pro­
gram. These directives bind the tax inspector within the offi­
cial hierarchy, without prejudice, however, to his right to 
attempt to have the directives amended. These directives 
strive primarily to reword obscure statutory language, give 
concrete examples of their application, or solve basic interpre­
tative or controversial problems . The more wide ranging scope 
of this program, compared with the legislative regulations pro­
gram, is evident in the following tabulation: 
Number of Pages Covered-Average of 400 Words to a Page 









1 6  
82 







Both legislative regulations which possess the force of law, 
and administrative directives which bind only personnel within 
the tax administration as a matter of hierarchical control, are 
prepared in the department of the Director-General of Tax Af­
fairs by staff members with an educational background at the 
university level. However, legislative regulations are submit­
ted for the approval of the Under Secretary and, following pub­
lication, became an official part of the law. 
There is no formal provision or recognized practice for 
soliciting an expression of non-government opinion prior to 
formalization of the regulations and directives . However, the 
Minister on his own initiative may decide to consult with groups 
particularly interested. 
Section c. The Rulings Program 
2 .  7 Formal advance private written rulings to taxpayers 
The Netherlands Internal Revenue Service does not issue 
unilateral, binding, private written rulings to taxpayers cover­
ing proposed transactions . Nor is it possible to enter into a" 
legally binding closing agreement in such cases . 
Repeatedly the Dutch Supreme Court has held that any 
agreement between the tax administration and a taxpayer lacks 
binding force and legally provides no certainty to either party. 
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Indeed, even if an inspector and a taxpayer have agreed upon 
the depreciation to be allowed for a particular piece of indus­
trial equipment in a given year, the taxpayer remains free to 
argue for the use of another method in a subsequent-or even 
the same-taxable year if he concludes that the agreed upon 
method of calculation is contrary to the statute . 
The only agreements which the Supreme Court will uphold 
are those which establish a value at issue between the parties 
and do not require interpretation of a statute. For example, 
if the value of a parcel of realty in a given year is in ques­
tion, the inspector and taxpayer may choose two experts, and 
agree that the average of the experts ' estimates will bind both 
parties . 
The various limitations described above reflect theory, 
however, not the actual practice .  Daily, throughout the coun­
try, agreements are made between the local offices and the 
taxpayer or his practitioner, with a view to fix the exact amount 
of tax liability. Many controversies over issues of fact or of 
law are settled, i .e . ,  compromised between inspector and tax­
payer .  This settlement has no legal status ; but since it is a 
gentleman's agreement, the result is reliable and the system 
has seemed to work well in practice .  Usually the compromise 
is developed between the taxpayer and the inspector, without 
the interference of a higher official. However, prospective sit­
uations involving more complex issues or greater amounts of 
money (e .g . ,  a proposed merger or corporate reorganization) 
may lead a taxpayer to seek optimum certainty. After a writ­
ten memorandum and all the relevant documents have been 
presented to the local inspector and have been discussed with 
him, the taxpayer may take the initiative in the mutual decision 
reached by the inspector and the taxpayer to raise the matter 
at the national office level. In that event, the national office ,  
after consulting with the local office, will make a thorough 
analysis of its own and may hold extensive discussions with 
the taxpayer . In due course, the taxpayer will receive a let­
ter from the Ministry, outlining the tax consequences of the 
proposed transaction if carried out as described by the tax­
payer. 
This practice grew out of the administration's belief that 
a taxpayer, who is interested in a complex and possibly con­
troversial type of prospective transaction, ought not be forced 
to abandon the transaction because of tax uncertainties.  How­
ever, since taxpayers have no legal right to such a decision 
from the Minister or, for that matter, even from an inspector, 
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there are no formal rules of procedure governing the practice .  
Further the fact that there is such a practice does not mean 
that just any taxpayer can raise just any issue directly with the 
Minister.  Indeed, an ordinary taxpayer who writes the Ministry, 
requesting a decision on a dispute between him and his inspec­
tor regarding an assessment normally will receive a prompt 
answer to the effect that, if the taxpayer considers the assess ­
ment incorrect, the matter is properly the concern of a Court 
of Appeal. Again, should a tax expert or a corporation inquire 
concerning the tax consequences of a contract seemingly in­
spired by the tax avoidance possibilities, the national office 's 
response is not likely to prove helpful. In other words, the 
tax administration exercises complete discretion in deciding 
whether to rule in advance in any given case, and whether it 
will do so at the local or national levels . 
The lack of statutory authorization for these rulings, settle­
ment, and compromise activities has not made them less ef­
fective. Actions before the Court of Appeal rarely disclose 
evidence that a compromise agreement-which the court would 
be free to disregard-has been breached. This satisfactory, if 
extralegal, state of affairs is the prime reason the Under Sec­
retary of Finance declared a few years ago that he saw no need 
for legislation authorizing and regulating formal closing agree­
ments . That conclusion was clearly warranted, given the exist­
ing practices, certain recognized qualities of Dutch character 
and the high standards of the Internal Revenue Service inspec­
tors , and the difficulty of designing a regulatory statute which 
would adequately respond to the many diverse aspects of which 
account must be taken if the practices are to be implemented 
wisely. 
2 . 8  Informal technical advice to taxpayers on proposed transac­
tions 
It is not known how often taxpayers seek informal advice 
from the local inspectors on the consequences of proposed 
transactions . It is common practice, however, for both local 
and national levels to discuss freely with taxpayers the alter­
natives available in shaping a proposed business transaction, to 
the end of helping the taxpayer achieve the most favorable tax 
consequences. Should the inspector himself be in doubt about 
a question, he is likely, particularly in the case of a substan­
tial financial matter, to request advice from the District Direc ­
tor, who in turn may refer the question to the Ministry. 35 In 
35 In practice , only the important cases of large taxpayers are car­
ried to the national level. 
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the end, what began as an informal discussion may conclude 
with written advice . In either event, in actual practice ,  the 
inspector will feel bound despite the absence in law of official 
status for the advice .  A gentleman's word has been given. 
2.9 Technical advice to field offices 
From the foregoing, it should be clear that local offices 
are permitted-though not encouraged-to request the higher 
echelon (i .e . ,  the District Director) to indicate the appropriate 
stance with respect to a specific situation. Should the Direc­
tor, in turn, request such advice from the national office ,  the 
response, commonly given in writing-not by telephone-is pre­
pared by the staff of the Director-General of Taxes .  
2 . 10 Publication of te chnical advice given to taxpayers and local 
offices 
Interpretative positions taken by the Ministry in response 
to requests for advice in specific cases are not likely to be 
published except where the matter is one of general interest. 36 
Illustratively, the Ministry would be likely to publish the an­
swer to an inquiry by a life insurance company about the fiscal 
consequences of certain clauses in an insurance policy .  The 
in-service publication will take the form of an administrative 
directive to lower echelon personnel. Outside publication will 
be accomplished by releasing the full text of the directive to 
tax periodicals. Usually, a published directive will set forth 
the underlying rationale . 
Despite this practice of publishing the most important deci­
sions, there is no formal publication program. Indeed there 
is no formal system of administrative rulings . Substantive 
technical rulings in the field of income, wage, and corporation 
taxes probably total less than a hundred a year, with about 
forty a year being published . This, of course, represents only 
a very small part of all the Ministry 's decisions on matters 
sent up by the inspectors . Many such decisions, however, owing 
to the peculiar factual circumstances of the cases, have the 
limited character of jus in causa positum. 
Despite the limited publication program, the inspectors 
very swiftly learn, albeit informally, the stance taken by the 
Ministry in particular situations . There is a high degree of 
cooperation and a continuing exchange of information as well 
as views and opinions . 
36 Publication would be in the form of an incidental bulletin. 
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In addition to the important administrative decisions of 
general interest, the national office intermittently informs in­
spectors and tax periodicals also of decisions taken in so-called 
hardship cases . The purpose is to alert taxpayers to the types 
of hardship cases where favorable decisions may be expected, 
either from the national office, or if power is delegated, from 
the local or district offices. 
CHAPTER XX:lll 
ASSESSMENT, REFUND, AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL PROCEDURES 
Section A. Assessment and Audit Procedures 
3.1  Introductory note 
As noted earlier the Netherlands income tax statute actual­
ly consists of three separate though closely related laws ( indi­
vidual income tax, wage tax on employees, and corporation 
profits tax) . 
The discussion below of assessment and audit procedures 
focuses just on the income tax; then follows a summary of the 
differences peculiar to the two other related taxes .  
3 .2a Details of the assessment and audit procedures re individ­
uals (income tax) 
Netherlands income tax legislation is not geared to the so­
called self-assessment system. However, it does rely on a 
taxpayer 's so-called tentative return in making tentative assess­
ments, and to this limited extent there is resemblance in fact 
if not in theory. The ultimate assessment though is made by 
an inspector in reliance, but only in part, on a yet different 
final return which, in essence, is a questionnaire showing the 
net income received during the preceding calendar year. But 
at least part of the tax due for that calendar year normally 
was paid in the course of that same year, on the basis of the 
tentative or estimated assessment which generally was made at 
some point between April and August. That tentative assess­
ment was then payable in at least five monthly installments . 
Also, during that calendar year, tax was withheld at the source 
as to certain types of income, especially in respect to wages 
and dividends . 
To illustrate, this overall reporting scheme is triggered in, 
say, 1966, when on or about February 1, the typical taxpayer 
receives a form containing his final return for 1965 and the 
tentative return covering income anticipated during 1966, both 
of which must be returned by April 1, unless for good cause 
the taxpayer is able to secure an extension. 
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Should he fail to file by the due date without cause, a fine 
of five percent is imposed on the tax due . And on complete 
failure to file, the inspector is authorized to prepare assess ­
ments based on his estimate of the taxpayer's  income .1 Fur­
ther, for gross negligence in preparing the return or for de­
liberately filing a false return, a deficiency tax can be imposed, 
to a maximum of 100 percent. In addition, a deliberately false 
return is ground for a criminal indictment, which can lead to 
a heavy fine (or even a prison term), though this fine and the 
administrative tax increase mentioned above are not both im­
posed in the same case. 2 
The tax form contains four pages,  and is accompanied by 
an explanatory booklet of approximately sixteen pages which 
answer the most frequently recurring questions about the tax 
law and the procedure to be followed in preparing the return. 
The form itself is in effect a questionnaire, seeking data re­
garding the taxpayer 's personal affairs, i .e . ,  marital status, 
number of children, sources and amounts of income, deductible 
items, and the amount withheld on wages,3 dividends,4 and cer­
tain other types of income. Taxpayers carrying on a trade or 
business must also attach signed copies of a balance sheet and 
profit and loss statement. Also, if the taxpayer 's capital, how­
ever invested, exceeds a certain amount, 5 he is liable for a 
separate proportional capital tax, vermogensbe lasting, and must 
fill in a form with two extra pages,  covering both his income 
and capital tax, to which he attaches a list of his investments 
and the income therefrom. 
To return to our illustration, the inspector upon receiving 
the tax form on or before April 1 ,  1966, typically does rely 
on it to make the tentative assessment for 1966, and thereby 
facilitates commencement of the installment payments . But the 
final return covering 1965 is examined before the final assess ­
ment for that year is made. 6 The information there is verified, 
1 Since such an assessment is unlikely to err in the taxpayer' s  
favor , such taxpayers usually lodge an administrative appeal. 
2 Legally these are two distinct penalties that can be imposed for 
the same offense.  The Under Secretary , however , has instructed the 
inspectors that they must refrain from assessing the defic1ency tax in 
cases where there has been a criminal indictment. 
3 The tax on wages is withheld at a progressive rate. 
4 withholding rate as of 1967 is a flat 25% . 
5 For a married taxpayer the free capital is f. 55 ,000 , raised for 
each dependent child by f. 13 ,500 .  Thus , a married couple with three 
dependent children would have free capital of f. 95 ,500 .  
6 The term inspector includes not only inspectors of  the academic 
level, but also any member of the inspectorate' s personnel belonging 
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first by reference to the files maintained in the inspectorate . 7 
However, even with the aid of these files, the inspector will 
not always know that a given taxpayer resolved a doubtful issue 
in his own favor even though, in consequence, a certain item 
was omitted in computing income, or a doubtful deduction was 
taken. 8 Also, if the issue was exposed to light, the explanation 
attached to the return may not be in sufficient detail to permit 
the inspector to resolve the issue. Thus, as explained below, 
the inspector's examination may be complemented by the audit 
division's  verification of the taxpayer 's accounts, and in either 
setting the taxpayer may be asked, by telephone or in writing, 
for additional information as to matters set out in the return 
or in an accompanying document. Should the taxpayer fail to 
comply with any such request, the statute provides that if he 
contests the assessment at a later date he will have the burden 
of proof. 
It is recognized that an examination based just on the in­
spectorate 's files will not expose all errors in all returns, but 
it is not feasible to undertake a more detailed examination of 
every return. These competing considerations are compro­
mised; annually a proportion of the returns are examined with 
extreme care, primary attention being focused on those involv­
ing high incomes or those which tend to involve complex tax 
problems . Further, emphasis is placed on returns showing 
profits from a trade or business, as distinct from those re­
porting incomes from easily verified sources such as stocks, 
bonds, or annuity contracts . Returns of the former type typi­
cally are prepared by tax practitioners . While this fact is a 
reasonable guarantee that the figures in the return and supple­
mentary records are accurate, it is no guarantee that the re­
turn includes no doubtful issues .  While standards and instruc­
tions govern an inspectorate 's selection process, the inspector 
has discretion to add any returns to those otherwise falling in 
the full-examination category. Once in this category, the books 
of the taxpayer will be examined by the Audit Division of the 
(footnote continued) 
to a group ( hoojdcontroleur, commies) authorized by legislative regu­
lation to perform tasks assigned by the statute itself to an inspector . 
7 The inspectorate maintains for each taxpayer a legger contain­
ing the returns of previous years and a dossier which contains infor­
mation of long-run value , such as reports from death duty inspec­
torates , copies of pertinent contracts , etc . 
8 The inspector sometimes discovers that a taxpayer has erred in 
the government' s favor and paid more in taxes than was owing. Under 
such circumstances , the inspector makes the correction. 
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inspectorate . In particularly intricate cases, however, the Fis ­
cal Audit Office takes over . 
Either the Audit Division or the Fiscal Audit Office is free 
to and will draw its own conclusions as to what the audited 
records reveal. In the course of their audits, they will resolve 
interpretative issues and recommend a course of action to the 
inspector, giving their supporting reasons . It must be recog­
nized, however, that their function is purely advisory. The 
inspector alone makes the final decision as to whether or not 
a deficiency assessment-or a refund-is in order . 
Illustrating the foregoing is data pertaining to one recent 
year. Out of the approximately two and a half million income 
tax assessments , 440,000 taxpayers ' books were examined. Of 
these, the Fiscal Audit Office checked about 72,000 and the in­
spectorates '  own Audit Divisions--composed of hoojdcontroleurs 
and lower ranking staff members-the balance .  
It should be emphasized, however, that the statute empow­
ers the inspector alone to make or refrain from making an 
assessment. This power extends to the compromising of claims 
or issues, including the splitting and/or trading of issues in 
the course of reaching a settlement with the taxpayer over all­
yes -or -all-no questions of law. 9 
Higher echelons do not interfere with the inspectors ' han­
dling of their work and this noninterference extends to the in­
spectors ' settlement activity. No careful check is made on 
the cases settled by the splitting or the trading of issues . In 
part, this is because the inspectors are trusted, bribery being 
nonexistent. In part, it is a realistic recognition that the tax­
payer will litigate if he feels he is not receiving fair treatment, 
the inexpensiveness and accessibility of the courts making such 
litigation easy and available . 
On the whole taxpayers (or their representatives) tend to 
accept the position taken by inspectors as being correct ap­
praisals of the situations in question. Typically, if an inspector 
sees an item on a return with which he disagrees or which he 
questions, he telephones the taxpayer to come in to discuss the 
matter. At this initial point of contact, prior to :my definite 
assessment, there can be and frequently is a settlement between 
9 The Dutch term for this type of agreement is aading, the equiv­
alent of the French term transaction . While the word is used in com­
mercial dealings , in the tax area it means an act whereby the tax 
administration consents not to institute proceedings on the basis of an 
asserted deficiency in return for the payment of an amount of money 
mutually agreed upon. 
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the parties of outstanding points in controversy, including the 
splitting or trading of issues . Moreover, at such a conference 
the inspector is free to and from time to time will make sug­
gestions to the taxpayer for the taxpayer's  benefit . 
Only when the inspector himself concludes that he needs 
advice will he consult the head of the inspectorate or a higher 
echelon. Within the hierarchic setting, however, the Regional 
Office does maintain a running check on the inspectorates under 
its supervision. Incident to this, of course, the Regional Of­
fice may sample the quality of an inspectorate ' s  assessments, 
including its handling of administrative appeals .10 Should it 
locate an error, whether in favor of the government or the 
taxpayer, it will force a correction. 
Though examinations do delay the final assessment, this 
does not seriously prejudice the taxpayer, for most of his tax 
will have been paid earlier,  either through withholding or in­
stallments . Further, there is a time limit within which the 
final assessments must be completed; for example, final as­
sessments for 1966 must be made by July 1 ,  1968. The in­
spector 's notice of final assessment, addressed to the taxpayer 
may indicate either that a refund 11 is in order or that some 
portion of tax remains unpaid. The latter situation may arise 
only because of a low tentative assessment, or because the in­
spector concluded that both the tentative and final returns were 
.incorrect, the final assessment being based on a higher net in­
come. In such case, the inspector must explain the difference 12 
in such detail that the taxpayer may decide whether to lodge 
an administrative appeal within the allowed grace period which 
commences to run from the date of the final assessment no­
tice. 
Although the inspector bases his notice of final assessment 
on an examination of the taxpayer 's  final return, even that as­
sessment is not completely final. Under certain circumstances 
a deficiency assessment is possible. Ordinarily, of course, 
the preliminary contacts between the inspector and the taxpayer 
prior to issuance of the notice of final assessment will have 
resulted in satisfactory resolution of all difficulties and a 
10 while this intermittent activity is useful , it does not insure uni­
formity among the inspectorates . Factors promoting, if not achieving 
uniformity , are the statutes , the decisions handed down by the several 
tribunals , the directives , the technical advice and other literature sent 
out from headquarters.  
11 See note 7 supra . 
12 Required by an administrative regulation. 
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correct assessment. However, whether advertently or inadver­
tently, the taxpayer may have omitted one or more items which 
should have been included in total net income and the inspector 
may not have discovered the omission in the course of his ex­
amination for that year. In such cases, a deficiency assess­
ment, navorderingsaanslag, is possible, if two conditions are 
satisfied. First, such deficiency must be assessed within a 
five-year period beginning with the close of the calendar year 
in question. Second, there must be a novum, i .e . ,  such an as ­
sessment must be based on a newly discovered fact . A defi­
ciency assessment cannot be made where the incorrect final 
assessment resulted from the inspector' s  own error or omis­
sion or because the inspector changed his opinion on a matter 
of statutory interpretation, for example because the Supreme 
Court shifted its position. 
This limited use of deficiency assessments , authorized by 
statute and clarified by an extensive body of court decisions 
dealing with the existence or nonexistence of a novum, balances 
the taxpayer's  need for certainty and the tax administration's  
responsibility for determining tax liability in accordance with 
the statute, not just in accordance with the taxpayer 's return. 
The overall assessment arrangement applies to millions of 
Dutch taxpayers, from men in high income brackets to those in 
low brackets, such as the greengrocer. However, taxpayers in 
the middle or lower income brackets who derive their income 
primarily or solely from wages need not file a return. Their 
income tax obligations are covered by the wage tax withheld 
by their employers . 
3 . 2b De tails of the assessment and audit procedures relating to 
corporations (corporations tax) 
While assessment and audit procedures for corporations 
are very similar to those for individuals , four differences do 
exist. 
The first and most important difference reflects the legis­
lature 's  recognition that many controversial questions develop 
in the corporate setting. When the inspector decides 'that he 
will make an assessment which deviates from either the facts 
or figures in a corporation's return, the statute requires that 
he first give the corporation's board an opportunity to discuss 
with him the points at issue. As shown later,  this requirement 
affects also the legal setting of any administrative appeal. Not 
infrequently, this discussion results in a splitting or a trading 
of all-yes -or-all-no issues of law. The inspector 's  power to 
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enter into binding settlement agreements is as great in the 
corporate as in the individual setting. 
Another difference:  withholding of taxes at the source ap­
plies , in the corporate setting, only to dividends received by 
the corporation on stock of other corporations which it owns . 
A third difference is in the basis used for a corporation's  
tentative assessment. While the assessment of an individual 
taxpayer is based on a current tentative return, the corporate 
tentative assessment is based on the final return covering the 
preceding year . This difference stems from the legislature 's 
awareness that it  is much more difficult to calculate future 
profits of a corporation than for a natural person. 
A final difference is responsive both to the relatively high 
potential yield of each corporate return and to the intricacies 
involved in ascertaining the profit and loss of most corpora­
tions . In one recent year for example, just 36,000 corporations 
paid almost one and a third billion guilders, whereas two and 
a half million individual income taxpayers paid only two and a 
half billion guilders, with a like number of wage taxpayers pay­
ing another two billion. In consequence, the majority of cor­
poration tax assessments are preceded by an audit of the 
corporate records . And as to these, the Fiscal Audit Office 
plays a more significant role than it does in the case of the 
individual income tax. In a recent year, out of approximately 
36,000 corporate returns , 30,000 were audited, 13,000 by the 
Fiscal Audit Office, and 17,000 by the Audit Division of the 
inspectorates . 
3 . 2c Details of the assessment and audit procedures re individ­
uals (wage tax) 
Clues, suggesting that an employer has failed either to 
withhold the proper amount of wage tax or to forward an amount 
withheld, typically emerge as members of the inspectorate 
(most often from the Audit Division), carry on their regular 
investigations relating to other taxes (i .e . ,  the turnover tax) or 
to the payment of state old age pension premiums . 
Should an employer fail to withhold tax or fail to forward 
an amount withheld, the inspector can prepare an estimated 
assessment, as to which the taxpayer may enter an administra­
tive appeal. Further, a deficiency assessment can be asserted 
where an employer failed to withhold an adequate amount of 
wage tax even though no novum is present, and in such case 
the tax can be raised by a maximum of 100 percent. 
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Section B. Administrative Appeals 
3 . 3  Introductory note 
The Netherlands tax statute makes no provision for a tax­
payer to argue his case, formally or informally, before an of­
ficial of the tax administration other than the lowest grade 
decision-making official with whom the taxpayer first dealt 
and with whom he disagreed . Since the legislature itself has 
charged the local inspector of taxes with the task of making 
the assessments in his geographical area, in theory no other 
tax official, whether from the district or the national office, 
has any legal power whatever either to make an assessment 
himself or to annul an assessment made by the competent 
authority. 
In fact, however, a review procedure in the nature of an 
administrative appeal does exist, though it is implemented in a 
manner which preserves the ultimate authority of the inspector. 
This procedure permits a taxpayer to secure a review only of 
questions pertaining to his original final assessment; the pro­
cedure is not available with respect to a deficiency assessment 
of any kind-income, corporation, or wage tax. If a taxpayer 
wishes to challenge a deficiency assessment, he must turn to 
the courts . 
3 . 4a Details of the administrative appeal procedure re assess­
ments in income tax (natural persons) 
As noted previously, when an inspector 's notice of final 
assessment differs from the taxpayer 's final return, the in­
spector must include an explanatory note of any changes made.  
The change may actually be quite acceptable, for the taxpayer 
may have agreed to it earlier, during the informal exchange of 
views with the inspector. Illustratively, the taxpayer may have 
acknowledged he was in error or the change may represent an 
agreement to split or to trade all-yes-or-all-no issues . It 
also is possible, however, that the taxpayer, though aware from 
the earlier discussion that the inspector planned to make the 
change, decided either that the assessment was too high or that 
he himself erred earlier in the government's  favor by failing, 
for example, to take a deduction to which he believes he was 
entitled. 
Should the taxpayer decide to protest the assessment, he 
has two months from the date of the notice of assessment to 
file a written but informal petition, bezwaarschrijt, with the 
inspector. And even where a petition is not filed within the 
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two-month period, in limited circumstances a taxpayer who has 
paid the assessment may secure a review by filing a claim for 
refund, a matter discussed more fully in 3 .  7 ,  infra. 
The statute does not require that the taxpayer 's  petition 
set forth the arguments on which his protest rests, though this 
obviously is desirable and usually is done in one degree or 
another .  Further, if the taxpayer desires to be heard by the 
inspector before a decision is reached, a specific request to 
this effect must be included in the petition; otherwise the in­
spector is not bound to communicate with him. 
Where a tax practitioner prepared the taxpayer's original 
final return, that same practitioner usually prepares the peti­
tion and handles the case in the inspector 's office, though the 
taxpayer may accompany him. In any event, any correspond­
ence or oral discussions are carried on quite informally. 
The statute makes no specific provision regarding the en­
tire burden of proof. However, the inspector may request the 
taxpayer to supply "such books and documents as can serve in 
support of the taxpayer' s  contentions ." The statute also pro­
vides that, on failure to comply, the assessment will be upheld 
on the theory that there has been no proof the assessment was 
erroneous . In short, the statute assumes that the taxpayer who 
is asked to produce written documentation has these items in 
his possession, unless the contrary is shown clearly. Thus a 
taxpayer who withholds records or documents, claiming they 
would reveal confidential relationships or professional secrets , 
would bear the burden of proof even though the confidential re­
lationship or professional secret could be established legally. 
The filing of the petition sets in motion a series of dis ­
cussions and investigations which explore every aspect of the 
case, with both sides exposing their evidence,  rationale, and 
arguments . Typically, the process involves much more than a 
mere restatement of arguments presented earlier .  It is entire­
ly possible for the parties at this time to enter into a binding 
agreement to split or trade all-yes-or-all-no issues of law. 
Should this occur, the taxpayer withdraws his petition and the 
inspector notes the adjustments made in the original assess ­
ment. The care taken through this entire process, including 
that associated with the inspector's reconsideration of the ra­
tionale behind the original assessment, has led the government 
to compare the process-juridically a purely administrative 
one-with that of a trial tribunal, though admittedly more in­
formal. While the inspector who initially made the assessment 
continues to represent the government, he is free to consult 
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the head of the inspectorate before making a decision, but is 
not required to do so. 
A period of time, varying from some weeks to many months, 
will elapse from the time a petition is filed to the point the 
inspector will hand down his written decision. Whether he ac­
cepts or rejects, either in whole or in part, the taxpayer 's  
contentions, the rationale of the decision will be set forth, in 
part to assist the taxpayer in deciding whether to carry his 
case to the courts . 
Not all petitions will be followed by a formal decision, 
however .  In cases which raise a question of fact or a so-called 
mixed question of law and fact, rather than a clear-cut inter ­
pretative question of law, the inspector and the taxpayer, after 
exploring all points of view, may reach an informal agreement 
without actually resolving all of the potential legal arguments . 
Under such an agreement, the taxpayer may withdraw his peti­
tion, thus preventing an eventual recourse to the courts . On 
his part the inspector, recognizing that the taxpayer has some 
valid arguments, will have lowered the assessment. In short, 
something resembling a compromise has been reached. 
The reason this procedure is not available in the case of 
deficiency assessments is attributable to the nature of the ex­
ceptional ground on which such an assessment must be based 
and to the consequent initial procedure followed in making this 
type of assessment. Such an assessment is permitted only if 
there is a novum (new fact) . Further, the inspector must con­
tact the taxpayer before making the assessment, and at that 
stage there always is a full exchange of views and arguments . 
In consequence, after that exchange, it would be superfluous to 
file an administrative appeal before the same official. Such a 
taxpayer can turn, however, to the courts . 
About one hundred inspectorates deal with income tax mat­
ters, though the actual number of individual inspecteurs handling 
these administrative appeals is much larger. It has been es­
timated that the number of such appeals approximates 230,000 
annually. 
3 .4b Details of the administrative appeal procedure re corpora­
tion tax assessments 
As earlier noted, a corporate tax assessment which varies 
from the return is preceded by a full discussion between the 
inspector and either the board of the corporation or its tax 
adviser. This exchange of views, which may well lead to a 
settlement of one or more outstanding issues, is comparable 
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to those occurring during an administrative appeal from an in­
dividual income tax assessment .  For this reason, the statute 
permits the corporation, with the written consent of the inspec­
tor, to bypass the administrative appeal procedure and appeal 
directly to the courts . In practice, however, very few corpora­
tions follow this route. Most prefer first to resort to an ad­
ministrative appeal. In a recent year, 3,000 corporations filed 
administrative appeals, the average being 130 for each inspec­
torate dealing with the corporation tax. 
3 . 4c Details of the administrative appeal procedure re assess ­
ments in wage tax (natural persons) 
Theoretically, the employee who is subject to a withhold­
ing tax has as much right to lodge an administrative appeal as 
any other taxpayer . In practice, however, an employee is not 
likely to lodge such an appeal. The wage tax is basically just 
a method of payment, covering the tax due on employee wages, 
with the total income tax to be computed later. Hence the 
wage earner has no reason to use the administrative appeal 
procedure .  Should he succeed in reducing the amount of tax 
withheld, the amount payable later, covering his total income, 
would increase proportionately. 
When an employer fails to withhold tax or to pay over taxes 
withheld, he may receive an assessment or a deficiency assess­
ment. Upon receiving an assessment, he may file a petition 
for an administrative appeal. However, should he receive a 
deficiency assessment, the administrative appeal procedure is 
denied him and he must move directly into the courts . 
Section c .  Extent Administrative Processing of 
Refund Claims Departs from Administrative 
Processing of Assessments 
3 . 5  Introductory note 
Except in the limited circumstance described in 3 .  7, infra, 
the processing of refunds is an integral part of, and not dis­
tinct from, the assessment procedure itself. 
The tax statute, not the assessment, creates the source of 
the Dutch taxpayer 's  liability. Essentially, the assessment is 
a provisional consolidation 13 of the legal obligation created by 
13 In the Netherlands taxability exists as an obligato ex lege as 
soon as the circumstances set out in the tax statute have come into 
existence: i .e. , a natural person has resided within the Netherlands 
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law. Adjustment can be initiated either by the taxpayer 's time­
ly invocation of an administrative appeal (with ultimate recourse 
to the judiciary) or by the inspector 's imposition of a deficien­
cy assessment. Either of these actions, though involving only 
the assessment procedure, might disclose an erroneous assess­
ment which could trigger an automatic refund of taxes previ­
ously paid. 
3 . 6  Details regarding refund procedures prior to an adminis­
trative appeal 
Assume, for example, that the tax withheld from an em­
ployee 's  wages in 1966 exceeded the total liability subsequently 
set forth in his notice of assessment. No special refund pro­
cedure is required to accommodate this . According to the 
Netherlands ' statute ,  the employee's 1966 tax obligation is fixed 
by the final assessment he normally will receive during 1967 
or 1968 . If the taxpayer has overpaid, the notice of final as­
sessment will show a negative amount, i .e . ,  that he is entitled 
to a refund. If he believes this negative amount should be 
larger, a petition timely filed will assure an administrative ap­
peal, subject to the same rules as if he had received an as­
sessment he believed to be too high. 
A comparable situation arises where the taxpayer 's  tenta­
tive return showed a higher net income than his actual income 
proved to be. His final return will be followed by a final as­
sessment setting forth a negative amount. Again the taxpayer 
can file a petition for review if he believes himself entitled to 
a greater refund. 
There is one circumstance, .however, where a taxpayer, 
prior to his receipt of a final assessment, may seek to obtain 
money previously paid in or withheld. Illustratively, a tax­
payer' may have filed a tentative return for 1966, received a 
tentative assessment based thereon, and discovered tater that 
the estimate-and consequently the tentative assessment-was 
too high. An administrative appeal is not available, because 
no final assessment based on a final return has been made . 
Nevertheless, in cases where a delay in refunding would work 
(footnote continued) 
and has enjoyed a certain net income , whatever the amount , during 
the past calendar year . Illustratively , should a taxpayer die on J anu­
ary 2 of a certain year , his estate would be legally burdened with a 
debt arising from the tax on his income of the previous year. It is 
immaterial that neither a final assessment or final return has been 
made for that year . 
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a hardship on the taxpayer, administrative regulations issued 
by the Under Secretary of Finance authorize the inspector to 
handle such claims for refund as if they were administrative 
appeals . Accordingly, the inspector typically refunds an amount 
he considers reasonable . However, a refusal by the inspector 
cannot be carried to the courts . At most, if the inspector has 
acted unreasonably, the taxpayer might request the Under Sec­
retary of State to exert his hierarchic power to change the in­
spector 's mind. 
3 . 7  Details of the administrative appeal procedure re refund 
claims 
Normally, whether a final income tax assessment shows a 
negative amount (a right to some refund being recognized) or 
a positive sum, the taxpayer can contest the matter further at 
the administrative level only if, within a period of two months 
beginning with the date of the final assessment notice, he files 
a petition for review. 
Not infrequently, however, a taxpayer discovers more than 
two months after the date of this notice that he did not deduct 
an item he believes to be deductible . In some such cases, spe­
cial procedures are available to accommodate a refund. But 
these procedures are less clearly defined than are those which 
apply when the taxpayer has petitioned for review within the 
allotted two-month period. This is because the statute itself 
authorizes review only in the latter circumstances. The course 
of action to be followed by our taxpayer depends upon whether 
his failure to claim his deduction was due to his own negli­
gence or was caused by circumstances beyond his control. 
Where the taxpayer failed to claim a refund because of 
negligence or trivial inconveniences, he has no right to relief. 
Nevertheless, he may request the inspector to grant a refund 
and the latter may do so without consulting his superiors, pro­
vided less than five years have elapsed since the taxable year 
in question. If more than five years have elapsed, the national 
office ,  depending on the circumstances, might grant relief. It 
is possible, of course, that an inspector might deny a request 
in a situation where the equities were indubitably in the tax­
payer's favor. The taxpayer would have but one recourse, i .e . ,  
request the Under Secretary of Finance to exert his hierarchic 
influence to the taxpayer's  benefit. 
Where, during the allotted two-month period following an as ­
sessment, a taxpayer failed, because of serious illness or other 
circumstances beyond his control, to invoke an administrative 
NETHERLANDS: 
472 ASSESSMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE A PPEALS 
review of a claimed refund, he may seek a waiver of the two­
month rule by filing a written request with the President of  
the Chamber of Taxation at the Court of Appeal. This official 
may extend the two-month period otherwise prescribed by stat­
ute upon finding that the special circumstances did in fact pre ­
vent the timely filing of the petition. 
CHAPTER XXIV 
RESOLUTION OF INTERPRETATIVE INCOME TAX 
QUESTIONS BY INDEPENDENT TRIBUNALS 
4 .1  Introduction 
Recourse to the Netherlands tax tribunals, whether to the 
trial or appellate level, is inexpensive, and the procedures are 
as informal as possible . Under a 1956 statute, there is a sin­
gle level of trial tribunals and one appellate tribunal.1 
· 
Under the 1956 statute, original jurisdiction over tax cases 
at the trial level was given to special taxation chambers in 
the regular appellate tribunals, the Gerechtshoven, not to the 
ordinary trial tribunals .2 The tax chambers so created-which 
replaced the Raden van Beroep staffed by nonprofessional 
1 For years prior thereto , the need for reform had been acknowl­
edged but there was considerable disagreement as to the shape it 
should take. Two proposals attracted particular attention. One advo­
cated the institution of specialized courts for tax cases , with judges 
drawn from tax specialists (former tax practitioners of the academic 
level, former tax inspectors of the same level , lawyers with a high 
degree of competence in tax problems) . The other advocated the use 
of ordinary courts of justice to handle all tax cases . 
2 The use of special chambers within the regular appellate tribu­
nals was dictated by the government' s belief that tax cases should not 
be given to a specialized tribunal . It argued that many tax cases not 
only raised problems analogous to those arising in other areas of law 
but also involved contract and property issues . At the same time, the 
use of special chambers within a general court permitted the utiliza­
tion of men with tax expertise. Jurisdiction was given to the general 
appellate rather than to the general trial tribunals for these three 
reasons. First , the government argued that the administrative appeal 
bore a strong resemblance to an action before a trial tribunal . Sec­
ond, by the creation of special tax chambers in the five courts of ap­
peal , Gerechtshoven, jurisdiction over tax cases would be confined to 
a limited number of tribunals ,  thereby facilitating specialization by the 
judges in tax matters and contributing to greater uniformity in deci­
sions. Third, the fact that the judges of these taxation chambers 
would rank equally with judges of the appellate tribunals would more 
nearly insure first-rate applicants for the new positions . 
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jurist3 -are termed Belastingkamers, Chambers for Processing 
Taxation cases . 4 
Decisions of the Belastingkamers may be reversed by the 
Supreme Court, on appeal by either the taxpayer or the inspec ­
tor .  However, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited 
to questions of law. 
Section A. Organization and Procedures:  
Trial Le vel 
4.2 Organization of the trial tribunals 
The five Courts of Appeal are located at Amsterdam, The 
Hague, and three provincial capitals . The Courts of Appeal 
located at The Hague and Amsterdam have two Taxation Cham­
bers , the other three, one apiece. 5 
Each chamber consists of three counselors, Raadsheren, 
and a clerk, griffier, who is a jurist. The counselors are ap­
pointed by the Queen and hold their positions until they reach 
age seventy. One has the rank of Vice President of the Court 
and acts as President of the Chamber . 
a The Raden van Beroep, established in the nineteenth century , 
were given a new legal status in 1914. This establishment terminated 
the use of general jurisdiction for tax cases which had been the prac­
tice since the Napoleonic period. There were 20 of these Raden van 
Beroep . The statute required that their decisions be written and in­
clude rationale .  Appeal lay to the Supreme Court , Hoge Raad, but 
only in case of "either violation or misapplication of the statute" or 
"lack of motivation." The use of part-time nonprofessional jurists as 
judges brought mounting criticism to the Raden van Beroep. Since the 
judges were nominated to the post of honor from local and other jur­
ists , or from economists , members of the Chamber of Commerce, 
municipal officials , lawyer s ,  etc . ,  there was no assurance they pos­
sessed any real expertise in tax matters-a matter of increasing con­
cern as the tax statutes multiplied in number and complexity . More­
over , dockets became increasingly clogged because of the limited 
number of cases which could be heard by spare-time jurists . 
4 Despite the fact that the institution of the Belastingkamers, with 
the shift from nonprofessional nonspecialist jurists , crf:ated a sharp 
break with the past, the procedures employed actually changed very 
little. In large measure,  this is because the Supreme Court , since 
the creation of the Raden van Beroep, has borne the responsibility , 
through countless decisions , of developing procedural rules as well as 
interpreting the substantive provisions . 
5 The greater population concentration in the western part of the 
country accounts for the additional Taxation Chamber at Amsterdam 
and The Hague . 
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The intentions of the 1956 statute indicated, first, that the 
new tribunals were not to be isolated from the main stream of 
the Courts of Appeal but, second, that the three counselors were 
to be appointed from tax experts . Accordingly, every effort 
was made to appoint to each chamber (1 )  one applicant with 
previous judicial service, usually in a trial tribunal, (2) one 
applicant familiar with interpretative problems because of work 
as a lawyer or as a secretary to a former Raad van Beroep, 
and (3) one applicant with previous service as a chief inspec­
tor or director in the Internal Revenue Service.  Thus coun­
selors of the Taxation Chambers fall into two categories : tax 
experts who previously superimposed tax expertise on a general 
legal background, and judges with relatively little tax expertise 
upon appointment but who acquire this over their years of 
service.  
Further to insure their expertise and to stabilize these 
Chambers, counselors appointed thereto are not entitled, con­
trary to  the practice followed as to  others, to  have requests 
for a transfer to a non-tax chamber 6 honored automatically. 
An initial dearth of qualified applicants, however, resulted 
in one temporary modification in the 19 56 statute ,  to permit 
appointment until 19677 of suitable individuals without academic 
qualification. Specifically, instead of the required completion 
of law studies at a Dutch university-this being the customary 
requirement for judicial nomination-appointees need only have 
passed their examinations at the State Academy of Taxes or 
equivalent earlier examinations . 
Many tax cases do not actually involve a legal problem.  
In consequence, the 19 56 statute empowered the President of a 
Taxation Chamber to decide whether a case would be heard by 
the full chamber of three members or before a unus iudex ­
a single counselor assisted by the clerk. While there is some 
variation in the practices of the individual courts, the Presi­
dents have assigned a majority of the cases to unus iudex. 
Only in rare instances has a party to the proceeding request­
ed to be heard by a full chamber, and typically those requests 
are honored. Indeed, that the competence of the Taxation 
Chamber judges has attracted far more confidence than did the 
6 The practice among the Courts of Appeal , located at the three 
provincial capitals varies . Some use regularly, though on a limited 
basis , some only intermittently , counselors of the Taxation Chambers 
in sessions of their civil and/or penal chambers.  
7 This cut-off date was extended in 1967 for five year s ,  and prob­
ably will be extended for another five-year period. 
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nonprofessionals who sat on the earlier Raden van Beroep is 
strikingly illustrated by the sharp rise in the number of cases 
heard by a unus iudex, 8 and seems justified since also there 
has been a sharp decline in Supreme Court reversals of trial 
decisions . 9 
Each Court of Appeal decides whether its Taxation Cham­
ber, whether at full strength or in unus -structure,  will go on 
circuit or hold sessions only in the city where the court is 
located. 
4.3  Processing cases through the trial tribunals 
Taxation Chambers have jurisdiction of all tax controver ­
sies except those involving turnover taxes, import and excise 
duties, registration fees and stamp duties . It is immaterial 
whether the taxpayer has or has not paid the tax. 
An appeal to a Taxation Chamber is an inexpensive and a 
simple process. There are no court costs, witness fees are 
paid by the court, and the taxpayer need not be represented by 
counsel. The taxpayer must lodge his appeal within two months 
following receipt of either the inspector's decision on an ad­
ministrative appeal or a deficiency assessment, or receipt of 
a corporation tax assessment. However, should the taxpayer 
fail to  file the petition within the allotted time, and if he  can 
show such failure resulted from a force majeure ,  he may re­
quest permission from the Taxation Chamber President to file 
later .  
The petition of appeal, beroepschrijt, prepared either by 
the taxpayer or his representative, 10 should indicate both the 
particular relief requested and the rationale upon which he re­
lies, attaching thereto any supporting documents . Taxpayers 
are permitted, however, to file abbreviated petitions within the 
statutory period, with the rationale being submitted at a later 
date . Normally, upon failure to submit a rationale, the cham­
ber itself will request that such be forwarded in writing. Even 
so, it is not unusual for the President of the chamber, during 
the oral hearing, to permit the taxpayer to supply it orally. 
Copies of the petition and of any supporting records are 
sent by the court to the inspector concerned. The inspector 
8 A unus iudex heard about 28% of the cases when the Raden van 
Beroep were the trial tribunals .  Now a unus iudex hears about 58%. 
9 The Supreme Court reversed about 40% of the Raden van Beroep's 
decisions appealed to it. Presently , reversals occur in only about 17% 
of the appeals from the Taxation Chambers .  
1 0  The representative may b e  a tax practitioner , an accountant , or 
a lawyer . 
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has one month-which the court may extend-within which to 
file his written note of answer, vertoogschrijt, indicating both 
his underlying rationale and his objections to the taxpayer 's 
conclusions or rationale . If, as usually is the case, there was 
an administrative appeal prior to this point, the inspector's 
written answer usually is based on the opinion set out in his 
earlier administrative decision. He is free, however, to add 
new arguments , new facts, and submit additional supplementary 
records. Also, he may alter his original opinion, reflecting a 
conclusion that the taxpayer originally was right in part, or 
even as to the whole, with new rationale being offered to justi­
fy the amount of taxable income as re-determined. Illustra­
tively, the inspector may acknowledge that he himself erred in 
his treatment of one particular item in reaching his original 
decision. However, as will be noted later, the inspector may 
not wait until the oral hearing to introduce such a statement. 
It is implicit in the foregoing that the inspector who re­
ceives the taxpayer 's petition, prepares the note of answer, and 
represents the administration at the hearing, is the same in­
spector who made the original assessment and heard the tax­
payer's  administrative appeal. There is, however, one excep­
tion. An administrative regulation requires that, in a hearing 
before the Court of Appeal, an inspectorate must be represent­
ed by an inspector of academic level. If the official who ear­
lier handled the taxpayer 's  assessment and/ or administrative 
appeal did not hold this rank, he will be superseded by a prop­
erly qualified inspector. 
The legislature attached great importance to the oral hear­
ing. It anticipated that, in a typical case, submission of the 
taxpayer 's petition and of the inspector 's note of answer would 
complete the written phase of the trial. Upon request, however, 
the President of the Taxation Chamber, may permit a second 
round of memoranda to be filed by the parties .  And this usual­
ly occurs in the more intricate cases.ll 
The interchange of memoranda sometimes leads the parties 
to renew their contact, orally or in writing. Each may have 
developed a greater appreciation of the other's position. Each 
may be inclined to believe certain aspects of the case make 
informal agreement preferable to court adjudication. Whatever 
the reasons, informal discussions, of which the court officially 
is unaware, may take place leading to a settlement. When such 
11 There is , however , no direct exchange of documents between the 
parties ; the court acts as intermediary . 
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discussions are taking place, the court may receive notice 
from the parties, requesting an adjournment of the oral hear­
ing until they have had an opportunity for further consultation. 
In these discussions, the inspector is free to exercise his own 
judgment regarding a settlement, though he may decide to con­
sult the head of his inspectorate. If the informal discussions 
are successful, the court will receive a letter from the tax­
payer, reflecting his wish to withdraw his petition. 
Over a fairly recent three-year period, almost 70 percent 
of the taxpayer 's petitions were withdrawn, though this figure 
is somewhat deceiving in present context, for it also includes 
what relatively is a much smaller number of cases withdrawn 
by taxpayers after the oral hearing. 
Where a case is not resolved informally, the court fixes 
a day for the oral hearing, and notifies the parties by a sim­
ple registered letter .  The taxpayer may be represented by 
counsel, although the court may require the taxpayer himself 
to be present. In any event, the taxpayer also is free to bring 
such experts-e.g. ,  accountants-as he may wish. Before the 
court actually hands down its decree, it may request further 
written information from the parties themselves or from others .  
Such information must be turned over to the other party and 
should either party request another oral hearing, it must be 
provided within a reasonable time . 
While the statute itself provides for an oral hearing, it 
does not otherwise set forth formal rules governing a Taxation 
Chamber's procedures . The draftsmen of the 1956 act con­
cluded that the numerous Supreme Court decisions fixing pro­
cedural rules under the 19 14 statute would remain applicable. 
In consequence, the decisions, arresten, of the Supreme Court 
are of enormous significance in dealing with matters such as 
the burden of proof, rules of evidence, rules of court, , etc . Only 
the more important of these can be summarized here .  
The court may not go beyond issues laid before it by  the 
parties . Illustratively, if a point in controversy is whether a 
particular amount of depreciation is allowable as to a particu­
lar item, the court may not decide another issue on which the 
parties are agreed, for example, whether a certain expense is 
deductible or nondeductible. In other words, the court may not 
re-examine uncontested questions associated with the taxpayer 's  
assessment. 
By like token, even as to a contested item, the court may 
not make a finding which increases the taxpayer 's income be­
yond that determined by the previous administrative appeal or, 
in other circumstances, by the assessment. 
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There are no formal rules establishing the burden of proof. 
The court has full freedom to select and reject evidence as 
well as to determine the relative weight of the evidence offered. 
In practice, inter alia, this means the court need not accept 
the offer of a party to submit additional evidence in the form 
of documents or yield to a demand by one of the parties to use 
experts or hear witnesses. It also may decide whether evi­
dence introduced by a given party is adequate, in keeping with 
the Supreme Court 's general policy that a person must prove 
as much as may be expected reasonably from him under the 
circumstances of the case.  For example, if normal experience 
in a given situation justifies the inspector 's assumption as to 
a matter, the taxpayer will be expected to submit evidence if 
he makes a contention to the contrary. Not infrequently, a de­
cision will include this type of comment " . . .  that in [i. e . ,  the 
particular circumstances] a reasonable distribution of the bur­
dens of proofs requires that the taxpayer [or the inspector] 
should have proved that. . . .  "
As a corollary to the court 's control over the acceptance 
or rejection of evidence, it has the same degree of control over 
the objection by a party to the introduction of evidence. Occa­
sionally in the course of the oral hearing, a party may present 
an argument bottomed on facts not heretofore brought out in 
the exchange of documents preceding the hearing. Typically, 
the other party objects, on the ground the evidence comes as 
a surprise, and that he has not had adequate opportunity to de­
fend against it. The court has power to reject or accept the 
objection. Should the objection be rejected, and the party al­
lowed to place the evidence before the court, the case usually 
is adjourned to give the objecting party full opportunity to plan 
his defense to the newly presented material and the arguments 
based thereon. 
If the hearing is before the full bank of the Taxation Cham­
ber, the taxpayer usually is represented by a top-level tax 
practitioner and rarely is unrepresented. Exactly the reverse 
situation prevails where a unus iudex hears a case.  This poses 
a problem for the unus iudex, for lack of representation tends 
to create uncertainty as to the reliability and accuracy of the 
information presented. 
Only the parties and the taxpayer 's  representatives appear 
before the chamber members and the clerk. The public is ex­
cluded, to the end of preserving secrecy regarding the taxpay­
er's financial affairs . 
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The president of the Taxation Chamber opens the hearing 
by requesting the taxpayer or his representative to state his 
case .  This statement may be limited to a bare reference to 
the petition of appeal itself, or it may involve a detailed and 
complicated analysis . The inspector then makes his statement, 
responding to that of the taxpayer . This interchange may be 
followed by further discussion between the parties . The mem­
bers of  the Chamber also assume an important and positive 
role ; they are free to raise questions, require further informa­
tion as to certain aspects of the case, and may even take the 
initiative in establishing the facts . The whole process is in­
tended to be informal, with both parties and the court partici­
pating fully, to the end of clarifying the points in dispute. 
The president at his discretion closes the oral hearing. 
Typically, this occurs when the court believes it has sufficient 
information regarding the details to permit it to begin its own 
deliberations . Sometimes, however, by the close of a hearing 
the court does not have sufficient information and may request 
that it be supplied. Finally, a practice has developed which 
permits the judges to suggest an adjournment whenever they 
conclude the parties might benefit by resuming discussions be­
tween themselves . 12  A judge may believe that the parties 
themselves may be getting a feeling that the truth lies some­
where between the two extremes . In such circumstances, the 
president-speaking informally-may inquire if the parties have 
any interest in further private discussions . If the parties in­
dicate such an interest, the president adjourns the case and 
asks that the Taxation Chamber be informed of further develop­
ments . Sometimes an agreement is reached and, if so, the 
Taxation Chamber is notified that the case is withdrawn. Some­
times, while full agreement is not reached, the parties do agree 
upon certain facts . The Taxation Chamber is infor!fied of this 
limited agreement and told that the parties desire a decision 
only on the remaining issues of fact and the issues of law. 
The complexity of a case will determine whether the actual 
decision is handed down several weeks or several months after 
the hearing is officially closed. The statute requires that the 
decision be written and contain an explanation for the conclu­
sions reached. In practice, the judgment states the findings of 
fact, explains the legal conclusions drawn from these facts, and 
12 Though not based on a statute , this practice is considered as 
being with the ratio legis because of the prudence and restraint with 
which it is used. 
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concludes by indicating whether it reverses or sustains, in 
whole or in part, the administrative appeal decision. 
Not all decisions of Taxation Chambers are appealed to 
the Supreme Court. However, even unappealed decisions can 
have some effect on similar cases coming before both the de­
ciding chamber and other chambers .  The precise amount of 
effect, however, depends upon the strength of the underlying 
rationale of the decision as reflected in the explanation set 
forth in the opinion. Of course, some decisions have little 
precedent value if only because of the peculiar factual circum­
stances involved in the case .  
Private tax publications print those decisions of the Taxa­
tion Chambers which develop principles of major interpretative 
significance and are likely, therefore, to have some future in­
fluence.  Where such a decision favored the taxpayer, there 
usually is a footnote explaining why the Under Secretary of 
Finance did not appeal to the Supreme Court. However, all 
concerned realize that a decision by the Under Secretary not 
to appeal does not mean that he is prepared to adhere auto­
matically to the principle of the case.  About 15 percent of all 
Taxation Chambers decisions are published, with the remaining 
8 5  percent falling into three categories:  ( 1) those involving 
primarily questions of fact, (2) those which dismissed the peti­
tion because of formal defects, and (3) those raising such fun­
damental issues that appeal to the Supreme Court is anticipated­
with ultimate publication of the Supreme Court 's decision. 
But even the published 1 5  percent is a fairly large abso­
lute number. For example, over a fairly recent three-year 
period, Schedule I in the Appendix to this PART indicates that 
the Taxation Chambers of the five Courts of Appeal decided in 
those respective years 2065, 1852 ,  and 1897 cases.  However, 
in addition to income, corporation, and wage tax cases, these 
figures include cases involving inheritance duties, capital tax, 
real estate tax, etc . Approximately 70 percent of the total fall 
in the income, corporation, and wage tax areas, with 80 percent 
of the 70 percent being true income tax cases. 
Section B.  Organization and Procedures:  
Appellate Tribunals 
4.4 Organization of the appellate court system 
There is only one appellate tribunal, for tax as well as 
other cases-the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad 
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der Nederlanden), which sits at The Hague . Each of the Court 's 
three Chambers has five Counselors, highly qualified doctors 
of law appointed by the Queen, with tenure until age seventy. 
The 19 56 statute did not alter the Supreme Court's tax 
jurisdiction; one of its three chambers has continued, as its 
prime responsibility, to handle tax appeals . As is true of other 
civil and penal cases, however, appeals are confined to errors 
of law. However, as is not true of other civil and penal cases, 
appeals in tax cases may be based on a lack of motivation­
that is, the decision handed down by the court could not be 
justified by the facts as found by the court. 
In the case of the government, in theory it is the Under 
Secretary of Finance who decides whether an adverse lower 
court decision will be appealed. As a practical matter, how­
ever, the choice is made by the Director-General of Taxes at 
the national office, or by a senior member of his staff . 
4. 5 Processing a case through the appellate tribunal 
Procedures associated with tax appeals to the Supreme 
Court are even simpler than those pertaining to a trial tribunal. 
Within one month after the lower court decision, the appellant 
files with the Supreme Court's record office a petition of ap­
peal, beroepschrift in cassatie, simultaneously paying a small 
filing fee-f. 10. 
This petition is usually, though not necessarily, prepared 
by a well qualified tax practitioner. In those cases, the peti­
tion itself, after identifying the legal issue, goes on to analyze 
the legal argument on which the taxpayer relies. A much more 
succinct, even defective, petition is legally sufficient, however, 
in accordance with the Supreme Court 's belief that the process ­
ing o f  tax cases must not be impeded by formal requirements . 13 
A copy of the petition of appealis forwarded to the appel­
lee who, in turn, files a written answer, vertoogsch:rijt. This 
exchange of documents is usually all that the parties do, al­
though each has a right to request an oral argument, a right 
l3 Jllustratively , a peasant , on receipt of an adverse decision by a 
Raad van Beroep, sent a copy of the decision to the Supreme Court . 
He wrote on the copy "My shield and trust art thou, 0 Supreme Court ," 
a variation on a line in the Netherlands national anthem , the "Wil­
helmus ," which reads "My shield and trust art thou, 0 God, my Lord," 
The Supreme Court accepted this appeal-couched in words both effec­
tively eloquent and extremely vague-as one which fulfilled the statu­
tory requirements . Obviously , this was an exceptional set of circum­
stances . 
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rarely exercised by the Under Secretary of Finance .  In a 
small minority of cases, taxpayers do request an oral argu­
ment, though it must be conducted by a lawyer whereas the 
petition itself may be prepared by the taxpayer .  
In the majority of cases, some months elapse before the 
Supreme Court hands down its written decision. The decision 
includes a statement of the facts as found by the Taxation 
Chamber of the Court of Appeal, a summary of that lower 
court's rationale, a summary of the petition of appeal, and 
finally the Supreme Court 's own conclusion. While the Court 
is responsive to the petition, it also is free to go beyond it, 
basing its decision solely on errors of law not raised by the 
appellant. 
The great majority of Supreme Court decisions constitute 
precedents in fact, if not in law. This is particularly true 
where the Court itself elaborates on the meaning of a provi­
sion in the tax statute, as distinct from instances where heavy 
reliance is placed on the underlying rationale of the lower 
court. Today, many petitions and pleas in tax cases discuss 
and cite as authority Supreme Court decisions in analogous 
cases. 
While a majority of Supreme Court decisions are truly 
significant, some are not . Illustratively, the appellant may 
have alleged a violation of the law because the court below did 
not supply a sufficient basis for its decision, that is, the facts 
established in the course of the trial could not possibly justify 
its decision. Under such circumstances the Supreme Court is 
likely to use language such as the following " . . .  that the 
court, on the basis, of the facts as established, properly could 
render the decision reached," or " . . .  that in the given situa­
tion the court did not act contrary to that which is reasonable 
when it imposed on the taxpayer [or, alternatively, the inspec­
tor] the burden of proof concerning . . . .  " 14 
More than 50 percent of all Supreme Court decisions are 
published, with publication being handled by private editors . 
The text of the decision often is accompanied by comments 
from tax specialists. Schedule II in the Appendix to this PART 
14And ,  of course, an important precedent is unlikely to emerge 
from a case in which the Supreme Court , without deciding the matter , 
remands it to the Taxation Chamber with a directive to re-open the 
case to make additional findings of fact , and hand down another deci­
sion "taking into consideration" the Supreme Court' s generally stated 
views . 
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indicates that, over a recent two-year period, the Court de­
cided 486 tax cases, of which about 70 percent were income, 
corporation, and wage tax cases, with the great bulk involving 
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